INSS Israel

The new issue of INSS Strategic Assessment: Hamas and the New Great Game, Israeli Deterrence and the October 7 Attack, China–UAE Space Cooperation: Risk or Opportunity for Israel? and many more... | All the articles are waiting for you here >> https://bit.ly/3WXB1kI

The Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh: A Significant but not a Decisive Development A researcher in the Palestinian program at INSS, Yohanan Tzoreff, writes: The assassination of the chairman of the Political Bureau of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, is certainly a significant event. Haniyeh has led the organization since 2017, when he was first elected chairman, and again in 2021 when he was elected a second time. It is still too early to determine how his assassination will affect the war and Hamas as an organization, but its timing in the middle of a war, and after the assassination of Hezbollah senior official Fuad Shukr in Lebanon as well as of Haniyeh’s deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, several months ago may have a cumulative effect. It must be remembered that Haniyeh was never number 1 in the organization. In the short history of Hamas, there has never been anyone whose status has been recognized and accepted as standing above everyone else, except for Ahmed Yassin. This also shows the nature of the organization and perhaps the secret of its survival: having a very broad popular base and making cardinal decisions by consensus and shared responsibility. Hamas will quickly find Haniyeh’s replacement and continue on its path while adapting to the needs of the hour. It is worth noting that after the assassination of Yassin, there was a turnaround that led to Hamas’s participation in the 2006 elections, in contrast to its opposition to participating in the 1996 elections. The question is whether after 10 months of a bloody war, can an event of this type bring about a new way of thinking in Hamas? It’s still too early to say, and any assessment in this matter before the release of the hostages and the end of the war would be premature. But as mentioned, the cumulative effect that can influence Israel in a positive direction also has significance. As far as Iran is concerned, Haniyeh’s assassination reveals its weaknesses as a sponsor, unable to protect its allies that it hosts, its intelligence vulnerabilities, and its great arrogance.

Two Assassinations in Two Capital Cities: Insights and Implications for the Future INSS researcher and former deputy head of the National Security Council, Lt. Col. (ret.) Orna Mizrahi, writes: The surprising assassination of Fuad Shukr (Hajj Mohsin), Nasrallah’s right-hand man, after the disaster in Majdal Shams, is a very hard and painful blow to Hezbollah. It once again proves Israel’s intelligence and operational capabilities, as they attacked in a targeted manner in the heart of the Dahiyeh neighborhood, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut. This assassination is significant not only because of Shukr’s status and importance within the organization, serving as a sort of chief of staff at Nasrallah’s side, but also due to his direct responsibility as the head of Hezbollah’s strategic array for attacks on Israel’s northern communities since October 8, and specifically for the killing of the 12 Druze children in Majdal Shams. A few hours later, the assassination of a senior Hamas official, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Political Bureau, during his visit to Tehran (for which Israel has not taken responsibility), further strengthens Israel’s sense of capability and courage, but also contributes to the confusion and embarrassment among the leaders of the “axis of resistance,” led by Nasrallah and the Iranians, who are now required to react against Israel. From our experience so far, the elimination of senior officials has not produced a change at the strategic level, and their main benefit comes from the cognitive value associated with it and the short-term consequences on the developments on the ground. The elimination in Lebanon will not stop the “war of attrition” that Hezbollah is waging against Israel in the north, but it seems that under the current circumstances, after almost 10 months of fighting, it is an appropriate response that allows both sides to avoid a wide war, which neither is interested in at this stage. Consultations are now being held in Beirut and Tehran on how to respond. Before the assassination of Shukr, Hezbollah, which hesitates to admit his death, had already committed to carrying out an equivalent response to the results of the Israeli operation and had warned against an attack in Beirut. Therefore, it is possible to estimate with certainty that an unusual reaction is expected, but it seems that due to the relatively limited nature of the Israeli action, the attack by Hezbollah will be such that allows Israel to “contain” the event. A lot depends on what Israel will do, especially in circumstances where at the same time a move by Iran is also possible, since the elimination of Haniyeh happened under the noses of its security forces, as well as the desire of the Houthis to retaliate against Israel for the attack on the Hodeida Port.

The Disaster in Majdal Shams: How to Respond? Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman writes: The disaster in Majdal Shams requires a tough and different Israeli response from what has been done so far, but it is important to act wisely. According to the details known so far, it seems that Hezbollah fired a heavy rocket and took responsibility for the shooting (it claimed that it had aimed at Mount Hermon and took responsibility before realizing the serious consequences). Upon learning of the results of the attack and the harm to children and youth, it retracted its acceptance of responsibility in a rather unusual way. Hezbollah’s attempt to deny any connection to the shooting indicates that Nasrallah understands that this disaster endangers its standing with the Druze community in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s shooting was apparently aimed at the headquarters of the Hermon Brigade as a response to Israel’s foiling of a unit from the Radwan Force. However, it does not matter as far as Israel is concerned—Hezbollah is responsible for this massacre and must pay the price. So what is the right thing to do now? Hezbollah has made a grave mistake. Harming children, and in particular Druze in the Golan Heights, puts it in a negative light in Lebanon. This is added to the fury of many Lebanese over the country’s deterioration into a war against Israel, which for them is completely unnecessary. Therefore, time is now working in our favor. It is better to let Hezbollah cook a little in the terrible stew it has created. Therefore, it is not urgent to act within hours. A response after a few days would also be appropriate. In this case it would be wrong to act from the gut. It is always true to think before acting, and now even more so. In the end, Israel must react harshly, there is no doubt. Israel can respond using a large number of methods and against a wide variety of targets. Israel has several strategic surprises, which should be kept and activated only when they lead to a maximal achievement. In conclusion, the serious situation on the northern border needs to be resolved, and the security system is preparing for this. However, one must not get confused—attention must be directed to the north without neglecting the hostages in Gaza. Even a temporary lull in the fighting in Gaza in favor of the hostage deal can give enough time and allow the IDF to act differently in Lebanon. It is worth taking advantage of the upcoming round of talks in Rome to achieve this. The article was first published on the N12 website

Elections for the Syrian Parliament: Not Free, Not Fair A member of the Syria program at INSS, Mika Naftali, writes: On July 15, national elections for the Syrian parliament were held in most of the areas under the control of the Assad regime. These are the fourth elections since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. The 250-member Syrian parliament has traditionally been controlled by the Ba’ath party—the party of President Assad. This control is not likely to be undermined, in addition to the fact that the parliament in practice has no real power vis-à-vis the presidency. In the current elections, about 1,500 candidates competed for the 250 seats in the Syrian parliament. The ruling Ba’ath party is expected to take about 70% of the seats (along with its allies, members of the “Progressive National Front” parties). The rest of the seats are expected to be taken by independent candidates. The process of selecting the candidates is subject to strict procedures by the Central Election Commission, which checks and approves (in cooperation with the Syrian intelligence) the submission of the candidacy. The committee makes sure to choose candidates who identify with the regime’s values and ensures that they are not members of the opposition, which ensures the regime’s continued control of the parliament. Holding parliamentary elections once every four years allows the regime to demonstrate its governance and presence in the territories it controls. In fact, it is a symbolic act designed to create the appearance of legitimacy for Assad’s regime, even though it is not a real democratic election. It should be noted that the presidential elections, which occur once every seven years, were last held in 2021, with President Assad winning 95% of the votes. Despite the existence of the elections, protests were held on the day of voting. These protests, led by the Druze community in As-Suwayda in southern Syria, have been ongoing for nearly a year against the Assad regime. Protestors broke into dozens of polling stations in different localities, expelled the members of the polling committees, scattered the ballots, or set them on fire. These protests have been taking place against the backdrop of the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria and have been highlighting the regime’s inadequate response to the citizens’ difficulties amid the crisis.

The SCO: A cooperation between Eurasia countries or a bloc against the American-led international system?   Paul Weisko   The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its 24th Summit on July 3-4 in Astana. The leaders of SCO member states attended the summit, including the presidents from China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and Pakistan's Prime Minister. India's President Modi did not attend the summit. Still, he sent his Minister of External Affairs instead, signaling a cautious approach due to Russia’s close ties with China and questions about what India could gain from the SCO. The placeholder for the Iranian presidency also attended the summit. The presence of Turkey's and Azerbaijan's leaders as dialogue partners and the leader of the new SCO member, Belarus, further highlighted the summit's significance.   The Astana Declaration was a key outcome of this SCO summit. The declaration included a call for a multipolar world order, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism efforts. It also condemned civilian deaths in Gaza and denounced double standards regarding terrorism. However, given Iran’s participation, it is doubtful that these clauses were intended to target groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.   In addition to BRICS, the SCO is one of the few international organizations in which China plays a leadership role. In his speech at the summit, Xi Jinping called for “an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, practice true multilateralism, and make global governance more just and equitable” and stated that “the SCO should make its important contribution to eliminating the deficits in peace, development, security, and governance.” This indicates China’s vision for the world and what it intends to replace the current world order with should it fall. However, as the organization shifted from countering nationalistic activities among Central Asian populations to being billed as an alternative to NATO, it has lost much of its effectiveness in addressing regional issues due to too many countries' animosity towards each other.

The Operation to Eliminate Deif: The Impact on the War and Effect on Sinwar INSS’ senior researcher, Prof. Kobi Michael, writes: The results of the operation to eliminate Mohammed Deif are still unclear, but if the goal was indeed achieved (something that, according to media reports, is “highly probable”), it is a worthy and important operation that to some extent is comparable to the operations to eliminate Qassem Soleimani and Imad Mornia. All three were experienced, senior officials, very significant centers of knowledge and highly important symbols in their organization and outside of it. The elimination of Deif becomes even more significant given the current reality of severe damage to Hamas’ military wing and its transition to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. However, it is important to remember that organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah are more than the sum of their components or commanders. Israel has previously eliminated the leaders of these organizations and other very senior military figures, and yet the organizations continued to grow, develop and become more significant security threats to Israel, while establishing their status as political players in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas. I believe that the elimination (if indeed successful) will definitely have an effect on Sinwar, who lost a partner and a close friend (the two are childhood friends who grew up in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, joined Hamas together and were among the founders of the military wing). On the other hand, it is far from obvious that this will lead Sinwar to significantly moderate his position due to a fear of being similarly targeted. It is important to remember—Sinwar is not afraid of death. He sees himself and the struggle through religious, historical and messianic lenses. As long as he stands on his own two feet and leads the organization in the Gaza Strip, he will remain the mover and shaker and the most influential factor when it comes to the hostage release deal.

The Important Key Country Barely Mentioned in the Presidential Debate Ofir Dayan, a researcher at the INSS’s Glazer Israel–China Policy Center, writes: As far as China is concerned, the historic presidential showdown between incumbent President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump was both surprising and unsurprising. Unsurprisingly, China was not mentioned much in a debate that traditionally—and in accordance with the American voting pattern—focuses on domestic issues. But surprisingly, and despite the discourse surrounding China and its threats to Taiwan, Beijing was mentioned almost exclusively in an economic context and not a political-security one. As expected, the contestant who mentioned China by name in all cases, except for one, is former President Trump who spoke about the 10% protective tariffs that he wishes to levy on all goods entering the United States, in order to make countries, including China, pay sums that will reduce the American deficit. Biden, for his part, attacked Trump and said that he did not achieve any progress on the issue with China during his tenure, while Trump chose to return to the issue in his concluding statement and contradict Biden’s claim of the lowest trade deficit with China since 2010 and said that today the deficit with China is actually the largest. Trump referred almost absent-mindedly to China from a political perspective when he said that now, under the Biden administration, the leaders of the US rivals—Kim Jong-Un of North Korea, Xi of China, and Putin of Russia—no longer respect the Western power. This lack of respect, he claimed, could ignite a third world war and could actually lead to economic cooperation between China and Iran, which would stop and isolate Iran if the United States would refuse to do business with any country, including China, that maintains economic relations with Iran. The almost complete disregard of China by the two presidents on a stage where they are only interested in talking about their achievements, may indicate a lack of positive progress on the issue, especially given the growing tensions in the South China Sea and between China and Taiwan and China and the Philippines. But it also shows the large gap between American policy makers and their interest in China and in its military capabilities and that of the public, which focuses mainly on the economic issue, a framing that was used by the two presidents in the debate.

The Supreme Court’s Decision on the Conscription Law: Insights The executive director of INSS, Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman, has some insights on the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the conscription law: 1. The Supreme Court of Justice stated the obvious. The operational need and the cost of the war oblige us to increase the scope of recruitment for the IDF. This is a need that is true both on an ethical level and on a professional-operational level. 2. We are facing unusual security challenges that will accompany us for several years. Even if we don’t initiate endless wars all over the Middle East, the defense needs require it. 3. Security service for all is the current need also from a social perspective. This is an opportunity to create a more equal, more moral, and more cohesive Israeli society. 4. The IDF can recruit everyone, and this requires preparation. There is no long-term significance to the number 3,000. Its meaning is tactical, irrelevant in the long run, and I suggest abandoning this number before it becomes sacred. 5. The Supreme Court’s decision is an opportunity to implement a national plan for an adapted and integrated service for all, in accordance with the policy recommendation published by the Institute for National Security Studies: “A multi-dimensional service model”—a proposal to change the personnel structure of the IDF. To read INSS’s policy recommendation on the conscription law>>https://lnkd.in/diF4KTNT

The War in Gaza Harms Israeli–Moroccan Normalization INSS researcher Dr. Morr Link writes: A recent Arab Barometer report, published last month, reveals troubling findings from an Israeli perspective. The latest opinion poll indicates a sharp decline in popular support for normalization between Israel and Arab states, including Morocco, dropping from 31% in 2022 to only 13%. This marks a significant shift in Morocco, which previously had high levels of support for normalization compared to other Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan. This decline is attributed to how the Arab world, including Morocco, views the ongoing war in Gaza. According to the poll’s findings, Moroccans commonly describe the events in Gaza as a massacre (26%), a war (24%), a genocide (14%), or a mass killing (14%). Since October, almost weekly protests have been held in Morocco in support of the Palestinians, commonly calling for severing of ties between Israel and Morocco. This trend exacerbates the tension between Morocco’s official policy of maintaining ties with Israel, albeit at a low profile, and the increasing public and political opposition. On the one hand, the Kingdom has allowed public demonstrations in support of the Palestinians, an issue that has gained significant support in Morocco and in the Arab world in general. Over the years, the Royal Palace has consistently reiterated its support for the Palestinians to establish a state within the 1967 borders, alongside Israel. These demonstrations also help deflect attention from pressing domestic issues such as the cost of living. On the other hand, the Kingdom has shown little tolerance for open criticism of its official policies of continuing its ties with Israel, and at least two people have been arrested in recent months for criticizing its policies. While key aspects of Israeli–Moroccan relations remain unaffected by the war in Gaza—bilateral trade continues, and security ties remain intact—other important aspects have been significantly harmed, most notably overt diplomatic ties, official visits, and tourism. This pattern of fluctuating relations during periods of escalation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is not new. Israel would do well to remember that Morocco’s support for the Palestinians may extend beyond lip service. During the Second Intifada, Morocco went as far as severing relations with Israel due to the conflict’s escalation, and it took nearly twenty years to renew them.