HF Integration Pty Ltd’s Post

The Process safety Accidents Involving Naphtha Alkylation Processing Units in the Last Years Raised the Discussions Above the Security of these Units and the Risks Associated with the Dealing of Strong Acids like Fluoridric (HF) and Sulfuric (H2SO4) which are Commonly Applied as Homogeneous Catalyst to the Naphtha Alkylation Processes. These Discussions are in the Core of the Decision Making Process of Some Players which Decided to Shutdown their Processing Units or Revamp the HF and Sulfuric Acid Alkylation units to Adopt New Naphtha Alkylation Technologies Capable to Balance the Gasoline Quality and Process Safety. Another Driving Force to the Installation of New Naphtha Alkylation Processing Units Can be the LPG Surplus in Some Markets Once this Route Can Offer the Opportunity to Produce Low Sulfur and High Quality Gasoline, Especially Considering the TIER 3 Regulation. Despite the risks related to the operation of naphtha alkylation units, the alkylate is an important octane booster for the gasoline and some forecasts indicates an annual growth rate of the global alkylation units capacity of 1,5% until 2025. According to Global Data Company, the global alkylation capacity increases from 2.406 thousand barrels per day (Mbpd) in 2015 to 2.553 Mbpd in 2020 and the USA is responsible for 1.276 Mbpd of this capacity. The video below shows the moment of a huge explosion caused by a process safety accident in a naphtha alkylation processing unit operated by Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES Company) in 2019, this video calls our attention the the necessity to a severe and strict control of integrity and process safety requirements of the crude oil refining assets... More details about this accident can be found at the following link: https://lnkd.in/dgG2NVk9 #naphthaalkylation #octanebooster #oil #tank #storage #vessel #fire #refinery #plant #terminal #foams #firesafety #firefighting #desing #learning #engineering #fuel #petroleum #gasoline #diesel #spill #poolfire #rimfire #boilover #fireengineer #training

Kudos to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board for the thorough investigation of the Pryor Trust blowout, Oklahoma 2018, which resulted in five fatalities. The investigation resulted in several actions including the investigation of Automated Well Control. API - American Petroleum Institute published a bulletin in 2022, API 16H Automated Safety Instrumented Systems for Onshore Blowout Preventer Actuation. Safe Influx conducted a "Gap Analysis" between their system designed and built in 2019 and the 2022 API Bulletin, and determined COMPLIANCE. Contact Safe Influx or your equipment provider to have Automated Well Control protect your operations. #blowout, #drilling, #wellcontrol, #humanfactors

📝 Final Investigation Report for the Fatal Naphtha Release and Fire at BP-Husky Toledo Refinery Just Released! The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) issued its final investigation report into the fatal naphtha release and fire at the BP-Husky Toledo Refinery (“BP Toledo Refinery”) in Oregon, Ohio, which occurred on September 20, 2022, and resulted in the death of two BP employees, who were brothers. During an emergency situation at the refinery, liquid naphtha was released from a pressurized vessel, which resulted in a vapor cloud that subsequently ignited, causing a flash fire, which fatally injured the two BP employees. The events on September 20, 2022 resulted in approximately $597 million in property damage at the refinery, including loss of use. Over 23,000 pounds of naphtha were released during the incident. Attached herewith is a comprehensive investigation report which details invaluable safety issues, causes, and recommendations stemmed from the incident. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board bp #investigation #incident #process_safety

HYDROGEN SULFIDE ― THE PROCESS SAFETY BASICS (PART 2) We continue our review of the properties of hydrogen sulfide in the wake of the recent fatal accident at a Pemex refinery in Deer Park. In this post at https://lnkd.in/dz5Jer7X we look at the first part of the OSHA Fact Sheet to do with hydrogen sulfide.

𝙆𝙚𝙮 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝙁𝙚𝙙𝙚𝙧𝙖𝙡 𝙄𝙣𝙫𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙞𝙜𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙩𝙤 𝘽𝙋 𝙍𝙚𝙛𝙞𝙣𝙚𝙧𝙮 𝙀𝙭𝙥𝙡𝙤𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 A federal investigation into the 2022 bp refinery explosion in Ohio, which resulted in the tragic loss of two employees, Ben and Max Morrissey, has revealed critical safety lapses and missed opportunities for prevention. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board identified a lack of training, poor safety processes, and communication failures as key factors leading to the incident. Despite numerous safety alarms and evident equipment issues, BP did not halt production, which could have prevented the catastrophe. The report draws parallels to a similar incident at BP's Texas City refinery in 2005, underscoring a recurring pattern of inadequate safety measures for handling dangerous situations. The refinery, now under the ownership of Cenovus Energy, has resumed operations with ongoing improvements in safety protocols. https://lnkd.in/g7V-dMCY

If you work in Refineries or Chemical Process Plants, take some time to read the final report from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board regarding the September 2022 fatal fire at the BP-Husky (now Cenovus' Ohio Refining Company) Refinery. HRG teaches "Learning Organization and Level of Knowledge" as principle number 1 of our HRO model of culture. Unfortunately, companies continue to underinvest in becoming a learning organization. See the excerpt below from the executive summary. After you read this report, please let me know why your organization does not need to focus on High Reliability Organization principles. {Yes, I am tired of being nice about this...people are getting killed.} We can do better. We must do better. Let's learn and apply HRO Principles. "Learning from Incidents. The final recommendation of the report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel in 2007 (“the Baker Panel Report”) stated: “BP should use the lessons learned from the Texas City tragedy and from the Panel’s report to transform the company into a 13 Investigation Report recognized industry leader in process safety management” [2, p. 257]. a In its investigation of the September 20, 2022, naphtha release and fire, the CSB found similarities between the overflow events of the BP Toledo Refinery incident and the findings from the fatal explosions in 2005 at the BP refinery in Texas City, Texas. Catastrophic incident warning signs existed prior to the September 20, 2022, incident at the BP Toledo Refinery, and had BP effectively recognized and acted upon the warning signs following a 2019 incident, the company could have provided more effective safeguards to prevent the overflow of multiple vessels during a refinery upset such as the September 20, 2022, incident. (See Section 4.4)" P.S. Did you take action to share the learnings from this incident with your team? Or did you just say to yourself "That can't happen here. We are too good."? https://lnkd.in/gCiWJt84 #highreliabilityorganization #processafety

Reformer tubes, nestled within the heart of the refinery furnace, play a crucial role in the crude oil manufacturing process. They house the critical chemical reactions that convert hydrocarbons into valuable products. However, these tubes are vulnerable to runaway reactions, where temperature and pressure rapidly escalate, leading to explosions and devastating consequences. 𝐈𝐦𝐚𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐜𝐞𝐧𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐨: On a routine day at a refinery, a malfunctioning temperature sensor in a reformer tube goes unnoticed.  Operators unaware of the rising heat, continue feeding raw materials into the furnace, further fueling the reaction.  The uncontrolled reaction generates excessive heat and pressure, exceeding the reformer tubes' capacity.  As a result, reformer tubes rupture, releasing a torrent of fire, hazardous chemicals, and shockwaves, leading to a catastrophic failure. To prevent such accidents in oil and gas refineries, implement robust safety measures: ✔Thorough hazard identification and risk assessment ✔Strict adherence to safety protocols ✔Effective training and education ✔Implementing advanced safety systems XYMA's Ultrasonic Waveguide sensors can remotely capture temperature at multiple points in reformer tubes to enhance asset life and minimise the risk of runaway reactions.   Connect with us to learn more about how you can safeguard your process! #XYMAAnalytics #SensorSolutions #WaveguideTechnology #IndustrialSafety #OilAndGasIndustry

Temperature measurement in reformer tubes presents distinct challenges due to the harsh operating conditions and the critical role of temperature control in the reforming process. The following are some specific challenges and considerations for temperature measurement in reformer tubes: 👉 High Temperatures 👉 Uniform Temperature Distribution 👉 Thermal Stress 👉 Corrosive Atmosphere 👉 Vibration and Mechanical Integrity 👉 Remote Monitoring and Maintenance 👉 Safety Considerations #Engineering #IndustrialSafety #Maintenance #ThermalManagement #xymaAnalytics #sensortechnology #waveguidetechnology

For anyone involved in process safety, the Chemical Safety Board report into the fire and fatal incident at bp's former Toledo Oil Refinery is sobering reading. https://lnkd.in/gcS2zFaj As is often the case with these types of incidents, there were multiple contributory causes to the incident: 1. Lack of high level instrumentation to prevent overfilling, reliance on human intervention (there were multiple vessels overfilled, cascading to a downstream unit); 2. Alarm overload in the 12 hours prior to the incident (over 3700 alarms in 12 hours); 3. System in an abnormal operating mode, with parts of the plant bypassed or out of service.

We conclude our brief series to do with hydrogen sulfide safety with 'Hydrogen Sulfide ― The Process Safety Basics (Part 5) Emergency Response' at https://lnkd.in/eteAz499. Most readers of this blog are familiar with H2S: its properties and its dangers. Nevertheless, in the wake of the recent accident at the Deer Park Pemex refinery, it makes sense to consider the basics one more time. In this final post we discuss Emergency Response in the event of an H2S leak.