Michael Kimes’ Post

Nukes in space? Well, there is this thing called the Outer Space Treaty (1967). BLUF - the treaty prohibits signatories from putting into orbit any weapons systems that are WMD - nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, etc. The purpose of the weapon need not be to attack targets on the ground. Putting the weapons into space is a grave breach in and of itself. (Article IV) That said... Russia can't even fight Ukraine. Yet somehow, they're going to come up with the capability (and the money) to put nukes in orbit in an attempt to blind the US constellation? (That's what we call our comms and intel satellites.) They may want to put nukes in space - but they don't have the wherewithal to make that event happen at the moment. Panetta, in his remarks, is being coy. Protecting the constellation has been a mission of the NRO since its founding. We have various mechanisms to protect the constellation. Not all are classified. On 21 February 2008, the US Navy destroyed a malfunctioning US spy satellite, USA-193, using a RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 about 247 km (153 mi) above the Pacific Ocean. The purpose was to destroy the satellite and to test our ASAT capability. That was our last known ASAT test. Two years ago, to avoid an "anti-satellite race," the United States announced it would cease operations in developing ASAT technology. To our knowledge, the last ASAT test was in 2021. The main issue was junk flying around after the satellites were destroyed. Unlike Star Trek or Star Wars - when something blows up in space - it isn't vaporized. That debris represented a problem for the future of space launches. As a broader issue, there is concern that companies like SpaceX, who want to launch thousands of satellites in LEO, could create a debris field that would make celestial navigation impossible. Space is about the most expensive thing any country can engage in. Obviously, the Russians could decide to forgo other things in favor of a space-based nuke - but it would have to withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. That act would undoubtedly cause the US to withdraw as well. The most likely result is that China and Russia would face the entirety of the US space industry and the A&D sectors for domination of Space and the Moon. It would be a game they wouldn't win.

Russia's veto against the deployment of nuclear weapons in space might be seen not merely as political subterfuge but as a strategic maneuver grounded in historical precedence. From the advancements in sailing technology during the 14th to 17th centuries to the control of airspace in the 1940s, the pursuit of domain dominance has historically been instrumental in sustaining empires. The placement of nuclear weapons in space could catalyze global weapons proliferation in the cosmos, escalating an arms race beyond Earth's confines. Particularly a nation that has shown aggression towards non-hostile neighbors. #UN #space

https://lnkd.in/dVUR-UZN Space Nukes Are Bad The danger of these weapons isn’t just that Moscow might actually use them. It’s that Washington knows Moscow might actually use them. by James M. Acton Published on October 8, 2024 If U.S. diplomats aren’t already explaining, in great detail, to spacefaring nations—friend and foe alike—just how much damage a single Russian space nuke could do to their satellites, they should do so. Moreover, they should suggest that foreign heads of state express concern to Putin directly. He needs to know that the international repercussions from the use of such weapons would be dramatic. The United States should also make its command-and-control satellites more survivable. This isn’t easy, but there is one glaring omission in current U.S. plans that should be addressed. Satellites in the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture—the planned U.S. system comprising thousands of military satellites—will not be radiation hardened. Such hardening cannot enable a satellite to survive the blast from a nearby nuclear explosion, but it can enable those further away to withstand other effects, including the electromagnetic pulse and radiation. The good news is that the Department of Defense plans to update the design of satellites in the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture regularly—precisely so new capabilities can be added. As a matter of urgency, it should examine the benefits and costs of hardening all future satellites.1 Arms control also can help manage crisis instability by reducing the threat to vulnerable assets. Moscow has no interest in talking right now, and its record of violating agreements causes understandable concern in Washington about entering new ones. Even so, the United States can and should prepare for possible future negotiations. To this end, the intelligence community and the State Department should be tasked to assess whether a prohibition on space-based nuclear weapons could be defined and verified.2 The Departments of State and Defense should assess what the United States should be prepared to give up in return for such a prohibition.3 To be clear, a ban on space-based nuclear weapons should be reciprocal and apply to both Russia and the United States; even so, it would benefit the United States more than Russia. It therefore would have to be paired with a second reciprocal ban that favored Russia to ensure a mutually beneficial package. None of these options are panaceas. If Putin’s back were against the wall in a war against the United States, he might not worry much about how third parties would react to his detonating a nuclear weapon in space. Hardening satellites is expensive and provides only partial protection. The political prospects for arms control are poor. Nonetheless, because of the risk of crisis instability, Russia’s space nukes are uniquely dangerous. It is better for the United States to respond with half measures than not at all.

Russia and China’s space-based nuclear ASAT advancements present immediate risks to U.S. military space systems. Both nations are leveraging nuclear capabilities to disrupt space networks, threatening U.S. reliance on proliferated satellite constellations. CRG’s SME-Based Opportunities, INTERIM Advice & Differentiators: Opp - Space Resilience & Nuclear Hardening: The U.S. must build resilient satellites that can withstand nuclear effects like enhanced radiation belts and EMPs. -         Advice: Invest in radiation-hardened systems and AI-driven satellite autonomy for real-time response and recovery. -         Differentiator: CRG’s expertise in space-hardening positions clients to deliver durable, mission-critical satellite solutions. Opp - AI & Autonomous Space Operations: Russia’s and China’s strategies necessitate AI-enhanced satellites for automated adjustments and survivability. -         Advice: Develop autonomous systems to maintain operational tempo under nuclear stress. -         Differentiator: CRG equips clients with cutting-edge AI tools to optimize satellite performance in contested environments. Opp - EMP Defense: Space detonations risk critical terrestrial infrastructure. -         Advice: Offer EMP-hardened systems for both space and ground networks. -         Differentiator: CRG’s EMP defense solutions safeguard mission continuity across all domains. Contact CRG today for expertise in space resilience and EMP defense. 👉 crgroupinc.com | contact@crgroupinc.com #CRG #SpaceWarfare #NuclearASAT #DefenseInnovation #AI #EMPDefense #SatelliteSecurity #EW #Nuclear #ASAT #Satellites #NationalDefense #NationalSecurity #EMP

The #UnitedStates has confirmed that #Russia is developing an "indiscriminate" #NuclearWeapon to deploy in #space, which could cause catastrophic effects on global satellite infrastructure and violate international #treaties. #Pentagon officials, including #AssistantSecretaryOfDefense for #SpacePolicy #JohnFPlumb, have expressed grave concern about the threat this development poses, warning that a nuclear detonation in space could destroy #commercial, #civil, and #militarysatellites, leading to a collapse of critical services and communications. A nuclear explosion in #LowEarthOrbit (#LEO) could render the area unusable for up to a year, impacting everything from weather forecasting to national security. The U.S. has noted that #Russia vetoed a #UN resolution co-proposed by the U.S. and #Japan, which urged nations not to develop nuclear weapons in space, highlighting Moscow's reluctance to adhere to established international norms. #China also abstained from supporting the resolution while developing its own #counterspace capabilities, raising significant security concerns for the #USA and emphasizing the need for a robust and well-protected space presence. Given the potential threat to U.S. satellites and the implications for global stability, the U.S. must accelerate its efforts to enhance space defense and #counterspace technology to protect its interests and ensure the safety of space operations. https://lnkd.in/g6FF-AaE #USASecurity #SpaceDefense #SpaceWeapons #InternationalTreaties #NationalSecurity #LEOThreat #RussiaVeto #ChinaThreat

🌌 The development of space-based nuclear weapons by Russia raises serious concerns about global security. It is crucial for the international community to work together to prevent the weaponization of space and uphold peace. #space #security #peace #internationalcooperation 🌍🛰️https://lnkd.in/divcqCSm

A nuclear detonation in space would certainly cause a disruption. Disruptions, of course, make for opportunities. Russia turning most satellites in LEO into scrap would create quite a lot of opportunity for a new class of private space contractors interested in cleaning up the mess. Especially since the FCC and international partners have a rule that all satellite operators in LEO have to dispose of their junk within five years of end of mission: https://lnkd.in/ebQTFBd2 Russia launched Cosmos 2553 in February of 2022. The FCC issued its deorbiting rule on September 30, 2022. When you know the Russians are going to hand you a bunch of lemons, you might as well get ready to make lemonade. Let’s see what happens. https://lnkd.in/ejpTW7-E

Iran's Minister of Communications and Information Technology: The country will soon witness the launch of the first "Saman" system to transfer space cargo between Earth orbits. This system is able to transfer light satellites from a 300 km orbit to a 5000 km orbit, Iran successfully launched the first test of this system on October 12, 2019. Adib's Note: As they are aiming to reach higher orbits the technology used in the vectors are dual purpose. These satellite vectors can be used to deliver nuclear weapon system. This is concerning because our recent intelligence shows that iran has resumed the work on the Neutron Initiators as we have previously reported. The last satellite launch has been conducted with the IRGC made QAEM-100 a 3 stage solid fuel vector. Although in order to carry a reentry vehicle the vector should be able to achieve the suborbital LEO, reaching a higher orbit would the precursor to building more complex vectors and anti-satellite weapon systems. The mere fact that their satellite vectors are designed to carry multiple payloads is alarming. This trial to reach the MEO (medium earth orbit) could also mean that they are tryin to build their own navigation system to further advance their Ballistic missile program. The orbit is suitable for missile defense and tracking as well which could further their ability to advance their early warning systems.// Alert Item!

Iran's Minister of Communications and Information Technology: The country will soon witness the launch of the first "Saman" system to transfer space cargo between Earth orbits. This system is able to transfer light satellites from a 300 km orbit to a 5000 km orbit, Iran successfully launched the first test of this system on October 12, 2019. Adib's Note: As they are aiming to reach higher orbits the technology used in the vectors are dual purpose. These satellite vectors can be used to deliver nuclear weapon system. This is concerning because our recent intelligence shows that iran has resumed the work on the Neutron Initiators as we have previously reported. The last satellite launch has been conducted with the IRGC made QAEM-100 a 3 stage solid fuel vector. Although in order to carry a reentry vehicle the vector should be able to achieve the suborbital LEO, reaching a higher orbit would the precursor to building more complex vectors and anti-satellite weapon systems. The mere fact that their satellite vectors are designed to carry multiple payloads is alarming. This trial to reach the MEO (medium earth orbit) could also mean that they are tryin to build their own navigation system to further advance their Ballistic missile program. The orbit is suitable for missile defense and tracking as well which could further their ability to advance their early warning systems.// Alert Item!