Arms Industry

At the beginning of the war there were within the limits of the Confederacy 15,000 rifles and 120,000 muskets. There were at Richmond about 60,000 old flint-muskets, and at Baton Rouge about 10,000 old Hall's rifles and carbines. At Little Rock, Ark., there were a few thousand stands, and a few at the Texas arsenal; increasing the aggregate of serviceable arms to about 143,000. Add to these the arms owned by the several States and by military organizations, and it would make a total of 150,000 for the use of the armies of the Confederacy. There were a few boxes of sabres at each arsenal, and some short artillery swords. A few hundred holster pistols were scattered about. There were no revolvers.

Before the war little powder or ammunition of any kind was stored in the Southern States, and that little was a relic of the war with Mexico. It is doubtful if there were a million rounds of small-arm cartridges. The chief store of powder was that captured at Norfolk; there was, besides, a small quantity at each of the Southern arsenals, in all, 60,000 pounds, chiefly old cannon powder. The percussion-caps did not exceed one-quarter of a million; and there was no lead on hand. There were no batteries of serviceable field-artillery at the arsenals, but there were a few old iron guns mounted on Gribeauval carriages fabricated about 1812. The States and the volunteer companies did, however, possess some serviceable batteries. But there were neither harness, saddles, bridles, blankets, nor other artillery or cavalry equipments.

To furnish 150,000 men, on both sides of the Mississippi, in May, 1861, there were no infantry accoutrements, no cavalry arms or equipments, no artillery, and, above all, no ammunition ; nothing save small arms, and these almost wholly the old pattern smooth-bore muskets, altered from flint locks to percussion.

Within the limits of the Confederate States the arsenals had been used only as depots, and only one of them had a single machine above the grade of a foot-lathe. Except at Harper's Ferry Armory, all the work of preparation of material had been carried on at the North; not an arm, not a gun, not a gun-carriage, and, except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition, had for fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States. There were consequently no workmen, or very few, skilled in those arts. Powder, save perhaps for blasting, had not been made at the South. No saltpetre was in store at any Southern point. It was stored wholly at the North. There were no worked mines of lead except in Virginia, and the situation of those made them a precarious dependence. The only cannonfoundry existing was at Richmond. Copper, so necessary for field artillery and for percussion-caps, was just being obtained in East Tennessee. There was no rolling-mill for bar-iron south of Richmond, and but few blast-furnaces, and these, with trifling exceptions, were in the border States of Virginia and Tennessee.

The first efforts made to obtain powder were by orders sent to the North, which had been early done both by the Confederate Government and by some of the States. These were being rapidly filled when the attack was made on Fort Sumter. The shipments then ceased. Nitre was sought for in the caves of North Alabama and Tennessee. Between four and five hundred tons of sulphur were obtained in New Orleans, where it had been imported for use in the manufacture of sugar. Preparations for the construction of a large powder-mill were promptly commenced by the Government, and two small private mills in East Tennessee were supervised and improved. On June 1, 1861, there were probably 250,000 pounds, chiefly of cannon-powder, and about as much nitre, which had been imported by Georgia. There were the two powder-mills above mentioned, but we had had no experience in making powder, or in extracting nitre from natural deposits, or in obtaining it from artificial beds.

For the supply of arms an agent was sent to Europe, who made contracts to the extent of nearly half a million dollars. Some small-arms had been obtained from the North, and also important machinery. The machinery at Harper's Ferry Armory was partially saved from the flames by the heroic conduct of the operatives; that for making rifle-muskets was transported to Richmond, and that for rifles with swordbayonets to Fayetteville, N.C. In addition to the injuries suffered by the machinery, the lack of skilled workmen caused much embarrassment. In the meantime the manufacture of small-arms was undertaken at New Orleans, and prosecuted with energy, though with limited success.

In field-artillery the manufacture was confined almost entirely to the Tredegar Works in Richmond. Some castings were made in New Orleans, and attention was turned to the manufacture of field and siege artillery at Nashville. A small foundry at Rome, Ga., was induced to undertake the casting of the 3-inch iron rifle, but the progress was very slow.

But the progress of development was steady. A refinery of saltpetre was established near Nashville during the summer, which received the nitre from that vicinity, and from the caves in East and Middle Tennessee. Some inferior powder was made at two small mills in South Carolina. North Carolina established a mill near Raleigh. A stamping-mill was put up near New Orleans, and powder was made there before the fall of the city. Small quantities were also received through the blockade. It is estimated that, on the 1st of January, 1862, there were 150 sea-coast guns, of various calibre, in position, from Evansport, on the Potomac, to Fort Brown, on the Rio Grande. If their calibre was averaged at thirtytwo pounders, and the charge at five pounds, it would require, at 40 rounds per gun, 600,000 pounds of powder for them. The field artillery-say, 300 guns, with 200 rounds to the piece -would require 125,000 pounds ; and the small-arm cartridges -say ten million-would consume 125,000 pounds; making, in all, 850,000 pounds. Deducting 250,000 pounds, supposed to be on hand in various shapes, and the increment is 600,000 pounds for the year 1861. Of this, perhaps 200,000 pounds had been made at the Tennessee and other mills, leaving 400,000 pounds to be supplied through the blockade, or by purchase before the beginning of active hostilities.

In equipping the armies first sent into the field the supply of accessories was embarrassingly scant. There were arms, such as they were, for over one hundred thousand men, but no accoutrements or equipments, and only a meagre supply of ammunition. In time, the knapsacks were supplanted by haversacks, which the women could make. But soldiers' shoes and cartridge-boxes must be had ; leather was also needed for artillery-harness and for cavalry saddles; and, as the amount of leather which the country could furnish was quite insufficient for all these purposes, it was, perforce, apportioned among them. Soldiers' shoes were the prime necessity. Therefore a scale was established by which, first, shoes and then cartridge-boxes had the preference; after these, artilleryharness, and then saddles and bridles. To economize leather, the waist and cartridge-box belts were made of prepared cotton cloth, stitched in three or four thicknesses. Bridle-reins were likewise so made, and then cartridge-boxes were thus covered except the flap. Saddle-skirts, too, were made of heavy cotton cloth strongly stitched. To get leather, each department procured its quota of hides, made contracts with the tanners, obtained hands for them by exemptions from the army, and got transportation over the railroads for the hides and for supplies. To the varied functions of this bureau was finally added that of assisting the tanners to procure the necessary supplies for the tanneries. A fishery, even, was established on Cape Fear River to get oil for mechanical purposes, and, at the same time, food for the workmen. In cavalry equipments the main thing was to get a good saddle which would not hurt the back of the horse. For this purpose various patterns were tried, and reasonable success was obtained. One of the most difficult wants to supply in this branch of the service was the horseshoe for cavalry and artillery. The want of iron and of skilled labor was strongly felt. Every wayside blacksmith-shop accessible, especially those in and near the theatre of operations, was employed. These, again, had to be supplied with material, and the employees exempted from service.

It early became manifest that great reliance must be placed on the introduction of articles of prime necessity through the blockaded ports. A vessel, capable of stowing six hundred and fifty bales of cotton, was purchased by the agent in England, and kept running between Bermuda and Wilmington. Some fifteen to eighteen trips were made before she was captured. Another was added, which was equally successful. These vessels were long, low, rather narrow, and built for speed. They were mostly of pale sky-color, and, with their lights out, and with fuel that made little smoke, they ran to and from Wilmington with considerable regularity. Several others were added, and devoted to bringing in ordnance and, finally, general supplies. Depots of stores were likewise made at Nassau and Havana. Another organization was also necessary, that the vessels coming in through the blockade might have their return cargoes promptly on their arrival. These resources were also supplemented by contracts for supplies brought through Texas from Mexico.

The arsenal in Richmond soon grew to very large dimensions, and, except cannon and small-arms, produced all the ordnance stores that the army required, in quantities sufficient to supply the forces in the field. The arsenal at Augusta was very advantageous to the armies serving in the South and West, and furnished for them much field-artillery complete. The Government powder-mills were entirely successful. The arsenal and workshops at Charleston were enlarged, steam was introduced, and good work done in various departments. The arsenal at Mount Vernon, Ala., was moved to Selma in that State, where it grew into a large and wellordered establishment of the first class.

The chief armories were at Richmond, and Fayetteville, N. C. The Richmond armory turned out about 1,500 stand per month; the Fayetteville armory, owing to the want of operatives, only 400 per month. Factories for Sharpe's carbines and rifle-carbines were established at Richmond, Asheville, and Tallahassee. A great part of the work of these factories consisted in the repair of arms. In this way the gleanings of the battle-field were utilized. Nearly 10,000 stand were saved from the field of Manassas, and from those about Richmond, in 1862, we obtained about 25,000 excellent arms. All the stock of inferior arms disappeared from the armories during the first two years of the war, and were replaced by a better class of arms, rifled and percussioned.

"We began, in April, 1861," truly writes General Gorgas, " without an arsenal, laboratory, or powder-mill of any capacity, and with no foundry or rolling-mill, except in Richmond ; and before the close of 1863-or within a little over two years-we supplied them. During the harassments of war, while holding our own in the field, defiantly and successfully, against a powerful enemy; crippled by a depreciated currency ; cramped by a blockade that deprived us of nearly all the means of getting material or workmen; obliged to send almost every able-bodied man to the field; unable to use the slave-labor with which we were abundantly supplied, except in the most unskilful departments of production; hampered by want of transportation even of the commonest supply of food; with no stock on hand, even of articles such as steel, copper, leather, iron, which we must have to build up our establishments-against all these obstacles, in spite of all these deficiencies, we persevered at home, as determinedly as did our troops in the field against a more inspiring opposition; and, in that short period, created, almost literally out of the ground, foundries and rolling-mills at Selma, Richmond, Atlanta, and Macon; smelting works at Petersburg; chemical works at Charlotte, N. C.; a powder-mill far superior to any in the United States, and unsurpassed by any across the ocean; and a chain of arsenals, armories, and laboratories equal in their capacity and their approved appointments to the best of those in the United States, stretching, link by link, from Virginia to Alabama."