China’s New Non-Military Offensives against Taiwan
Global Taiwan Brief - Volume 9, Issue 14 (July 24, 2024)
Since the election of Lai Ching-te (賴清德) as the president of the self-governing democracy of Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC, 中華民國), Beijing has been turning the screws on the island-nation—and not just in the military domain. National security officials from Taiwan are now sounding the alarm about a noticeable shift in the Chinese multi-domain pressure campaign against the island democracy. Indeed, multiple indicators are pointing to a more aggressive turn in Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s (習近平) approach to Taiwan in the months ahead.
While a change in Beijing’s strategy was already visible in the latter half of Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) second term—particularly in the military space—recent activities in the non-military space—in the areas of diplomatic/political, legal, information/united front, and economic measures—are perhaps most troubling. Additionally, they are broadly indicative of a comprehensive shift in Beijing’s overall approach from deterring Taiwan’s independence to compelling its unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, 中華人民共和國)—by military force if necessary.
Diplomatic and Political Pressure
On the diplomatic front, Beijing is currently going after Taiwan’s 12 remaining diplomatic partners. Since 2016, Taiwan’s international diplomatic presence has steadily diminished, from 22 diplomatic partners to only 12. Just days after Lai’s unprecedented presidential victory—which represented the first time that a political party won three consecutive terms for president in Taiwan—Beijing flipped the small Pacific nation of Nauru.
Taiwan’s last dozen diplomatic partners are vulnerable to PRC enticement and coercion to varying degrees. Although the current president of Paraguay—Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partner in South America—has expressed strong personal support for continuing ties with Taiwan, Paraguay stands as a potentially acute reminder that many of these last remaining steadfast diplomatic partners are seemingly always one election away from switching recognition.
While Beijing’s diplomatic successes against Taiwan are clear, Taipei has made important advancements in raising its international visibility and political engagement with other like-minded partners on the world stage with the support of like-minded friends. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Beijing is now putting more emphasis on not only enticing but pressuring Taiwan’s non-diplomatic partners to downgrade political ties and support cross-Strait “reunification.” Indeed, Beijing appears to no longer seek a political endorsement from other countries for its “One-China Principle” (一個中國原則), but is now pressuring other countries to take action that actively supports the PRC’s position on “reunification.”
In the past, some countries that maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC have been asked to have Taipei move its representative office from the capital to other locations, or to put pressure on Taipei’s local representative offices to remove any reference to the Republic of China or Taiwan from the name of their de facto embassies. China has also continued to pressure countries with which it has diplomatic ties to deport Taiwan nationals accused of criminal activities to the PRC rather than back to Taiwan.
Countries that have recently established unofficial ties or have increased their political ties with Taiwan also find themselves increasingly in the cross-hairs of Beijing’s diplomatic offensive—the cases of Lithuania and the Czech Republic are prime examples of this. Other pressure tactics could include applying sanctions against people and other entities for engaging with Taiwan, limiting the consular activities of Taiwan’s foreign missions, and restricting government contacts with Taiwanese counterparts and supporters of Taiwan.
The fact that British lawmaker Conservative MP Tim Loughton from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China was denied entry to Djibouti in April 2024 is potentially instructive of Beijing’s future tactics in this space. In such instances, not only are Taiwanese lawmakers and persons sanctioned or wanted by Beijing singled out, but also other lawmakers from third countries who have run afoul of Beijing’s policies on Taiwan. Such persons could be potentially denied entry or surveilled in third countries, which are either allied or significantly influenced by Beijing.
Propaganda and United Front Work
In addition to diplomatic pressure, the CCP is also ramping up its political warfare activities, particularly in the areas of overt united front work and propaganda directed against Taiwan’s central government and ruling party. This is particularly noteworthy in the CCP’s attempts to co-opt Taiwan’s key opposition parties. In addition to existing ties with the Kuomintang (KMT, 中國國民黨), the CCP showed interest in the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, 台灣民眾黨) throughout the presidential campaign—and particularly after the elections, in which the TPP walked away with a decisive minority of seats in the Legislative Yuan.
Since beginning his post as KMT vice chairman in October 2021, Andrew Hsia (夏立言) has led the official party channel for dialogue to China at least eight times. Notably, there has been a plethora of other cross-Strait exchanges headed by various factions of the KMT that began in 2024. The delegation that raised the most eyebrows is perhaps the one led by Fu kun-chi (傅崐萁)—an influential power broker among local factions of the KMT and the current caucus whip for the KMT. In April—just a month before the inauguration—Fu brought a delegation of local faction members to China. Local factions are instrumental in influence peddling during local elections. Although there have been insinuations of collusion because of the correlation in the timing between these visits and the controversial reform measures adopted by the opposition parties immediately after the inauguration, it should be noted that the authorities have not yet provided clear and convincing evidence of a conspiracy.
Chinese disinformation and propaganda also remain rampant in Taiwan’s information space. Taiwanese national security officials are particularly concerned by AI-enabled efforts spreading disinformation on social media platforms, including Chinese-owned platforms like Duoyin (抖音, Tiktok) and Xiaohongshu (小紅書) that have large user bases in Taiwan. Additionally, so-called “local collaborators”—with the support of traditional media—are increasingly parroting the CCP’s talking points, thereby increasingly blurring the line between what may be legitimate political opposition and Chinese government propaganda.
Russian propaganda disinformation tactics and narratives used against Ukraine are also increasingly more visible in the Chinese approaches to Taiwan. This is indicative of the increasing cross-pollination of Chinese and Russian disinformation and malign influence tactics. One recent example was a disinformation case concerning the fabricated news carried by a major news outlet about US pressure on Taiwan to establish a biowarfare lab in Taiwan, which appeared intended to stoke American skepticism among the general public. As Chinese support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues and the Chinese-Russian “unlimited partnership” grows, there will likely be more sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures in Chinese malign influence activities in Taiwan.
A New Feature: Lawfare
The most notable feature in the PRC’s new multi-domain offensive against Taiwan is the use of a suite of lawfare measures, which include the application of law enforcement instruments intended to extend the claimed jurisdiction of Chinese authorities and constrain that of the Taiwanese authorities.
Extra-Territorial Applications of Domestic Law
Specifically, there are clear signs that Beijing is broadening the application of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL, 反分裂国家法). Since its passage in 2005, the ASL was primarily used as a rhetorical instrument for the legal justification of China’s use of military force against Taiwan. On June 21, based on the ASL and other legal measures, the PRC promulgated the “Opinions on Punishing the Crimes of Splitting the Country and Inciting Splitting the Country by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Diehards,” (關於依法懲罰「台獨」頑固分子分裂國家、煽動分裂國家犯罪的意見), which could apply criminal punishment, even the death penalty to “secessionists” in absentia.
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In particular, the guidelines specify actions that constitute the “crimes of secession” and “incitement to secession,” including:
This could be seen as Beijing’s response to what it views as internationalization and increased external interference in the Taiwan issue in recent years. As written, the excessively broad law notably does not limit the application of these laws by geographical scope of citizenship, which could presumably include both ROC citizens and non-ROC citizens. These guidelines signal a new phase in the PRC’s new multi-domain offensive against Taiwan and its supporters and represent an especially nefarious form of lawfare. As it stands, it could be a particularly gross application of transnational repression by plausibly justifying, under its domestic law, the forcible repatriation of persons to the PRC–and further signal the “Hong Kongization” of Taiwan in terms of the application of domestic law and regulations.
Legalization of its “One-China Principle” through UNGA Resolution 2758
In addition to the application of domestic legal measures to extend PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan and its administered territories, China has also been more aggressively forcing its distorted interpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 in an attempt to legalize its “One-China Principle.” In its statement declaring the switch in its recognition of the PRC, the government of Nauru cited UNGA Resolution 2758 as a legal basis for supporting its decision. Moreover, civil society groups applying to join international organizations have been barred from admission due to the misleading application of UNGA Resolution 2758.
Hostage Diplomacy
As the PRC seeks to increasingly extend its laws and jurisdiction over Taiwan and its people, in a report delivered to the Legislative Yuan, Tsai Ming-yen (蔡明彥), the director of the National Security Bureau (NSB, 國家安全局)—Taiwan’s premier intelligence agency—revealed how “in the past 12 months, 15 Taiwanese have been detained or undergone trials after entering China and the two special administrative regions, while 51 have been interrogated by border officers—and the number is increasing.” The NSB director also noted with concern that the number of cases concerning national security investigations involving PRC covert influence has been increasing in recent years—raising the specter of potentially more extraordinary measures.
Maritime Law Enforcement and Civil Aviation for Contesting and Limiting Territorial Jurisdiction
Beijing is using the unilateral application of its domestic law and regulations as a form of lawfare to constrain the legal space of the Taiwan government—and deter other countries from engaging with it. These measures seem intended to limit the Taiwan government’s agency, and represent Beijing’s efforts to deny the existence of the ROC and the objective reality that the ROC and PRC are two separate jurisdictions.
The Chinese authorities are not issuing new laws per se and Beijing’s legal claims over Taiwan have not changed. Still, the PRC is beginning to enforce these claims—with implications for other competing claimants with territorial disputes with China. Similar to how the PRC has begun to suddenly and arbitrarily enforce certain regulations on Taiwanese companies operating in China for coercive political purposes, it is now increasingly utilizing the China Coast Guard (中国海警局)—a paramilitary force used for maritime law enforcement that is directed by the Central Military Commission (CMC, 中央軍事委員會), and increasingly deployed with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN, 中國人民解放軍海軍)—in patrols around Taiwan—in order to enforce its maritime and territorial claims over Taiwan. Some of these activities by purportedly non-military vessels include increasingly encroaching upon the 12 nautical miles of territorial waters claimed by Taiwan, conducting maritime surveillance around Taiwan, detention of ROC citizens for alleged illegal fishing, forced inspection of civilian vessels, and PRC civilian intrusion into the harbors. Indeed, the PRC appears to be shifting from a previous stance of tacit acknowledgment that the PRC and ROC are two separate jurisdictions toward denying it.
Economic Coercion
In the economic sphere, Beijing leans heavily on coercive economic tools through a combination of targeted suspension of preferential tariff terms, selective bans of imported goods, expanded import restrictions on a range of products beyond just agricultural and aquatic goods, arbitrary regulatory enforcements targeting select companies for their political activities, and the sanctioning of individuals and organizations. Although such measures do not yet represent a significant departure from the PRC’s longstanding strategy, Beijing will likely dial up these tactics to apply even greater pressure on Taiwan’s new leadership in the years to come.
Conclusion
The intensification of these non-military measures is broadly indicative of a comprehensive shift in Beijing’s overall approach from one of deterring Taiwan’s independence to compelling its unification with the PRC, Beijing does not appear to have abandoned its desire for “peaceful reunification,” and it would prefer to annex Taiwan without the use of military force.
However, in a review of the Chinese measures taken from 2016 to now, Beijing’s current stance represents a departure from its prior stance of tacitly acknowledging the separate jurisdictions of the PRC and ROC, to now seemingly deny this objective fact.
Although these gray zone actions are non-kinetic by operational standards, if the PRC’s actions to systematically erode the ROC’s legal space with such activities go unchallenged and take on other more challenging forms—compounded by its aggressive military activities—the situation could escalate and become dangerous. It bears noting that such PRC lawfare tactics are likely intended to provoke a response (or inability to respond) from the United States and Taiwan. If not properly managed, these tactics could drive a wedge between Taiwan’s new leadership and the United States. Going forward, clear communication between Washington and Taipei is essential and any response on either side must be carefully calibrated.
With the US election slated for November, Beijing is unlikely to dramatically scale up its actions in the coming months lest it raise the Taiwan issue into a national election issue. What is visible now is likely only a preview of the actions to follow. Vigilance is paramount.
Correction: A previous version of this article incorrectly identified the country that denied entry as Somalia.