What's 'Littoral Manoeuvre' for Defence?

Since the 2023 Defence Strategic Review confirmed the imperative, a large part of the Australian Army’s thinking and discussion on littoral manoeuvre has highlighted examples and case studies of amphibious operations. And why not?  From the assault at Gallipoli that is woven into the national psyche, to the high watermark of capability employed in the Oboe campaign in the final stages of the Pacific campaign, the Australian Army has much to be proud of in this area and its history is rightly often evoked.

But, it is possible that the focus on considering amphibious operations – inevitably amphibious assaults – crowds out a more comprehensive consideration of what has been asked of the Army within the joint force.

1st Wave is committed to supporting the Australian Army develop the strategy, concepts, capabilities and technology needed to ensure its littoral operations and capability is fit for purpose. We bring together decades of experience and leadership in military and corporate littoral operations in the Indo-Pacific.

As we see it, littoral manoeuvre covers a broad sweep of operational level manoeuvre and it is not synonymous with amphibious operations, although they complement each other.  Those schooled in amphibious concepts and doctrine might say that the acronym of DRAW (Demonstration, Raid, Assault, Withdrawal) reflects the true flexibility of amphibious forces.  That would be fair, but risks missing an important point.  

We see littoral manoeuvre as an operational-level concept and not a tactic.  These operations, within a strategy of strategic denial, allow the Australian Defence Force to manoeuvre to a position of advantage relative to an adversary across the ‘dominant geography’ of the Indo Pacific.

Two things are important here.  The first is the principle – that we believe firmly at 1st Wave – of the unique and inherent ability of land power to occupy and hold terrain in the littoral that in doing so disrupts the freedom of action of an adversary.  In this way land power is strategically fundamental for the joint force within a strategy of strategic denial. 

Secondly, to achieve operational-level littoral manoeuvre, the Australian Army needs new enabling tactics to complement existing combat, combat support and combat service support functions.  These include expeditionary stevedoring, port operations, beach and coastal survey, and expeditionary over-the-shore logistics.  Given the pressure to turn the tide on personnel shortages, it is hard to see the Australian Army being able to develop these capabilities internally in the timeline demanded of it. 

At 1st Wave, we see both a challenge and opportunity as Army transitions to being a focussed force.  We believe the littoral capability the Army must accelerate must not place additional strain on scarce joint enablers already under pressure. This means Army will need new partnerships, including with industry, to conduct littoral manoeuvre that not not displace other joint and integrated capabilities. Land 8710 is part of this as it will deliver critical hardware, but by itself it will not be a comprehensive capability. A new way of operating demands new thinking and considering new and innovative ways of operating.

We think reviewing case studies other than amphibious assaults and applying emerging technology solutions to possible strategic denial scenarios will be helpful for the Army to consider the solutions it needs to assemble its littoral manoeuvre capability.

In following posts we will use our experience to highlight the sorts of possibilities that the Australian Army could consider as it develops this critical capability.  We welcome your thoughts and feedback either online or directly.