The relationship between Russia and China has witnessed a significant growth in the past few decades, especially in the 10 years under the two current Presidents: Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The relationship appears to have now reached its zenith in the post-Cold War time frame. The very fact that both leaders have met each other more than 40 times in the last 10 years is a testament to the strength and significance of the partnership.
A few days before Russia initiated its “special military operation” in Ukraine, Putin visited China. A year later, Xi returned the favour, visiting Russia between March 20 and 22. This is Xi’s first visit to a foreign country after becoming President for the third term, showcasing the importance of the Sino-Russian relationship for him. In fact, his first visit after becoming President for the first time 10 years ago, was also to Putin’s Russia. The latest visit throws substantial light on the emerging trends in the bilateral relations. It also comes against the backdrop of a serious intensification of major world power rivalry, which risks pushing the world into a hot rather than cold war.
Focus of Xi’s visit
Perhaps the most important part of the meeting was Xi’s presentation of China’s 12-point peace plan to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In response, Putin said that “many of the provisions of the peace plan put forward by China are consonant with Russian approaches and can be taken as the basis for a peaceful settlement when the West and Kiev are ready for it”. While putting the onus for peace on the other side and acknowledging China’s self-projected image as peace broker, Russia did not steer away from its current position in the conflict—a win-win outcome for both Xi and Putin.
During the visit, two joint statements were signed: one on “Deepening the Russian-Chinese Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation for a New Era” and another on a “Plan to Promote the Key Elements of Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation until 2030”. Two of these documents, according to Putin, “set forth long-term goals for the governments, businesses and civil society of our two countries in terms of delivering on the objectives we share, which deal with facilitating national development in all areas”. The two sides signed several agreements, including cooperation in the media sector; in fundamental sciences, especially in the nuclear sector; in economic ties in the Russian Far East; and in the management of state-owned companies.
Information exchange and joint production are important in the media sector since both Russia and China’s media outlets are under the radar of the West and increasingly facing restricted access to Western audiences. Western governments are fearful of attempts by Russian and Chinese media to spread their own propaganda as well as interfere and influence elections and domestic politics in Western political systems. Both China and Russia know the power of the media; they have themselves experienced numerous attempts by the West to destabilise their governments using media. The “colour revolutions” that were orchestrated in post-Soviet States such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; the Arab Spring protests; and the string of anti-Beijing protests in Hong Kong have impressed upon the two countries the need to not only safeguard their political systems from hostile foreign media influence but also unleash the same upon their rivals.
Similarly, Russia and China are aware of the importance of coordinating their research in fundamental sciences, especially in nuclear sciences, to ensure that they can complement their strengths and keep up with or even surpass the West in these fields. Science and technology are playing a crucial role in the emerging geopolitical scenario, especially given the rapid advances in areas like artificial intelligence and quantum technologies. In fact, “technological sovereignty” is an important component of both countries’ outlook on technology governance, as evinced in the recent interaction between the two leaders.
A Power of Siberia natural gas pipelines facility in Heihe, Heilongjiang province, China. The two countries are working on setting up a second gas pipeline. | Photo Credit: Bloomberg
Both countries, with a historical legacy of state-led economic development and with the shared experience of managing a transition to market economies, see the strong need to work jointly to make their state-owned companies more agile and effective, and dovetail them with their shared geopolitical trajectories. As the age of decoupling has set in and deepened in the past few years, it becomes essential for both countries to make the best use of their strengths in the state sector to shape the geopolitical rivalry in their favour.
At the level of societal relations, student exchange has been significantly emphasised in Xi’s recent visit. With the possibility of such exchanges becoming restricted in the West for both countries, such cooperation acquires greater relevance than in the past.
Economic engagements
Russia-China bilateral trade doubled in the past decade and has risen by 30 per cent in the last one year of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Bilateral trade is soon expected to cross $200 billion going by the current rate of growth. One of the biggest components of trade is energy, which flows from Russia to China. Russia’s economy is asymmetrically dependent on its natural resources; its economic survival thus depends on its trade in resources. For Russia, China acts as an alternative market for hydrocarbons at a time when access to the West is closing. The recent controversial blasts that damaged the Nord Stream pipelines connecting Russia to its markets in Western Europe are more than emblematic of the direction in which the Russia-Europe energy cooperation is heading.
It is important to note that Russia and China are currently working on setting up a second “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, which passes through Mongolia. The same trend applies to agricultural trade, yet another important part of Sino-Russian economic cooperation, given the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on global food security. Russia is one of the biggest exporters of foodgrains and China is a leading importer of agricultural produce; it therefore becomes strategically essential for both countries to strengthen cooperation in this area. Nearly two-thirds of Russia-China trade is now transacted in their national currencies—the rouble and the yuan. Both countries have been consistently working towards challenging the dollar dominance in the international monetary system.
Highlights
- The relationship between Russia and China has witnessed a significant growth in the past few decades, especially in the 10 years under Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.
- Xi’s visited Russia between March 20 and 22, his first visit to a foreign country after becoming President for the third time.
- The latest visit throws light on the emerging trends in the bilateral relations. It also comes against the backdrop of a serious intensification of major world power rivalry.
Region-wise coordination
There are immense prospects for collaborative partnership between Russia and China in certain regions, especially the Arctic, where the rising impact of global warming has opened up new opportunities in sectors such as resource extraction and transportation. Russia is an Arctic state with massive prospects for fisheries as well as resources like oil and natural gas. Moreover, the Northern Sea Route, probably the most navigable transcontinental polar sea route which may become ice-free in the future, runs close to the entire northern coastline of Russia. China is aiming to use this sea route extensively in future to diversify its trade routes with Europe—it already has the Indo-Pacific sea lanes connecting it to the continent via the Mediterranean, and has in the last decade developed a network of overland connectivity routes to Europe spanning the entire post-Soviet space.
In short, the so-called “Polar Silk Road” will be a new third leg of its decade-old silk road mega-project—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Together, they will encircle as well as cut through the Eurasian landmass, developing a network of arteries for China’s power projection. Russia, on the other hand, has its own big idea—the Eurasian Economic Union, through which it plans to recreate the Soviet sphere of influence. As far as regions like West Asia-North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are concerned, Russia and China seem to be coordinating their positions, with Russia offering security cooperation and China offering economic and developmental cooperation. This coordinated strategising has posed a significant challenge to the sustenance of deep-rooted Western influence in these regions. By complementing each other’s regional strategies, they are seeking to gain better geopolitical dividends.
Taiwan and China
China and Russia have deeply revanchist territorial approaches—with China planning to “re-integrate” Taiwan with the mainland and Russia wanting to integrate parts of Ukraine. There are parallels here and at the same time differences in how the two issues are dealt with by the two countries. Experts observe that China is keenly watching developments in the Ukraine theatre to plan for a similar eventuality across the Taiwan strait. China has, at multiple times, said that it will exercise the military option to reunify Taiwan with the mainland if circumstances call for it. With Taiwan, like Ukraine, having an assertive leadership unwilling to bend, such a scenario cannot be ruled out in the future. In fact, recent key assessments from the US government predict that a military invasion by China on Taiwan is bound to happen, most probably within this decade. Xi Jinping’s sustained calls over the last half decade to the People’s Liberation Army for war preparedness as well as Beijing’s recurrent signalling point to this.
Ukrainian soldiers fire a self-propelled howitzer towards Russian positions near Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine, on March 5. During Xi’s visit, China presented a 12-point peace plan to resolve the conflict. | Photo Credit: LIBKOS/AP
What lessons China will learn from Russia’s struggle to obtain its objectives within a limited time frame and war effort is far from certain. However, it is certain that Russia’s “special military operation” may not be replicated in large parts by China. Even though Beijing appears to have been planning for quick and decisive victories and not a prolonged conflict, it might still have to rethink its options. How to fight and win a war of attrition amidst escalating sanctions by the West is something China may find expedient to consider. Moreover, Taiwan is an island, not a neighbour with a contiguous land border. In addition, even though Taiwan may hardly match the size of the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine, the terrain is totally different. Unlike the latter’s homogenous flat terrain with agricultural fields dominating the landscape, Taiwan is largely mountainous and forested, surrounded by densely populated urban centres. The mode of warfare that China may use against Taiwan is bound to be radically different from what Russia has used against Ukraine.
In addition to all this, unlike Ukraine, which is still not part of the American alliance even after a year of the conflict, Taiwan is an ally of the US. The Joe Biden administration has at multiple times indicated, albeit not without controversy, that it will come to Taiwan’s support with military means if necessary. In short, China will have to face tougher challenges than Russia in fulfilling its territorial objectives.
The meeting points
Russia and China increasingly share a common world view and strategy at the macro level. Both the countries have emphasised that they will strive jointly towards achieving “a more just and democratic multipolar world order, which should be based on the central role of the UN, its Security Council, international law, and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”. However, their actions have been more revisionist in tone. Efforts like the RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral, the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) grouping, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have been manifestations of this at the multilateral level.
Both have also come together to talk about critical issues like strategic stability—their joint draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) at the United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament being a case in point. Although such a treaty appears to be in line with their global quest for a more just world order, it is specifically aimed at undercutting US efforts at weaponising space. The US domination of the international system is in the cross hairs of their joint struggle.
“China and Russia have deeply revanchist territorial approaches—with China planning to “re-integrate” Taiwan with the mainland and Russia wanting to integrate parts of Ukraine.”
Nevertheless, the Sino-Russia relationship has its limitations at micro levels. The two countries do not yet have a military alliance, which could have taken their ties to the level matching the Sino-Soviet alliance under Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin. Sino-Russian relations still suffer from the legacy of the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s that resulted in a violent border conflict. Today, the borders are mutually agreed, fully defined, and well-demarcated international boundaries, yet there is still some uneasiness on both sides. On the Russian side of the eastern border, both the Russians and the Chinese have historical claims going back to the times when Tsarist Russia and Qing China contested over the region.
Present ground realities do not help either. Russia’s Far East is a concern for Moscow—the region is located several time zones away from Moscow and too close to Beijing and hardly populated compared with the densely populated Chinese provinces across the border. This area has vast unexploited resources on which China has an eye. Russia’s experience with the resulting influx of Chinese people, investments and influence has been far from pleasant. There is also some wariness in Russia over China’s rising strategic footprint in the Central Asian region, which has traditionally been part of the Russian sphere of influence.
China has, notably, not supported Russia’s move in Ukraine, only backing its justification. China’s relationship with Ukraine and Europe is far more positive than that of Russia and, therefore, requires striking at least a superficial balance between the two conflicting sides.
In the larger scheme of things, however, it is certain that the Sino-Russian axis will gain further cohesion because of intensifying systemic rivalry in the international system. The “Ukraine-Taiwan equivalence” will only cement this increasingly robust partnership. The two have “bigger fish to fry” than dwelling on mutual suspicions; if they do not present a united front against the US-dominated international system, they may well not exist in their current forms to fight over differences. While the differences may put some limits on an otherwise “no limits” partnership, they might well reserve that inevitable fight for another day.
Dr Anand V. is Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the China Study Centre at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education. The views expressed in the article are personal.
