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2020 – today
- 2024
[j10]Mengjing Chen, Yang Liu, Weiran Shen
, Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Qiang Yang:
A mechanism design approach for multi-party machine learning. Theor. Comput. Sci. 1003: 114618 (2024)- [c81]Yadong Xu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen, Xun Wang, Zichen Wang, Yinsong Xue, Pingzhong Tang:
Simultaneous Optimization of Bid Shading and Internal Auction for Demand-Side Platforms. AAAI 2024: 9935-9943 - [c80]Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang:
Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets. IJCAI 2024: 2886-2894 - [i42]Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang:
Price Competition in Linear Fisher Markets: Stability, Equilibrium and Personalization. CoRR abs/2407.11869 (2024) - [i41]Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang:
Proportional Dynamics in Linear Fisher Markets with Auto-bidding: Convergence, Incentives and Fairness. CoRR abs/2407.11872 (2024) - 2023
- [c79]Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang:
Collusion-Proof and Sybil-Proof Reward Mechanisms for Query Incentive Networks. AAAI 2023: 5892-5899 - [c78]Chengjie Wu, Pingzhong Tang, Jun Yang, Yujing Hu, Tangjie Lv, Changjie Fan, Chongjie Zhang:
Conservative Offline Policy Adaptation in Multi-Agent Games. NeurIPS 2023 - [c77]Bonan Ni, Xun Wang, Qi Zhang, Pingzhong Tang, Zhourong Chen, Tianjiu Yin, Liangni Lu, Xiaobing Liu, Kewu Sun, Zhe Ma:
Ad Auction Design with Coupon-Dependent Conversion Rate in the Auto-bidding World. WWW 2023: 3417-3427 - [i40]Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang:
Collusion-proof And Sybil-proof Reward Mechanisms For Query Incentive Networks. CoRR abs/2302.06061 (2023) - [i39]Pingzhong Tang, Youjia Zhang:
A Truthful Referral Auction Over Networks. CoRR abs/2302.08135 (2023) - [i38]Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang:
Sequential Persuasion Using Limited Experiments. CoRR abs/2303.10619 (2023) - [i37]Youjia Zhang, Pingzhong Tang:
A Strategy-proof Mechanism For Networked Housing Markets. CoRR abs/2303.10832 (2023) - 2022
- [j9]Mengjing Chen, Haoqiang Huang, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang:
Optimal pricing policy design for selling cost-reducing innovation in Cournot games. Theor. Comput. Sci. 901: 62-86 (2022) - [c76]Bonan Ni, Pingzhong Tang:
Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-ante Constrained Player. AAAI 2022: 5156-5163 - [c75]Mengjing Chen, Yang Liu, Weiran Shen, Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Qiang Yang:
A Mechanism Design Approach for Multi-party Machine Learning. FAW 2022: 248-268 - [c74]Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Xiwang Yang:
Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design. IJCAI 2022: 165-171 - [c73]Mingyang Liu, Chengjie Wu, Qihan Liu, Yansen Jing, Jun Yang, Pingzhong Tang, Chongjie Zhang:
Safe Opponent-Exploitation Subgame Refinement. NeurIPS 2022 - [c72]Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Xiwang Yang:
A competitive analysis of online failure-aware assignment. UAI 2022: 317-325 - [i36]Bonan Ni, Pingzhong Tang:
Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-Ante Constrained Player. CoRR abs/2201.11027 (2022) - [i35]Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Xiwang Yang:
Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design. CoRR abs/2205.00192 (2022) - [i34]Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang:
Auto-bidding Equilibrium in ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets. CoRR abs/2210.06107 (2022) - 2021
- [j8]Weiran Shen, Yuan Deng, Pingzhong Tang:
Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Artif. Intell. 301: 103577 (2021) - [j7]Kai Jin, Pingzhong Tang, Shiteng Chen, Jianqing Peng:
Dynamic Task Allocation in Multi-Robot System Based on a Team Competition Model. Frontiers Neurorobotics 15: 674949 (2021) - [c71]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Xun Wang, Yadong Xu, Xiwang Yang:
Coupon Design in Advertising Systems. AAAI 2021: 5717-5725 - [c70]Hangyu Mao, Chao Wang, Xiaotian Hao, Yihuan Mao, Yiming Lu, Chengjie Wu, Jianye Hao, Dong Li, Pingzhong Tang:
SEIHAI: A Sample-Efficient Hierarchical AI for the MineRL Competition. DAI 2021: 38-51 - [i33]Hangyu Mao, Chao Wang, Xiaotian Hao, Yihuan Mao, Yiming Lu, Chengjie Wu, Jianye Hao, Dong Li, Pingzhong Tang:
SEIHAI: A Sample-efficient Hierarchical AI for the MineRL Competition. CoRR abs/2111.08857 (2021) - 2020
- [c69]Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu, Michael Zhang, Ruohan Qian, Yan Hong, Zhi Guo, Zongyao Ding, Pengjun Lu, Pingzhong Tang:
Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions. AAAI 2020: 2236-2243 - [c68]Qingpeng Cai, Ling Pan, Pingzhong Tang:
Deterministic Value-Policy Gradients. AAAI 2020: 3316-3323 - [c67]Shenke Xiao, Zihe Wang, Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Xiwang Yang:
Optimal Common Contract with Heterogeneous Agents. AAAI 2020: 7309-7316 - [c66]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Xun Wang, Yadong Xu, Xiwang Yang:
Learning to Design Coupons in Online Advertising Markets. AAMAS 2020: 1242-1250 - [c65]Jingchang Sun, Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
Games of Miners. AAMAS 2020: 1323-1331 - [c64]Pingzhong Tang, Xun Wang, Zihe Wang, Yadong Xu, Xiwang Yang:
Optimized Cost per Mille in Feeds Advertising. AAMAS 2020: 1359-1367 - [c63]Chuheng Zhang, Yuanqi Li, Xi Chen, Yifei Jin, Pingzhong Tang, Jian Li:
DoubleEnsemble: A New Ensemble Method Based on Sample Reweighting and Feature Selection for Financial Data Analysis. ICDM 2020: 781-790 - [c62]Pingzhong Tang, Dingli Yu, Shengyu Zhao:
Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space. EC 2020: 133-157 - [c61]Feiyang Pan, Xiang Ao, Pingzhong Tang, Min Lu, Dapeng Liu, Lei Xiao, Qing He:
Field-aware Calibration: A Simple and Empirically Strong Method for Reliable Probabilistic Predictions. WWW 2020: 729-739 - [i32]Mengjing Chen, Yang Liu, Weiran Shen, Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Qiang Yang:
Mechanism Design for Multi-Party Machine Learning. CoRR abs/2001.08996 (2020) - [i31]Chuheng Zhang, Yuanqi Li, Xi Chen, Yifei Jin, Pingzhong Tang, Jian Li:
DoubleEnsemble: A New Ensemble Method Based on Sample Reweighting and Feature Selection for Financial Data Analysis. CoRR abs/2010.01265 (2020) - [i30]Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Yuan Deng:
New Complexity Results on Coalitional Manipulation of Borda. CoRR abs/2010.03372 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c60]Ling Pan, Qingpeng Cai, Zhixuan Fang, Pingzhong Tang, Longbo Huang:
A Deep Reinforcement Learning Framework for Rebalancing Dockless Bike Sharing Systems. AAAI 2019: 1393-1400 - [c59]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers. AAAI 2019: 2125-2132 - [c58]Binghui Peng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Learning Optimal Strategies to Commit To. AAAI 2019: 2149-2156 - [c57]Shani Alkoby, Zihe Wang, David Sarne, Pingzhong Tang:
Making Money from What You Know - How to Sell Information? AAAI 2019: 2421-2428 - [c56]Feiyang Pan, Qingpeng Cai, Anxiang Zeng, Chun-Xiang Pan, Qing Da, Hua-Lin He, Qing He, Pingzhong Tang:
Policy Optimization with Model-Based Explorations. AAAI 2019: 4675-4682 - [c55]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networks. AAMAS 2019: 215-223 - [c54]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
Buyer Signaling Games in Auctions. AAMAS 2019: 1591-1599 - [c53]Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Dispatching Through Pricing: Modeling Ride-Sharing and Designing Dynamic Prices. IJCAI 2019: 165-171 - [c52]Feiyang Pan, Shuokai Li, Xiang Ao, Pingzhong Tang, Qing He:
Warm Up Cold-start Advertisements: Improving CTR Predictions via Learning to Learn ID Embeddings. SIGIR 2019: 695-704 - [c51]Feiyang Pan, Qingpeng Cai, Pingzhong Tang, Fuzhen Zhuang, Qing He:
Policy Gradients for Contextual Recommendations. WWW 2019: 1421-1431 - [i29]Feiyang Pan, Shuokai Li, Xiang Ao, Pingzhong Tang, Qing He:
Warm Up Cold-start Advertisements: Improving CTR Predictions via Learning to Learn ID Embeddings. CoRR abs/1904.11547 (2019) - [i28]Feiyang Pan, Xiang Ao, Pingzhong Tang, Min Lu, Dapeng Liu, Qing He:
Towards reliable and fair probabilistic predictions: field-aware calibration with neural networks. CoRR abs/1905.10713 (2019) - [i27]Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Xiwang Yang:
Optimal mechanisms with budget for user generated contents. CoRR abs/1907.04740 (2019) - [i26]Qingpeng Cai, Ling Pan, Pingzhong Tang:
Deterministic Value-Policy Gradients. CoRR abs/1909.03939 (2019) - [i25]Shenke Xiao, Zihe Wang, Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Xiwang Yang:
Optimal Common Contract with Heterogeneous Agents. CoRR abs/1911.04146 (2019) - 2018
- [c50]Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Pingzhong Tang, Yiwei Zhang:
Reinforcement Mechanism Design for Fraudulent Behaviour in e-Commerce. AAAI 2018: 957-964 - [c49]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Yuan Deng:
Coalition Manipulation of Gale-Shapley Algorithm. AAAI 2018: 1210-1217 - [c48]Yuan Deng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang:
Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm. AAMAS 2018: 928-936 - [c47]Qingpeng Cai, Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
Ranking Mechanism Design for Price-setting Agents in E-commerce. AAMAS 2018: 1504-1512 - [c46]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
Buyer-Optimal Distribution. AAMAS 2018: 1513-1521 - [c45]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
A Closed-Form Characterization of Buyer Signaling Schemes in Monopoly Pricing. AAMAS 2018: 1531-1539 - [c44]Pingzhong Tang, Dingli Yu:
Balanced Outcomes in Wage Bargaining. AAMAS 2018: 2091-2093 - [c43]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design. EC 2018: 169 - [c42]Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
The Price of Prior Dependence in Auctions. EC 2018: 485-502 - [c41]Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Vehicle Dispatching for Ride-sharing Platforms via Dynamic Pricing. WWW (Companion Volume) 2018: 51-52 - [c40]Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Pingzhong Tang, Yiwei Zhang:
Reinforcement Mechanism Design for e-commerce. WWW 2018: 1339-1348 - [i24]Feiyang Pan, Qingpeng Cai, Pingzhong Tang, Fuzhen Zhuang, Qing He:
Policy Gradients for Contextual Bandits. CoRR abs/1802.04162 (2018) - [i23]Ling Pan, Qingpeng Cai, Zhixuan Fang, Pingzhong Tang, Longbo Huang:
Rebalancing Dockless Bike Sharing Systems. CoRR abs/1802.04592 (2018) - [i22]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Computer-aided mechanism design: designing revenue-optimal mechanisms via neural networks. CoRR abs/1805.03382 (2018) - [i21]Qingpeng Cai, Ling Pan, Pingzhong Tang:
Generalized deterministic policy gradient algorithms. CoRR abs/1807.03708 (2018) - [i20]Pingzhong Tang, Dingli Yu, Shengyu Zhao:
Group-Strategyproof mechanisms for facility location with Euclidean distance. CoRR abs/1808.06320 (2018) - [i19]Feiyang Pan, Qingpeng Cai, Anxiang Zeng, Chun-Xiang Pan, Qing Da, Hua-Lin He, Qing He, Pingzhong Tang:
Policy Optimization with Model-based Explorations. CoRR abs/1811.07350 (2018) - [i18]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers. CoRR abs/1812.02993 (2018) - 2017
- [j6]Pingzhong Tang, Hanrui Zhang:
Unit-sphere games. Int. J. Game Theory 46(4): 957-974 (2017) - [c39]Lijie Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Ruosong Wang:
Bounded Rationality of Restricted Turing Machines. AAAI 2017: 444-450 - [c38]Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo:
Fans Economy and All-Pay Auctions with Proportional Allocations. AAAI 2017: 713-719 - [c37]Pingzhong Tang, Yifeng Teng, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Yichong Xu:
Computational Issues in Time-Inconsistent Planning. AAAI 2017: 3665-3671 - [c36]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang:
Practical versus Optimal Mechanisms. AAMAS 2017: 78-86 - [c35]Zhiyuan Li, Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang, Tingting Xu, Wei Zhan:
Stability of Generalized Two-sided Markets with Transaction Thresholds. AAMAS 2017: 290-298 - [c34]Zhipeng Jia, Pingzhong Tang, Ruosong Wang, Hanrui Zhang:
Efficient Near-optimal Algorithms for Barter Exchange. AAMAS 2017: 362-370 - [c33]Lijie Chen, Fangzhen Lin, Pingzhong Tang, Kangning Wang, Ruosong Wang, Shiheng Wang:
K-Memory Strategies in Repeated Games. AAMAS 2017: 1493-1498 - [c32]Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Tie-Yan Liu, Weidong Ma, Tao Qin, Pingzhong Tang, Changjun Wang, Bo Zheng:
Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling (Extended Abstract). IJCAI 2017: 4985-4989 - [c31]Pingzhong Tang:
Reinforcement mechanism design. IJCAI 2017: 5146-5150 - [i17]Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Vehicle Dispatching Schemes via Dynamic Pricing. CoRR abs/1707.01625 (2017) - [i16]Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Pingzhong Tang, Yiwei Zhang:
Reinforcement Mechanism Design for e-commerce. CoRR abs/1708.07607 (2017) - [i15]Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu, Michael Zhang, Ruohan Qian, Yan Hong, Zhi Guo, Zongyao Ding, Pengjun Lu, Pingzhong Tang:
Reinforcement Mechanism Design, with Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions. CoRR abs/1711.10279 (2017) - 2016
- [j5]Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Tie-Yan Liu, Weidong Ma, Tao Qin, Pingzhong Tang, Changjun Wang, Bo Zheng:
Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 56: 429-461 (2016) - [c30]Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang, Tingting Xu, Hang Zheng:
Optimizing Trading Assignments in Water Right Markets. AAAI 2016: 551-557 - [c29]Yuan Deng, Pingzhong Tang, Shuran Zheng:
Complexity and Algorithms of K-implementation. AAMAS 2016: 5-13 - [c28]Kai Jin, Pingzhong Tang, Shiteng Chen:
On the Power of Dominated Players in Team Competitions. AAMAS 2016: 14-22 - [c27]Tie-Yan Liu, Weidong Ma, Tao Qin, Pingzhong Tang, Guang Yang, Bo Zheng:
Online Non-Preemptive Story Scheduling in Web Advertising. AAMAS 2016: 269-277 - [c26]Wenyi Fang, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Digital Good Exchange: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1277-1278 - [c25]Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang:
Single Item Auctions with Discrete Action Spaces: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1305-1306 - [c24]Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Pingzhong Tang:
Facility Location with Minimax Envy. IJCAI 2016: 137-143 - [c23]Wenyi Fang, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Digital Good Exchange. IJCAI 2016: 264-270 - [c22]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Dynamic Auctions with Bank Accounts. IJCAI 2016: 387-393 - [c21]Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Chang Liu, Pingzhong Tang:
Mechanism Design for Personalized Recommender Systems. RecSys 2016: 159-166 - [c20]Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang:
Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items. EC 2016: 103-120 - [c19]Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang:
Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete Information. EC 2016: 197-211 - [i14]Kai Jin, Pingzhong Tang, Shiteng Chen:
On the power of dominated players in team competitions. CoRR abs/1602.02063 (2016) - [i13]Pingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang:
Ironing the Border: Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items. CoRR abs/1603.00562 (2016) - [i12]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts. CoRR abs/1605.08840 (2016) - [i11]Suiqian Luo, Pingzhong Tang, Chenggang Wu, Jianyang Zeng:
Approximation of barter exchanges with cycle length constraints. CoRR abs/1605.08863 (2016) - [i10]Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng:
How to manipulate truthful prior-dependent mechanisms? CoRR abs/1606.02409 (2016) - 2015
- [c18]Song Zuo, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal Machine Strategies to Commit to in Two-Person Repeated Games. AAAI 2015: 1071-1078 - [c17]Wenyi Fang, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Randomized Assignments for Barter Exchanges: Fairness vs. Efficiency. ADT 2015: 537-552 - [c16]Lijie Chen, Pingzhong Tang:
Bounded Rationality of Restricted Turing Machines. AAMAS 2015: 1673-1674 - [c15]Qipeng Liu, Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang:
Mechanism design for resource allocation: with applications to centralized multi-commodity routing. AAMAS 2015: 1741-1742 - [c14]Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal Auctions for Partially Rational Bidders. IJCAI 2015: 118-124 - [c13]Suiqian Luo, Pingzhong Tang:
Mechanism Design and Implementation for Lung Exchange. IJCAI 2015: 209-215 - [i9]Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal commitments in auctions with incomplete information. CoRR abs/1502.07431 (2015) - [i8]Yuan Deng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang:
Coalition manipulations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. CoRR abs/1502.07823 (2015) - [i7]Qipeng Liu, Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang:
Mechanism design for resource allocation with applications to centralized multi-commodity routing. CoRR abs/1503.06536 (2015) - [i6]Pingzhong Tang, Hanrui Zhang:
Unit-sphere games. CoRR abs/1509.05480 (2015) - 2014
- [c12]Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang, Wenyi Fang:
Internally Stable Matchings and Exchanges. AAAI 2014: 1433-1439 - [c11]Jian Li, Yicheng Liu, Lingxiao Huang, Pingzhong Tang:
Egalitarian pairwise kidney exchange: fast algorithms vialinear programming and parametric flow. AAMAS 2014: 445-452 - [c10]Qipeng Liu, Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang:
Mechanism design for route allocation in multiple-commodity network. AAMAS 2014: 1607-1608 - [c9]Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus. EC 2014: 227-240 - [c8]Lingqing Ai, Xian Wu, Lingxiao Huang, Longbo Huang, Pingzhong Tang, Jian Li:
The multi-shop ski rental problem. SIGMETRICS 2014: 463-475 - [i5]Weidong Ma, Bo Zheng, Tao Qin, Pingzhong Tang, Tie-Yan Liu:
Online Mechanism Design for Cloud Computing. CoRR abs/1403.1896 (2014) - [i4]Lingqing Ai, Xian Wu, Lingxiao Huang, Longbo Huang, Pingzhong Tang, Jian Li:
The Multi-shop Ski Rental Problem. CoRR abs/1404.2671 (2014) - [i3]Pingzhong Tang, Yifeng Teng, Zihe Wang, Shenke Xiao, Yichong Xu:
Settling the open problems in Kleinberg-Oren time-inconsistent planning models. CoRR abs/1411.7472 (2014) - 2013
- [i2]Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus. CoRR abs/1311.5966 (2013) - 2012
- [c7]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders. AAAI 2012: 1457-1463 - [c6]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices. AAMAS 2012: 729-736 - [c5]Tyler Lu, Pingzhong Tang, Ariel D. Procaccia, Craig Boutilier:
Bayesian Vote Manipulation: Optimal Strategies and Impact on Welfare. UAI 2012: 543-553 - [i1]Tyler Lu, Pingzhong Tang, Ariel D. Procaccia, Craig Boutilier:
Bayesian Vote Manipulation: Optimal Strategies and Impact on Welfare. CoRR abs/1210.4895 (2012) - 2011
- [j4]Pingzhong Tang, Fangzhen Lin:
Discovering theorems in game theory: Two-person games with unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs. Artif. Intell. 175(14-15): 2010-2020 (2011) - [j3]Pingzhong Tang, Fangzhen Lin:
Two equivalence results for two-person strict games. Games Econ. Behav. 71(2): 479-486 (2011) - [c4]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Approximating Optimal Combinatorial Auctions for Complements Using Restricted Welfare Maximization. IJCAI 2011: 379-385 - 2010
- [j2]Pingzhong Tang, Yoav Shoham, Fangzhen Lin:
Designing competitions between teams of individuals. Artif. Intell. 174(11): 749-766 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j1]Pingzhong Tang, Fangzhen Lin:
Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems. Artif. Intell. 173(11): 1041-1053 (2009) - [c3]Pingzhong Tang, Yoav Shoham, Fangzhen Lin:
Team competition. AAMAS (1) 2009: 241-248 - [c2]Pingzhong Tang, Fangzhen Lin:
Discovering Theorems in Game Theory: Two-Person Games with Unique Pure Nash Equilibrium Payoffs. IJCAI 2009: 312-317 - 2008
- [c1]Fangzhen Lin, Pingzhong Tang:
Computer-Aided Proofs of Arrow's and Other Impossibility Theorems. AAAI 2008: 114-119
Coauthor Index
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