

# Shielding Atari Games with Bounded Prescience

Extended Abstract

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## ABSTRACT

We present the first explicit-state method for analysing and ensuring the safety of DRL agents for Atari games. Our method only requires access to the emulator. We give a suite of 42 properties that characterise “safe behaviour” for 31 games. We evaluate the safety of the best available DRL agents which, as our experiments show, violate most of our properties. We propose a countermeasure that implements shielding using bounded explicit-state exploration. Our method improved their overall safety, producing the safest DRL agents for Atari games currently available.

## KEYWORDS


Safe AI; Deep Reinforcement Learning; Atari Games

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Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) combines neural networks with reinforcement learning (RL) and, capitalising on recent advances in both technologies, has been successfully employed in many areas of artificial intelligence, from playing games against humans to controlling robots in the physical world [3, 19, 38, 44]. A setup of this kind consists of an agent and a neural network that automatically learns to interact with the environment by maximizing rewards received as consequence of its actions [13, 23]. DRL has demonstrated super-human capabilities in numerous applications, notably, the game of Go [38], and is now used in safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving [27]. While DRL agents perform well most of the time, the question of whether unsafe behaviour may occur in corner cases is an open problem. Safety analysis answers the question of whether the environment can possibly steer the system into an undesirable state or, dually, whether the agent can guarantee that the system remains within a set of safe states (an invariant) in which nothing bad happens [15, 20, 31]. We discuss the safety of popular DRL methods for one of the most challenging benchmarks: the Atari 2600 console games.


\*The work reported in this paper was done prior to joining Amazon.



**Figure 1: The effect of a bounded-prescience shield on game Freeway. In (a), both actions ‘up’ and ‘down’ are safe thus allowed; in (b), action ‘up’ is unsafe thus blocked by the shield.**

Games for the classic Atari 2600 console feature low-resolution graphics and small memory footprints. They are simple when compared with contemporary games, yet offer a broad variety of scenarios including many that are difficult for modern AI [9, 32, 34, 41]. Macroscopically, diversity in the game mechanics challenges the generality of the machine learning method; microscopically, diversity in the outcome of multiple identical plays, i.e., the *non-determinism* in the game, challenges the robustness of the trained agent. Many Atari games exploit variations in the response time of the human player for differentiating runs. The Arcade Learning Environment (ALE) creates this diversity by randomly injecting no-ops, skipping frames, or repeating agent actions [21, 32]. On one hand, this prevents overfitting the agent but, on the other hand, implies that there is no guarantee that an agent works all of the time—the scores that we use to rank training methods are averages. Agents are trained for strong average-case performance.

The application of DRL in safety-critical applications, by contrast, requires worst-case guarantees, and we expect a safe agent to maintain *safety invariants*. To evaluate whether or not state-of-the-art DRL delivers safe agents we specify a collection of properties that intuitively characterize safe behaviour for a variety of games, ranging from generic properties such as “don’t lose lives” to game-specific ones such as avoiding particular obstacles. Figure 1 illustrates the property “duck avoids cars” in the game Freeway. In the scenario in Fig. 1a this property is maintained regardless of the action chosen by the agent whereas the scenario given in Fig. 1b offers the possibility of violating it. We conjecture that satisfying our properties is beneficial for achieving a high score, and therefore study whether



**Figure 2: Properties grouped by number of satisfying agents before (w/o dots) and after BPS (with dots).**

neural agents trained using best-of-class DRL methods learn to satisfy these invariants.

The safety of DRL has been studied from the perspective of verification, which determines whether a trained agent is safe as-is, and that of synthesis, which alters the learning or the inference processes in order to obtain a safe-by-construction agent [2, 5, 6, 8, 15]. Verification methods for neural agents have borrowed from constraint satisfaction or abstract interpretation [10, 16, 18, 24, 26, 39, 42, 43]. These symbolic approaches either reason about the safety of neural networks in isolation, e.g., vulnerability to adversarial attacks [40], or require a symbolic representation of the environment; unfortunately, these are unsuitable to Atari games because their mechanics are hidden inside the Stella emulator (i.e., the core of ALE). We circumvent this limitation by adopting an *explicit-state* verification strategy [12] that only requires access to the emulator.

Our method explicitly enumerates all traces induced by the agent after every non-deterministic initialisation of the game. Meanwhile, it labels all visited states as safe or unsafe using custom labelling functions that observe lives counts, rewards, and also the generated screen frames. We specified labelling functions for 42 non-trivial properties for 31 games. We evaluated the safety w.r.t. our properties on 6 agents trained using different technologies, i.e., A3C [33], DQN [35], IQN [14], and Rainbow [22]. As seen in Fig. 2 all agents violate 24 of our properties, whereas only the 4 *minimal* properties (properties satisfied more than half the time by random agents) are satisfied by all. Surprisingly, properties that are intuitively difficult for humans, e.g., “don’t die”, are satisfied by some agents, whereas many of the *shallow* properties which require no planning or foresight (e.g. “don’t walk out of bounds”) are violated.

To improve the overall safety of DRL agents w.r.t. our properties, we build *shields* using our explicit-state labelling and exploration technique. Ensuring safety amounts to constraining the traces of the system to those that are admissible by the safety property. Methods that act on the training phase modify the optimization criterion or the exploration process in order to obtain neural agents that naturally act safely [15]. Methods of this kind typically require information about the environment, e.g., in the form of teacher advice [37]. To the best of our knowledge, naturally safe agents have never been trained for Atari games. On the other side of the

spectrum, shielding enables the option of fixing unsafe agents at inference phase only, introducing a third actor—the shield—that takes over control when necessary and with minimal interference [2]. A shield leverages the fact that safety properties are usually easy to satisfy, in contrast to the main objective of the task.

Shields formally guarantee that a model environment satisfies a safety property, regardless of the agent’s actions. Shielding has been applied to models defined as finite state machines, timed automata, dynamical systems, and multi-agent systems [2, 4, 7, 28, 30, 46]. Unfortunately, complete models of the environment are not always available, and this is also the problem for the Atari games. To overcome this limitation, shields are usually computed over an abstract model that is learned from samples of environment behaviour [1, 11, 25]. However, this has not been applied to the Atari games. We investigate the benefit of shielding for the Atari games using an arguably simpler approach: we shield the agents from taking actions that lead to unsafe outcomes within some bounded foresight of the future, which we obtain using explicit-state exploration. We thus study a form of shielding that acquires knowledge about the environment online, while it runs [29, 36].

The idea of a bounded search from the current state is commonplace. Like a rudimentary chess-playing computer, our method considers every combination of moves ahead of time—up to some bound—before taking an action [45]. We augment agents with *bounded-prescience shields* (BPSs) which, during execution, restrict the admissible actions to those that are necessarily safe within this prescience bound. At every step, a BPS enumerates all traces from the current state for a bounded number of extra steps and labels each of them as safe or unsafe; then, it invokes the agent and chooses the next action whose traces are all labelled as safe and whose agent score is the highest. As seen in Fig. 2, our method ensured satisfaction of shallow properties for all agents. Notably, it also fixed some properties that we consider difficult and that were satisfied by most but not all non-deterministic executions using the original agent.

Summarising, our contribution is threefold. First, we enrich the Atari games with the first comprehensive library of safety specifications. Second, we implement an explicit-state safety checker for the Arcade Learning Environment and discover that current DRL algorithms consistently violate most of our safety properties. Third, we implement a shielding method that, by exploiting a bounded foresight of the future, improves the safety of existing agents w.r.t. a set of simple yet critical properties, without interfering with their main objective. To the best of our knowledge, our method has produced the safest DRL agents for Atari games currently available.

The full version of this paper is available on arXiv [17]. The implementation and the experimental setup are on GitHub<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/HjalmarWijk/bounded-prescience>

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