The Royal Air Force Museum’s Post

In the light of the current debate in Germany, it may be a good moment to remind some "strategists" about basic rules in communications: If you are not in the military, don't use military jargon. If you did not storm the beaches of Normandy on D-Day, don't use D-Day as a term for your little project (particularly if you are German). The same holds true for other popular approaches in politics these days. If you haven't suffered under the Nazi regime, don't make Nazi references and if you are not an actual Holocaust survivor, avoid Holocaust comparisons. In general: Using martial language or grand historic references may give you a warm fuzzy feeling internally. But it will always backfire on you as soon as someone outside your echo-chamber reads those words. So please - just don't do it.

"War is a racket. It always has been. It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives. A racket is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of people. Only a small "inside" group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many. Out of war a few people make huge fortunes." Written in 1935 by a highly decorated US Marine, General Smedley D. Butler. Read it in whole below. https://lnkd.in/dKSuukzV It concludes with: "To summarize: Three steps must be taken to smash the war racket. - We must take the profit out of war. - We must permit the youth of the land who would bear arms to decide whether or not there should be war. - We must limit our military forces to home defense purposes."

My latest in The National Interest; for the 80th anniversary of D-Day, I analyse the military politics and strategy behind this vital moment of the Second War War: https://lnkd.in/eBH8sjHh

According to Russian government figures, USSR losses within postwar borders now stand at 26.6 million, including 8 to 9 million due to famine and disease. In August 2009 the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) researchers estimated Poland's dead at between 5.6 and 5.8 million. Historian Rüdiger Overmans of the Military History Research Office (Germany) published a study in 2000 estimating the German military dead and missing at 5.3 million, including 900,000 men conscripted from outside of Germany's 1937 borders, in Austria, and in east-central Europe. The Red Army claimed responsibility for the majority of Wehrmacht casualties during World War II. The People's Republic of China puts its war dead at 20 million, while the Japanese government puts its casualties due to the war at 3.1 million. An estimated 7–10 million people died in the Dutch, British, French and US colonies in South and Southeast Asia, mostly from war-related famine.

Featured Article: A Veteran's Perspective on the War in Afghanistan We're honoured to present a powerful and thought-provoking article in our latest issue, penned by a British veteran of the war in Afghanistan. In this candid piece, the author shares personal experiences from the front lines, shedding light on the harsh realities and the disillusionment that comes with the notion of a "just war." Highlights: Personal Journey: The veteran's firsthand account of the complexities and challenges faced during their deployment. Critical Realisations: A deep dive into the realisations about the war's true nature and the questioning of its justification. Conscription Commentary: The author's opinion on conscription and its implications, informed by their unique perspective and experiences. This article offers a raw, unfiltered look at the impact of war on those who serve, challenging prevailing narratives and inviting readers to reflect on the broader implications of military conflict. Read this compelling piece on our magazine website now. Link in bio.

There should be no other weapon in the war against terror than Love. If you think that thought is the stuff of cupid's bow and cotton-candy, then think again! If we were not so afraid of Love we would engage it as our military over the militarism of might, for who is it that we fight? What have the warlords of this world taught us anyway, other than how to exercise military, political and economic control over nations in such a way that they would not wish it for their own, rather peace and freedom from the fear of such violence. Love! Do any of our governments wish for that? Does Love figure at all in their non-civil, self-assertive agendas? If so, then why not simply show it, and share in it, if the only arms we need to ensure the union of Peace are the ones we use to embrace. What else have we really left to do, after having tried all lesser options but to love! If war was meant to teach us anything, should it not at least have taught us that?

Having just finished reading about the Battle of Hue (Vietnam), one of the key aspects of the early fight was the US military refusing to destroy property, especially cultural and religious. This led to gruesome street fighting and causalities until the military suspended the policy and allowed for building destruction in order to force out NVA and Vietnmith fighters. Fascinating to watch the policy pendulum swing and the consequences over time. - - - The American way of street and town fighting did not resemble that of other armies. To Americans, flesh and blood and lives have always been more precious than sticks and stones, however assembled. An American commander, faced with taking the Louvre from a defending enemy, unquestionably would blow it apart or burn it down without hesitation if such would save the life of one of his men. And he would be acting in complete accord with American ideals and ethics in doing so. Already, in the Korean War, American units were proceeding to destroy utterly enemy-held towns and villages rather than engage in the costly business of reducing them block by block with men and bayonets, as did European armies. If bombing and artillery would save lives, even though they destroyed sites of beauty and history, saving lives obviously had preference. And already foreign observers with the United States Army—not ROK’s—were beginning to criticize such tactics. Observers from France and Britain, realizing that war was also highly possible in their own part of the world, were disturbed at the thought of a ground defense of their homelands. For the United States Army, according to its history and doctrine, would choose the lives of its men over the continued existence of storied cathedrals. #military #history

Interesting observations from DarwinFish86 on why U.S. Military leaders are obsessed with body counts these days (also known as how the U.S. Military surpassed Dr. Evil and lost it's moral standing). When you can't win hearts and minds, count bodies instead: US involvement in Vietnam was ostensibly to protect the South Vietnamese state. to engage in an offensive war against North Vietnam was seen as politically risky since the US did not want to drag China or the Soviet Union into the conflict. as a result the US strategy was largely limited to a defensive and/or retaliatory role against North Vietnamese invaders or Viet Cong guerrillas. The combination of geopolitics and geography meant that there were no clear "front lines" in the conflict, as the US military was familiar with from its experiences in WWII and Korea. traditional measures of military progress such as capturing territory or taking a hill were practically meaningless. without this traditional means of gauging success, the US Army high command had to find a new way of reporting their strategic situation. The "body count" strategy was implemented in the aftermath of the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965. the battle featured a new experimental US doctrine where ground troops were inserted via helicopter into areas with heavy enemy presence and by virtue of airborne support and overwhelming firepower were able to inflict tremendous casualties against superior numbers with a relatively small force. at LZ X-Ray (the first of 3 separate combats in the Ia Drang battle) the Americans suffered 79 killed and 121 wounded, in comparison to over 600 confirmed and possibly over 1000 NVA killed in action. the "success" of the Ia Drang battle convinced Army commanders that small numbers of US infantry supported by air power and artillery could inflict massive casualties on the enemy far in excess of their own. US Army commanders seized on this lopsided "victory" as a convincing method of reporting progress in an otherwise chaotic and unmanageable conflict. it looked good on paper, and gave politicians a means of presenting a more positive narrative of the course of the war to the American public. that it turned out to be a pitifully inadequate measure of the actual strategic situation and was rather limited in effectiveness was largely ignored until the later stages of the war.

So well thought out & executed.