U.S. Coast Guard’s Post

FAILING BASIC AUDIT PROCEDURES COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES Yves Genest, that "an unhealthy organizational culture" resulted in "failure to perform standard crew resource management" is not surprising, as you showed in your post here: https://lnkd.in/eBMMMmca Sometimes auditors tend to stretch audit and accounting concepts such as materiality and take independent view of the items under consideration, instead of consideration of the significance of immaterial items in terms of how they endure and/or how they impact operations when aggregated. The result is that issues not considered material are ignored and they slide into blindsides where they endure, accumulate and gain materiality and significance but not noticed by managers and auditors. Then suddenly they explode into a serious impact. This has been a serious problem in audit, leading to obviously avoidable failures. PCAOB Chair Erica Williams has been warning about this that “audit firms are failing in basic audit procedures,” (2023),[1] which she considers as “completely unacceptable,” (2023).[2] Auditors need to shift our doxastic states and rethink concepts to track contemporary realities of auditing. We should emphasize significance more than materiality; we should also be more objective and reduce discretion in consideration of materiality. Put simply, materiality should be considered with “pragmatic muddling through,” (Power, 2013).[3] Every exception should be considered significant and kept under the purview of control thinking, not tucked away to blindsides as immaterial. The reason is that exceptions are dynamic not static; while their materiality may not change, their significance may change over time or even surprisingly. The more mature audit minds are the less likely they make wrong materiality judgment. Older auditors, therefore, should invest in imbuing their tacit wisdom into younger auditors are who mostly take materiality decisions in basic audit procedures. [1] Ryan, V. (2023, July 26). PCAOB inspections find 40% of audits with deficiencies. CFO. https://lnkd.in/eSsXuSbg [2] Shin, R. (2023). 22 years after the $63 billion Enron collapse, a key audit review board finds the industry in a 'completely unacceptable' state. Retrieved July 29, 2023, from https://lnkd.in/eSSkv4iG [3] Power, M. (2013). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford University Press.

The formation of vehicle rescue teams within the Military Fire Department of Santa Catarina (CBMSC) began in the 1990s, when specialised companies engaged in the sale of rescue equipment promoted training actions, typically focusing on more practical procedures and techniques. The integration of vehicle rescue as a fundamental part of the training has not only improved the response capacity in traffic-related situations but has also had a significant effect on the quality of service provided and the safety of the population. Moreover, 90 per cent of the institution's personnel involved in operational activities are trained in vehicle rescue. Andre Pugas examines the evolution of vehicle rescue in the CBMSC. Read CRJ 19:1 here: https://rb.gy/ncrhi4  New subscribers can sign up here: https://rb.gy/tymt32 #CRJ #crj19:1 #CBMSC #Rescue #VehicleRescue #MilitaryFireDepartment #OperationalActivities #SantaCatarina #Training #AndrePugas

The United States Air Force just released its accident report on this January's crash of one B-1 https://lnkd.in/gPS-vFUh The report contains attention-getting content for the aviation community in and beyond the #military, including the EXSUM's five substantially contributing factors: (1) The MC’s failure to perform #standardcrewresourcemanagement; (2) #Adverseweatherconditions which included undetected #windshear that contributed to rapid shifts in the MA’s #airspeed on final approach and #limitedceilingvisibility conditions influencing a #changeinlandingrunways; (3) #Ineffectiveflyingoperationssupervision, as reflected by one person acting as both Supervisor of Flying and Operations Supervisor, being #tasksaturated, having poor #situationalawareness of the airfield environment, and being unaware of active #NoticestoAirmen making the #executedapproachunauthorized; (4) The #lackofawareness of #airfieldconditions, particularly amongst aircrews and their leadership of #weathersensoroutages that prevented requisite personnel from having accurate #visibilityreadings for Runway 13; and (5) An #unhealthyorganizationalculture that permitted #degradationofairmanshipskills, #inadequatefocus on governing directives, #lackofdiscipline, and #poorcommunication regarding airfield conditions and hazards. And that's just the EXSUM. In the spirit of collaboration, publicizing these #lessonslearned and findings, and seeking to prevent a recurrence of these failures and mistakes, pass on the content to your friends & colleagues in the broad aviation community. Marty Kauchak, editor Civil Aviation Training Magazine Alexander Robinson Air Force Global Strike Command #training Halldale Group

Agree…’tube and wing’ is so ‘last century’… BWB designs are the future of passenger aviation and mobility, and Bombardier is moving deliberately towards that goal with the EcoJet, and with environmental sustainability being a key component. https://lnkd.in/gGD6yMu2

Osprey pilots and air and maintenance crews with the 3rd Marine Airwing have started training with MV-22 Ospreys again following the lifting of the aircraft's grounding. The grounding was implemented after a November crash that resulted in the tragic loss of seven lives. The first squadrons to resume training are those next in line for deployment. The United States Marine Corps has 17 squadrons using over 300 Osprey aircraft, making it the largest user of this type of aircraft among all branches. The return to flight operations will be conducted in a deliberate and methodical manner to ensure the safety and confidence of the crews. The grounding provided an opportunity for a thorough review of the crash and the implementation of additional safety procedures. The training process is expected to take some time, with units gradually progressing from basic skills to advanced missions. #CampPendleton #OspreyTraining #MilitaryNews #Aviation #MarineCorps #TrainingUpdate #CampPendletonSquadrons #OspreyGroundingLifted #MarineAviation #SafetyFirst #TrainingProgress

499-B Helicopter Rescue Basket (Compact) LSC’s original compact Rescue Basket is standard equipment aboard all US Coast Guard rescue helicopters, and in service with numerous international military & civilian operators. The frame opening has been enlarged to better accommodate two adults without increasing the overall dimensions. An integrated, yet flexible stainless steel bail retainer has been added to keep the bails from dropping after removing the hoist hook. The frame of the basket is constructed of tubular stainless steel for low maintenance. The bail assembly folds into the basket for compact stowage. The bottom is covered with a detachable-replaceable plastic mesh liner. Basket provides excellent flotation performance and is self-righting with 100% reserve buoyancy. Float covers have reflective markings and are printed with safety pictorials. The basket measures 44-1/2” long x 25” wide x 39” high assembled, and 21” high when stowed. Weight: 39 lbs. NSN: 4240-01-HS1-9969. Limitations Weight Load Limit – 600 lbs. (272 kg) Life Limit – 25 years from the DOM or 20 years from the date placed in service. #SAR #HELICOPTER #TREANING #AIRCREW #AIR #AVIATION #HOIST #RESCUE #BASKET

This is the result of weak politicians messing with national security. We need real leadership to take charge of congress and see that the increase funding and readiness to the National Guard is a national security imperative

Graybeardisms - Back in the day - when Oilers were part of the MLSF (Mobile Logistics Support Force) manned by USN sailors, we would have stayed on mission and supported the Battle Force with our logistics package (JP-5) and other needed supplies! We would have found a way to "getter-dun" !! In 1979 our SD-based DE was transitting to Yoko with USS Cook and an NFAF tanker - because of ship-alts, that converted fuel storage tanks to CHT (sewage) we lost independent steaming days - therefore we could only go 5 days without needing to "hit" a gas station. We spent 24 hours at the IDL heading 000/180 instead of beating the ship up continuing to head 270. In a 1 minute period the CO Cook reported that he saw our sonar dome, screw, and rudder complete out of the water. Cook cracks a rib during her transit - - For the past 5 decades - LANTFLT - Centric war-games have "fiery-dusted" away the need for MSLF protection by sub-surface-air assets. What has happened to our Navy ??? - Vrckn It's not just me ... UPDATE 9/27/24 "One of the largest mistakes made over a generation ago was moving from USS to USNS, that is part of the fix. A big part of the fix though? Be an adult enough to hurt people’s feeling. Be a mature enough institution enough to say we got it wrong. Then get money. We need more auxiliaries. We need to bring back some auxiliaries, such as Destroyer Tenders. The post-Cold War B-school false horizons are no longer a vanity-indulgence we can afford to continue. Without adequate numbers—and redundancy—then you don’t have a blue water navy. You can have all the battle force destroyers and carriers you want, but if they cannot be replenished at sea, you have a coastal defense fleet. To quote The Other Sal again: we’ve been here before. Early in the Pacific War, USS Lexington was tasked to conduct a raid on Wake Island. At 2,500 miles, any strike required an oiler for fuel. USS Neches (AO-5) sortied from Hawaii to meet Lex but on 22 Jan 1942, Neches was torpedoed and sunk by Japanese submarine I-72. The raid was canceled and after this, no oiler sailed without escort, requiring the diversion of destroyers from other missions to protect the remaining oilers and to convoy vital tankers sailing from the US to replenish the Pearl Harbor fuel farm left untouched by the Japanese raid."

We have completed the II stage of training of the logistics personnel responsible for coordinating and securing the operation of aircraft arresting systems in the Polish Armed Forces. Stage II – practical training – was carried out based on a major overhaul, combined with the modernization of equipment, and took place at WTL Toruń. The renovated and modernized systems were installed in the 32 BLT in Łask, and their full efficiency and operability were confirmed by tests, among others, intercepting an aircraft several times.

“We hit our ‘Go-No-Go’ – knock it off and return to base." In March 2001, our USMC CH46 helicopter squadron was between overseas deployments, and I was filling the billet as the Operations Officer. Looking to try something different, we decided to cap our monthly training cycle with an event to loosely simulate the “Raid on Son Tay.” The actual raid, codenamed Operation Ivory Coast, was conducted in Nov of 1970 to rescue U.S. Prisoners of War (POWs) from a North Vietnamese POW Camp. It became a blueprint for special operations forces…” [link in the comments] Planning – objectives ·      Use the historical story of the actual raid as professional military education ·      Generate joint cooperation (including the Army) ·      Get outside the local training area ·      Earn advanced flight leadership designations for select pilots and aircrew   Preparation and Coordination -Visited Camp Mackall (US Army Special Forces training facility) to coordinate use of a site to simulate our POW Camp -Researched the actual raid and built a series of presentations to educate participants -Requested a UH-1N Huey helicopter and crew to be our flying Command & Control aircraft -Recruited some motivated Marines to be “role players” and occupy the POW Camp for two days prior to our planned rescue -Called in a favor for some Marines to provide Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) (i.e. observe the role players in the POW camp at Camp Mackall). We inserted R&S via helicopter -Scripted actions by our S-2/Intel simulating POW and guard activities, so the R&S could observe and report back to us via radio Execution In the flight mission brief I stated **Go-No-Go** criteria (the assets and/or threat conditions necessary to continue) as a "...a minimum of 4xCH-46 helicopters to rescue the POWs and extract the R&S force" (key: we needed 4 to accomplish our training objectives). Unfortunately, one of the 46s had a mechanical problem before launch -- down to 5…we pressed on Twenty minutes into the flight, a second aircraft had a system failure that forced a precautionary landing in a farmer’s field. Dilemma: our Go-No-Go was 4x46s for the mission, but this downed aircraft required his wingman to return to base and pick up the repair effort – down to 3… Result:  we had fallen BELOW our Go-No-Go to accomplish our training objectives.   So, after weeks of planning and coordination, I had to call a “Knock it off and RTB”. [A single aircraft pushed on to pick up the R&S element and the role players, and the mechanics repaired and recovered the downed aircraft that evening -- all made it safely back to base.] So, what’s the lesson? We use Go-No-Go as a check valve when things don't go as planned. In business, this applies to your plan to purchase a new product, merger/acquisition, or myriad other possibilities. As the Leader, it’s up to you make the call to comply, or violate the Go-No-Go criteria set BEFORE the mission -- weigh your decision VERY carefully.