Kevin Mickey’s Post

I would also add the challenge of balancing current mission requirements and the need to innovate towards future challenges. True change is neither easy or comfortable but it is necessary and leading through that requires empowerment, accountability, and innovation acceptance. https://lnkd.in/eWnXdQHz

Meaningful change requires more than vision. It requires inescapable pressure. My observation of human nature has been that people generally won’t change until they have no other choice. Bureaucracies have one prime objective: protect the bureaucracy. Those embedded in the bureaucracy will have little incentive to support new ideas that threaten their stability. This is one great reason that the best tech companies reinvent and reorganize constantly. DoD doesn’t have that latitude. Or does it? #dreambigger

"To prevent the new cold-war competition from escalating into a hot war, we need to innovate as if the free world depends on it. This path forward requires substantial investments in technology and an infrastructure built for innovative national-security research and education. Failure to act risks not only our strategic position but also our future stability and influence on the global stage. The answer lies within incentivizing our Force to innovate rapidly." National security is a shared responsibility, requiring interdisciplinary and collaborative work across industry, academia and government. In his recent op-ed, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and member of the Defense Innovation Board retired Admiral Mike Mullen, Chair of the NPS Foundation's Advisory Council, underscores the urgent need to reform the Department of Defense's incentive structures to foster a culture of innovation. At the NPS Foundation, we empower the Naval Postgraduate School to connect active-duty students, top researchers, and subject matter experts to understand global threats, develop new capabilities, and deliver solutions. Our commitment extends to developing agile leaders who can drive the adoption of these new capabilities within the DOD. By fostering collaboration between military, academic, and industry experts, we ensure that NPS remains a powerful innovation accelerator, bridging the gap between private sector ingenuity and the specific needs of the DOD. "In the face of a clear and present danger, there is no room for hesitation. Leaders must lead." Read more from Adm. Mullen: https://lnkd.in/gv2EEKnu

The Future of U.S. Defense Hangs on Innovation and Urgency—We’re Out of Time. The U.S. faces a critical moment, similar to the industrial shift seen during WWII. But today, unpredictable funding and continuing resolutions (CRs) are paralyzing innovation. The looming threat of conflict with China demands we not only innovate, but produce and scale fast. The defense industrial base can no longer be held back by bureaucratic delays and funding instability. The war in Ukraine has shown us the importance of rapid adaptation and scalability. But without stable, long-term funding, our ability to build a resilient defense industrial base and sustain logistics in contested environments like the Indo-Pacific will be compromised. The Indo-Pacific’s vast distances and complex terrain will strain our logistics, making it essential to preposition supplies and invest in a decentralized, agile network. We must break the cycle of CRs by moving to multi-year defense budgets, allowing for long-term planning and sustained production. Defense acquisition processes need to be streamlined, and public-private partnerships must be strengthened to drive rapid innovation. We can’t afford to let political dysfunction slow us down. The stakes are too high. The future of U.S. defense depends on breaking free from short-term thinking, ensuring predictable funding, and accelerating innovation. Our national security depends on it. #DefenseInnovation #LogisticsTransformation #DefenseProduction #SustainmentSolutions #ScienceAndTechnology #ContestedLogistics #PredictiveLogistics #DefenseLogistics #IndustrialBase #SupplyChainResilience #MilitaryTechnology #WartimeLogistics #DefenseAcquisition #FutureOfDefense #IndoPacificDefense #NationalSecurity #DefenseIndustry #MilitaryLogistics #DefenseContracting #AdvancedManufacturing

Big thanks to The Merge and Christine (Chris) Michienzi for this thought-provoking and candid conversation on how to fix the defense industrial base (DIB). Here are my top takeaways and humble thoughts trigged by the discussion: The Core Issue: DIB unable to quickly surge production of essential weapon systems. Ukraine = big wake-up call, raising concerns about a direct/protracted conflict. Reasons for the Problem: DIB currently optimized for efficiency, not resilience. Key factors are unpredictable demand / tight margins. Makes industry CapEx difficult to justify, resulting in antiquated manufacturing processes and stagnated production capacity. Dwindling workforce another major concern. Solutions: - Increased funding: DoD topline should be closer to 6% of GDP (currently around 4%). Specifically, Congress should "appropriate" more funding for long-lead-time items and multi-year procurement programs. - Allies/ Partners: Aggregate demand is critical for sustaining US DIB and addressing supply chain fragility. Co-production/co-development is important. Just as important is increasing parts/component commonality. - Urgency: This needs to be a top concern across the entire national security enterprise. HUMBLE THOUGHTS What should the DIB be optimized for? I see some very broad optimization scenarios: Option 1: Sustaining a protracted high-intensity war.  Option 2: Ability to quickly surge production capacity for a protracted high-intensity war. (This is the approach DoD appears to be moving towards) Some Important questions to consider: 1) What's the gap between current capacity and the projected operational demand? 2) How do different DIB optimization scenarios impact an adversary's deterrence calculus and the military's responsiveness to an operational stimulus? 3) What are the ballpark costs of each option, and what variables can be controlled by DoD/Congress? To this point, incentivizing US capital markets and deliberate/upfront coordination with allies/partners are important variables that can augment the defense topline. NOTE - Around the 35min mark, good discussion on the capital markets/investor perspective. Need for a National Defense “Communications” Strategy: This discussion needs to extend beyond the defense sector, addressing how massive increases in defense spending relate to the average American's life and why it's a worthwhile investment compared to other areas like infrastructure or social services. If there's to be any hope of securing massive funding increases, the government must better explain the connection between national security threats, their potential impact on daily life, and how enhanced defense spending can mitigate these risks, i.e., tangible implications vs abstract platitudes. (e.g., upholding the rules-based order is not it, need to be a lot more candid about the threat environment).  https://lnkd.in/eac3TfwD

An important national defense discussion today. Why middle ground defense companies are key to the health of the defense industry, and why they need to be kept strong. @ 3:30pm ET - Chairman & CEO of Leonardo DRS William J. Lynn III and former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment Ellen M. Lord discuss the critical role of mid-sized companies in the defense ecosystem. https://lnkd.in/eDzAat2s #LeonardoDRS

Earlier this month, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General CQ Brown, Jr. joined USD(A&S) William LaPlante for the latest DoD-wide Program Executive Officer (PEO) Summit: https://lnkd.in/eBKE2qvG "Acquisition is a profession and an expertise that takes an incredible amount of knowledge and skill built over time — and I can't emphasize enough how important your work is to our ability to implement the National Defense Strategy," LaPlante told attendees. “You and your program managers are the ones helping to translate the tremendous prototyping and modernization efforts taking place across the department and industry into production. If we're not getting those capabilities into the hands of the warfighters at scale, we're not fully realizing that innovation." Bringing together PEOs from across the Departments and Service and Component Acquisition Executives, discussion focused on acquisition for competitive advantage, collaboration with industry, and the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The summit, facilitated by OUSD(A&S) and Defense Acquisition University, is a semiannual event to build cross-Service relationships, maintain open dialogue, and ultimately improve #DefenseAcquisition outcomes. Read more below!

A camel is a horse that was designed by committee. If you want something done quickly, put one capable person in charge of everything needed for success and keep that person in place until they either succeed or fail. No dotted lines in the org chart. If that person fails, replace them. General Groves is the father of the nuclear bomb, Admiral Rickover the father of Navy Nuclear Power, Admiral Meyers is the father of Aegis. We know these people by name. Does anyone know who the Father of Constellation is? https://lnkd.in/eFVpVjfC

Positive things coming from the PEO Summit and from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. From Undersecretary LaPlante: "You and your program managers are the ones helping to translate the tremendous prototyping and modernization efforts taking place across the department and industry into production. If we're not getting those capabilities into the hands of the warfighters at scale, we're not fully realizing that innovation." And from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, GEN Brown: "There's operational risk, policy risk and fiscal risk. We have to make sure the people who own these risks come together in the same room so we can have the hard conversations and figure out where trade-space exists to accelerate delivery at scale." https://lnkd.in/gCxCWS5F

The Department of the Air Force is retooling to meet the demands of Great Power Competition. The acquisition processes that have served us since the end of the Cold War don’t scare our potential peer adversaries, in fact they’re counting on their continuance. The institutional resistance to change highlighted in this article manifests itself in what I’ve called a “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency” (aka slow rolling). Lead, follow or get out of the way!