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CRASH AND PAY: OWNING AND CLONING PAYMENT DEVICES



Agenda

- Basics of an EMV payment transaction
- Review of Attacks
- Cloning A Mastercard
- Cloning A VISA
- EMV Issues
- ApplePay
- Tools Used
- Software Developed
- Key takeaways from this talk




ATC	Application Transaction Counter	Monotonic counter of transactions performed	
UN	Unpredictable Number	Random number used in transaction	
CVV/ CVC	Card Verification Value (VISA)/ Card Verification Code (Mastercard)	Used to prevent alteration of data on the card.	
dCVV/ CVC3	CVV3(MasterCard)/ dynamic CVV(Visa)	Used to prevent alteration of card data and prevent cloning of cards.	
ττα	Terminal Transaction Qualifiers (Visa)	Indicates what kind of card verification the terminal supports	
PAN	Personal Account Number Account Number assigned to the user		
PSE	Payment Systems Environment	Tells terminal that the card is a banking card	
AID	Application IdentifierTells terminal what brands the card supports (MasterCarVisa etc.)		
PDOL	Processing Data Options List	g Data Options List List of tags we need the terminal to send the card (amount, UN etc.).	
AFL	Application File Locator	Indicate what records the terminal needs to read.	
AIP	Application Interchange Profile	Field to tell the terminal what authentications the card supports	

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The Payment Transaction Flow



Transaction Initialization




6F2F840E325041592 E5359532E4444630 31A51DBF0C1A61184 F07A000000041010 870101500A4D41535 44552434152449000

6F388407A0000000 41010A52D500A4D41 53544552434152448 701015F2D02656E9F 1101019F120A32382 044656772656573BF 0C059F4D020B0A900



Get Transaction Parameters and Records




771282025880940 C08010100100101 01180102009000


706A9F6C0200019F65021C 009F660203FE9F6B135444 XXXXXXX0108D150220100 0000000000009F6701059F 6206000000001C009F6306 000000003FE5629423534 343433343333031343630 3130385E202F5E31353032 323031303030303030303030 303030309F640105900



MasterCard Magstripe Transaction








7081A05713544434330146 0108D15022011920000000 000F5A0854443433014601 085F24031502285F250310 11235F280200365F340101 8C219F02069F03069F1A02 95055F2A029A039C019F37 049F35019F45029F4C089F 34038D0C910A8A0295059F 37049F4C088E0E0000000 000000042031E031F039F 07023D009F080200029F0D 05F0508408009F0E050000 0000009F0F05F070848000 9F420200369F4A0182900 7081E08F01059F32010390 81B0B1F425CF818E9625C9 A6336C05D04DF2EF341C64 B47FA94AF66BFF42349E1C 56CA58C6715BEB39DE1F9B EE49234D9005FD65A7F3FF






D5DD3864ABFBEAF70EE6B3 A1FF829CCC44610D0972AC 67A6DB9A0D1F88C809DAE4 BA34AF5D3290D5AD128D28 D6B9B0D913D9571C2E53DD 702C5A4574B2E22F9B568D EE97688C89EF146CAE0DEF C5C8CAA66FE0AA519B4BCD 226DB89E1728B1105D8A1C AE35F9DF01FD05D13D7991 44C187968EEF600012DBC4 7672FFF80EA099DDB2DD5A 3CCF6E4D50307A358F3C53 848AF3B12257900

70049F470103900





7081949F46819022DC74BE C45F5C94B20A42260D7DF6 450CCA89BA64873A91DA5E 4EB12B112C71C1CEA58064 4EF61E315F06371924718D A74D5204F3489AAAA929F1 20E7CBC51DB0B25D0E7CFC DC74394E3630941C05BBDF C39898286F582190CD09D2 658B00565ED56C50C465EF BD7847E6162C913C5F6976 D24EBDC5719D9A1A809246 14DA7E5AD5E324C3798DC1 268C481BB66D42FC900


88E672EF9E10EA7E900



Contactless Card

Bank of Elbonia

7781819F2701809F360208 D99F4B6052382F51D261DB ED1D801A1FED56D2DA279F 4EA048FE0FFB296875D5DA 056D606582849307A9EAF2 1D96FAF9648C80AF50118F 40495877DD6D6E32A404CB C0B67D48490216D7307361 D5B380909F7B6CC45D311F 2C9AC08802944528B35AA0 859F10120210A040012200 0000000000000000000FF 900



Terminal

80AE90002B00000 000000100000000 00000360000000 000003614010100 000000001100008 8E672EF9E10EA7E 00000000

here is a serie of the series of the series

A Review of Attacks



Police in talks with banks to fight tap-and-go crime wave

MARK BUTTLER HERALD SUN JANUARY 16, 2015 10:00PM

- This is the major form of fraud from contactless transactions.
- Contactless (and Chip in the US) require no authentication.
- Limited by transaction amounts
 - £20 in the UK
 - AUD\$80 in Australia etc.



- Contactless/contact transactions contain no distance bounding protections.
- Made easier with the emergence of native support for Host Card Emulation on Android
- See the talks and papers:
- 2007 "Keep Your Enemies Close: Distance Bounding Against Smartcard Relay Attacks." Saar Drimer and Steven J. Murdoch @ Cambridge
- 2012 "NFC Hacking: The Easy Way" Eddie Lee @ Defcon
- 2015 "Relay Attacks in EMV Contactless Cards with Android OTS Devices" Ricardo Rodriguez and Pepe Vila @ HITB




Solutions








Card Cloning





Cards are mini HSMs

- Cards have hardware crypto accelerators and key storage.
- Physical protections against attack
- Small attack surface
- Normally EAL CC 5+ certified
 - Semiformally Designed and Tested
 - Includes testing for side-channel attacks




Symmetric Keys

Кеу	Name	Description
KD _{CVC3}	ICC Derived Key for CVC3 Generation	Symmetric Key used for generating the CVC3
MK _{AC}	ICC Application Cryptogram Master Key	Symmetric Key used to derive the session key for generation of the Application Cryptogram
SK _{AC}	ICC Application Cryptogram Session Key	Symmetric Key used to generate the Application Cryptogram



blackhat Dynamic Signing







Jackhat Transaction Cloning

- Full chip based EMV transaction take time
- Requires upstream equipment to support (terminal upgrades, new HSMs etc.).
- So the contactless standards includes modes to support old equipment and quick transactions.
- Key to the cloning of transactions is the "Magstripe" modes
- These are designed to be used with equipment that can only support magnetic card data
- MasterCard Magstripe Mode
- VISA dCVV and CVN17

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Cloning Transactions



Magstripe Mode


 Magstripe mode consists of the terminal generating track data similar to the physical magstripe.


MasterCard

- We get the card to generate a dynamic CVV that the terminal insert into the track.
- This is sent off to the payment processor for verification.
- The weaknesses is how the CVVs are generated



Compute Cryptographic Checksum







Forming the UN

Length of UN = NumBitsSet(Ktrack) – Ttrack

Ktrack = Number of non zero bits in the track 1 bit map Ttrack = Number of digits of ATC to be included

CVV is formatted as Binary Coded Decimal.

Take a UN of 4 bytes:

- 4 bytes binary = 2³² values = 4,294,967,296
- 4 bytes BCD = 10⁸ values = 100,000,000
- UN length of $2 = 10^2$ values = 100



How to clone a transaction

- 1. Read and copy card records
- 2. Generate dictionary of COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM responses for all possible terminal random numbers
- 3. Flip the M/CHIP support bit (tag 82)
- 4. Replay stored records to the terminal
- 5. Look up UN returned by the terminal in the dictionary
- 6. Collect purchase and get out of there.



How long does it take?



Scan your Paypass!

Track 1 UN Length 2 decimal places Track 2 UN Length 2 decimal places Number of transactions to clone:

100.0 Time to Clone

0.25 Minutes

🖬 🗉 🔺 🔹 🔍 🖬 16:10

Scan your Paypass!

Track 1 UN Length **4 decimal places** Track 2 UN Length **4 decimal places** Number of transactions to clone:

10000.0

Time to Clone

25.0 Minutes

 < 0 □

https://github.com/peterfillmore/Check-Paypass-Random-Number



Demo





The flaw is built into the system

A PayPass card using the MasterCard brand:

- Must support *PayPass*—Mag Stripe transactions (unless for domestic use only)
- May support PayPass—M/Chip transactions

R ALL The Unpredictable Number must be at least 2 digits in length.

The terminal should monitor the number of aborted transactions. If the frequency is high it is likely that a fraudster is trying to get a specific value of the Unpredictable Number. The terminal should take appropriate measures to reduce the risks of an attack, such as introducing wait times after three aborted transactions.

Paypass – M/Chip Requirements 2013



Attack can be detected on the card issuers side – ATC will jump.

Fixes

- Card issuers need to issue cards with UN lengths of at least 4.
- Issuers should prompt for a second factor of authentication on failed transaction
 - PIN, Insert Chip Card
- Payment Processors should reject non M/Chip transactions over contactless.
- Terminals must be tested on RNG generation

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Cloning a VISA



- Dynamic CVV dCVV
 - Legacy magstripe equivalent mode
 - ► Terrible, broken on release
- Cryptogram Version Number 17 CVN17
 - Updated to magstripe equivalent mode
 - ► Lot better than dCVV
- Quick Visa Smart Debit/Credit qVSDC
 - Reduced EMV mode
 - Defined in standard for speed
- Visa Smart Debit/Credit VSDC
 - ▶ Full EMV mode (i.e. CDA)
 - Slower requires card to be in field for complete transaction



9F66 - TTQ – Terminal Transaction Qualifier

Table 3 - Terminal Transaction Qualifiers (Tag '9F66')

Byte	Bit	Definition		
1	8	11 - Contactless magnetic stripe (MSD) supported 10 - Contactless magnetic stripe (MSD) not supported		
	7	'1' - Contactiess VSDC supported '0' - Contactiess VSDC not supported		
	6	'1' – Contactiess qVSDC supported '0' – Contactiess qVSDC not supported		
	5	'1' - Contact VSDC supported 0' - Contact VSDC not supported		
	4	'1' – Reader is Offine Only '0' – Reader is Online Capable		
	3	"1" – Online PIN supported 10" – Online PIN not supported		
	2	'1' – Signature supported 0' – Signature not supported		
	1	RFU-bX		
2	8	 '1' – Online cryptogram required '0' – Online cryptogram not required 		
	7	'1' – CVM required '0' – CVM not required		
	6-1	RFU - b'xxxxxxx'		
3	8-1	RFU - b'xxxxxxxxx		
4	8-1	RFU – b'xxxxxxxx		

Table 1 – Summary of Possible Card / Reader Interactions

Contactless Card Capability Reader Configuration	MSD and qVSDC	MSD, qVSDC, and VSDC
MSD and qVSDC	qVSDC	qVSDC
qVSDC only	qVSDC	qVSDC
qVSDC and VSDC	qVSDC	VSDC
MSD, qVSDC, and VSDC	qVSDC	VSDC
MSD and VSDC	MSD	VSDC
MSD	MSD	MSD



dCVV Mode







Figure 5 – Dynamic CVV Algorithm






Cloning

- 1. Read and copy card records
- 2. Turn the magstripe bit on (set AIP bytes to 0x0080
- 3. Replay stored records to the terminal
- 4. Collect purchase and get out of there.



Demo





Prevention


It has been agreed that a migration from dCVV to Cryptogram Version 17 will take place for MSD readers and that by a migration date to be determined, MSD readers will support Cryptogram 17. An MSD market is not a full data market and Cryptogram 10 is not supported in these markets.

- Requires explicit support from the terminal
- This mode has been obsoleted by the CVN17 method
- Requires that the terminal support dCVV mode.
- So the payment processor should disable dCVV mode on the terminal.
- Issued cards should not support this mode (my debit VISA card only supports fDDA modes)



CVN17

- Here we use the "Get Processing Options" command to generate the Application Cryptogram
- This is transmitted separately from the track data
- Also contains amounts, currency and a terminal UN




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Inbuilt EMV Issues



Terminals

- > EMV Only terminals require no tamper resistance.
- Certification only covers interoperability
 - Does the terminal play well?
- Terminals are not required to be tested for any logical security
- Update mechanisms are not defined by EMVco





UNs

> Are an integral part of EMV security – yet:

UN is not defined to be generated by a cryptographic random number source

Frequently will include a date or counter value

New text:

6.5.6 Unpredictable Number

The terminal shall be able to generate an Unpredictable Number (tag 9F37) to be used for input to the card cryptograms (Application Cryptograms and DDA/CDA signatures) so as to ensure the unpredictability of data input to this calculation and thereby the freshness of the cryptogram.

A terminal may use the same Unpredictable Number throughout a transaction. The Unpredictable Number could be generated by a dedicated hardware random number generator or could, for example, be a function of previous Application Cryptograms, the terminal Transaction Sequence Counter and other variable data (e.g. date/time). In the second example the function could be a hash function or a keyed encipherment function.


Section 11.3 of Book 2 provides an example of an approved method for generating the Unpredictable Number using a hash function.

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Apple Pay




Hardware





Software





NFC Hardware

Secure Element

- Holds the token, keys, certificates and commands needed to perform a transaction
- Can be managed remotely by the issuer
- Loaded over a remote connection by the card issuer

PN548 Controller

- Handles the rest of the transaction
- Interfaces with the secure element to perform the transaction
- Performs the transaction by itself.
- Returns the necessary values back as EMV data to the Nearfield.Framework to form the payment token.

black hat USA 2015 PKPayment Token

Transaction ID
Payment Network
Payment Token Data
Signature
Encrypted Payment Data
Expiry Date
PAN
EMV Data

https://github.com/beatty/applepay_crypto_demo

black hat Dump Approved Alds

Peters-iPhone:~ root# ps aux | grep "passd" 284 ... /System/Library/Frameworks/PassKit.framework/passd mobile Peters-iPhone:~ root# cycript -p 284 cy# mySE = [[PDSecureElement alloc] init] #"<PDSecureElement: 0x13f6894d0>" cy# mySE.secureElementCards @[#"<NFCard: 0x13f681700> { aid=A000000041010010000001 family=0x0(UNKNOWN) lifecycle=0x7(selectable) activation=0x80(nonactivatable) authTransient=YES }",#"<NFCard: 0x13f646d40> { aid=A000000031010010000001 family=0x0(UNKNOWN) lifecycle=0x7(selectable) activation=0x0(deactivated) authTransient=YES }",#"<NFCard: 0x13f59c9f0> { aid=A000000250109010000001 family=0x0(UNKNOWN) lifecycle=0x7(selectable) activation=0x0(deactivated) authTransient=YES }"]

black hat Is it vulnerable?

- Yes!
- The NFC controller handles all the transaction when enabled.
- However either the user has to authorize the payment with touch ID or passcode
- Or using a jailbroken device that has malware that has enabled the transaction
- Additionally any purchase over the contactless limit will be verified through "Consumer Device Cardholder Verification Method" (CDCVM)

https://support.apple.com/en-au/HT202527

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Tools Used



ACR-122U

Around AUD\$60 off ebay

- Reads lost of stuff.
- Fickle loves to crash, horrible drivers

Can be made to support card emulation

Good to get started understanding stuff

Lots of limitations – like limited APDU length(~260 bytes),

Stuck with what the interface chip gives you.

No command chaining support (at least in RFIDIOT)



Proxmark 3

- Available for around US\$200
- Supports 125/134KHz, 13.56MHz.
- FPGA handles raw signals,
- ARM higher protocol stuff
- Super powerful/Super Painful
- API is a bit hairy



Lots of bugs! But good development community.

My fork of proxmark to handle EMV Stuff <u>https://github.com/peterfillmore/proxmark3</u>

ckhat Android Phones with NFO

- Prior to 4.4.4 (KitKat) Card Emulation not officially supported. But Cyanogen mod lets you.
- NXP chip supports emulation but not in official AOSP ^(B), watch out for pre 2013 android NFC phones
- Broadcom chip does, which was added in Nexus 4, Samsung Galaxy S4 etc.
- Better then ACR-122U cos its less buggy but limited to chip support stuff – can't spoof UID – limited by internal buffer lengths (2472 in Nexus4).

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Software l've developed

black hat Additions to RFIDiot

https://github.com/peterfillmore/RFIDIOt

Added on scripts to perform contactless transactions for MasterCard and VISA cards


MasterCard:

MagStripe	\$python ChAP-paypass.py -dv -C MSR		
M/Chip	\$python ChAP-paypass.py -dv -C MCHIP		
VISA:			
dCVV	\$python ChAP-paywave.py -dv -C dCVV		
CVN17	\$python ChAP-paywave.py -dv -C CVN17		
fDDA0	\$python ChAP-paywave.py -dv -C fDDA0		
EMV	\$python ChAP-paywave.py -dv -C EMV		

ckhat NFC Fuzzing

https://github.com/peterfillmore/EMVFuzzer

- Work in progress
- Uses Sully generated text files as input
- Requires a rooted phone need to programmatically power cycle the NFC from the command line.
- I want to try and incorporate this into a Better solution – feel free to fork!





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Final Thoughts



Thanks

Pwpiwi@proxmark3 – Putting up with my complaining and fixing the Proxmark3 code

Adam Laurie for writing the RFIDidiot Tool – major help in learning this stuff. Android team for adding HCE and allowing developers to access NFC Hardware iOS hackers for developing awesome tools – you know who they are.

Credits and References

"Don't Stand So Close To Me, An analysis of the NFC attack surface" – Charlie Miller 2012

"PinPadPwn" – Nils & Rafael Dominguez Vega Pin Pads, 2012

"Credit Card Fraud - The Contactless Generation" Kristian Paget, 2012

"Mission Mpossible" –Nils and Jon Butler 2013

"Cloning Credit Cards: A combined pre-play and downgrade attack on EMV

Contactless" - Michael Roland 2013

Standards - http://www.emvco.com

Utilities - http://www.emvlab.org/tlvutils/

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/

black hat USA 2015 Key Takeaways

- You <u>can't</u> clone cards (economically)
- You <u>can</u> clone transactions
- Legacy support reduces EMV security
- Random numbers aint random.
- Current standards do not mitigate these attacks sufficiently
- EMV Terminals and software are a huge worry
- ApplePay is a solid implementation of existing technologies.