Luca Leone’s Post

EpiSci's chief technology officer Dan “Animal” Javorsek describes some of the needed changes to the defense acquisition system in order to help agencies take advantage of software-defined technologies. "While hardware meets a requirement, software solves the problems warfighters care about. Software, and the data that powers it, has become dramatically more important than the hardware that long dominated our defense acquisition ecosystem. The big companies defining our lives today - Amazon, Google, Meta, etc. - are all data-driven organizations. Like these corporations, what truly gives our military’s existing combat platforms their advantage is their software, enabled by performant hardware. Unfortunately, many of the challenges of shifting to a software-forward mindset arise because the military’s large acquisitions programs are designed to acquire hardware from incumbent companies that have been rewarded by the existing capability model that sets in once vendor lock is achieved. In fact, vendor lock has only strengthened since the infamous “Last Supper” of 1993 where Secretary of Defense Les Aspin encouraged dozens of companies in the defense industrial base to consolidate and merge into today’s few big prime contractors."

After giving my "It's About Time" lecture at many conferences over the last several years I finally decided to publish it. In the article below, I describe how we are at a unique moment in DOD history. Open architectures are liberating systems plagued by vendor lock with the promise to reinvigorate competition in our Defense Industrial Base. This marks an important transition for America and our Allies. Although our burgeoning software-defined era is just beginning it may be our saving grace. In addition to the promise to regain the temporal advantage, it has the potential to extract the latent capability currently trapped in our existing warfighting force. At EpiSci we're benefiting from DOD's willingness to rethink the age-old hardware-centric acquisitions model. As one of a select few truly "software-only" companies, we see our developers as a profit-center instead of a cost-center. I'm confident we're uniquely poised to maximize this opportunity. If you're interested in joining in this revolution please see our careers (https://lnkd.in/ehcdf2pT) or LinkedIn pages. If you'd like to read more please checkout the link to my Opinion Editorial in the Washington Technology publication by GovExec. Blue Skies! https://lnkd.in/eCYE-MWP

A very interesting article that resonates with my goals and why I started writing about Defense Tech startups and the necessity for the Pentagon to change its acquisition process. The most poignant line in the article that highlights the crux of the problem we currently face, "the increasing risk to national security from a shrinking supplier base of 6 vendors who receive two-thirds of all procurement dollars, down from 50 vendors in 1990."

This is an interesting article highlighting a unique opportunity for smaller players in the defense and government technology sector to engage in M&A.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks recently highlighted the accelerating pace of change and innovation within the Department of Defense (DoD). Key initiatives like the Replicator Initiative are driving rapid advancements in capability development, reducing acquisition timelines, and fostering collaboration with nontraditional defense companies. With over $57 billion flowing through new acquisition pathways and significant progress in software and hardware upgrades, the DoD is transforming how it meets national security challenges. 💬 What steps are you taking to accelerate innovation and adaptation?

Jeff Decker and Noah Sheinbaum writing in the Texas National Security Review, have outlined their findings of a much needed survey of the defense industrial base about their challenges & concerns in doing business with the Government.  Their top findings: 1. Partnering with different types of companies requires different tactics. 2. Defense Department partnerships with new entrants to the federal market often falter because companies and buyers are disconnected. 3. New entrants are unprepared to meet federal government requirements like technical certifications .... or licensing requirements ... which can impede technology transition and cause delays in award. 4. U.S. government's overly assertive stance on intellectual property rights delays awards and shrinks the pool of companies willing to sell to the Defense Department.  5. The difficulty companies face in obtaining security clearances and accessing physical and virtual classified environments limits the U.S. government's exposure to new or commercial capabilities. To me, the toughest challenges here involve finding #1, which incorporates the issue of getting the right types of contracts particularly to small businesses, some needing speed and others size to sustain their innovation efforts. Also difficult to address will be point #4 about protecting highly valuable intellectual property rights of startups, particularly those engaged in SBIR contracts. This will require a substantial shift in DoD thinking as well as adoption of standardized frameworks for IP protection. Despite the challenges, this study has a number of concrete recommendations to align the defense industrial base with the specific objectives of the National Defense Industrial Strategy. "Company success in the defense market is inextricably linked to the military's success on the battlefield. The government's success metric should not be tied to the success of any one company. Rather, success for the government means building the infrastructure that allows a parade of mission-driven entrepreneurs and company builders to develop, deliver, and scale disruptive technology and services to benefit the warfighter and strengthen U.S. national security. Achieving this goal means better aligning government policies and personnel with companies, making access easier, and eliminating the myriad obstacles that dissuade many from entering and thriving in the defense market." #defenseindustry #defenseinnovation #freedomsforge #defensetech https://lnkd.in/eWqsG5B7

Very insightful article from Michael A. Brown detailing the gap between R&D and procurement. I particularly like the comment "the disconnect between research programs and the acquisition system is one of the reasons for the valley of death for non-traditional suppliers: vendors successfully performing on R&D or prototype contracts may be waiting years before there is a requirement written" This is the challenge facing many Australian robotics SMEs. Whilst there may be funding for R&D to build a prototype, it can be years before a tender is written - which the SME cannot survive - they need orders. In this case, the valley of death is temporal. And this is not restricted to defence - we see the same in Mining and Ag. In my case, I have seen the mining industry invest $M in R&D (which is great) but once a prototype is built they are not interested in buying their "own" technology. They wait a few years (sometimes a decade or more) and then buy from a global OEM, often after all the patents have lapsed. And then - even worse, when the OEM does not have the capability to deliver the technology in Australia, they acquire the SME that did the research in the first place. The argument between tech push and market pull is a false choice. What we should be doing is supporting the SMEs that live in the valley. Rather than trying to work out how to help universities push out their tech. Or how the customer (defence, mining, ag etc) can acquire the tech. We need to support the SME to translate the research to the market. In the US there is the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program https://www.sbir.gov/about Whilst this provides funding - it does not de-risk the transfer. Irrespective of funding the technology could still fail. To address this risk, I am very interested in the idea of forward technology procurement insurance. This is discussed in my article of Australian Made Robots. https://lnkd.in/gwY_NqJs It also needs to be recognised that Australia is very bad at research translation. We have one of the lowest innovation efficiencies in the world and we rank 72nd for knowledge diffusion. To address this issue we need to work out who should be responsible for research translation. Is it the Universities - No. Is it the Government - No. Is it the Customer - No. It is the OEM/SME that should be responsible for research translation! David Pocock (Australian independent senator) is interested in the role of procurement policy to enhance sovereign capability https://lnkd.in/g8mSaZtc Which is also related to the situation where our defence procurement strategies have been left us flat-footed. https://lnkd.in/g97wZqHa Attn: Robin Smith OBE CSC, Adam J. Hepworth, PhD Jason Scholz, S. Kate Conroy, Warwick Penrose, Ben Sorensen, Shawn Tansley GAICD, Stephen Bornstein, Simonette Cox, Kelvin Ross, Rob Sutton, John Sheridan, 🕹 Ross Newman, Darren Foster, Jeff Sterling, Dr Joe Cronin

This goes beyond the transition of projects to programs of record; it also calls for an intricate architecture needed to depict an integrated framework across portfolio, domain, and enterprise.

'Reading between the lines of the new US National Defense Industrial Strategy' By Kathryn Levantovscaia "As the Department of Defense gears up to unveil its implementation plan for the strategy, the spotlight should be on harnessing the right approaches to tackle the very deficiencies the NDIS identified. Here are three approaches at its disposal: 1) Invest in capabilities that require public capital: The Department of Defense should build a case for long-term federal funding beyond traditional budgetary cycles by delivering a comprehensive strategy to solicit appropriations for fiscal years 2025-2030. 2) Renovate acquisition practices: The Pentagon should work to expedite long-needed acquisition reform tailored to speed and efficiency. The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption’s final report, released in January, offers several recommendations, including ways for the Department of Defense to streamline processes by simplifying and consolidating approval processes, eliminating unnecessary paperwork, and leveraging technology for automation. 3) Advance allied industrial integration. The Department of Defense must find ways to address challenges impeding the NDIS’s international collaboration objectives without jeopardizing US national security. It should encourage joint projects where allies manufacture components or subsystems, creating economic benefits and shared responsibility.

The #DoD is not a company. Say it with me now… the #dod is not a company. There are no private shareholders. There is no “CEO”. The business model is not the right frame. Sure… are there bureaucratic reasons to have better coordination between R&E and A&S? Yes. But there are good- legally required through Congress (because it’s the American taxpayer who pays for the budget) reasons- why there are different legal authorities and different incentive structures. This is not a *profit maximization* model. It’s a long and short term capabilities model that has to be equipped now, prepare for contingencies and plan for long term undetermined futures. Stop talking about it like a company.