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The distribution of vegetation roughly corresponds to the zones of elevation and precipitation. It is possible to distinguish three general regions: (1) the coastal plain and its wadis, in which dry-climate plants such as the date palm, citrus fruits, banana, and cotton as well as spurges (euphorbia), acacia, and tamarisk predominate (the dry wadis of the eastern desert support similar flora), (2) the middle highlands, with a variety of such food crops as melons, nuts, grapes, and grains, as well as various spurges, eucalyptus, sycamore, fig, and carob, and (3) the mountainous interior, with its temperate-zone crops, including coffee, the mild stimulant khat (qāt), and a variety of woody shrubs and trees. Yemen retained considerable forest cover into the early years of the 20th century. However, the pressures generated by rapid population growth—notably the increased demand for stovewood and agricultural land—largely depleted the forest legacy. In the early 21st century a negligible amount of forest cover remained.
These same human pressures have had a devastating effect on Yemen’s wildlife. Evidence suggests the presence of such species as panther, ostrich, various antelopes (including the Arabian oryx), and large cats (e.g., lions) as recently as a century ago; some species of panther and antelope, which persist in Yemen, are threatened, surviving in limited numbers. One of the largest wild mammals still widespread in Yemen is the hamadryas baboon (Papio hamadryas), though its numbers too are said to be diminished; among the smaller mammals are the hyena, fox, and rabbit. In two categories of wildlife—birds and insects—Yemen has a relatively abundant and varied population; many species remain uncatalogued. Probably the greatest diversity of fauna, however, inhabits the waters of the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. Among the many different species are tuna, mackerel, shark, sardines, lobster, shrimp, and squid.
People
Ethnic groups
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The people of Yemen overwhelmingly consider themselves Arabs, but they have tended to divide themselves between northern and southern groups, a historical division that has linguistic roots but which is otherwise difficult to trace. Yemenis of northern origin, for example, are said to have descended from Mesopotamians who entered the region in the 1st millennium bce, and they claim ancestry of the biblical figure Ismāʿīl (Ishmael). The southern group, which represents the old South Arabian stock, claims descent from Qaḥṭān, the biblical Joktan.
Ethnic minorities include the Mahra, a people whose roots are unclear and who occupy a part of eastern Yemen, as well as the island of Socotra, and who speak a variant of the ancient Himyaritic language. (See Mahra Sultanate.) On the Tihāmah coastal plain, in-migrations from Ethiopia and Somalia have occurred over many centuries. There is a clear African admixture in the coastal population as well as a distinct social group known as the Akhdām, who perform menial tasks and are the closest thing to a caste in Yemen. In the far north there are still small remnants of the once-large Jewish communities (most migrated to Israel after 1948), while in the area of Aden and the eastern regions there are distinct Somali, Indonesian, and Indian elements in the population, legacies of the British colonial era as well of economic and political ties extending back over two millennia.
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Among Arab groups, tribal affiliation is another deep-seated component of social identity. Some tribal confederations have histories spanning more than two millennia. These affiliations continue to serve as a key basis for political and social organization throughout the country, although the postindependence governments of both South Yemen and, to a lesser extent, North Yemen set out to eradicate what then were considered reactionary cultural institutions. Although efforts toward detribalization were at least in part effective, subsequent events indicated that such identifications were still socially, economically, and politically relevant.
Languages
More than nine-tenths of Yemenis speak some dialect of Arabic as their first language, and Modern Standard Arabic—the literary and cultural language of the broader Arab world—is taught in schools. There are several main dialects, but minor differences often occur within smaller geographic areas. The Arabic of the rural areas of the south is still heavily influenced by the ancient South Arabian languages. A dialect of Judeo-Arabic spoken by the Jewish community has fallen almost entirely out of use in Yemen. Hindi, Somali, and several African languages are spoken in pockets. Several ancient Semitic dialects, including Bathari, Mehri, and Socotri (Soqotri), remain in a chiefly oral capacity. Those languages have tended to recede as literacy in Arabic has become more common.
Religion
Throughout society, the broadest distinctions between population groups are based not on ethnicity but on religious affiliation. Islam is the state religion, and the Sunni branch of Islam, represented by the Shāfiʿī school, predominates. The Shiʿi minority consists of the Zaydī school, which has long been politically dominant in the mountainous highlands of the north, and the Ismāʿīlīs, now a relatively small group found in the Haraz region of northern Yemen and in Jabal Manakhah, the mountainous area west of Sanaa. The non-Muslim community is very small, consisting mostly of foreign visitors and workers. All are free to worship as they wish—including the Jewish community—but, as in most conservative Muslim countries, proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is illegal.
Historically, Yemen has had its share of Islamic militants, particularly since the return of combatants who fought in the 1980s on the side of the mujahideen (Arabic: mujāhidūn, “those who engage in jihad”) in the Afghan War (1978–92).
Settlement patterns
Yemen is an overwhelmingly rural country, with about two-thirds of the people living in the countryside. With only a few exceptions, the rural population is distributed fairly evenly. The monsoon rainfall that causes the western slopes of the massif to be so well-dissected makes the area the most densely populated part of the country. Fertile soils are another regional asset. In varying concentrations, Yemenis inhabit nearly all the country’s geographic zones—from sea level to 10,000 feet (3,000 metres) and higher. (In fact, the intricate variety of subregions and microclimates produces an agricultural base of astonishing diversity.) The scarcity of farmland has greatly influenced rural settlement and construction patterns, as has the need for security. Villages tend to be small, and buildings are erected on ground that cannot be cultivated—frequently along cliffs and rock outcroppings. Homes often consist of several stories (as many as five or more), with the lower floors being made of hand-hewn stone. Upper stories, where the family resides, are usually made of mud brick, a superior insulator. These quarters also have many windows, providing ventilation in the heat of the summer. The location of the living quarters in these upper stories offers the capacity for storage in the lower stories, as well as an element of security.
Cities in Yemen follow patterns seen in other parts of the Arab world. Original construction consisted of a walled and fortified old city, in which the ornate multistory home was standard. The old city also contained shops, souks, schools, and mosques. In the modern period, urban areas began to sprawl outside the old city, and the wealthy began to build larger and more-ornate mansions and villas in nearby suburbs.
Demographic trends
In many respects, the most important contemporary demographic trend has been the emigration of large numbers of males between the ages of 15 and 45 for employment in other countries. The number of such emigrants has fluctuated because of political and economic volatility over the years. Typically, however, there have been more than one million Yemeni nationals employed abroad—chiefly in Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab countries of the Persian Gulf region, as well as in Great Britain (in the industrial Midlands and in Wales), and in the United States (in industrial areas of the Northeast and Midwest and in the agricultural areas of California). The remittances of these emigrants played an important role in the balance of payments, in radically increasing the income of most Yemenis, and in funding many local development projects. Since 2013, when Saudi Arabia adjusted its labour and visa laws to encourage employment of Saudi citizens, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers have been forced to leave Saudi Arabia.
The population of Yemen continues to display characteristics typical of less-developed areas: high birth rate, high infant mortality rate, low levels of literacy, and the ill effects of poor hygiene, unsanitary water supplies, and inadequate public health service. More than two-thirds of the population is under 30 years of age, and less than one-eighth is 45 years of age or older. Major health and education programs funded by foreign governments and by the United Nations have attempted to address both structural and programmatic deficiencies.
Economy
Despite economic advances since the 1970s—most notably the beginning of the commercial exploitation of oil and natural gas—Yemen is one of the world’s poorest and least-developed countries. The majority of Yemenis are subsistence agriculturalists. Only about 3 percent of the country’s land is arable (mostly in the west), though roughly one-third is suitable for grazing. During the first half of the 20th century, the rulers in the north (the imams; see Zaydiyyah) achieved and maintained virtual self-sufficiency in food production for their region. By contrast, at the beginning of the 21st century, unified Yemen was heavily dependent on imported food, despite the market expansion and increased investment of the 1970s and ’80s. One important reason for this situation was the scarcity and high cost of domestic labour, the result of the exodus of much of the adult male labour force that began in the 1970s. In addition, the remittances of these emigrants (most of which were transferred through unofficial channels and therefore not taxed) fueled inflation, driving the prices of domestic food products above those of imported equivalents, such as U.S. grains and Australian meats.
One of the more important issues raised by the merger of the two Yemens was the integration of the socialist command economy of the south and the largely market-driven economy of the north. By the early 1970s the government of the south had nationalized almost all land and housing, along with most banking, industrial, and other business enterprises in the country; thereafter, all new industries and businesses of any size were state-owned and state-operated. The private sector has since been encouraged and has been fueled by remittances from migrant workers.
Following the 1994 civil war, the regime of Col. Ali Abdullah Saleh negotiated an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that committed Yemen to a multiyear matrix of structural adjustments in exchange for financial and economic incentives. The package of reforms and aid, which were to be phased in over several years, was designed to make Yemen both economically viable in a postremittance era and more attractive to foreign investors in an increasingly globalized international economy. The reforms, which included the elimination of subsidies on many basic necessities, cuts in budget deficits, and the downsizing of the government and the public sector, were painful for many and generated widespread discontent and public protest; safety-net projects cushioned the economic blows for only some of the most vulnerable Yemenis, and instances of corruption and favouritism only made the sacrifices harder to accept. Nevertheless, the regime managed to keep quite close to the schedule of reforms in the second half of the 1990s, and the IMF and World Bank repeatedly acknowledged its successes. The opening of Aden’s new container port in 1999 and the ongoing development of an industrial free zone there, inaugurated in 1991, raised hopes for future economic gains.