Senior Chinese Official Calls for More Effective Preferential Measures after Taiwan’s General Elections
Global Taiwan Brief - Volume 5, Issue 2 (January 29, 2020)
On January 19, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its “2020 Taiwan Work Conference” (2020年對台工作會議) in Beijing. The annual conference is the first major policy meeting laying out the CCP’s policy and approach toward Taiwan since the island-democracy had its general elections on January 11. The results of the elections saw the incumbent president, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), and her ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), win a second-term as president and maintain an absolute majority over the country’s Legislative Yuan, respectively. This clear blow to Beijing comes amid the intensification of its “soft-hard” measures over the past several years to diplomatically isolate and coerce the central government in Taiwan while at the same time lure people and businesses from Taiwan through a raft of preferential economic measures (such as the 31 measures released in February 2018 and later 26 measures in November 2019) that provide equal if not special treatment for Taiwan entities.
The work conference was attended by the deputy director of the inter-agency policy-coordinating body, the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG)—which is the highest-level party organ responsible for developing the party-state’s Taiwan policy—Wang Yang (汪洋). Wang is concurrently a member of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Wang headlined the conference and declared that the CCP should raise the effectiveness of its preferential measures of “benefit Taiwan for the people’s interest” (惠台利民), promote more cross-Strait youth exchanges, emphasize the “One-China principle” and resolutely oppose and contain any forms of Taiwan independence. The 2020 meeting was chaired by State Councilor and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅). The 2018 and 2019 work conferences were hosted by Politburo Committee member and director of the CCP’s Committee of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪).
Wang, who is the fourth-highest ranking cadre, highlighted the components of this “soft-hard” approach at the 2018 work conference. For the “hard” measures, the CCP would uphold the “One-China principle” and the so-called “1992 Consensus,” and resolutely oppose and contain any form of Taiwan secession. During the 2018 meeting, Wang reportedly stated that “[w]e [CCP] should remain true to our original aspiration, keep our mission firmly in mind, and fully implement the CCP Central Committee’s decisions and plans [for Taiwan affairs] in a spirit of ‘time and tide wait for no man; seize the day, seize the hour’ [emphasis added].” For the “soft” measures, Beijing would expand cross-Strait economic and cultural cooperation; deepen the development of cross-Strait economic and social integration; gradually give equal treatment to Taiwan nationals studying, starting businesses, working, and living in the People’s Republic of China; and encourage people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to promote Chinese culture and their “spiritual affinity.”
According to the People’s Daily—the CCP’s official mouthpiece—Wang noted that cross-Strait relations and Taiwan work will become more complicated and severe in 2020. Repeating his call from the 2019 work conference, Wang called on party cadres in the PRC’s Taiwan work-related system to strengthen the “four consciousnesses” (四個意識)—political consciousness (政治意識), overall situation consciousness (大局意識), core consciousness (核心意識), and awareness of alignment (看齊意識)—strengthen the “four self-confidences,” and achieve “two safeguards,” and earnestly implement the thought of the CCP Central Committee’s policy decisions on Taiwan, adhere to the “One-China” principle, and resolutely oppose and contain any form of secessionist activities.
Most notably, the chairman of the CPPCC—which is also the highest level organ in charge of the United Front system—emphasized that it was necessary to improve the effectiveness (實效) of measures that “benefit Taiwan for the people’s interests,” improve the institutional arrangements and policy measures to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, deepen cross-Strait integration and development, and ensure the welfare of “Taiwan compatriots.” Highlighting the focus of this approach, Wang noted that it was necessary to vigorously promote cross-Strait youth exchanges and create better conditions for Taiwanese youth to come to China for study, internship, entrepreneurship, and employment.
Clearly ignoring the impact of the civil unrest in Hong Kong on Taiwan’s elections, Wang repeated the common refrain that it was necessary to learn from Xi Jinping’s important guidance on Taiwan work and implement the policy of “peaceful (re)unification; one country, two systems.” In keeping with past practices, Liu Jieyi (劉結一), director of both the CCP Central Committee and State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, delivered the work report.
While most analysts expect that Beijing will further harden its approach against Taiwan after the general elections, the work conference does not indicate a change in the CCP’s current approach or policy towards Taiwan. For now, Beijing seems poised to continue its “soft-hard” strategy against Taiwan, although it is not clear how it intends to raise the effectiveness of its policies of enticing Taiwanese youths, businesses, and aligned-political actors, while continuing to diminish Taiwan’s international space and maintaining its coercive military activities.
Perhaps more troubling for the future of cross-Strait relations is that General Secretary Xi Jinping has already clearly shown that he is unwilling to work with Taipei under Tsai’s rule, and there will be little willingness or reason on the part of President Tsai to unilaterally provide further concessions than what she has already offered. As Beijing’s response to the election results through the Xinhua News Agency make clear: “Momentary reversals are but just bubbles left behind by the tides of history … We want to directly warn Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP not to act willfully and rashly because of a temporary fluke.” It appears that Beijing may already have its eye set for 2024.
President, TriOrient Investments. Co-Chair, Private Equity Committee at AmCham Taiwan.
4yThanks for sharing that, Russell Hsiao, J.D. At a recent forum at AmCham Taipei, four legislators - two each from the DPP and KMT - gave their views on what the January 11th election may mean for Taiwan’s government going forward. One of the DPP lawmakers said while the victory was indeed a landslide win for President Tsai Ing-wen, if one digs down into the results at the various levels, there are different ways to read the outcome. He shared those views mostly because he probably hopes the winners do not take their victories for granted. His colleague made a good point, regarding the need to carefully interpret the results to understand what the voters of Taiwan really want: if even Taiwan politicians have to think carefully and communicate with them to understand the voters of Taiwan, then Beijing is clueless in thinking it can win the “hearts and minds” of the Taiwanese. Beijing, however, believes it can because it has no experience with real democratic processes and rule. Communication in China is one way: top-down.