Darren T Say’s Post

View profile for Darren T Say, graphic

Consumer Duty Champion | R-Day 🎃 = Better Outcomes for 92% of Workers | Helping CEOs & Workers become Net Zero Heroes

The last time I reviewed Hargreaves Lansdown's platform offering was back in 2020 as I chose them as one of the biggest established players promoting their Workplace solution to SMEs. They were one of the most expensive in terms of AMC but were offering pseudo bespoke portfolios and were (according to my mystery shopper experience) offering me more than just a pathway into the zombie land of 'Double Defaulters'. However, there were multiple things that their service failed to do for me. I covered these areas of failure in my private response to CP20.9 - driving Value for Money in Pensions, which I submitted purposefully after the deadline had passed for feedback from the great and the good in Pensions La La Land. Failure 1. This particular COBS failure is in fact industry wide e.g. not restricted solely to Hargreaves, and equates on average to a ~10% worse outcome for 1 in 2 workers assuming ONS data. Failure 2. This particular COBS failure goes back to 2011 engagements with Hargreaves technical experts, who ignored my team's warnings about the impact of restricting platform investment assets to only 'liquid' variants and purposefully restricting 'illiquid' variants. Failure 3. This failure relates to COBS19.1 expectations. This is triggered by multiple systemic failures under COBS, starting with failing to identify or establish my actual retirement goal, which is to achieve a minimum of 50% of my working income, after 25% TFC and with a sustainable capital base that creates a 2% increase in income. Without establishing my need, Hargreaves (or any Firm) can't possibly be certain of it meeting my needs affordably, or if it doesn't, identifying the best possible steps to take as alternatives. For the Private Equity Firms thinking that £4.7bn is a 'steal' because Hargreaves traded at £6.7bn not so long ago, I would strongly suggest you look more closely at what level of Restitution Funding may, or, may not, be embedded as #BlindSpotRisk on the Corporate Balance Sheet. My VfM analysis uses unique consumer data sets, which amongst other things, assesses the current cost of six of the largest pension provider's default fund outcomes in the Effectiveness, Efficiency and Relevance of meeting 9 in 10 worker's unmet needs. As of 31st July 2024, Consumer Duty Price and Value expectations will apply to 45m* Workplace DC pension pot owners. *source is from the 5 ⭐ #Pensionwashing experts at Corporate Adviser who refused to share a copy of their research with me as according to their Commercial Director I'm not an expert specialising in Workplace or EBC solutions, despite my LinkedIn profile clearly referencing six of their 5 ⭐ Award winners over the years 🤣 I have no issue with 5 ⭐ Awards being given, if they are justified, which arguably they are, for 1 in 10 workers. However, my focus for 25 years, and for the next 20 years (at least), are the other 9 in 10 where there is ZERO evidence of PMF for Workplace and Individual DC pensions. #BUOM

Hargreaves Lansdown shares spike after rejecting bid

Hargreaves Lansdown shares spike after rejecting bid

citywire.com

To view or add a comment, sign in

Explore topics