



Attackers Don't Follow Your Rules

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To know your enemy, you must become your enemy.

– Sun Tzu

If you want to defeat an adversary, you must at least understand their capabilities. This is especially true for cyber adversaries, and a tenet at the heart of red team engagements.

Red teaming is the practice of safely conducting real-world attacks against an organization to identify vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in network architecture, gaps in security controls and deficiencies within security operations. While generic penetration testing can be useful, deeper mission-based exercises guided by threat intelligence are far more effective. They can reveal the most relevant actions needed to protect an organization's critical assets, improve technical controls and create resilience through operational enhancements and overhauls.

Case study: Nation-state CEO attack

A recent Mandiant client was concerned about news reports of attackers specifically targeting CEOs and the uptick in the use of zero-day attacks.¹ Mandiant was contacted to undertake a red team exercise, solely focusing on email access and applied only to the primary organization.

Following a review of the initial brief, Mandiant highlighted limitations in the original scope and suggested a more realistic threat scenario:

- It was practical to assume that zero-day access, by its nature, would be successful against the targeted resource. Initial recon of the organization's attack surface showed that a Microsoft Exchange or VPN server would be a good initial starting point.
- The CEO's email, while always an interesting target, was not the primary goal of this organization's adversaries. Mandiant determined that nation-state actors such as APT29, seeking access to research information and government connections were a more realistic attack scenario.
- 3. As a bilateral trust setup exists between the organization and its holdings, a compromise in any single subsidiary would mean a compromise for all. A supply-chain attack or subsidiary breach would be the easiest way in for an attacker.

The exercise also focused on assessing whether post-exploitation attacker activities within the network could be detected. Phishing emails eventually get past email defenses; whether through luck, misconfiguration, exploit usage or a combination of all three. The defenses that trigger after a payload has been deployed should therefore be tested.

To enhance the exercise, the team used the phishing elements of APT29's attack campaign.² New techniques that APT29 might use to remain stealthy inside the organization were noted and new C2 channels via third-party storage solutions were added to the setup.

^{1.} Mandiant (April 21, 2022). Zero Tolerance: More Zero-Days Exploited in 2021 Than Ever Before.

^{2.} Mandiant (April 28, 2022). Trello From the Other Side: Tracking APT29 Phishing Campaigns.




Figure 1. Attack lifecycle for the APT29 threat group.

Execution

As expected, the phishing controls and training performed well. In the first few weeks, they thwarted all efforts to get a foothold into the system. However, by subtly altering the content of the phishing message and switching from wide-spread targeting to spear-phishing, a single visit to the red team hosted website resulted in the download of the ISO file. The file did not contain the mark-of-the-web indicator, so no security warnings were displayed to the victim user and the hidden files executed as a DLL search-order hijack attack, giving the red team access to a single user system.

Endpoint detection and response (EDR) was bypassed by exploiting permissive "safe folders" on the system. Quick lateral movement of the system was achieved via the victim user's access to files containing clear-text passwords in a source code sharing solution. This gave admin rights on several database servers, one of which did not have active security solutions running.

In parallel, the supply-chain simulation performed on an information exchange system managed to escalate their privileges to administrator and dump credentials from memory through a version of Mimikatz, changed to reflect custom threat actor techniques. The credentials revealed the past presence of a user from the central domain and lateral movement into the network was secured by using these credentials against the originating system.

The two paths converged to exploit weaknesses in the Active Directory configuration, escalate privileges and acquire domain administrator level access and full control over the internal network. In the original scenario this would have been the end of our mission, but the current objective was defined as "access to critical IP."

Using the high-level access acquired, Mandiant identified systems within a segregated subnet and cloud resources, which contained information required to access the organization's critical IP. By using the internal package deployment system within the domain, a permit-listed version of the Mandiant implant was moved to the identified research lead's system and then run.

Various methods to access the research systems were explored; having access to the user password via keylogging was not enough. A custom piece of code was written to trigger a very realistic but fake two-factor authentication prompt on the victim machine to steal the temporary token and log in with full access. The theft of a critical piece of data could now be simulated and the mission was complete.

Expanding the original red team mission from basic email compromise to mimicking APT29 tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) provided the organization with deeper insights. They were now able to identify and address controls that provided only surface level coverage, could be bypassed or were perhaps never encountered at all.

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