FlyX Avia’s Post

MGN 379 (M+F) Amendment 1: use of electronic navigational aids Stabilisation Modes on Radar: Ground Stabilisation: -Speed and Heading from GNSS, -Course and speed over ground, -Best suited for coastal Navigation, -A fixed target will appear stationary. Sea Stabilisation: -Speed and Heading from Gyro (or another THD) and Log, -Course and speed through the water, -Best suited for Anti-collision, -Fixed target will have a vector direction reciprocal to set and the speed will indicate the rate of drift. “The Raster Chart Display System (RCDS) uses RNCs, which are exact facsimiles of official paper charts, and for which Hydrographic Offices take the same liability as for their paper products. RNCs, being little more than images, do not have the functionality of ENCs that allow ECS such as ECDIS to interact with them and alert the operator. Therefore, the availability of safety features in the charts themselves is nil, and if navigating on them the mariner should treat them just as they would a paper SNC. RCDS will still allow the constant position of the ship to be plotted on the chart from sensors, and some systems may allow manual corrections to be drawn/added, but extreme caution must be given in this mode. As previously mentioned, in these cases when ENCs are not in use, an appropriate and up-to-date folio of paper charts is required as the primary navigation means.”

Sharing some Knowledge about AIS on Merchant Vessels . AIS is an automatic tracking system used on ships to transmit and receive information about their position, identity, course, and speed. Here’s a breakdown of how AIS works on ships: Key Components: AIS Transponder: Installed on the ship’s bridge, this device sends and receives AIS messages. GPS or Internal Sensors: Provide position and movement data to the AIS transponder. VHF Radio: Used for communication with other AIS-equipped ships and shore-based stations. How AIS Works: Continuous Broadcasting: The AIS transponder continuously sends out messages containing the ship’s static and dynamic information, such as: Ship name and identification Position (latitude and longitude) Course and speed MMSI (Maritime Mobile Service Identity) Receiving and Processing: Other AIS-equipped ships and shore-based stations receive these messages and process them to display the ship’s information. Synchronization: AIS stations synchronize themselves to avoid overlapping transmissions and ensure accurate information exchange. Regulatory Requirements: IMO Convention: The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires all vessels of 300 gross tons and above engaged in international voyages, as well as all passenger ships, to carry AIS. SOLAS Regulation: The Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention regulates the use of AIS, mandating its installation on certain vessels. AIS Classes: Class A: Mandatory for all vessels 300 GT and above engaged in international voyages and all passenger ships. Provides full AIS functionality. Class B: Limited functionality, designed for pleasure craft and smaller vessels not subject to SOLAS requirements. Benefits: Improved Safety: AIS enhances collision avoidance and reduces the risk of accidents. Enhanced Navigation: AIS provides accurate and timely information for navigation, allowing for more efficient route planning and vessel tracking. Vessel Traffic Services: AIS enables shore-based Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) to monitor and manage vessel traffic, improving maritime safety and efficiency. In summary, AIS is a critical system on ships, providing essential information for navigation, safety, and traffic management. Its continuous broadcasting and receiving capabilities enable accurate tracking and monitoring of vessels, enhancing maritime safety and efficiency. #navigation #merchantships #Bridgeequipments #Safety #Sea #Ports #Onshore #Offshore

Dangers in the use of VHF for the purpose of Collision Avoidance at sea The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (“COLREGS”), as amended, provides general rules to be followed in order to avoid collisions at sea where good seamanship should complement these rules. There has been a significant number of collisions where misuse of VHF radio equipment and AIS information has been established to be a contributory factor. The COLREGS, however, does not specify exactly the role of VHF and other navigational aids, other than the use of ‘all available means’ when keeping a proper lookout. To this effect, the use of VHF radio equipment for the purposes of anti-collision is strongly discouraged. Anticollision measures agreed upon via VHF radio communications may not always be appropriate and may lead to a catastrophic situation. Therefore, it is important to be reminded that all Masters and navigation watch-keeping officers on ships shall be vigilant against the use of VHF communications as a means of avoiding collisions and shall take note of the following risks: • The agreed actions between two or more vessels, made over the VHF radio to avoid collision and without considering the risks of such an agreed action, may not comply with the requirements of the COLREGS. This may also have an effect on other vessels in the vicinity who are fully observing the requirements of the COLREGS. Such actions may lead to the development of a close quarters situation or to a collision; Agreement reached via VHF radio communication between vessels for collision avoidance could be misunderstood or misinterpreted due to language difficulties, imprecise or ambiguous expressions; • Uncertainty may exist over the identity of approaching vessels, when navigating in restricted visibility, during period of darkness, and in circumstances when there is more than one vessel. • A natural phenomenon known as Tropospheric Propagation may cause radio signals to travel in the part of the atmosphere adjacent to the surface and extending up to some 7,620 metres. Such signals are thus directly affected by weather conditions extending over some miles. • Important messages in the conversation through VHF radio could be interrupted or are not being received clearly due to busy radio traffic, squelch control, static noise and interference of radio communication; • The loss of valuable time in trying to make contact on VHF radio or else having a lengthy conversation on VHF radio instead of taking appropriate and immediate action, in ample time, to comply with the COLREGS and to avoid a collision. • Identification of vessels without AIS information may be difficult during night-time, in restricted visibility or when there are more than two vessels in the vicinity within the VHF radio range.

In the vast expanse of the world’s oceans, where ships traverse isolated and sometimes perilous routes, one technological innovation stands as a beacon of safety and efficiency: the Automatic Identification System (AIS). This article serves as a comprehensive guide to understanding AIS, its importance in the maritime industry, and how it revolutionizes safety and navigation on the high seas.

Performance Standards of AIS - SART - An overview The performance standards for AIS Search and Rescue Transmitters (AIS-SART) are detailed in the Resolution MSC.245(83), adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)1. Here are some key points from the performance standards: AIS-SARTs are designed to be used in conjunction with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on ships and Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft. Upon activation, an AIS-SART should start transmitting a sequence of AIS Messages 1 and 141. The AIS-SART should transmit its position, derived from an internal or external GNSS receiver. The AIS-SART should be detectable by any AIS-equipped vessel or aircraft within VHF range. The AIS-SART should be capable of operating in the harsh maritime environment and should be able to float. The AIS-SART should have a battery life of at least 96 hours in operational mode. These performance standards apply to AIS-SARTs installed on or after 1 January 2010. They aim to ensure the operational reliability of such equipment and to avoid, as far as practicable, adverse interaction between such equipment and other communication and navigation equipment on board ships. They also aim to provide reliable data to rescue coordination centres. For more detailed information, you may refer to the IEC 61097-14 standard2, which specifies the minimum performance requirements, technical characteristics, and methods of testing for AIS-SARTs.

Information that ILS provide There are three types of information given to the pilot by the ILS. They are: Guidance information: Given by the localizer and glideslope. These help the pilot align the aircraft properly with the runway for landing. The localizer provides lateral or horizontal guidance, letting the pilots know if they need to turn left or right to correct their course. The Glideslope gives vertical guidance, letting the pilots know if the aircraft is too high or too low on the approach. Range information: This is provided by the Marker Beacons, DME, and GPS. This information tells the pilot the distance remaining to the runway. The pilot uses this range information to verify that the aircraft is flying at the right height for that section of the approach. Range information is also used to adjust the aircraft configuration and prepare the aircraft for landing. Lowering flaps, extending the landing gear, and making the final decision to land or go around are all tied to the distance remaining to touchdown. Visual information: This is given by the Approach Lighting System. Approach lights help the pilot transition from instrument flying to flying visually for the very last part of the approach. Equipments you need on the aircraft: The localizer uses radio frequencies just like a VOR does, so all you need are standard VHF (Very High Frequency) radio receivers. The glideslope requires a UHF (Ultra High Frequency) receiver. The instruments that can display the signal readout to the pilot are the CDI and the HSI. The CDI stands for Course Deviation Indicator. This instrument features two moving needles, one vertical and one horizontal, that show the deviation from the Glideslope and Localizer courses respectively.

I have observed numerous comments regarding “The Dali” from individuals who lack the qualifications to command a vessel or even serve as crewmembers in any capacity. therefore, I feel compelled to address some misconceptions surrounding this incident for the benefit of these "experts." Firstly, it's important to clarify that the accident was not caused by: 1)     The vessel being flagged in Singapore. In fact, Singapore is an excellent well respected flag. 2)     The crew not meeting international standards. Maritime crews worldwide adhere to the same minimum standard outlined in the STCW regulations. 3)     The size of the vessel. Ship rudder designs account for size and maneuverability. 4)     The speed of the vessel. Vessel speed is regulated by COLREGS, and The Dali was reportedly proceeding at a safe speed. Second, The accident could not have been prevented by: 1)     Dropping the anchor (even if someone had been forward to drop the anchor the cable would most likely have parted due to vessel momentum) 2)     Operating during the day (The physics of a vessel with a locked rudder are the same during the day as they are during the night) What you need to know: All ships are equipped with two independent steering systems and two independent generators to power each system. Typically, these systems operate in parallel during port operations. Additionally, predeparture checks are conducted in American ports to ensure steering functionality. However, if a ship loses power, these systems become non-operational. A video circulating online shows The Dali experiencing power loss at least twice. In such situations, the rudder remains locked in its last position until power is restored. Emergency steering can be manually activated in the steering gear room, but this process takes approximately 15 minutes and is designed for safe return to port, not extended navigation. There is evidence suggesting The Dali attempted to avoid the collision by reversing engines, as indicated by a plume of black smoke visible in the video. This action likely aimed to reduce speed and evade the bridge. It's worth noting that The Dali may have a right-hand propeller configuration, resulting in transverse thrust or "prop wash" when going astern, causing the stern to swing to port and the bow to starboard. According to AIS data, The Dali was traveling at 1.5 knots upon collision, which is notably slow. This speed suggests the vessel may have been thrusting astern in an attempt to mitigate the impact on the bridge. Currently, the vessel is under investigation by various authorities, including the vessels classification society, representatives from the Singaporean flag, the NTSB, the USCG, and most likely the company's internal investigators. Qualified and competent marine investigators recognize that there is likely no single root cause but rather multiple contributing factors to this incident. Please stop speculating and creating conspiracy theories. 

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) occurs when a fully operational aircraft, controlled by the pilot, accidentally collides with terrain, water, or obstacles, often without the pilot realizing the danger until it's too late. These incidents most frequently happen during approach and landing phases, particularly with non-precision approaches, and are usually caused by loss of situational awareness or errors in interpreting approach charts. Consequences: - Ground collisions can result in the loss of the aircraft and cause fatalities or injuries. Preventative Measures: - Following Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) - Utilizing Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) - Maintaining good situational awareness regarding terrain Common Scenarios: - Pilot-related: Pilots may descend below Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) due to poor weather or over-dependence on GPS, resulting in terrain impact. - ATC-related: Air traffic controllers might provide incorrect headings or instructions, leading to collisions if the issue isn’t addressed promptly. Contributing Factors: - Adverse weather - Reduced visibility, particularly at night - Ambiguous approach documentation - Misuse of standard phraseology - Pilot fatigue and disorientation Solutions: - Increase the use of TAWS in aircraft - Enhance understanding of approach and landing risks - Adopt Continuous Descent Final Approaches (CDFA) - Implement Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) systems - Employ Electronic Terrain and Obstacle Data (eTOD)