Shawn Hendricks’ Post

This is a fantastic explanation of why the 100-object-year metric does not adequately constrain satellite deployments to prevent oversaturation and increased risk for space operations. Orbital carrying capacity would be a significant and necessary limiter in the short term, while accounting for improvements in satellite maneuverability, autonomous positioning, and defunct satellite deorbiting along with future development of debris recycling platforms. The addition of a space traffic footprint would greatly incentivize increased sustainability efforts during this period of development and transition and far into the future. I hope to see more space advocates taking a critical look at the development of these regulations so that space access can be protected for many generations to come.

In my view, while the FCC’s 100-object-year metric provides some insight, it is fundamentally inadequate for comprehensive risk assessment. It does not account for the relative geometry among satellites, their sizes, maneuverability, trackability or the varying risks posed by orbital neighborhoods or highways. This lack of granularity makes it insufficient for a comprehensive risk assessment. Here’s my take… https://lnkd.in/eY-fS3Qg

How WRC-23 Set the Path for a Framework for the Future of Space Communications (Via Satellite) https://lnkd.in/e-u2tqNn

It's ultimately math, but first you have to set up the equation. When it comes to on-orbit refueling, there are so many variables to consider. This article mentions geostationary satellites as prime candidates, but that's just the tip of the iceberg. ❔ What's the satellite's function? ❔What's the horizon for payload obsolescence? ❔Projected changes in launch costs? ❔Progress of commercially available options? I'm fascinated to see the final equation (and solution).

A good day to examine the deep future of space conflict…check out my #ficint piece “Aces High Frontier” about space strategy and conflict in the 2050s.

There are a plethora of options available, that are all situationally dependent. Things to consider are the specific threats involved to the specific assets. How can we use the operational environment to our advantage, not only for mission success, but also for defense? There are no trees or hills to hid behind in orbit, but there are other objects that could be a type of chaff or blocker (in the event of kinetic attack). Is a connected refueling/servicing satellite able to have an alternate use after it has fulfilled its mission? Also, how might we use orbital mechanics to our advantage in both offensive and defensive operations? Nothing should be removed from the table unless it's physically impossible. Technologically unachievable options need to be sent to R&D facilities to invent the technologies. What's physically and technologically possible should be prioritized for cost/benefit and then implemented (at least as a proof-of-concept). Our adversaries are thinking outside the box in order to catch and eventually surpass us in the realm of Space. If we wish to maintain the advantage, we must do the same.

Great highlights on the Remote Sensing ABC session organized by IEEE GRSS Lahore Chapter!

Report: Space Innovation Facilitating Capabilities for In-Space Servicing Assembly and Manufacturing (FCC 2024) #SpaceEconomy #NewSpaceEconomy #NewSpace #Space

X-band is very important band for Remote Sensing (Earth Observation) satellites. Now more countries are developing satellite remote sensing capabilities in each countries. We need to keep X-band frequency is available for new space players and existing players of course.

Satellite servicing is a great example of the network effects occurring in the space industry, which results from its very strong growth. https://ow.ly/jrtN50SQ5SE