John Boscariol’s Post

Canada names 85 Chinese research groups that ‘may pose’ threat to national security On Tuesday the federal government named more than 100 institutions in China, Russia and Iran which it says represent the "highest risk to Canada's national security." The government says the listed institutions are connected to those countries' militaries and state security agencies. Around 85 Chinese research institutions that “may pose” a threat to national security and sensitive research. The federal government also released what it called a list of "sensitive" research areas — including advanced weapons, quantum technologies, robotics, aerospace, space and satellite technology and medical and health-care technology. The listing is part of a push to secure Canadian research and development in sensitive industrial sectors — including advanced weaponry, aerospace and space technology, and quantum science and technology — from economic espionage and theft. The list, published Tuesday afternoon, also includes 12 Iranian and six Russian organizations the Canadian government believes have ties to “military, national defence or state security entities.” More information please access below web-link： https://lnkd.in/g6JWwBj6

More and more countries are getting picky about who they will allow their researchers to collaborate with. Now it's #Canada announcing stricter guidelines for sensitive international partnerships. https://lnkd.in/gajnwHgw The new measures are aimed at stopping the use of federal money for research that might go against Canada's national security interests. At the top of the list of concerns are advanced technologies, including #AI #renewables and anything with #miltary or #dualuse applications. This is part of a broader trend. A couple of months ago I wrote about a proposed Australia-UK-US military #freetradezone (https://shorturl.at/ovFTV). Governments all over the world are understandably trying to keep sensitive tech to themselves and allies. A possible downside of this trend is that less international research collaboration could lead to slower progress. And also make it harder to agree at the global level on how to govern these powerful new technologies. Merriden VarrallJames TaylorMike KalmsJames CopseyAnnie V.Hibra Q.Antonia RobsonSamuel H.

The Canadian Government has realized that Canada's academic research and technology has been the target of foreign states, including, China, Russia and Iran. Now it's doing something about it. The following article from Global News highlights that the Canadian Government is trying to secure Canadian research and development in sensitive industrial sectors. The upside: The Canadian Government is finally listening to its intelligence agencies like CSE and CSIS in regard to how this sector has been targeted and is making progress. The downside: Foreign actors like China, Russia and Iran will not stop stealing Canadian research and technology simply because a number of academic or research institutions and facilities have been listed. This is where the real game of state sponsored industrial and academic espionage begins. Russia, China and to a lesser extent Iran have highly active espionage networks throughout North America and if they can't acquire the information they want via infiltrating Canadian research and academic institutions they will turn to other means. This includes more emphasis on Cyber attacks to acquire the information as well as using agents and operatives to gain access to businesses that partner with research and academia or using front companies (not associated with any government or military based research) to entice Canadian Companies to work with or partner with them. I'm very happy to see the Canadian Government trying to fix this problem, but the next steps will truly show how the Canadian Intelligence Community is being proactive in this regard. To learn more about International Intelligence operations and espionage, go to https://lnkd.in/g5gfQZ_7 Is the Canadian Government doing enough to ensure that foreign states aren't stealing research relating to advanced weaponry, aerospace and space technology, and quantum science? What else do you think should be done to prevent economic espionage and theft from happening in Canada? https://lnkd.in/egzVKryt

The pressure is building for the EU to embrace dual-use research, with EU leaders including research and innovation in dual-use technologies in the 2024-2029 agenda for the first time and the Science, Research and Innovation Performance (SRIP) report, released by the Commission last week, underlining the need for the EU to take defence R&D more seriously. EU investment in defence has seen a steady increase over the past five years, but most spending is on equipment. Meanwhile, spending on basic and applied research, and technology validation has fallen behind.

The Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern is out! To ensure compliance with the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern, researchers involved in activities funded by a research grant that advance a sensitive technology research area must review the list of Named Research Organizations. This list is composed of research organizations and institutions that pose the highest risk to Canada’s national security due to their direct, or indirect connections with military, national defence, and state security entities. You can use Scopus and SciVal to determine your institution's collaborations that were involved with one of the 103 institutions listed in the Policy. We can also take it a step further by linking collaborations to attained funding. Interested? Send me a line. #scopus #scival

Partnerships between U.S. and Chinese universities have led to significant federal funding supporting China's military technology development. U.S. tax dollars have facilitated advancements in hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, nuclear technology, and semiconductors through these collaborations. There are rising national security concerns, prompting calls for stricter safeguards against scientific collaborations. Although American universities do not conduct covert research, their findings can be repurposed for military use. The U.S. House of Representatives has responded by passing legislation to enhance competition with China, which includes banning Chinese-made drones and restricting access to advanced U.S. technologies. The report indicates a decline in U.S.-China scholarly collaboration, partly due to the Trump administration's anti-spying measures. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has urged Chinese students to focus on less sensitive fields, raising concerns among academics about the potential negative effects on scientific engagement and U.S.-China relations. An analysis found approximately 8,800 publications involving U.S. researchers funded by the Department of Defense working with Chinese counterparts, some linked to China's defense sectors. The report emphasizes that joint institutes pose a risk by enabling the transfer of U.S. technology to China, particularly as American researchers travel to China for these projects. Georgia Tech has denied involvement in research or funding linked to China but is ending its partnership with Shenzhen due to trade secret theft allegations. The University of California, Berkeley, is also dissolving its collaboration with Tsinghua University, while the University of Pittsburgh remains silent regarding its partnership with Sichuan University. #AsiaRisk #GeopoliticalConflictandDisputes #Japan Follow us for daily updates on risk and operations in Asia! https://lnkd.in/guU38ks7

New Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern is focused on researcher affiliations and targets the highest-risk collaborations with military and state security-related institutions. As part of this policy, researchers should keep in mind that institutions that are not included in the Named Research Organizations (https://lnkd.in/gC2ECisD) list at this point may still pose a risk to Canada’s research and are encouraged to apply due diligence practices to mitigate risks that may be associated with any collaboration or partnership in a sensitive technology research area. https://lnkd.in/gH_RQpgK

TECH PILFERAGE? A recent #report by #congressional #Republicans reveals that #US #China #universityPartnerships over the past decade have funneled hundreds of millions in #federalFunding to #Beijing, aiding in the development of #criticalMilitaryTechnologies. This includes advances in #hypersonic #weapons, #AI, #nuclear, and #semiconductor #tech. The report calls for stronger #safeguards to protect #nationalSecurity. #TechRivalry #USChinaRelations #MilitaryTech #NuclearTech #HigherEducation #Congress #Geopolitics https://loom.ly/d4H3_4M

A recent House committee investigation has revealed that U.S. federal funding supported over 2,000 research papers in the past decade, involving collaborations between U.S. and Chinese researchers, which contributed to advancements in China's military technology. These papers included critical research areas such as high-performance explosives, rocket fuels, underwater target tracking, and artificial intelligence for coordinated drone operations, as reported by *The New York Times*. While U.S. scientists have historically collaborated with Chinese researchers on fundamental scientific projects, this report highlights significant national security concerns, as unregulated research has potentially bolstered China's military capabilities. The House GOP-led report emphasizes that U.S. Department of Defense-funded research, intended to preserve America’s military superiority, may have inadvertently aided the Chinese military. This discovery raises alarms about the extent to which U.S. research collaborations have been exploited by China to strengthen its military advancements. In response, the report suggests implementing a ban preventing federally funded U.S. researchers from collaborating with Chinese institutions affiliated with China's military. If such a ban is enacted, it could significantly reduce the volume of collaborative research between the two countries, particularly in high-tech and defense-related fields, and reshape the future of international scientific partnerships between the U.S. and China.

Despite the intense discussions in the US and the EU on China’s MCF strategy/policy for the past few years, and numerous awareness-raising events among universities and research centers, there is surprisingly little discussion on the “how” part. How to identify potentially problematic foreign entities? How to make/tweak regulations on foreign collaborations by Universities? How to maintain the increasingly elusive balance between academic freedom and national security? Data Abyss might be providing a great service on the first problem.