The Fourth Offset: Preparing for an uncertain future through innovation in military education

The recent National Security Strategy asserts the “People’s Republic of China (PRC) harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.[i] Although the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review foretold of the PRC’s ability to “field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages,” concerns of this rising competitor date back to 2001.[ii],[iii] In 2014, the U.S. embarked on the Third Offset Strategy to address the erosion of America’s military dominance and technological superiority with the creation of the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) as a hedge against a rising PRC.[iv]The Third Offset leverages the application of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, human-machine teaming, and an interconnected network of capabilities to preserve American technological dominance and warfighting advantage. However, after nearly a decade of defense investment towards the Third Offset, the asymmetric technological advances have struggled to manifest as credible capabilities.[v],[vi] The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested billions in Third Offset technologies only to abandon the programs outright or pivot to similar efforts.[vii],[viii],[ix] The pursuit of these technical capabilities remains central to the research and development investment and future force priorities at the expense of other ways to secure our warfighting edge.[x],[xi],[xii]  

Swinging Behind the Pitch

There are reasons to question the likelihood of the Third Offset strategy’s success. As a recent GAO report bluntly highlights, former defense leaders acknowledge the military’s long history of mistaken prognostication about the future of warfare resulting in a lack of preparedness for the conflict ahead.[xiii],[xiv] Poor predictions often stem from not holistically understanding the factors that drive changes in the environment and thinking about the potential warfighting application of technological advances and their implications in conflict.[xv] In 2013, the Defense Science Board asserted that the U.S was the world’s technology leader, but the gap was closing. Despite efforts to reform the defense acquisition system, program requirements and budgetary planning cycles remain significant impediments to rapidly scaling and deploying the latest technological advances.[xvi],[xvii],[xviii],[xix] Additionally, with an eye towards 2030, waning U.S. economic dominance compared to the latter half of the 20th century will diminish a quantitative or even qualitative military advantage due to a shrinking and vulnerable defense industrial base. [xx],[xxi] Furthermore, the shift to offshore manufacturing accelerates the ability of others to close the gap in U.S. technology leadership by learning and improving upon emerging technology.[xxii]

The PRC intends to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049; integral to this strategic aim is an ambitious modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 2035 and to transform into a “world-class” military.[xxiii] A critical enabler of this national objective is the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy encompassing interrelated efforts uniting China’s civilian technology and industrial base with the defense industrial base, integrating science and technology (S&T) innovations across military and civilian sectors, and cultivating talent by blending military and civilian expertise.[xxiv] Today, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is the largest navy in the world with over 350 ships and submarines.[xxv] Additionally, the combined air arm of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation consists of over 2,800 aircraft. This total battle force size when combined with an inventory of over 1,250 land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, in conjunction with robust integrated air defense systems, provides the PRC a clear advantage in its aspiration to assure a military victory across the Taiwan Strait and hegemonic influence throughout the region.[xxvi] Complementing the PRC’s conventional forces, the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) rapidly matures space, cyber, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare capabilities coupled with the ability to leverage S&T innovations through MCF suggesting the asymmetric advantage sought through the Third Offset is swinging behind the pitch.[xxvii]

The PRC is the United States’ greatest strategic rival; they aggressively pursue to dominate technologies associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution and become a global innovation superpower in support of the PLA’s modernization efforts.[xxviii] The PLA has also undergone significant education modernization by relying on China’s civilian universities for advanced technology talent development since the early 2000s.[xxix] In 2003, the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC) ordered the PLA to implement a program to develop a cohort of commanding officers capable of directing “informationalized” warfare supported by the exploration of key technologies and innovative development of weaponry and equipment by 2023.[xxx] The PRC’s National University of Defense Technology is one of nearly 40 PLA education institutions awarding advanced and graduate degrees in S&T and produces three times as many graduate students as the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) combined.[xxxi] In contrast, NPS is the DON’s S&T graduate education institution and Navy student enrollment, both active duty and DON civilians, continues a decreasing trend since 2012; furthermore, more NPS students are enrolled in non-S&T curricula (defense management or national security affairs) than are enrolled in the S&T programs.[xxxii] While the U.S. Marine Corps enrollment at NPS has slightly increased over the same period, the divergent approaches to advanced and technical education between the PLA and the DON portend an intellectual readiness mismatch and numbers do not favor the U.S. Navy. 

The Fourth Offset

Critics of the Third Offset approach question the United States’ ability to prevail in a high-technology strategy considering the state of the domestic economy and its corresponding role within the global economy.[xxxiii] Some view the recent National Security Strategy’s focus on a modern industrial and innovation strategy and investment to secure core technologies such as semiconductors as the Fourth Offset.[xxxiv],[xxxv] Others suggest the next offset is education.[xxxvi] The National Intelligence Council supports this view, advising continuous workforce education preserves technology leadership and enhances resilience to potentially disruptive advances in technology caused by automation, data analytics, artificial intelligence, and biotechnologies.[xxxvii]

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Work offers the Third Offset is not all about technology and that people play a critical role, “…the great strength of the United States and its NATO allies are the capabilities of its servicemen and -women and their ability to adapt to a wide variety of different situations.”[xxxviii] The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recognize the need to gain and sustain intellectual overmatch against adversaries who have offset American military superiority; however, the JCS focus is on developing talent with the ability to design and implement operational and strategic level campaigns.[xxxix] This view diminishes the importance of technological leadership in achieving decision advantage in uncertain future operational environments.[xl]

Like in shipbuilding and aircraft production, the PLA is outpacing us in warfighter development. To restore balance, the Navy must prioritize investing in intellectual readiness – the cognitive and psychological preparedness necessary to sustain performance and respond appropriately in the face of uncertain and complex situations.[xli] Naval leadership understands the importance of an educated force. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro assembled a Naval Education Task Force (NETF) to build upon the Education for Seapower strategy and make the DON “an even more adaptive learning organization that prepares our people to prevail over current and expected threats in the operating environments of the present and future.”[xlii] In concert with the NETF, the CNO’s Navigation Plan Implementation Framework launched a complementary effort to evolve the Navy’s approach to a requirements-driven career continuum of professional learning focused on developing relevant warfighting competencies and enabling improved talent management outcomes; specifically, recapitalizing the return on education investment lost due to underfilling funded quotas and low- or no- subspecialty utilization in subsequent tours following graduation. While the Task Force’s recommendations are forthcoming, they will also likely take an incremental approach to evolve naval education by focusing on university system-style governance and achieving economies of scale by sharing capabilities across the education enterprise.

Naval Education 4.0

The Naval Service must initiate a revolution in military education and lead the adoption of Education 4.0 approaches to keep pace and preserve our warfighting advantage. Our competitors are already embracing learning approaches to lead in the present-day period of technological change and innovation described as the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0). Industry 4.0 is characterized by cyber-physical systems connected through the internet of things, Big Data, and cloud computing supported by artificial intelligence define this era.[xliii],[xliv] Emerging work environments integrate the expanded use of novel technologies, networked human-machine teams, and virtual work environments; these changes require education to evolve and provide relevant knowledge and skills to the current and future workforce.[xlv]

Education 4.0 is a conceptual framework that innovatively uses technology to develop highly competent professionals capable of employing the right physical and digital resources to increase and apply design innovation principles in developing solutions that drive competitive advantage.[xlvi] In education 4.0, artificial intelligence and machine learning assess student performance and tailor educational material to individual needs; learning is self-directed with instructors serving as expert mentors guiding students.[xlvii] This approach builds upon emerging concepts for Education 3.0 such as personalized learning environments for students to develop mastery of subject matter beyond the constraints of a traditional physical classroom.[xlviii] These concepts are neither too bold nor too progressive for the Navy’s vision for talent development; specifically, Ready Relevant Learning and an outcomes-based education framework grounded in individual core competencies. 

Naval Education 4.0 (Naval Ed 4.0) is a learner-centered approach that applies blended learning (both online and offline curricula) and flipped classrooms that bring interdisciplinary teams together for deep learning-by-doing through immersive lab experiences collaboratively working in project teams to solve relevant problems.[xlix] Studies have shown that blended learning improves academic outcomes.[l] This paradigm shifts away from instructor-centered approaches that still dominate higher education today and leverages innovative pedagogies such as, cybergogy (engaged online learning), heutagogy (self-directed learning), and peeragogy (peer-based learning).[li],[lii],[liii] This approach is reflective of the current information age where online resources flatten access to information, leverages individual goal-oriented motivation, and harnesses work-place social-networks that already influence informal and on-the-job experiential learning that comprise the preponderance of the Navy Leader Development Framework.[liv] Naval Ed 4.0 supports distributed learners and can also scale to expand reach and access to a larger segment of the service than under current programs. Research indicates opportunities for advanced education is an influential factor in warfighter retention.[lv]  

Recommendations

Integrate the fundamentals and systems sections of Personnel Qualification Standards into an adaptive Learning Management System that monitors individual learner competency and can offer agile curricula that reinforces areas of proficiency and remediates areas for improvement. Data analytics can provide unit leaders with better awareness of strengths and vulnerabilities within their teams while also serving as a feedback loop to accession and pipeline training and education organizations on areas for emphasis. The ultimate aim is to reduce variation in watch stander performance.

Pilot blended education programs that coincide with unrestricted line community production shore tours or restricted line tours at warfare development centers. Modeled upon the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) LEAD Program at the U.S. Naval Academy, provide relevant full-time academic instruction at the beginning of the tour that culminates in an interdisciplinary Capstone project partnered with subject matter experts from industry and the systems commands to develop innovative warfighting solutions. These projects are the core of the Naval Innovation Ecosystem bringing together academia, the Naval Research and Development Establishment, and industry to rapidly move technology from the lab to the warfighter. Graduates continue individual experiential learning through the remainder of their tour resulting in immediate utilization while setting conditions to transition solutions into capability.

Reconsider designating NPS as a professional military education institution; specifically, a command and staff college that provides a technical education in concert with the Naval War College’s College of Distance Education JPME Phase 1. Current discussions suggest the Navy will prioritize service war college student fills over technical graduate education opportunities.  However, this path will produce suboptimal outcomes. Creating a pool of joint qualified officers eligible to serve as joint force commanders requires JPME 1 and 2 and an experience tour resulting in joint qualification. Pressing due course officers JPME Phase 1 does not fulfill the objective requirements. This limits the technical education opportunity increasing the risk of technical competency across the naval force while our competitor deliberately develops technological knowledge in their commanders.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Team, as part of the Joint Force, must deter challengers, and when required, defeat adversaries in combat. The services may be called to task before Third Offset capabilities are fielded to deter aggression, both Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken contend that the PRC is moving faster than anticipated and positioning to seize Taiwan.[lvi] Yet, the future is too uncertain to say the U.S. will definitively know how to defeat the PLA; instead, former U.S. Air Force Acquisition Chief Will Roper contends the side that is more agile and able to adapt and innovate faster in the next conflict will prevail.[lvii] The Navy and the Joint Force need to pursue the Fourth Offset, modern-age intellectual readiness to ensure agility when contested. The continuous adoption of disruptive technologies rapidly evolves the character of warfare. This dynamism compels a force design that perpetuates our warfighting edge, accelerates capabilities innovation, and sustains tactical, operational, and strategic adaptation in - and beyond - this decade. Total Force Design extends beyond platforms and systems to holistically encompass how we (i) develop the force’s ability to think, lead, and win in an age of cognitive warfare, (ii) how we generate the force, and (iii) how we employ the force in increasingly uncertain operating environments. Importantly, victory in the last begins with success in the first.[lviii] Simply stated, the ability to accelerate warfighting capability and the intellectual competence to adapt in competition or conflict requires urgency and a new approach to developing and delivering warfighting advantage.

[i] The White House. (2022). National Security Strategy (Issue October).

[ii] Department of Defense. (2006). Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

[iii] Work, B. (2015). The Third U. S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies.

[iv] Ibid

[v] Hasik, J. (2018). Beyond the Third Offset Matching Plans for Innovation to a Theory of Victory. Joint Force Quarterly, 2018 Q4(91), 14–21. 

[vi] Hillner, E. P. (2019). The Third Offset Strategy and the Army modernization priorities. In Center for Army Lessons Learned (Issue May).

[vii] Ibid

[viii] Katz, J. (April 19, 2022). Navy plans to sink large undersea drone program. Breaking Defense.

[ix] Sharp, D. (July 1, 2021). US Navy ditches futuristic railgun, eyes hypersonic missiles. Defense News. 

[x] Chief of Naval Operations. (2022). Navigation Plan 2022. Department of the Navy.

[xi] Department of Defense. (2018). Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Department of Defense.

[xii] Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering. (2022). DoD USD R&E Technology Vision for an Era of Competition (2022). Department of Defense

[xiii] Cohen, R., Chandler, N., Efron, S., Frederick, B., Han, E., Klein, K., Morgan, F., Rhoades, A., Shatz, H., & Shokh, Y. (2020). The Future of Warfare in 2030. In The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions. 

[xiv] Zenko, M. (2012, October). 100% Right 0% of the Time. Foreign Policy. 

[xv] Cohen, R., et al. (2020).

[xvi] Dombrowski, P. (2015b). Cybered Conflict and the Third Offset Strategy. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 186–197.

[xvii] Katz, J. (2022b, September 14). Citing industry capacity, Navy’s Gilday throws cold water on three destroyers per year. Breaking Defense.

[xviii] Macedonia, M. (2018). Army Science Board Fiscal Year 2017 Study Character of Future Warfare. 

[xix] Welter, T. (2021, May 6). We are lost in the woods on acquisition reform. Defense News, 4. 

[xx] Cohen, R., et al. (2020).

[xxi] Defense Science Board. (2013). Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030.

[xxii] Dombrowski, P. (2015a). America’s Third Offset Strategy New Military Technologies and Implications for the Asia Pacific. 

[xxiii] Department of Defense. (2021). Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. 

[xxiv] Ibid 

[xxv] Ibid

[xxvi] O’Rourke, R. (2022). China naval modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy capabilities-background and issues for congress. In Measuring China’s Military Might.

[xxvii] Department of Defense. (2021).

[xxviii] Ibid

[xxix] Kamphausen, R. D. (2021). The People of the PLA 2. 0 (Vol. 0). US Army War College Press.

[xxx] Kamphausen, R. D. (2021).

[xxxi] Bevins, J. E. (2022). Incentivizing Innovation: Promoting Technical Competency to Win Wars. Air & Space Operations Review, 1(3), 22–37.

[xxxii] Naval Postgraduate School (2022) NPS Command Brief dated 22 April 2022

[xxxiii] Dombrowski, (2015b)

[xxxiv] Kassinger, T. W. (2020, August 13). Shaping the Fourth Offset.

[xxxv] The White House. (2022). 

[xxxvi] Bollmann, C., Tomlinson, W., Herring, C., & Pace Jr., H. (2020). Education is the Next Offset. Proceedings, 146(11).

[xxxvii] National Intelligence Council. (2017). Global Trends: The Paradox of Progress. 

[xxxviii] Work, B. (2015)

[xxxix] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2020). Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education and Talent Management.

[xl] Rondeau, A. (2022, August). Rebalancing the Science and Art of War for Decision Advantage. Proceedings, 148(1).

[xli] Hone, T. (2022, October). Intellectual Readiness Is Vital to Sea Power. Proceedings.

[xlii] Department of the Navy. (2022). SECNAV Del Toro Kicks Off Naval Education Task Force. 

[xliii] Benešová, A., & Tupa, J. (2017). Requirements for Education and Qualification of People in Industry 4.0. Procedia Manufacturing, 11(June), 2195–2202. 

[xliv] Mourtzis, D., Vlachou, E., Dimitrakopoulos, G., & Zogopoulos, V. (2018). Cyber-Physical Systems and Education 4.0 - The Teaching Factory 4.0 Concept. Procedia Manufacturing, 23(2017), 129–134. 

[xlv] Benešová, A., & Tupa, J. (2017).

[xlvi] Miranda, J., Navarrete, C., Noguez, J., Molina-Espinosa, J. M., Ramírez-Montoya, M. S., Navarro-Tuch, S. A., Bustamante-Bello, M. R., Rosas-Fernández, J. B., & Molina, A. (2021). The core components of education 4.0 in higher education: Three case studies in engineering education. Computers and Electrical Engineering, 93(February).

[xlvii] ViewSonic. (2022). Blended Learning in Education 3.0.

[xlviii] Watson, W. R., Watson, S. L., & Reigeluth, C. M. (2013). Education 3.0: Breaking the mold with technology. Interactive Learning Environments, 23(3), 332–343.

[xlix] ViewSonic. (2022)

[l] Bizami, N. A., Tasir, Z., & Kew, S. N. (2022). Innovative pedagogical principles and technological tools capabilities for immersive blended learning: a systematic literature review. In Education and Information Technologies. Springer US.

[li] Bizami et al. (2022).

[lii] Marie, B. L. (2012). Heutagogy and Lifelong Learning: A Review of Heutagogical Practice and Self Determined Learning. International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning, 13(1), 56–71

[liii] Wang, M., & Kang, M. (2006). Cybergogy for Engaged Learning: A Framework for Creating Learner Engagement through Information and Communication Technology. Engaged Learning with Emerging Technologies, 225–253.

[liv] Chief of Naval Operations. (2019). Navy Leader Development Framework Version 3.0.

[lv] Sherrod, W. (2021). Factors Influencing First-Term Naval Aviator Career Continuation: A Gap Analysis. University of Southern California.

[lvi] Shelbourne, M. (2022, October 19). China’s Accelerated Timeline to Take Taiwan Pushing Navy in the Pacific, Says CNO Gilday. USNI News. 

[lvii] Hadley, G. (2021, October). Former Air Force Acquisition Chief: DOD Should Leverage ‘Revolving Door’ in New Ways. Air Force Magazine. 

[lviii] White, T. J. (2022). Personal communication.