Synthese, Volume 196

Volume 196, Number 1, January 2019

Special Issue on Real Possibilities, Indeterminism and Free Will

• 
  Thomas Müller, Antje Rumberg, Verena Wagner:
  An introduction to real possibilities, indeterminism, and free will: three contingencies of the debate. 1-10
• 
  Tomasz Placek:
  Laplace's demon tries on Aristotle's cloak: on two approaches to determinism. 11-30
• 
  Jan M. Broersen:
  Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity. 31-68
• 
  Peter Øhrstrøm:
  A critical discussion of Prior's philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom. 69-85
• 
  Ishtiyaque Haji:
  A paradox concerning Frankfurt examples. 87-103
• 
  Erasmus Mayr:
  Alternative possibilities and asymmetry. 105-125
• 
  Laura Waddell Ekstrom:
  Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will. 127-144
• 
  Robert Kane:
  The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams. 145-160
• 
  Niels van Miltenburg, Dawa Ometto:
  The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory. 161-178
• 
  Ruth Groff:
  Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination. 179-200
• 
  Barbara Vetter:
  Are abilities dispositions? 201-220

Regular Articles

• 
  Martin L. Jönsson, Tomoji Shogenji:
  A unified account of the conjunction fallacy by coherence. 221-237
• 
  Ari Maunu:
  The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals requires no restrictions. 239-246
• 
  Manuel Barrantes:
  Optimal representations and the Enhanced Indispensability Argument. 247-263
• 
  Daniele Mundici:
  De Finetti coherence and the product law for independent events. 265-271
• 
  Mathieu Vidal, Denis Perrin:
  A default-free solution to the imperfective paradox. 273-297
• 
  Shan Gao:
  The measurement problem revisited. 299-311
• 
  Neil Levy:
  Due deference to denialism: explaining ordinary people's rejection of established scientific findings. 313-327
• 
  Lorenzo Azzano:
  The question of realism for powers. 329-354
• 
  Sara Weaver:
  The harms of ignoring the social nature of science. 355-375
• 
  Selene Arfini, Tommaso Bertolotti, Lorenzo Magnani:
  Online communities as virtual cognitive niches. 377-397
• 
  Benjamin Eva:
  A-symmetric confirmation and anthropic skepticism. 399-412
• 
  Justin P. Bruner:
  Minority (dis)advantage in population games. 413-427
• 
  John Thrasher:
  Constructivism, representation, and stability: path-dependence in public reason theories of justice. 429-450

Volume 196, Number 2, February 2019

Special Issue on Scientific Realism

• 
  Darrell P. Rowbottom:
  Scientific realism: what it is, the contemporary debate, and new directions. 451-484
• 
  Johanna Wolff:
  Naturalistic quietism or scientific realism? 485-498
• 
  Bence Nanay:
  Entity realism and singularist semirealism. 499-517
• 
  Catherine Z. Elgin:
  Nominalism, realism and objectivity. 519-534
• 
  Greg Frost-Arnold:
  Should a historically motivated anti-realist be a Stanfordite? 535-551
• 
  K. Brad Wray:
  Discarded theories: the role of changing interests. 553-569
• 
  Peter Vickers:
  Towards a realistic success-to-truth inference for scientific realism. 571-585
• 
  Jamin Asay:
  Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism. 587-609
• 
  Juha Saatsi:
  What is theoretical progress of science? 611-631

Regular Articles

• 
  Claudia Picazo Jaque:
  Are mental representations underdeterminacy-free? 633-654
• 
  Julie Zahle, Harold Kincaid:
  Why be a methodological individualist? 655-675
• 
  Murat Aydede:
  Is the experience of pain transparent? - Introspecting phenomenal qualities. 677-708
• 
  Jonathan Reid Surovell:
  Stance empiricism and epistemic reason. 709-733
• 
  Daniel Bonevac:
  Free choice reasons. 735-760

Volume 196, Number 3, March 2019

Special Issue on 'Systematicity: The Nature of Science?' (first 8 articles), edited by Simon Lohse, Karim Bschir, Hasok Chang

• 
  Karim Bschir, Simon Lohse, Hasok Chang:
  Introduction: systematicity, the nature of science? 761-773
• 
  C. Mantzavinos:
  The nature of science. A dialogue. 775-793
• 
  Sara Green:
  Science and common sense: perspectives from philosophy and science education. 795-818
• 
  K. Brad Wray:
  Systematicity and the Continuity Thesis. 819-832
• 
  Timothy Daniel Lyons:
  Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism: the systematic quest for truth. 833-861
• 
  Alexander Bird:
  Systematicity, knowledge, and bias. How systematicity made clinical medicine a science. 863-879
• 
  Naomi Oreskes:
  Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science. 881-905
• 
  Paul Hoyningen-Huene:
  Replies. 907-928
• 
  Matthias Schirn:
  Frege's philosophy of geometry. 929-971
• 
  Alexei Grinbaum:
  The effectiveness of mathematics in physics of the unknown. 973-989
• 
  Santiago Ginnobili, Daniel Blanco:
  Wallace's and Darwin's natural selection theories. 991-1017
• 
  Geoff Georgi:
  Propositions, representation, and truth. 1019-1043
• 
  Kentaro Fujimoto:
  Deflationism beyond arithmetic. 1045-1069
• 
  Zach Barnett:
  Tolerance and the distributed sorites. 1071-1077
• 
  Olav B. Vassend:
  Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis. 1079-1095
• 
  Marko Tesic:
  Confirmation and the generalized Nagel-Schaffner model of reduction: a Bayesian analysis. 1097-1129
• 
  Laurenz Hudetz:
  The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages. 1131-1149
• 
  Casey Rebecca Johnson:
  Investigating illocutionary monism. 1151-1165
• 
  Jaakko Hirvelä:
  Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths. 1167-1186
• 
  Matthew C. Haug:
  No microphysical causation? No problem: selective causal skepticism and the structure of completeness-based arguments for physicalism. 1187-1208

Volume 196, Number 4, April 2019

Special Issue on Unity of Structured Propositions

• 
  Manuel García-Carpintero, Bjørn Jespersen:
  Introduction: primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition. 1209-1224
• 
  Matti Eklund:
  Regress, unity, facts, and propositions. 1225-1247
• 
  Marie Duzí:
  If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated? 1249-1283
• 
  Bjørn Jespersen:
  Anatomy of a proposition. 1285-1324
• 
  Richard Gaskin:
  From the unity of the proposition to linguistic idealism. 1325-1342
• 
  Jeffrey C. King:
  On propositions and fineness of grain (again!). 1343-1367
• 
  Scott Soames:
  Propositions as Cognitive Acts. 1369-1383
• 
  Peter W. Hanks:
  On cancellation. 1385-1402
• 
  François Récanati:
  Force cancellation. 1403-1424
• 
  Bryan Pickel:
  Unity through truth. 1425-1452
• 
  Jeff Speaks:
  Act theories and the attitudes. 1453-1473
• 
  Gary Ostertag:
  Structured propositions and the logical form of predication. 1475-1499
• 
  Peter Pagin:
  A general argument against structured propositions. 1501-1528
• 
  Lorraine Juliano Keller:
  What propositional structure could not be. 1529-1553

Regular articles

• 
  Julia Zakkou:
  Denial and retraction: a challenge for theories of taste predicates. 1555-1573
• 
  Lindsay Crawford:
  Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship. 1575-1593
• 
  Michael Bennett McNulty:
  Continuity of change in Kant's dynamics. 1595-1622
• 
  Clinton Castro, Casey Hart:
  The imprecise impermissivist's dilemma. 1623-1640
• 
  Charles Côté-Bouchard:
  'Ought' implies 'can' against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism. 1641-1656

Volume 196, Number 5, May 2019

Special Issue on Infinite Idealizations in Science

• 
  Samuel C. Fletcher, Patricia Palacios, Laura Ruetsche, Elay Shech:
  Infinite idealizations in science: an introduction. 1657-1669
• 
  Ryan M. Nefdt:
  Infinity and the foundations of linguistics. 1671-1711
• 
  Michael Strevens:
  The structure of asymptotic idealization. 1713-1731
• 
  Silvia De Bianchi:
  Combining finite and infinite elements: Why do we use infinite idealizations in engineering? 1733-1748
• 
  Samuel C. Fletcher:
  Minimal approximations and Norton's dome. 1749-1760
• 
  Giovanni Valente:
  On the paradox of reversible processes in thermodynamics. 1761-1781
• 
  Katie Robertson:
  Stars and steam engines: To what extent do thermodynamics and statistical mechanics apply to self-gravitating systems? 1783-1808
• 
  Andrew Wayne:
  Point-particle explanations: the case of gravitational waves. 1809-1829
• 
  Benjamin H. Feintzeig:
  Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems. 1831-1861
• 
  Pauline van Wierst:
  The paradox of phase transitions in the light of constructive mathematics. 1863-1884
• 
  Chuang Liu:
  Infinite idealization and contextual realism. 1885-1918
• 
  Sorin Ioan Bangu:
  Discontinuities and singularities, data and phenomena: for Referentialism. 1919-1937
• 
  Sam Baron:
  Infinite lies and explanatory ties: idealization in phase transitions. 1939-1961
• 
  Elay Shech:
  Infinitesimal idealization, easy road nominalism, and fractional quantum statistics. 1963-1990
• 
  John Earman:
  The role of idealizations in the Aharonov-Bohm effect. 1991-2019

Regular Articles

• 
  N. Ángel Pinillos:
  Knowledge and the permissibility of action. 2021-2043
• 
  Pawel Jakub Zieba:
  Naïve realism about unconscious perception. 2045-2073
• 
  Brent J. C. Madison:
  Is open-mindedness truth-conducive? 2075-2087
• 
  Leonid Tarasov:
  Semantic relativism and ways of knowing. 2089-2109

Volume 196, Number 6, June 2019

Special Issue on Psychiatry and its Philosophy

• 
  Serife Tekin, Edouard Machery:
  Beyond mind-body dualism: embracing pluralism in psychiatric research - introduction to the special issue, "Psychiatry and Its Philosophy". 2111-2115
• 
  Maël Lemoine:
  On the neurobiological redefinition of psychiatric symptoms: elimination, reduction, or what? 2117-2133
• 
  Sarah K. Robins:
  Confabulation and constructive memory. 2135-2151
• 
  Catherine Stinson:
  The absent body in psychiatric diagnosis, treatment, and research. 2153-2176
• 
  Kathryn Tabb:
  Philosophy of psychiatry after diagnostic kinds. 2177-2195
• 
  Serife Tekin:
  The missing self in scientific psychiatry. 2197-2215
• 
  Ginger A. Hoffman:
  Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders. 2217-2241

Regular Articles

• 
  M R. X. Dentith:
  Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence. 2243-2261
• 
  Luis Rosa:
  Reasoning without regress. 2263-2278
• 
  Don Fallis, Peter J. Lewis:
  Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling. 2279-2303
• 
  Brandon Boesch:
  The means-end account of scientific, representational actions. 2305-2322
• 
  Naftali Weinberger:
  Mechanisms without mechanistic explanation. 2323-2340
• 
  Markus I. Eronen:
  Robust realism for the life sciences. 2341-2354
• 
  Arnon Cahen:
  Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception. 2355-2383
• 
  Samantha Copeland:
  On serendipity in science: discovery at the intersection of chance and wisdom. 2385-2406
• 
  Benjamin C. Jantzen:
  Kinds of process and the levels of selection. 2407-2433
• 
  Mahrad Almotahari:
  Semantic deflationism deflated. 2435-2454
• 
  Anubav Vasudevan:
  Biased information and the exchange paradox. 2455-2485
• 
  Kevin Scharp:
  On the indeterminacy of the meter. 2487-2517
• 
  Jonathan Reid Surovell:
  Empirical significance, predictive power, and explication. 2519-2539
• 
  Bruno Whittle:
  Correction to: Self-referential propositions. 2541
• 
  Hans van Ditmarsch:
  Correction to: Dynamics of lying. 2543

Volume 196, Number 7, July 2019

Special Issue on Between First- and Second-Order Logic

• 
  Arnold Koslow:
  The modality and non-extensionality of the quantifiers. 2545-2554
• 
  Roy T. Cook:
  Possible predicates and actual properties. 2555-2582
• 
  Catarina Dutilh Novaes:
  Axiomatizations of arithmetic and the first-order/second-order divide. 2583-2597
• 
  Jody Azzouni:
  The challenge of many logics: a new approach to evaluating the role of ideology in Quinean commitment. 2599-2619
• 
  Alexander C. Paseau:
  A measure of inferential-role preservation. 2621-2642
• 
  Bob Hale:
  Second-order logic: properties, semantics, and existential commitments. 2643-2669
• 
  Liron Cohen, Arnon Avron:
  The middle ground-ancestral logic. 2671-2693

Regular Articles

• 
  Christos Kyriacou:
  Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized. 2695-2713
• 
  Brendan Larvor:
  From Euclidean geometry to knots and nets. 2715-2736
• 
  Richard Pettigrew:
  Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree. 2737-2776
• 
  James Norton, Kristie Miller:
  A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation. 2777-2802
• 
  Rafael Ventura:
  Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content. 2803-2820
• 
  Evan Westra:
  Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action-prediction hierarchy. 2821-2846
• 
  Julian Kiverstein, Mark Miller, Erik Rietveld:
  The feeling of grip: novelty, error dynamics, and the predictive brain. 2847-2869
• 
  Kegan J. Shaw:
  The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism. 2871-2884
• 
  Björn Lundgren:
  Does semantic information need to be truthful? 2885-2906
• 
  Mattia Riccardi:
  Perceptual presence: an attentional account. 2907-2926
• 
  Hans van Ditmarsch, Sophia Knight, Aybüke Özgün:
  Announcement as effort on topological spaces. 2927-2969
• 
  Stefan Roski:
  Bolzano and Kim on grounding and unification. 2971-2999

Volume 196, Number 8, August 2019

Special Issue on Evidence Amalgamation in the Sciences

• 
  François Claveau, Olivier Grenier:
  The variety-of-evidence thesis: a Bayesian exploration of its surprising failures. 3001-3028
• 
  Conor Mayo-Wilson:
  Causal identifiability and piecemeal experimentation. 3029-3065
• 
  Remco Heesen, Liam Kofi Bright, Andrew Zucker:
  Vindicating methodological triangulation. 3067-3081
• 
  Nicolas Wüthrich, Katie Steele:
  The problem of evaluating automated large-scale evidence aggregators. 3083-3102
• 
  Julian Reiss:
  Against external validity. 3103-3121
• 
  David M. Frank:
  Ethics of the scientist qua policy advisor: inductive risk, uncertainty, and catastrophe in climate economics. 3123-3138
• 
  Veronica J. Vieland, Hasok Chang:
  No evidence amalgamation without evidence measurement. 3139-3161
• 
  Samuel C. Fletcher, Jürgen Landes, Roland Poellinger:
  Evidence amalgamation in the sciences: an introduction. 3163-3188
• 
  Bennett Holman:
  In defense of meta-analysis. 3189-3211
• 
  David Danks, Sergey M. Plis:
  Amalgamating evidence of dynamics. 3213-3230
• 
  Tudor M. Baetu:
  On pain experience, multidisciplinary integration and the level-laden conception of science. 3231-3250
• 
  Michael Wilde, Veli-Pekka Parkkinen:
  Extrapolation and the Russo-Williamson thesis. 3251-3262
• 
  Molly Kao:
  Unification beyond justification: a strategy for theory development. 3263-3278
• 
  Marta Bertolaso, Fabio Sterpetti:
  Evidence amalgamation, plausibility, and cancer research. 3279-3317

Regular Articles

• 
  David Kalkman:
  New problems for defining animal communication in informational terms. 3319-3336
• 
  John Zerilli:
  Multiple realization and the commensurability of taxonomies. 3337-3353
• 
  Joshua Rowan Thorpe:
  Radical interpretation, scepticism, and the possibility of shared error. 3355-3368
• 
  Daniel Deasy:
  The triviality argument against presentism. 3369-3388
• 
  Namjoong Kim:
  Bad company objection to Joongol Kim's adverbial theory of numbers. 3389-3407
• 
  Paul Dimmock:
  Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias. 3409-3432
• 
  Edward Elliott:
  Impossible worlds and partial belief. 3433-3458
• 
  Daniel C. Burnston:
  Correction to: Cognitive penetration and the cognition-perception interface. 3459

Volume 196, Number 9, September 2019

Special Issue on The Uses and Abuses of Mathematics in Early Modern Philosophy

• 
  Tamás Demeter, Eric Schliesser:
  The uses and abuses of mathematics in early modern philosophy: introduction. 3461-3464
• 
  Mark Wilson:
  What I've learned from the early moderns. 3465-3481
• 
  Alan Nelson:
  Descartes on the limited usefulness of mathematics. 3483-3504
• 
  Mary Domski:
  Imagination, metaphysics, mathematics: Descartes's arguments for the Vortex Hypothesis. 3505-3526
• 
  Alison Peterman:
  Empress vs. Spider-Man: Margaret Cavendish on pure and applied mathematics. 3527-3549
• 
  Jonathan L. Shaheen:
  Part of nature and division in Margaret Cavendish's materialism. 3551-3575
• 
  Gábor Áron Zemplén:
  Diagrammatic carriers and the acceptance of Newton's optical theory. 3577-3593
• 
  Steffen Ducheyne:
  Constraining (mathematical) imagination by experience: Nieuwentijt and van Musschenbroek on the abuses of mathematics. 3595-3613
• 
  Tamás Demeter:
  Hume on the social construction of mathematical knowledge. 3615-3631
• 
  Charles T. Wolfe:
  Vital anti-mathematicism and the ontology of the emerging life sciences: from Mandeville to Diderot. 3633-3654

Regular Articles

• 
  Jared Peterson:
  A puzzle about desire. 3655-3676
• 
  Alexander Sandgren:
  A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity. 3677-3695
• 
  Cory Juhl, Brian Knab:
  On the empirical inaccessibility of higher-level modality and its significance for cosmological fine-tuning. 3697-3710
• 
  Adam Koberinski, Lucas Dunlap, William L. Harper:
  Do the EPR correlations pose a problem for causal decision theory? 3711-3722
• 
  Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker:
  Existentialism, aliens and referentially unrestricted worlds. 3723-3738
• 
  Filippo Casati, Naoya Fujikawa:
  Nothingness, Meinongianism and inconsistent mereology. 3739-3772
• 
  Marvin Backes:
  A bitter pill for closure. 3773-3787
• 
  Walter Carnielli, Abilio Rodrigues:
  An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth. 3789-3813
• 
  Cameron Gibbs:
  Basing for the Bayesian. 3815-3840
• 
  Andrea Polonioli:
  A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy. 3841-3867
• 
  Tim Oakley:
  The reductio argument against epistemic infinitism. 3869-3887
• 
  J. J. Cunningham:
  Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition? 3889-3910

Volume 196, Number 10, October 2019

Special Issue on Unconceived Alternatives and Scientific Realism

• 
  Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam, Ian James Kidd:
  Science, realism, and unconceived alternatives: introduction to the special issue on unconceived alternatives. 3911-3913
• 
  P. Kyle Stanford:
  Unconceived alternatives and conservatism in science: the impact of professionalization, peer-review, and Big Science. 3915-3932
• 
  Samuel Ruhmkorff:
  Unconceived alternatives and the cathedral problem. 3933-3945
• 
  Darrell P. Rowbottom:
  Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives: observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values. 3947-3959
• 
  Jesús Zamora-Bonilla:
  Realism versus anti-realism: philosophical problem or scientific concern? 3961-3977
• 
  Juha Saatsi:
  Historical inductions, Old and New. 3979-3993

Regular Articles

• 
  David Kinney:
  Inductive explanation and Garber-Style solutions to the problem of old evidence. 3995-4009
• 
  Jessica Carter:
  Exploring the fruitfulness of diagrams in mathematics. 4011-4032
• 
  Mattias Skipper, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen:
  Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective. 4033-4058
• 
  Nick Hughes:
  Dilemmic Epistemology. 4059-4090
• 
  Nicoletta Bartunek:
  Truth in the Investigations. 4091-4111
• 
  James E. Davies:
  Towards a theory of singular thought about abstract mathematical objects. 4113-4136
• 
  Sylvia Wenmackers:
  The Snow White problem. 4137-4153
• 
  David Hommen:
  Ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations. 4155-4183
• 
  Claudio Mazzola:
  Generalised Reichenbachian common cause systems. 4185-4209
• 
  Ittay Nissan-Rozen, Levi Spectre:
  A pragmatic argument against equal weighting. 4211-4227
• 
  Mark Bowker:
  Saying a bundle: meaning, intention, and underdetermination. 4229-4252
• 
  Nicholas Binney:
  Meno's paradox and medicine. 4253-4278
• 
  Becky Millar:
  Smelling objects. 4279-4303
• 
  Christos Douskos:
  The spontaneousness of skill and the impulsivity of habit. 4305-4328
• 
  Clayton Peterson:
  Accommodation, prediction and replication: model selection in scale construction. 4329-4350

Volume 196, Number 11, November 2019

Special Issue on Medical Knowledge in a Social World

• 
  Bennett Holman, Sven Bernecker, Luciana Garbayo:
  Medical knowledge in a social world: Introduction to the special issue. 4351-4361
• 
  Bennett Holman:
  Philosophers on drugs. 4363-4390
• 
  Mark D. Robinson:
  Financializing epistemic norms in contemporary biomedical innovation. 4391-4407
• 
  Rebecca Kukla:
  Infertility, epistemic risk, and disease definitions. 4409-4428
• 
  Teri Merrick:
  From 'Intersex' to 'DSD': a case of epistemic injustice. 4429-4447
• 
  Nir Ben-Moshe:
  The internal morality of medicine: a constructivist approach. 4449-4467
• 
  Sophie van Baalen, Annamaria Carusi:
  Implicit trust in clinical decision-making by multidisciplinary teams. 4469-4492

Regular articles

• 
  Georg Brun:
  Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences. 4493-4509
• 
  Mark Boespflug:
  Why Reid was no dogmatist. 4511-4525
• 
  Alfredo Vernazzani:
  The structure of sensorimotor explanation. 4527-4553
• 
  Maël Montévil:
  Possibility spaces and the notion of novelty: from music to biology. 4555-4581
• 
  Insa Lawler:
  Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievements. 4583-4603
• 
  Sim-Hui Tee:
  Constructing reality with models. 4605-4622
• 
  Brice Halimi:
  Settings and misunderstandings in mathematics. 4623-4656
• 
  Amir Asghari:
  Equivalence: an attempt at a history of the idea. 4657-4677
• 
  Mona Simion:
  A puzzle for epistemic WAMs. 4679-4689
• 
  Esben Nedenskov Petersen:
  A case for a certainty norm of assertion. 4691-4710
• 
  Matthew Baxendale:
  Mapping the continuum of research strategies. 4711-4733
• 
  Collin Rice, Yasha Rohwer, André Ariew:
  Explanatory schema and the process of model building. 4735-4757
• 
  Ulf Hlobil:
  Faithfulness for naive validity. 4759-4774
• 
  Benjamin Lennertz:
  Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement. 4775-4805
• 
  Ivano Ciardelli:
  Correction to: Questions as information types. 4807

Volume 196, Number 12, December 2019

Special Issue on Thinking (about) Groups

• 
  Alessandro Salice, John Michael, András Szigeti:
  Thinking (about) groups: a special issue of Synthese. 4809-4812
• 
  Axel Seemann:
  Reminiscing together: joint experiences, epistemic groups, and sense of self. 4813-4828
• 
  Amie L. Thomasson:
  The ontology of social groups. 4829-4845
• 
  Felipe León, Thomas Szanto, Dan Zahavi:
  Emotional sharing and the extended mind. 4847-4867
• 
  Carol Rovane:
  Is group agency a social phenomenon? 4869-4898
• 
  Brian Epstein:
  What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them. 4899-4932
• 
  Kourken Michaelian, John Sutton:
  Collective mental time travel: remembering the past and imagining the future together. 4933-4960
• 
  Tobias Hansson Wahlberg:
  Why the social sciences are irreducible. 4961-4987

Regular Articles

• 
  J. Adam Carter, Robin McKenna:
  Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. 4989-5007
• 
  John Pittard:
  Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism. 5009-5038
• 
  Sander Verhaegh:
  Sign and Object: Quine's forgotten book project. 5039-5060
• 
  Toby Friend:
  Can parts cause their wholes? 5061-5082
• 
  Joseph A. Baltimore:
  Expanding the vector model for dispositionalist approaches to causation. 5083-5098
• 
  Gregory Stoutenburg:
  In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck. 5099-5113
• 
  Sergio A. Gallegos:
  Models as signs: extending Kralemann and Lattman's proposal on modeling models within Peirce's theory of signs. 5115-5136
• 
  Justin Zylstra:
  The essence of grounding. 5137-5152
• 
  Iskra Fileva, Linda A. W. Brakel:
  Just another article on Moore's paradox, but we don't believe that. 5153-5167
• 
  Sebastian De Haro:
  The heuristic function of duality. 5169-5203
• 
  Alexandre Billon:
  Paradoxical hypodoxes. 5205-5229
• 
  Jelle P. Bruineberg, Anthony Chemero, Erik Rietveld:
  General ecological information supports engagement with affordances for 'higher' cognition. 5231-5251