Steinecke Maciura LeBlanc

A BC Court upheld the sanction imposed by a voluntary association against a clinical counsellor (who was a member of the association) for developing an intimate and sexual relationship with a client within days of ending their professional relationship. The sanction included a six-month suspension, supervision for a year, and restrictions on the member’s ability to supervise others. The member raised several procedural issues including that voluntary association took an adversarial role in the process (i.e., did not assist her). The member also argued that the sanction was excessive. The Court said: In my view, the evidence summarized above indicates no act or omission by the Association remotely approaching oppression, unfair prejudice, or procedural unfairness. To the contrary, the Association showed remarkable patience and fairness to Ms. Johnson throughout, particularly given the adversarial and intransigent positions it repeatedly faced. See: Johnson v BC Association of Clinical Counsellors, 2025 BCSC 559 (CanLII), https://lnkd.in/gBjHzDgV. @CanLII #professionalregulation

The Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB), which inspects accounting firms that audit public companies, will start publishing its inspection reports in early 2026. The CPAB states that this is the final step in its “multi-year project to enhance the information that we disclose”. https://lnkd.in/gSacYx-Q #professionalregulation

Scope of a complaint: The Ontario Judicial Council (OJC) has provided some guidance on interpreting the scope of a complaint when disciplinary allegations are subsequently made. Regional Senior Justice Paul Currie was charged criminally with assault. As a result, a formal complaint was made to the OJC. Despite the criminal charges being withdrawn, an investigation was conducted and specified allegations were referred to a hearing before the OJC. The specified allegations included an allegation of sexual misconduct, something that the letter of complaint did not mention. RSJ Currie sought to confine the hearing to the specific concerns raised in the letter of complaint. In an interim ruling, the hearing panel declined to so limit the scope of the hearing. The panel concluded that the inclusion of the sexual misconduct concerns was appropriate because they were “similar or related to the allegations in the complaint letter” and “directly relate to the allegations in the letter of complaint”. Protection of a witness alleging sexual misconduct: The OJC panel also banned publication of information that would identify the primary witness (who was not the formal complainant). Further the panel ruled as follows: “We direct that, to the extent that counsel for RSJ Currie proposes to cross-examine the primary witness on other sexual activity or proposes to introduce records in relation to which the primary witness has a reasonable expectation of privacy, counsel must give reasonable notice of the particulars of such proposed evidence in writing to presenting counsel and counsel for the primary witness. This notice is required so that any concerns about admissibility may be addressed by the panel in advance of such evidence being called or tendered at the hearing. Any ruling we make may be revisited if circumstances change in the course of the primary witness’s testimony.” See: Re RSJ Currie, 2025 OJC 1 https://lnkd.in/gM4gydFn #professionalregulation

"Particulars for Interim Orders" by Julie Maciura is the latest Regulation Pro blog entry: https://lnkd.in/gyCnAMwJ #professionalregulation Procedural fairness and expediency are often competing concepts when it comes to whether an interim order should be imposed to protect the public while a disciplinary investigation and hearing are pending. An Alberta Court balanced these concepts in Basaraba v College of Chiropractors, 2025 ABKB 176 (CanLII). The chiropractic regulator received information that a chiropractor had inappropriately touched patients without informed consent and, in fact, faced criminal charges for sexual assault relating to one of them. An interim order was issued requiring supervision by another regulated health professional. The regulator received additional information that the chiropractor may not have fully complied with the supervision order and that more sexual assault charges had been filed. The regulator gave notice that it was seeking an interim suspension but declined to provide the chiropractor with any particulars about the alleged non-compliance so as not to compromise the pending investigation. An interim suspension was issued relying heavily on the non-compliance concern. The Court set aside the interim suspension for lack of procedural fairness: “the allegation that he breached the supervision condition was devoid of every detail that would have allowed him to prepare an intelligent response.” The Court accepted that in order to protect the public interim orders must be imposed expeditiously: … I do not find or suggest that he was entitled to the level particularity or disclosure that would be required in advance of a final disciplinary hearing. Rather, I find that the Applicant was entitled to that basic level of particularity that would have enabled him to prepare a meaningful and intelligent response to the allegations…. I have also taken into account the legitimate, and indeed, paramount concerns of the Complaints Director and the Committee respecting the protection of the public. Those concerns were acute given the criminal charges that had been laid against the Applicant. Had I been convinced by the Respondent that the Complaints Director’s vagueness was necessary to protect the public, then my conclusion might well have been different. But since it is readily apparent that sufficient particularity could have been achieved by the introduction of a few additional words or sentences, I have not been so convinced. [see link for the entire blog]

A US review on private equity (PE) ownership of health practices concludes: “Trends in PE ownership rapidly increased across almost all healthcare settings studied. Such ownership is often associated with harmful impacts on costs to patients or payers and mixed to harmful impacts on quality. Owing to risk of bias and frequent geographic focus on the US, conclusions might not be generalizable internationally.” See: https://lnkd.in/gsr-APhP #professionalregulation

Marco Laverdière’s opinion piece suggests that the regulatory limitations on the private ownership of health practices are easy to circumvent and while, perhaps, having some benefits (e.g., technological innovation) creates price, accessibility, and quality of care concerns for patients: See: https://lnkd.in/gaUM6eJp #professionalregulation

Article describes concerns raised in Quebec on how corporate ownership of dental, veterinary, and other practices may create pressure to raise prices, reduce geographic accessibility, and undermine standards (e.g., facilitating excessive treatments). See: https://lnkd.in/gKPSRniV #professionalregulation

Prior Complaints and Prior Findings by Natasha Danson is the latest Regulation Pro blog entry: https://lnkd.in/grC6JkuB #professionalregulation When a discipline panel applies criminal sentencing principles at the penalty stage of a hearing, it is considered an aggravating factor to have previously been found to have engaged in criminal behaviour. In those circumstances, a more severe penalty can be imposed. For this principle to apply fully there must have been a formal finding made before the most recent conduct. There is some evolution of these principles in the criminal law sphere, but that is the “classic” approach to the issue. However, a key difference between “classic” criminal sentencing principles and professional disciplinary sanctions is illustrated where a discipline panel considers the previous complaints history of the registrant. A screening committee’s disposition of a complaint with a warning or remedial action (e.g., educational measures) is not a formal finding. It also does not always occur before the most recent conduct before the discipline committee. However, the discipline panel can still consider the prior complaint disposition in a discipline hearing when crafting a sanction that effectively protects the public. In Dhaliwal v. College of Veterinarians of Ontario, 2025 CanLII 22518 (ON SCDC), a veterinarian had been found to have engaged in professional misconduct in three separate proceedings. There was one appeal encompassing all three matters. The allegations related to informed consent, surgical issues and, in two cases, record keeping. When imposing sanction, the hearing panel considered the veterinarian’s complaints history, including prior warnings to ensure that he had obtained fully informed consent from clients and to improve his record keeping. The Court found that there was no error in the Discipline Committee considering the extensive complaints history and multiple warnings issued to the veterinarian: “It did not treat these as aggravating factors but simply as confirmation of the need to impose TCLs [terms, conditions, and limitations].” The Court accepted that the veterinarian had ignored and failed to heed prior advice and warnings such that specific restrictions were required to “increase the prospect of successful remediation”. Other points made in the decision include: [see link for the entire blog

Collaboration Is Not Conspiracy by Anastasia-Maria Hountalas is the latest Regulation Pro blog entry: https://lnkd.in/gc2FZQrW #professionalregulation In order to better protect the public, regulators of professions often collaborate with other regulators or government officials that have overlapping mandates. Most commonly, this collaboration is with the police: British Columbia College of Nurses and Midwives v Lemay, 2025 BCSC 256 (CanLII). But not always. A recent court decision found that such collaboration is not presumptively improper: Moore v. Glick et al., 2025 ONSC 1725 (CanLII). There, a plaintiff was suing representatives of the regulator who had obtained a court order shutting down his illegally-operated retirement home. The plaintiff was also suing a government official responsible for providing home care services who had assisted the regulator. Among the many claims made, was that the representatives of the regulator and the government official had conspired for an improper purpose to shut the plaintiff down. In particular, the plaintiff alleged that the government official, Nieson, “became upset because the plaintiff questioned the quality of work done by Personal Support Workers (“PSWs”) and spoke to his Member of Parliament about payment models for PSWs.” The plaintiff alleged that Nieson approached the regulator and conspired with its representatives to misuse the regulator’s authority in order to harm his business. This conspiracy allegedly included “duping” the plaintiff into accepting a quadriplegic resident who required certain care services that could only be provided at a licensed retirement home. The plaintiff alleged that the regulator was aware of the plan to move the resident into the home and intentionally stayed silent in order to obtain evidence against the plaintiff for operating an unlicensed retirement home. The conspiracy also allegedly included providing misleading information or deceptive evidence in the court application. The Court held that the specific facts of the alleged bad faith on the part of Nieson and the representatives of the regulator needed to be pleaded in the applicant’s material for court. Bad faith could not be assumed simply because Nieson and the regulator’s staff worked together in the regulator’s enforcement proceeding. The bald assertions above were inadequate to constitute particulars of bad faith and the Court dismissed this claim. Several other defences were relied upon by the Court in dismissing the other claims, including: [see link for the entire blog]

Regulators are increasingly using administrative monetary penalties (AMP) as a tool to encourage compliance with professional obligations. Typically, AMP’s are imposed for objective breaches of published expectations, such as record keeping requirements, where little judgment is necessary to determine if there was non-compliance. The AMP is usually not for a large amount. The breach is generally determined by regulatory staff (not a discipline committee) without a hearing. The registrant then has the option of an appeal / hearing / review if they believe there was no breach or that the amount imposed was unreasonable. The legal regulator for British Columbia imposed a $5,000 AMP on a lawyer for failing to properly verify the identity of a client for whom the lawyer had received trust funds. The Court set aside the AMP because the regulator had not provided a clear opportunity for the lawyer to respond to the concern before imposing the AMP. The Court also found that the regulator had misinterpreted its own rules. For failing to acknowledge its own mistake, the regulator was required to pay the lawyer $5,000 in costs. See: Samarakoone v The Law Society of British Columbia, 2025 BCSC 492 (CanLII), https://lnkd.in/e4sHhMZg. CanLII #professionalregulation