



The Little Pump Gauge That Could: Attacks Against Gas Pump Monitoring Systems

Kyle Wilhoit

Sr. Threat Researcher

 @lowcalspam


Stephen Hilt

Sr. Threat Researcher

 @sjhilt

Where The “Industry” Is...

SCADA Became Popular.

A screenshot of a web browser displaying the Shodan website. The browser's address bar shows 'https://www.shodan.io'. The website's navigation bar includes the Shodan logo, a search bar with the text 'port:10001 Product', and links for 'Explore', 'Contact Us', 'Blog', and 'Enterprise Access'. The main content area features a large graphic of a globe with red and white dots, and the headline 'The search engine for Power Plants'. Below the headline, there are two buttons: 'Create a Free Account' and 'Getting Started'. The page is divided into four sections, each with an icon and a title: 'Explore the Internet of Things', 'See the Big Picture', 'Monitor Network Security', and 'Get a Competitive Advantage'. Each section contains a brief description of the service's capabilities.

QuickTime Player File Edit View Window Help Tue 8:32 PM

Shodan ScanHub Developers View All...

SHODAN port:10001 Product Explore Contact Us Blog Enterprise Access Logout

The search engine for Power Plants

Shodan is the world's first search engine for Internet-connected devices.

Create a Free Account Getting Started

Explore the Internet of Things
Use Shodan to discover which of your devices are connected to the internet, where they are located and who is using them.

See the Big Picture
Websites are just one part of the Internet. There are power plants, Smart TVs, refrigerators and much more that can be found with Shodan!

Monitor Network Security
Keep track of all the computers on your network that are directly accessible from the internet. Shodan lets you understand your digital footprint.

Get a Competitive Advantage
Who is using your product? Where are they located? Use Shodan to perform empirical market intelligence.

Threats Began Adapting &
Changing.



SCADA Started




SCADA System RAT !!!

[CITE]

ANONTOXIC



Junior Member



Posts	137
Joined	Jun 21st, 2014
Credits	284 ¢
Reputation	0
Warmness level	0°C

SCADA System RAT !!!

Post: #1

Hello Where can i find any SCADA Rat ??? plzz heelp 😞

5 Months Ago

0

Trading in Dark Corners...



Vulnerabilities Continued...

```
US-KYLEW-MAC:Desktop kylew$ telnet 192.168.132.191 10001
Trying 192.168.132.191...
Connected to 192.168.132.191.
Escape character is '^]'.
^AI20200


I20200
05/18/2015 17:28

SHELL OIL


DELIVERY REPORT

T 1: SUPER
INCREASE   DATE / TIME                GALLONS TC  GALLONS WATER  TEMP DEG F  HEIGHT
          END: 05/18/2015 12:25    6541      6718    1.98      53.10    64.76
          START: 05/18/2015 12:15    5941      6118    1.98      53.10    41.76
          AMOUNT:                    6241      6418
```

Reported Incidents in US: 2014



SCADA Vulnerabilities and Incidents Per Year



■ Vulnerability Count ■ Incident Count



It's Easy




Criminal




Government

Why Attack SCADA?!

Guardian AST...dafuq is it?





Not All Tanks Are Created Equal



- Gas Station Tanks
- Backup Generator Tanks
- Terminal Station Tanks
- Other Tanks?

10001
Automated
Tank Gauge

I20100
JUL 6, 2015 10:27 PM

LINCOLN ENERGY SOLUT
4227 CROMWELL RD
CHATTANOOGA, TN 37421

IN-TANK INVENTORY

TANK	PRODUCT	VOLUME TC	VOLUME	ULLAGE	HEIGHT	WATER	TEMP
1	BIO DIESEL 1	15417	15214	14670	67.29	0.96	89.82
2	BIO DIESEL 2	15352	15152	14735	67.06	4.84	89.58
3	BIO DIESEL 3	14847	14653	15240	65.32	4.52	89.54




Introducing Gaspot



- HD Moore published his findings on Guardian's that are Internet facing
- Software based gas pump monitor honeypots
- Created to better understand attacks against gas pump monitor systems and non-critical infrastructure
- Derived from Anonymous' attacks against US based gas pumps
- Completely virtualized
- One Python script
- Accepts robust input/output
 - 6 commands

Architecture



Deployment Locations



Code Considerations



```
# If the response is the I20100 command, print the proper information
if "I20100" in response:
    # log it was an I20100 command
    target.write(str(datetime.datetime.utcnow().strftime('%m/%d/%Y %H:%M')) + \
        " - I20100 Command Attempt from: %s\n" % addr[0])
    conn.send(I20100())
```

```
# Temperature of the tank, this will need to be between 50 - 60
temp1 = str(random.randint(50, 60)) + "." + str(random.randint(10, 99))
temp2 = str(random.randint(50, 60)) + "." + str(random.randint(10, 99))
temp3 = str(random.randint(50, 60)) + "." + str(random.randint(10, 99))
temp4 = str(random.randint(50, 60)) + "." + str(random.randint(10, 99))
```

Gasport on Shodan



10001

Automated
Tank Gauge

I20100

06/13/2015 17:30

FUEL COMPANY


IN-TANK INVENTORY

TANK	PRODUCT	VOLUME	TC	VOLUME	ULLAGE	HEIGHT	WATER	TEMP
1	SUPER	6376		6509	3427	72.12	0.10	53.91
2	UNLEAD	4747		4886	6624	39.85	5.14	57.21
3	DIESEL	7241		7328	7623	44.32	3.44	50.71
4	PREMIUM	8262		8364	3618	67.46	9.30	50.75

Shodan and Gaspot Consideration



- Not all Gaspot instances are on Shodan
- Able to see “organic” growth



Attack Scenarios



- DDoS, bringing inventory control/distribution to a standstill.
- Change of pump names, resulting in incorrect fill of petrol into the tank. (eg: change unleaded to diesel)
- Change in pumping volume, resulting in over or under fill. (For instance, putting the volume as full, when it is empty)
- State sponsored, meaning a pump compromise to siphon off data for possible espionage during a business deal?

Classification of attacks



What They're Not...

- Portscans
- Successful telnet, then nothing
- Server fingerprinting
- Banner grabbing (HTTP GET)

What They Are...

- Successful commands resulting in possible failure
- Fat fingering after telnetting
- Targeted malware
- DoS and DDoS




Attacks...

Attack Breakdown



- 4 Pump Modifications
- 12 Pump Queries
- 2 DDoS/DoS Attacks




Attack Breakdown




Deployment / Attacker	US	RO	CN	RU	IR	SY	MX	CA
US	3		2				1	2
BR	1		1					
GB				2				
JO					2	1		
DE								
AE		1		1				
RU	1							

Connection Attempts



Valid Commands



Critical **vs.** Non-Critical Infrastructure



- Had a case study from 2013 showing attacks against critical infrastructure
- Wanted to find out if attacks happen to non-critical infrastructure



Attacks- Critical Vs. Non-Critical



- **Critical Infrastructure Honeypots 2013**

- Deployed in 8 countries
- 12 total deployments
- 74 Attacks in total

- **Non- Critical Infrastructure Honeypots 2015**

- Deployed in 7 countries
- 10 total deployments
- 18 Attacks in total

```
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#  
root@kali:/usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists#
```

KALI LINUX

the quieter you become, the more you are able to hear

Intelligence...?



Syrian Electronic Army



- Came about in 2011
- Supports President Bashar al-Assad
- Performs DDoS, Defacements, malware distribution, spamming, and general mischief
- Defaced CBS, AP, NPR, BBC, Al Jazeera, etc.



DDoS "Attack"




- DDoS performed for two days
 - Volume based attacks (UDP floods, etc.)
 - Protocol attack (Fragmented packets)
 - Roughly 2Gbps
- Performed on Gaspot in US
- Utilized what appears to be LOIC

```
GET /app/?  
id=17783745&msg=SEAcannn  
GO HTTP/  
1.1Host:OBFUSCATED-Agent:  
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel  
Mac OS X 10.5; en-US; rv:  
1.9.2.12) Gecko/20101026  
Firefox/3.6.12Accept: text/  
html,application/xhtml  
+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/  
*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-  
us,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding:  
gzip,deflateAccept
```


Attribution



- Possibly Syrian Electronic Army
 - 213.178.225.248
 - 213.178.225.232
 - 213.178.225.212
 - Etc.
- DDoS against Gaspot in US
- No public disclosure by SEA?
 - dafuq?
 - False flag?



Iranian Dark Coders



- Group operating out of Iran
- Pro-Iranian group
- Website defacements, information sharing, malware distribution, and hacktivism



Modification "Attacks"



- Iranian Dark Coders?
 - 5.106.221.208
 - 2.147.147.123
 - 5.219.58.67
 - 31.14.94.33
- Modification of pump names
- Attacked two honeypots in Jordan
- Possible false flag?

"H4CK3D by IDC-TEAM"



Escape character is '^J'.

^AI20100

I20100

06/30/2015 18:59

CHEVRON STATION

IN-TANK INVENTORY

TANK	PRODUCT	VOLUME	TC VOLUME	ULLAGE	HEIGHT	WATER	TEMP
1	H4CK3D by IDC-TEAM	5325	5375	6380	31.94	1.51	60.97
2	UNLEAD	6425	6503	9743	67.81	5.80	56.96
3	DIESEL	4323	4326	8866	54.47	1.42	60.60
4	PREMIUM	5119	5259	9422	32.75	4.93	58.50

"AHAAD WAS HERE"



Escape character is '^_']'.

^AI20100

I20100

06/30/2015 19:02

BP FUEL STATION

IN-TANK INVENTORY

TANK	PRODUCT	VOLUME TC	VOLUME	ULLAGE	HEIGHT	WATER	TEMP
1		5399	5523	5157	57.91	6.62	59.60
2	UNLEAD	7963	8032	7887	46.22	4.84	57.91
3	AHAAD WAS HERE	1536	1591	4082	40.86	9.54	57.26
4	PREMIUM	8808	8843	4272	29.33	6.57	53.59



This Site H4CK3D By IDC-TEAM

Iranian Dark Coders Team

We Are : M.R.S.CO - N30 - Satanic2000 - b3hz4d - G3n3Rall - AHAAD

AHAAD W4S H3R3



About AHAAD

Biography

Heck, I've hack, hack-hacks we've hacking, hacking

Location

Iran, Mini-City

Interests

Computer

Occupation

!Government jobs

OS

sth Between Linux & Windows

Sign

It was no wonder Vienna steal the health of your hair**If you are a woman be his
convoy hundred**

SCADA Ports 


Hi
.I just joined a short PDF to respect SCADA Ports ,
/Bfrsd private message if you have questions. Scan Link: <https://www.virustotal.com/En/File/1...ls/1416888002>

Attached Files

[\(Scada Ports.pdf \(900.0 KB, 59 views\) !\[\]\(fa6f3af6bfa46c5d4a2d362681095beb_img.jpg\)](#)

نقل قول

(Am1NOV (01-16-2015

The Following User Says
Thank You to 
:For This Useful Post

Fin.



lowcalspam



sjhilt

