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Michal Feldman
Person information
- affiliation: Tel Aviv University, Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Israel
- affiliation: Microsoft Research, Herzliya, Israel
- affiliation (former): Harvard University, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA
- affiliation (former): Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Business Administration, Jerusalem, Israel
- affiliation (former, PhD 2005): University of California, Berkeley, School of Information Management and Systems, CA, USA
Other persons with a similar name
- Michael Feldman — disambiguation page
- Michael B. Feldman — George Washington University, Department of Computer Science, Washington, DC, USA (and 1 more)
- Michael D. Feldman — University of Pennsylvania, Perelman School of Medicine, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Michael J. Feldman
- Michael R. Feldman — DigitalOptics Corporation, San Jose,. CA, USA
- Michael Feldman 0001 — University of Zurich, Department of Informatics, Zurich, Switzerland
- Michael Feldman 0002 — Haverford College, Haverford, PA, USA
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j49]Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. Algorithmica 86(5): 1600-1622 (2024) - [j48]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. Math. Oper. Res. 49(2): 653-674 (2024) - [c115]Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka:
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. AAAI 2024: 9688-9695 - [c114]Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco:
Pandora's Problem with Deadlines. AAAI 2024: 20337-20343 - [c113]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger:
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. ITCS 2024: 44:1-44:22 - [c112]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur:
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes. SODA 2024: 92-108 - [c111]Michal Feldman:
Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote). STOC 2024: 2 - [c110]Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan:
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. STOC 2024: 1235-1246 - [i84]Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo:
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. CoRR abs/2402.11084 (2024) - [i83]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. CoRR abs/2402.12017 (2024) - [i82]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms. CoRR abs/2402.17160 (2024) - [i81]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger:
Sequential Contracts. CoRR abs/2403.09545 (2024) - [i80]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Aviad Rubinstein:
The Query Complexity of Contracts. CoRR abs/2403.09794 (2024) - [i79]Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR abs/2405.08260 (2024) - 2023
- [j47]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai:
Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding. Games Econ. Behav. 140: 316-340 (2023) - [j46]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 76: 567-611 (2023) - [j45]Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner:
Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. 19(10) (2023) - [c109]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. FOCS 2023: 148-163 - [c108]Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. ICALP 2023: 58:1-58:20 - [c107]Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco:
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. EC 2023: 273-292 - [c106]Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz:
Ambiguous Contracts. EC 2023: 539 - [c105]Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Interdependent Public Projects. SODA 2023: 416-443 - [c104]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings. SODA 2023: 3759-3776 - [c103]Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Multi-agent Contracts. STOC 2023: 1311-1324 - [i78]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz:
Ambiguous Contracts. CoRR abs/2302.07621 (2023) - [i77]Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka:
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. CoRR abs/2302.09633 (2023) - [i76]Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco:
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. CoRR abs/2303.01078 (2023) - [i75]Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka:
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. CoRR abs/2304.03706 (2023) - [i74]Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. CoRR abs/2307.07495 (2023) - [i73]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur:
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes. CoRR abs/2309.10766 (2023) - [i72]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. CoRR abs/2310.00958 (2023) - [i71]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger:
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR abs/2311.18425 (2023) - [i70]Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan:
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. CoRR abs/2312.01874 (2023) - 2022
- [j44]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Prophet Matching with General Arrivals. Math. Oper. Res. 47(2): 878-898 (2022) - [j43]Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner:
A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. 18(8) (2022) - [j42]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. Theory Comput. 18: 1-33 (2022) - [c102]Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents. AAAI 2022: 4826-4833 - [c101]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld:
Two-Price Equilibrium. AAAI 2022: 5008-5015 - [c100]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Almog Wald:
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. SAGT 2022: 60-77 - [c99]Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC 2022: 820-845 - [c98]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching. EC 2022: 1148-1177 - [e2]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13112, Springer 2022, ISBN 978-3-030-94675-3 [contents] - [i69]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality. CoRR abs/2202.09215 (2022) - [i68]Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR abs/2202.09291 (2022) - [i67]Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Interdependent Public Projects. CoRR abs/2204.08044 (2022) - [i66]Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. CoRR abs/2209.12934 (2022) - [i65]Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. CoRR abs/2211.02004 (2022) - [i64]Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Multi-Agent Contracts. CoRR abs/2211.05434 (2022) - 2021
- [j41]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. 69(1): 188-206 (2021) - [c97]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI 2021: 5312-5320 - [c96]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran:
PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. AAAI 2021: 5321-5329 - [c95]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai:
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. AAAI 2021: 5391-5398 - [c94]Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Combinatorial Contracts. FOCS 2021: 815-826 - [c93]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. IJCAI 2021: 175-181 - [c92]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. SAGT 2021: 112-123 - [c91]Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? EC 2021: 390-408 - [c90]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. SOSA 2021: 107-110 - [i63]Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond). CoRR abs/2102.10654 (2021) - [i62]Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? CoRR abs/2102.13343 (2021) - [i61]Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour:
Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations. CoRR abs/2103.08634 (2021) - [i60]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. CoRR abs/2107.00357 (2021) - [i59]Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR abs/2109.14260 (2021) - [i58]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld:
Two-Price Equilibrium. CoRR abs/2112.08215 (2021) - 2020
- [j40]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 123: 327-341 (2020) - [j39]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Approximate Modularity Revisited. SIAM J. Comput. 49(1): 67-97 (2020) - [j38]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs. SIAM J. Comput. 49(3): 540-582 (2020) - [j37]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets. SIGecom Exch. 18(2): 38-44 (2020) - [j36]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(4): 20:1-20:29 (2020) - [c89]Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases. AAAI 2020: 1942-1949 - [c88]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. EC 2020: 191 - [c87]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. EC 2020: 499-500 - [c86]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models. EC 2020: 769-787 - [c85]Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. WINE 2020: 206-219 - [i57]Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR abs/2002.06863 (2020) - [i56]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models. CoRR abs/2002.09807 (2020) - [i55]Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir:
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. CoRR abs/2002.11461 (2020) - [i54]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. CoRR abs/2003.05913 (2020) - [i53]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai:
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. CoRR abs/2003.11857 (2020) - [i52]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. CoRR abs/2007.07216 (2020) - [i51]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR abs/2010.07280 (2020) - [i50]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran:
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. CoRR abs/2011.00498 (2020) - [i49]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals. CoRR abs/2011.01559 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j35]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81(8): 3136-3161 (2019) - [j34]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. Theory Comput. Syst. 63(7): 1470-1498 (2019) - [j33]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(3): 14:1-14:27 (2019) - [c84]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. APPROX-RANDOM 2019: 7:1-7:23 - [c83]Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff. AAMAS 2019: 918-925 - [c82]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. EC 2019: 19-20 - [c81]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS 2019: 249-272 - [c80]Michal Feldman:
Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk). ICALP 2019: 1:1-1:1 - [c79]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-min greedy matching. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS 2019: 10:1 - [i48]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. CoRR abs/1903.08384 (2019) - [i47]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR abs/1903.11360 (2019) - 2018
- [j32]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Michael Schwarz:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6(3-4): 10:1-10:2 (2018) - [c78]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub:
Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. ESA 2018: 27:1-27:14 - [c77]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama:
Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. EC 2018: 319-320 - [c76]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner:
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. EC 2018: 369 - [c75]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein:
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. EC 2018: 443-460 - [c74]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Multi-unit Markets. WINE 2018: 140-153 - [i46]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein:
99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. CoRR abs/1801.02908 (2018) - [i45]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. CoRR abs/1803.05501 (2018) - [i44]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub:
Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents. CoRR abs/1804.03244 (2018) - [i43]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. CoRR abs/1804.06637 (2018) - [i42]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama:
Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. CoRR abs/1805.05094 (2018) - [i41]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner:
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. CoRR abs/1806.03865 (2018) - [i40]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1811.09871 (2018) - 2017
- [c73]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing Social Goods. ESA 2017: 35:1-35:14 - [c72]Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs. FOCS 2017: 540-551 - [c71]Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman:
Liquid Price of Anarchy. SAGT 2017: 3-15 - [c70]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. SAGT 2017: 29-40 - [c69]Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir:
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. SAGT 2017: 186-198 - [c68]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing social goods. NetEcon@EC 2017: 10:1 - [c67]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. EC 2017: 243-244 - [c66]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC 2017: 323 - [c65]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC 2017: 343 - [c64]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman:
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices. EC 2017: 405-422 - [c63]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Approximate modularity revisited. STOC 2017: 1028-1041 - [i39]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. CoRR abs/1705.01589 (2017) - [i38]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman:
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices. CoRR abs/1705.01965 (2017) - [i37]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Identical Items. CoRR abs/1705.06623 (2017) - [i36]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing Social Goods. CoRR abs/1706.10009 (2017) - 2016
- [j31]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput. 45(1): 29-48 (2016) - [j30]Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri:
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1): 8:1-8:26 (2016) - [c62]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova:
Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model. AAAI 2016: 496-501 - [c61]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap. APPROX-RANDOM 2016: 8:1-8:23 - [c60]Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar:
Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers. NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 - [c59]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner:
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements. EC 2016: 251-267 - [c58]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb:
On Voting and Facility Location. EC 2016: 269-286 - [c57]Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. EC 2016: 383-400 - [c56]Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi:
Lottery Pricing Equilibria. EC 2016: 401-418 - [c55]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. EC 2016: 637-654 - [c54]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The price of anarchy in large games. STOC 2016: 963-976 - [c53]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions. WINE 2016: 131-144 - [i35]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated- and Coarse- equilibria of Single-item auctions. CoRR abs/1601.07702 (2016) - [i34]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner:
Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements. CoRR abs/1603.07939 (2016) - [i33]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. CoRR abs/1605.09548 (2016) - [i32]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Approximate Modularity Revisited. CoRR abs/1612.02034 (2016) - [i31]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities. CoRR abs/1612.03161 (2016) - [i30]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR abs/1612.04746 (2016) - [i29]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR abs/1612.08821 (2016) - 2015
- [j29]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects. Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015) - [j28]Michal Feldman, Tom Ron:
Capacitated Network Design Games. Theory Comput. Syst. 57(3): 576-597 (2015) - [j27]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games. SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev. 43(3): 71 (2015) - [c52]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. AAAI 2015: 872-878 - [c51]Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri:
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? AAAI 2015: 879-885 - [c50]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games. ICALP (2) 2015: 601-613 - [c49]Shoshana Vasserman, Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim:
Implementing the Wisdom of Waze. IJCAI 2015: 660-666 - [c48]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz:
How Robust Is the Wisdom of the Crowds? IJCAI 2015: 2055-2061 - [c47]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. SODA 2015: 123-135 - [c46]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. WINE 2015: 300-313 - [e1]Tim Roughgarden, Michal Feldman, Michael Schwarz:
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '15, Portland, OR, USA, June 15-19, 2015. ACM 2015, ISBN 978-1-4503-3410-5 [contents] - [i28]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games. CoRR abs/1503.04755 (2015) - [i27]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Truthful Secretaries with Budgets. CoRR abs/1504.03625 (2015) - [i26]Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman:
Liquid Price of Anarchy. CoRR abs/1511.01132 (2015) - [i25]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing. CoRR abs/1511.02399 (2015) - [i24]Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. CoRR abs/1511.05646 (2015) - [i23]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb:
On Voting and Facility Location. CoRR abs/1512.05868 (2015) - 2014
- [j26]Michal Feldman, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Introduction. Games Econ. Behav. 86: 339 (2014) - [j25]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5:1-5:19 (2014) - [c45]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208 - [c44]Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential decision making with vector outcomes. ITCS 2014: 195-206 - [c43]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier:
Clearing Markets via Bundles. SAGT 2014: 158-169 - [i22]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier:
Clearing Markets via Bundles. CoRR abs/1401.2702 (2014) - [i21]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. CoRR abs/1401.3494 (2014) - [i20]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. CoRR abs/1401.3837 (2014) - [i19]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1406.0576 (2014) - [i18]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. CoRR abs/1408.1211 (2014) - [i17]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1408.5192 (2014) - [i16]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. CoRR abs/1411.4916 (2014) - [i15]Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri:
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? CoRR abs/1411.5712 (2014) - [i14]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR14 (2014) - 2013
- [j24]Leah Epstein, Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir, Lukasz Witkowski, Marcin Witkowski:
Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Discret. Appl. Math. 161(13-14): 1843-1858 (2013) - [j23]Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman:
Mechanism design with a restricted action space. Games Econ. Behav. 82: 424-443 (2013) - [j22]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Adversarial Leakage in Games. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 27(1): 363-385 (2013) - [j21]Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Introduction to the Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(2): 5:1 (2013) - [c42]Reshef Meir, Yiling Chen, Michal Feldman:
Efficient parking allocation as online bipartite matching with posted prices. AAMAS 2013: 303-310 - [c41]Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
Pricing public goods for private sale. EC 2013: 417-434 - [c40]Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf:
Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective. EC 2013: 873-890 - [c39]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium. STOC 2013: 61-70 - [c38]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. STOC 2013: 201-210 - [c37]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem. WINE 2013: 1-14 - [c36]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. WINE 2013: 160-173 - [i13]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1304.2244 (2013) - [i12]Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale. CoRR abs/1305.0085 (2013) - [i11]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. CoRR abs/1309.2529 (2013) - 2012
- [j20]Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason A. Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher M. Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections. Artif. Intell. 187: 31-51 (2012) - [j19]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. Oper. Res. 60(3): 529-540 (2012) - [j18]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, Eyal Winter:
Combinatorial agency. J. Econ. Theory 147(3): 999-1034 (2012) - [j17]Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. SIAM J. Comput. 41(1): 12-25 (2012) - [j16]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bayesian ignorance. Theor. Comput. Sci. 452: 1-11 (2012) - [j15]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman:
Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies. Theor. Comput. Sci. 452: 56-74 (2012) - [c35]Steven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia:
On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions. AAAI 2012: 1285-1291 - [c34]Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability. AAMAS 2012: 771-778 - [c33]Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz, Michal Feldman:
Mastering multi-player games. AAMAS 2012: 897-904 - [c32]Michal Feldman, John K. Lai:
Mechanisms and Impossibilities for Truthful, Envy-Free Allocations. SAGT 2012: 120-131 - [c31]Michal Feldman, Tom Ron:
Capacitated Network Design Games. SAGT 2012: 132-143 - [c30]Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama:
Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles. EC 2012: 423-440 - [c29]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. EC 2012: 514-531 - [c28]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski:
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. EC 2012: 532-549 - [c27]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects. WINE 2012: 496-503 - [i10]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization. CoRR abs/1202.1590 (2012) - [i9]Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. CoRR abs/1202.3700 (2012) - [i8]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient. CoRR abs/1209.4703 (2012) - 2011
- [c26]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economical Graph Discovery. ICS 2011: 476-486 - [c25]Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman, Mishael Rosenthal:
Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability. SAGT 2011: 57-68 - [c24]Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. UAI 2011: 27-34 - [c23]Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing. WINE 2011: 97-108 - [c22]Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. WINE 2011: 391-398 - [i7]Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Stability Scores: Stability and Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. CoRR abs/1105.5983 (2011) - [i6]Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf:
Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location and the Mini-Sum-of-Squares Objective. CoRR abs/1108.1762 (2011) - 2010
- [j14]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Walking in circles. Discret. Math. 310(23): 3432-3435 (2010) - [j13]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A note on competitive diffusion through social networks. Inf. Process. Lett. 110(6): 221-225 (2010) - [j12]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 38: 339-369 (2010) - [j11]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks. Math. Oper. Res. 35(3): 513-526 (2010) - [j10]Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Structured coalitions in resource selection games. ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. 1(1): 4:1-4:21 (2010) - [c21]Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Playing Games without Observing Payoffs. ICS 2010: 106-110 - [c20]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Adversarial Leakage in Games. ICS 2010: 111-119 - [c19]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bayesian ignorance. PODC 2010: 384-391 - [c18]Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract. EC 2010: 159-166 - [i5]Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games. CoRR abs/1003.5326 (2010) - [i4]Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness. CoRR abs/1003.5328 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j9]Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong price of anarchy. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 289-317 (2009) - [j8]Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Efficient graph topologies in network routing games. Games Econ. Behav. 66(1): 115-125 (2009) - [j7]Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 51-68 (2009) - [j6]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 36: 387-414 (2009) - [j5]Michal Feldman:
A prescriptive approach for playing games. SIGecom Exch. 8(2): 4 (2009) - [j4]Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang:
The Proportional-Share Allocation Market for Computational Resources. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 20(8): 1075-1088 (2009) - [c17]Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Partition Equilibrium. SAGT 2009: 48-59 - [c16]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency. SAGT 2009: 109-121 - [c15]Ioannis Caragiannis, Jason A. Covey, Michal Feldman, Christopher M. Homan, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections. SODA 2009: 1058-1067 - [c14]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman:
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies. WINE 2009: 268-279 - [c13]Michal Feldman, Ran Tessler, Yoav Wilf:
Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities. WINE 2009: 351-361 - [i3]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks. CoRR abs/0907.2049 (2009) - [i2]Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. CoRR abs/0909.1072 (2009) - 2008
- [c12]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. SAGT 2008: 58-69 - [c11]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games. WINE 2008: 109-117 - 2007
- [j3]Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker:
Hidden-Action in Network Routing. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 25(6): 1161-1172 (2007) - [c10]Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. EC 2007: 84-92 - [c9]Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong price of anarchy. SODA 2007: 189-198 - 2006
- [j2]Michal Feldman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, John Chuang, Ion Stoica:
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 24(5): 1010-1019 (2006) - [c8]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Combinatorial agency. EC 2006: 18-28 - [c7]Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman:
Implementation with a bounded action space. EC 2006: 62-71 - [c6]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency. WINE 2006: 353-364 - 2005
- [j1]Michal Feldman, John Chuang:
Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems. SIGecom Exch. 5(4): 41-50 (2005) - [c5]Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker:
Hidden-action in multi-hop routing. EC 2005: 117-126 - [c4]Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang:
A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters. EC 2005: 127-136 - [c3]Michal Feldman, John Chuang:
The Evolution of Cooperation under Cheap Pseudonyms. CEC 2005: 284-291 - [i1]Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang:
A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters. CoRR abs/cs/0502019 (2005) - 2004
- [c2]Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, John Chuang:
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. EC 2004: 102-111 - 2003
- [c1]Michal Feldman, Shelley Zhuang:
Workshop Report for 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS '03) 21-22 February 2003 - Claremont Hotel, Berkeley, CA, USA. IPTPS 2003: 1-20
Coauthor Index
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