William Shafley’s Post

Perhaps, Commander Viscovich should get an invitation to visit the Surface & Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC). His argument smells dated and lacks empirical or anecdotal evidence. He ignores or is ignorant of the creation of SMWDC and Warfare Tactics Instructors and the return of live fire exercises. Yes, it’s been decades since major force-on-force naval battles by peer competitors. Some might say that’s a good thing. He ignores that our competitors have less experience than us. Consider recent naval operations such as CARNEY’s ops in the Red Sea, OIF, OEF, etc. Assessing the state of warfighting readiness is a much more complex problem than dated complaints about admin inspections. Someone invite the man to SMWDC, maybe we’ll get a retraction.

When I was Weps i told the 1st and 2nd tour divos that i would ask about red force caps and lims.  The 2nd tours flat out asked why that was important to know.  The 1st tours blew it off.  that is when i learned that russia has cruisers ans submarines and that the yono is a ballistic missile submarine. I appreciate that you made your priorities crystal clear to the DESRON staff and that you sent us places to learn.  It was scary that we had to correct the SUW WTIs exercise plans for some SWATT exercises because he didnt understand the caps/lims he was trying to test.  We fall short in training the majority of divos on tactics and the reason behind why we maneuver the ship certain ways.  Supposedly the new 3M system reduces time so we can focus more on preparing for combat.  The last time we did a reduction in administrative distractions we cut the voting assistance...  which came back

There is no warfighting readiness without material readiness so let’s not all hop on the bandwagon of saying we spend too much time or money there. I didn’t see that in the article but someone invariably goes there when we start collecting ideas.

Great post Bill. As a retired enlisted submariner, it was our habit to treat peacetime operations as if we were in combat. When the daily routine is viewed through the lens of war fighting, that dropped cup or poorly executed evolution suddenly becomes a matter of life or death and gets the right command priority to resolve. Sounds simple right? Not so much given the headwind of “outside” priority influence that causes you to spend a work day on motorcycle safety training when less than 1% of your crew rides while you have broken equipment that needs fixed.

Thanks for sharing one of the CIMSEC: Center for International Maritime Security Flotilla Series articles William Shafley. I beleive the power of the articles lay in their title, Series. These author’s were providing brief commentary, by design, to start a conversation on how can warfighting be better prioritized through deliberate management? I don’t think the answers were intended to be quals, certifications, or events. Indeed, deliberate management, at any level, should be trying to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of activities bounded by the time available to a unit. It begs leadership to ask questions about how an activity does or does not contribute to warfighting. Perhaps a modern definition of warfighting is required. I encourage reading the entire series, then right about it. Join the Flotilla group. Give up your sense of rightness as you consider other perspectives. Ask more questions about how they came to those conclusions. The dialogue should spur learning unbounded by rank, expertise, or community, and instead lean on imagination, critical thinking, and challenging assumptions. I have enjoyed reading the commentary here, glad to see some engagement. More needed.

Wait, did someone say new uniforms!?

Read "Neptune's Inferno", the story of a navy that thought it knew how to fight until it met one that really did know, and "The Rules of the Game", the story of the most powerful navy in the world that hadn't fought for over a hundred years and found all sorts of challenges...

As an instructor at Aegis Training and Readiness Center (ATRC) and a former IAMD WTI, this article resonates with me. Too often, I see students at all levels who have little to no desire to learn more than the basics. They are driven by liberty, don’t understand why they have to do anything extra and don’t have any desire to read a reference that hasn’t been spoon fed to them. There are about 10% of the students who come through who “get it”. They could be the first ship in the line of fire and need to be ready for it. This way of thinking has been perpetuated by years of ignoring that our peers are increasing their capabilities and while we may have more experience, we also don’t get to put our best and brightest on the watch when the first shot happens.

Readiness is nothing without a warfighting culture. What is that culture? 1. It is accountability for those who fail to meet the high demanding standards we need for the future fight. Senior officers need to have the same energy for justice when it comes to poor, negligent senior enlisted + officer performance, as they do for junior service member misconduct. 2. It is being uncompromising when it comes to discipline. Discipline is on the senior enlisted + officer leadership to emulate, and if they fail to demonstrate that discipline, see point #1. 3. It is building trust with your subordinates, your staff, your adjacent and your higher, in order to assume more risk. (There are Commanders who love to brief PowerPoint slides and talk about all the great things they’re doing, but when you dissect that DRRS report, what is revealed more often than not, is a “check in the box”organizational mentality that does everything they can to NOT innovate, to NOT pursue hard/realistic training and ultimately to NOT assume risk.) You can have 100% materiel readiness. You can be 100% manned/trained/equipped. You can be 100% trained/assessed/certified to standard. However, without accountability, discipline and trust, the unit will fail.

I like the article, but I guess I was hoping for some concrete recommendations. What should we STOP doing and what should we START doing? Ships build warfighting skills in the Basic Phase, SWATT, C2X, and then deploy. I attend the weekly readiness briefs at TYCOM and the focus is warfighting. Are there other items like maintenance, training, etc. - yes. But those often are necessary for warfighting readiness.