Hybrid Pathways’ Post

Like many of you, I have been spending a lot of time in the area of actionable program development for enabling the adoption of AI into our businesses. In this week’s  Security Sparks – Insight for Pro’s  I talk about things we can do now as building blocks to meet the industry where they are going while capitalizing on investments we’ve already made.  Have a listen and hope it “sparks” some ideas for you and your teams! #cyber #cybersecurity #aidefense #businessoperationsprotection #riskmanagement #ciso #cisolife #informationsecurity #ai

It's all about increasing speed to insight

Totally agree with this. I’m frustrated time and again by the slowness of capabilities being delivered to warfighters. Silicon Valley’s ability to tap commercial pressures’ speed to market was one of the biggest reasons we were able to maintain our technological edge with silicon chips and chip manufacturing from the cold war through the gulf war. We’re losing that edge in software, AI, and other new but critical technologies today. As a DoD, we NEED to figure out how we can deliver capabilities faster. Measuring time as a KPI for our programs would be a good start.

The US DoD still has a Cold War acquisitions system, but most all of our senior leaders in service today cut their teeth fighting violent extremists. There's two "iron triangles" I always think about. For acquisitions, it's about time, expense, and quality. Yet when I look at commercial solutions relative to defense primes, it's easy to find "faster, cheaper AND better." Yet when looking at the operational scale, I have a different scale. Mission: how important is this op? Time: what do I control, temporally? Risk: what's the risk to the team? And that last one extends back to the entire acquisitions food chain. When I'd be in a convoy with some fellow snake eaters and we'd come across an IED, we'd can'x our primary mission, EOD would come take care of it, and we'd go find that target another day. Mission risk was usually as close to zero as we could make it. Likewise, our garbage software, always several years behind what the commercial sector was capable of and filled with cyber vulnerabilities because of how the ATO process works from a bureaucracy perspective, was also that way because acquisitions personnel were inclined to take zero professional risk. But that was all okay because in that C-VEO/CT/COIN fight, for all but a small minority of missions (mostly done by my friends at JSOC TFs or OGAs), time was irrelevant. When mission is negotiable and time is irrelevant, it's easy to set mission and acquisition risk to zero. We're now facing Grand Power competition against a near peer (one with their own laundry list of problems). Mission is non-negotiable; free people and capitalist democratic ideals as well as economic and personal freedom as concepts are truly at stake on the global scale. Time isn't under our control either. Mike clearly articulates that time matters and how our acquisitions policy is hard broke and has continually failed to learn lessons from the very economy it exists to protect. Senior leaders, especially in acquisitions, need to get uncomfortable and start taking rapid calculated risks, because worrying about risk to their career sickens me. Tens of thousands of sailors and airmen are already at risk every day because of bureaucrats far more concerned about their own processes - that are mere habits, not actual policy much less law - who infuriate me daily within the Pentagon. It's my responsibility to start delivering more capabilities to my brothers and sisters, and it's going to take senior leadership owning more risk than passing it off to legacy systems, platforms and warfighters. Those men and women on the line ultimately have the most important framework of time to worry about: the time they may get to spend with their families if they get to survive the risk we ask them to shoulder. We owe it to them to do better.

The U.S. was in World War I about 18 months. In that time, not a single American-designed and -built warplane saw combat. The only American-built planes used in the air war were converted British DH-4s using American Liberty engines and those still took nearly a year to get overseas. Had the war gone on another 6 months, the story would’ve been much different. In WWII, we did have American planes at the start of the war, mostly thanks to the years-long run up to US involvement, a desire not to repeat the WWI situation I just described, and sales to our allies. However, every aircraft type we used in combat until VJ Day was already in design, test, or production when the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor. That’s after almost 4 years of leveraging nearly the entire U.S. economy, industrial might, and technical community. (The first jets were almost there, but they just missed out on fighting and used what were essentially American-improved versions of the British Whittle engine).

The big stories in Defense Tech and Acquisition this week include: • Stories from Jennifer Pahlka, Jerry McGinn, W. Stone Holden, George Landrith, and Charles Beames • Interesting approaches for regenerating the U.S. maritime industry. • A number of new entrants to address the munitions shortage. • CDAO, CENTCOM, and Air Force pushing forward on the AI front. • Army unleashing its experimental drone units to work out new CONOPS. • Air Force realizing they have too many bills and too many exquisite systems in the pipeline. • Space Force getting serious about leveraging commercial capabilities. • More international partners are focusing on defense and building internal to their nations. • Commentary from Matt MacGregor and I • Pods and videos from Offset Symposium, Schuyler Moore, Justin Fanelli, Mark Kitz, Bryan Clark, Tyler Sweatt, Jason R. Preisser, Alexis B., Bonnie Evangelista, Dmitri Alperovitch, Wasim K., Scott Wence, Arun Gupta #defensetech #defenseindustry #defenseinnovation https://lnkd.in/eBXP4rRm

In an era defined by rapid technological advancements, the landscape of warfare is undergoing a profound transformation. The traditional image of armies clashing on a battlefield has evolved into something far more intricate and interconnected: battle networks. These networks represent the convergence of cutting-edge technology, information warfare, and strategic coordination, and they are shaping the future of war in remarkable ways. In this new paradigm, information has become a potent weapon. Disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and electronic warfare can disrupt the adversary's decision-making processes and sow confusion. Effective control and manipulation of information can be as decisive as traditional firepower. Artificial intelligence plays a pivotal role in processing vast amounts of data and generating predictive insights. AI-driven algorithms can analyze historical data and anticipate enemy movements, optimizing strategic planning and resource allocation. Hypergiant's role in this space is growing and we are proud to contribute to the mission. Investing in systems and tools that do not produce kinetic effects is organizationally difficult but may be much more necessary to win in the future--especially if we place a premium on speed. In this future, my opinion is that humans will always be required--either standing on the objective with a rifle, or in a joint operations center, or repairing and sustaining force structure. Highly recommend reviewing the article below.

America's best comparative advantage lies in its digital capabilities, according to experts. The existing gap between these capabilities and the state of defense in the digital space needs to be bridged. The fight is shifting, and surface warfare officers must think differently about the kill chain. Today's kill chain is more influenced by a digital process of finding, fixing, and tracking. To stay ahead in the digital space, the United States Navy is looking to industry to digitize its ships. Read more on the National Defense Magazine. #digitalcapabilities #navy #killchain #digitalprocess #defense

Concepts are tough. Predicated on what the future might look like, they are almost always doomed to fail, at least in the sense that they are exposed to so many edge cases that hindsight tends to show how "off" they can be. Concepts are necessary though. They drive capability analysis, requirements, and acquisition decision trade-offs. In most cases, the concept just needs to be directionally correct to deliver relevant warfighting capability to the field; from there, it is up to the operators to deploy capability effectively within the ever-shifting operational and tactical paradigms of the battlefield. One underlying issue the authors touch on is when concepts try to answer every operational and tactical question, they pose inherent risks to the warfighter on the ground. As the authors state, "Most concepts fall prey to this technological overconfidence, particularly in the field of communications. Assured connectivity in combat is central to nearly all multi-domain operations work. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and NATO all place some style of next-generation command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the core of their concept, assuming an assured availability of strong networks in the relatively near future. In reality, and despite a significant amount of attention in recent years, the level of assured connectivity upon which much multi-domain operations thought is predicated is far from realistic." Then they recommend, "stop trying to make war “not war” by being overly clever. New concepts cannot erase attrition from the battlefield or lift the fog of war. Attempts to do so are quixotic at best. Focus on concrete operational problems and build solutions from there." To the point above, I wholeheartedly agree and often fear over-reliance on concepts and "technological overconfidence" cede focus from the power of mission command, commander's intent, solid, realistic training, and trust in our warfighters' adaptability and ingenuity. For me personally, I always try to frame my work in the ADG market from the first principle question of "What is the warfighter (or intel analyst or government software developer or SETA employee, etc.) actually 'doing'?" In most cases, that question lifts the veil and cuts through the conceptual jargon of what might they do or what could they do if everything was perfect. This, in effect, helps me focus on the concrete operational problems a business is trying to help solve for the warfighter and hopefully help them at least do what they are actually doing, just better. https://lnkd.in/e482MANv

Our Spark team is excited to host the Software Enabled Weapons Industry Day, July 17 - 18 in Huntsville, Alabama! This AFWERX Spark Collider event will be held in collaboration with Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate (AFRL/RW). Additional agencies from across the United States Department of Defense will be joining the event to work towards outlining a problem statement and looking to industry for possible solutions. This event will bring together entrepreneurs, warfighters, and experts! 💥 Government problem owners and solution providers will explore novel technologies and new opportunities to improve weapon systems performance. Come join us to discuss how various organizations within the Department of Defense are approaching software enabled weapons and discuss innovative ways to radically accelerate the weapon performance update cycle. If you have a solution that you think could fit the bill, register to attend and submit required security information by July 9: https://ow.ly/lZsR50SbWzm . . . #AFWERX #Spark #Collider #government #collaboration #event #technology #innovation #DoD #AI #weapons