



2023 Summer Reliability Assessment

May 2023

2023 Summer Reliability Assessment Video




Table of Contents

Preface	3
About this Assessment	4
Key Findings	5
Resource Adequacy Assessment and Energy Risk Analysis	5
Other Reliability Issues	6
Recommendations	8
Discussion	9
Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts	9
Wildfire Risk Potential and BPS Impacts	10
Risk Assessments of Resource and Demand Scenarios	11
Regional Assessments Dashboards	13
MISO	14
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	15
MRO-SaskPower	16
NPCC-Maritimes	17
NPCC-New England	18
NPCC-New York	19
NPCC-Ontario	20
NPCC-Québec	21

PJM	22
SERC-Central	23
SERC-East	24
SERC-Florida Peninsula	25
SERC-Southeast	26
SPP	27
Texas RE-ERCOT	28
WECC-AB	29
WECC-BC	30
WECC-CA/MX	31
WECC-NW	32
WECC-SW	33
Data Concepts and Assumptions	34
Resource Adequacy	36
Changes from Year-to-Year	37
Net Internal Demand	38
Demand and Resource Tables	39
Variable Energy Resource Contributions	44
Probabilistic Assessment	45

Preface

Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of NERC and the six Regional Entities, is a highly reliable, resilient, and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security

Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us

The North American BPS is made up of six Regional Entities as shown on the map and corresponding table below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Regional Entity while associated Transmission Owners/Operators (TO/TOP) participate in another.



MRO	Midwest Reliability Organization	
NPCC	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	
RF	ReliabilityFirst	
SERC	SERC Reliability Corporation	
Texas RE	Texas RE Texas Reliability Entity	
WECC	WECC	

About this Assessment

NERC's 2023 Summer Reliability Assessment (SRA) identifies, assesses, and reports on areas of concern regarding the reliability of the North American BPS for the upcoming summer season. In addition, the SRA presents peak electricity demand and supply changes and highlights any unique regional challenges or expected conditions that might affect the reliability of the BPS. The reliability assessment process is a coordinated reliability evaluation between the NERC Reliability Assessment Subcommittee, the Regional Entities, and NERC staff with demand and resource projections obtained from the assessment areas. This report reflects an independent assessment by NERC and the ERO Enterprise and is intended to inform industry leaders, planners, operators, and regulatory bodies so that they are better prepared to take necessary actions to ensure BPS reliability. This report also provides an opportunity for the industry to discuss plans and preparations to ensure reliability for the upcoming summer period.

Key Findings

NERC's annual SRA covers the upcoming four-month (June–September) summer period. This assessment provides an evaluation of generation resource and transmission system adequacy as well as energy sufficiency to meet projected summer peak demands and operating reserves. This includes a deterministic evaluation of data submitted for peak net demand hour and peak risk hour as well as results from recently updated probabilistic analyses. Additionally, this assessment identifies potential reliability issues of interest and regional topics of concern. While the scope of this seasonal assessment is focused on the upcoming summer, the key findings are consistent with risks and issues that NERC has highlighted in the 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment and other earlier reliability assessments and reports.

The following findings are NERC's and the ERO Enterprise's independent evaluation of electricity generation and transmission capacity as well as potential operational concerns that may need to be addressed for the 2023 summer.

Resource Adequacy Assessment and Energy Risk Analysis

All areas are assessed as having adequate anticipated resources for normal summer peak load and conditions (see **Figure 1**). However, the following areas face risks of electricity supply shortfalls during periods of more extreme summer conditions. This determination of elevated risk is based on analysis of plausible scenarios, including 90/10 demand forecasts and historic high outage rates as well as low wind, solar photovoltaic (PV), or hydro energy conditions:

- Midcontinent ISO (MISO): The risk of being unable to meet reserve requirements at peak demand this summer in MISO is lower than in 2022 due to additional firm import commitments and lower peak demand forecast. MISO is expected to have sufficient resources, including firm imports, for normal summer peak demand. Wind generator performance during periods of high demand is a key factor in determining whether there is sufficient electricity supply on the system to maintain reliability. MISO can face challenges in meeting above-normal peak demand if wind generator energy output is lower than expected. Furthermore, the need for external (non-firm) supply assistance during more extreme demand levels will depend largely on wind energy output. Results of MISO's capacity auction have not been released at the time of this assessment, and these could change MISO's firm resources for the summer.
- NPCC-New England: Anticipated resources in New England are projected to be lower than in 2022 but are expected to remain sufficient for meeting operating reserve requirements at normal peak demand. Operating procedures for obtaining emergency resources or non-firm supplies from neighboring areas are likely to be needed during more extreme demand or low resource conditions.

- NPCC-Ontario: Planned nuclear outage for refurbishment have reduced the electricity supply resources serving the province. Additionally, load growth is contributing to a constrained transmission network during high-demand conditions that may not be able to deliver sufficient supply to the Windsor-Essex area in the southwest part of the province. Additional generator outages or extreme demand can lead to reserve shortages and a need to seek non-firm imports. Ontario could potentially see a significant increase in reliance on imports this summer under both normal peak (50/50) and extreme (90/10) demand scenarios.
- SERC-Central: Compared to the summer of 2022, forecasted peak demand has risen by over 950 MW while growth in anticipated resources has been flat. The assessment area is expected to have sufficient supply for normal peak demand while demand-side management or other operating mitigations can be expected for above-normal demand or high generator-outage conditions.
- Southwest Power Pool (SPP): Reserve margins have also fallen in SPP as a result of increasing
 peak demand and declining anticipated resources. Like MISO, the energy output of SPP's wind
 generators during periods of high demand is a key factor in determining whether there is
 sufficient electricity supply on the system. SPP can face energy challenges in meeting extreme
 peak demand or managing periods of thermal or hydro generator outages if wind resource
 energy output is below normal.
- Texas (ERCOT): The area is experiencing strong growth in both resources and forecasted demand. ERCOT added over 4 GW of new solar PV nameplate capacity to the ERCOT grid since 2022. Additionally, load reductions from dispatchable demand response programs have grown by over 18% to total 3,380 MW. ERCOT's peak demand forecast has also risen by 6% as a result of economic growth. Resources are adequate for peak demand of the average summer; however, dispatchable generation may not be sufficient to meet reserves during an extreme heat-wave that is accompanied by low winds.
- U.S. Western Interconnection: Resources across the area are sufficient to support normal peak demand. However, wide-area heat events can expose the WECC assessment areas of California/Mexico (CA/MX), Northwest (NW), and Southwest (SW) to risk of energy supply shortfall as each area relies on regional transfers to meet demand at peak and the late afternoon to evening hours when energy output from the area's vast solar PV resources are diminished. Within the Western Interconnection, entities are planning to install over 2 GW of new battery energy storage systems, which can help reduce energy risks from resource variability. Wildfire risks to the transmission network, which often accompany these wide-area heat events, can limit electricity transfers and result in localized load shedding.

All other areas have sufficient resources to manage normal summer peak demand and are at low risk of energy shortfalls from more extreme demand or generation outage conditions. Anticipated Reserve Margins meet or surpass the Reference Margin Level, indicating that planned resources in these areas are adequate to manage the risk of a capacity deficiency under normal conditions. Furthermore, based on risk scenario analysis in these areas, resources and energy appear adequate. Figure 1 below summarizes the risk status for all assessment areas.



Seasonal Risk Assessment Summary		
High Potential for insufficient operating reserves in normal peak conditions		
Elevated	Potential for insufficient operating reserves in above-normal conditions	
Low	Sufficient operating reserves expected	

Figure 1: Summer Reliability Risk Area Summary

Other Reliability Issues

- Stored supplies of natural gas and coal are at high levels, but industry is monitoring for potential generator fuel delivery risks. The natural gas supply and infrastructure is vitally important to electric grid reliability, even as renewable generation satisfies more of our energy needs. Fuel supply and delivery infrastructure must be capable of meeting the ramp rates of natural-gas-fired generators as they balance the system when solar generation output declines. Likewise, owners and operators of some coal-fired generators in the U.S. Southeast report challenges in arranging coal replenishment due to mine closures and transport delays. Consequently, some Balancing Authorities (BA) continue to employ coal-conservation measures that began in late 2022 in order to maintain sufficient stocks for peak months.
- New environmental rules that restrict power plant emissions will limit the operation of coalfired generators in 23 states, including Nevada, Utah, and several states in the Gulf Coast, mid-Atlantic, and Midwest. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Good Neighbor Plan, finalized on March 15, 2023, ensures that affected states meet the Clean Air Act's "Good Neighbor" requirements by reducing pollution that significantly contributes to problems attaining and maintaining the EPA's health-based air quality standard¹ for groundlevel ozone (i.e., smog) in downwind states.² Coal and natural-gas-fired generators in states affected by the Good Neighbor Plan will likely meet tighter emissions restrictions primarily by limiting hours of operation in this first year of implementation rather than through adding emissions control equipment. RCs in summer-peaking areas typically are not able to authorize extended outages to upgrade systems during this summer season in order to ensure sufficient resources for high demand. The final rule approved by the EPA includes provisions designed to give grid owners and operators flexibility to help maintain reliability, including allowancetrading mechanisms. Consequently, RCs, BAs, and GOs will need to be vigilant for emissions rule constraints that affect generator dispatchability and the potential need for emission allowance trades or waivers to meet high demand or low resource conditions. State regulators and industry should have protocols in place at the start of summer for managing emergent requests.
- Low inventories of replacement distribution transformers could slow restoration efforts following hurricanes and severe storms. The electric industry continues to face a shortage of distribution transformers as a result of production not keeping pace with demand. A survey by the American Public Power Association revealed that many utilities have low levels of emergency stocks that are used for responding to natural disasters and catastrophic events.³

¹This standard is known as the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)

²https://www.epa.gov/csapr/good-neighbor-plan-2015-ozone-naags#summary

 $^{{}^3\}text{https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/appa-survey-members-shows-distribution-transformer-production-not-meeting-demand}$

Asset sharing programs used by utilities provide visibility and voluntary equipment sharing to maximize resources; however, electricity customers may experience delayed restoration of power following storms as crews must work to obtain new equipment. New efficiency standards for distribution transformers proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy could further exacerbate the transformer supply shortages.⁴

- Supply chain issues present maintenance and summer preparedness challenges and are delaying some new resource additions. Difficulties in obtaining sufficient labor, material, and equipment as a result of broad economic factors has affected preseason maintenance of transmission and generation facilities in North America. These supply chain issues have led some owners and operators to delay or cancel maintenance activities that are typically performed to ensure facilities are ready for summer conditions. Additionally, GOs in some areas that were preparing to interconnect new generation are facing delays that will prevent some from being available to meet expected peak summer demand. This includes areas in the U.S. Southeast and the U.S. part of the Western Interconnection (see Regional Assessments Dashboards for details). These supply chain issues can exacerbate concerns in elevated risk areas (Figure 1) and add challenges to operators across the BPS. Should project delays emerge, affected GOs and TOs must communicate changes to BAs, TOPs, and RCs so that impacts are understood and steps are taken to reduce risks of capacity deficiencies or energy shortfalls.
- Winter precipitation is expected to improve the water supply for hydro generation in parts of the U.S. West, but low water levels on major reservoirs remain a concern for electricity generation. Significant amounts of rainfall and high elevation snow are expected to help replenish reservoirs and maintain river flows that provide energy for most of California's hydroelectric facilities. However, reservoirs at the largest hydro facilities in the U.S. West, including Washington's Grand Coulee Dam and the Hoover Dam on the Arizona-Nevada border, remain at historic low levels, potentially limiting hydroelectric energy output. Power from these plants is used throughout the U.S. Western Interconnection.
- Unexpected tripping of wind and solar PV resources during grid disturbances continues to be a reliability concern. NERC has analyzed multiple large-scale disturbances on the BPS that involved widespread loss of inverter-based resources (IBR). In 2021 and 2022, the Texas Interconnection experienced widespread IBR loss events, like those previously observed in the California area. Similarly, four additional solar PV loss events occurred between June and August 2021 in California. In 2022, ERCOT required GOs to submit mitigation plans, and corrective measures are being implemented in 2023. In March 2023, NERC issued

the *Inverter-Based Resource Performance Issues Alert* to GOs of Bulk Electric System (BES) solar PV generating resources.⁵ As a Level 2 alert, it contains recommended actions for GOs of grid-connected solar PV resources, including steps to coordinate protection and controller settings, so that the resources will reliably operate during grid disturbances.

• Curtailment of electricity transfers to areas in need during periods of high regional demand is a growing reliability concern. During energy emergencies and periods of transmission system congestion, RCs and BAs may curtail area transfers for various reasons using established procedures and protocols. While the curtailments alleviate an issue in one part of the system, they can contribute to supply shortages or effect local transmission system operations in another area. Two recent extreme temperature events highlight the effect of transfer curtailments on area supply needs during energy emergencies. During the September 2022 wide-area heat dome, a BA in the WECC-SW assessment area declared an energy emergency when the neighboring assessment area, California Independent System Operator (CAISO), curtailed transfers in order to meet the high demand within their own area. During Winter Storm Elliott, firm exports were curtailed from PJM during a period of widespread energy emergencies in the U.S. Eastern Interconnection.

For the summer of 2023, several areas identified as having capacity or energy risks are relying on imports of electricity supplies. These areas include MISO, NPCC-Ontario, SERC-Central, and the assessment areas in the U.S. Western Interconnection. A wide-area heat event that severely affects regional demand or generator availability presents an added concern in areas that are dependent on imports for managing high electricity demand.

• In addition to the risk items identified in the Key Findings, resource outages will continue to present challenges in many areas during "near-peak" demand conditions that occur in spring and fall. Many parts of North America experience elevated temperatures that extend beyond the summer (June—September) months into periods when BPS equipment owners and operators historically scheduled outages for maintenance. Increasingly, BAs are facing resource constrained periods during shoulder months as unseasonable temperatures coincide with generator unavailability. Careful attention to long-term weather forecasts and the potential for unusual heat patterns in the shoulder months is important to inform the need for more conservative outage coordination periods.

⁴https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-proposes-new-efficiency-standards-distribution-transformers

⁵ https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/NERC%20Alert%20R-2023-03-14-01%20Level%202%20-%20Inverter-Based%20Resource%20Performance%20Issues.pdf

Recommendations

To reduce the risk of electricity shortfalls on the BPS this summer, NERC recommends the following:

- RCs, BAs, and TOPs in the elevated risk areas identified previously in the key findings should take the following actions:
 - Review seasonal operating plans and the protocols for communicating and resolving potential supply shortfalls in anticipation of potentially extreme demand levels
 - Employ conservative generation and transmission outage coordination procedures commensurate with long-range weather forecasts to ensure adequate resource availability
 - Engage state or provincial regulators and policymakers to prepare for efficient implementation of demand side management mechanisms called for in operating plans
- GOs with solar PV resources should implement recommendations in the inverter-based resource performance issues alert that NERC issued in March 2023.
- RCs, BAs, and GOs in states affected by the new Good Neighbor Plan should be familiar with its provisions for ensuring electric reliability and have protocols in place to act to preserve generation resources when necessary to support periods of high demand. State regulators and industry should have protocols in place at the start of summer for managing emergent requests.

Discussion

Summer Temperature and Drought Forecasts

Peak electricity demand in most areas is directly influenced by temperature. Weather officials are expecting above normal temperatures for much of the United States while Canada is largely expected to see normal or below-normal average temperatures (see Figure 2). In addition, drought conditions continue across much of the western half of North America, resulting in unique challenges to area electricity supplies and potential impacts on demand.⁶ Assessment area load forecasts account for many years of historical demand data, often up to 30 years, to predict summer peak demand and prepare for more extreme conditions. Above average seasonal temperatures can contribute to high peak demand as well as an increase in forced outages for generation and some BPS equipment. Effective preseason maintenance and preparations are particularly important to BPS reliability in severe or prolonged periods of above-normal temperatures.





Figure 2: United States and Canada Summer Temperature Outlook⁷

⁶ See North American Drought Monitor: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-precip/drought/nadm/maps

⁷ Seasonal forecasts obtained from U.S. National Weather Service and Natural Resources Canada: https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/long-range/ and https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/ and https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/ and https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/ and https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/ and https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/

Wildfire Risk Potential and BPS Impacts

Normal or below-normal fire risk is projected for much of the U.S. West at the beginning of the summer; in contrast, Florida, West Texas, and Central Canada project above-normal fire risks for the beginning of summer (see Figure 3). BPS operation can be impacted in areas where wildfires are active as well as areas where there is heightened risk of wildfire ignition due to weather and ground conditions. Above normal fire risk is projected for much of Canada throughout the summer.






Figure 3: North American Seasonal Fire Assessment for May through July 20238

Wildfire prevention planning in California and some states in the U.S. Northwest include power shut-off programs in high fire-risk areas. When conditions warrant implementing these plans, power lines (including transmission-level lines) may be preemptively de-energized in high fire-risk areas to prevent wildfire ignitions. Other wildfire risk mitigation activities include implementing enhanced vegetation management, equipment inspections, system hardening, and added situational awareness measures. In January 2021, the ERO published the *Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide*⁹ to promote preparedness within the North American electric power industry and share the experiences and practices from utilities in the Western Interconnection.

⁸ See North American Seasonal Fire Assessment and Outlook, May 2023. Subsequent updates at this link will include August and September: https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/NA Outlook.pdf

⁹ See the NERC Wildfire Mitigation Reference Guide, January 2021: https://nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Guide January 2021: <a href="https://nerc.com/comm/RSTC/Documents/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Guide January 2021: <a href="https://nerc.com/com/com/com/rstc/Documents/Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Mitigation%20Reference%20Mitigation%

Risk Assessments of Resource and Demand Scenarios

Seasonal risk scenarios for each assessment area are presented in the Regional Assessments Dashboards section. The on-peak reserve margin and seasonal risk scenario chart in each dashboard provide potential summer peak demand and resource condition information. The reserve margins on the right side of the dashboard pages provide a comparison to the previous year's assessment. The seasonal risk scenario charts present deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different demand and resource levels with adjustments for normal and extreme conditions. The assessment areas determined the adjustments to capacity and peak demand based on methods or assumptions that are summarized in the seasonal risk scenario charts; see the Data Concepts and Assumptions for more information about these dashboard charts.

The seasonal risk scenario charts can be expressed in terms of reserve margins: In **Table 1**, each assessment area's Anticipated Reserve Margins are shown alongside the reserve margins for a typical generation outage scenario (where applicable) and the extreme demand and resource conditions in their seasonal risk scenario.

Highlighted in orange are the areas identified as having resource adequacy or energy risks for the summer in the **Key Findings** section's discussion. The typical outages reserve margin is comprised of anticipated resources minus the capacity that is likely to be in maintenance or forced outage at peak demand. If the typical maintenance or forced outage margin is the same as the Anticipated Reserve Margin, it is because an assessment area has already factored typical outages into the anticipated resources. The extreme conditions margin includes all components of the scenario and represents the most severe operating conditions of an area's scenario. Note that any reserve margin below zero indicates that the resources fall below demand in the scenario.

In addition to the peak demand and seasonal risk hour scenario charts, the assessment areas provided a resource adequacy risk assessment that was probability-based for the summer season. Results are included in the Highlights section of each assessment area's dashboard and summarized in the **Probabilistic Assessment** section. The risk assessments account for the hour(s) of greatest risk of resource shortfall. For most areas, the hour(s) of risk coincide with the time of forecasted peak demand; however, some areas incur the greatest risk at other times based on the varying demand and resource profiles. Various risk metrics are provided and include loss of load expectation (LOLE), loss of load hours (LOLH), expected unserved energy (EUE), and the probabilities of energy emergency alert (EEA) occurrence.


Table 1: Seasonal Risk Scenario On-Peak Reserve Margins			
Assessment Area	Anticipated Reserve Margin	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Typical Outages	Anticipated Reserve Margin with Higher Demand, Outages, Derates in Extreme Conditions
MISO	23.0%	4.3%	-6.9%
MRO-Manitoba	29.1%	25.6%	13.1%
MRO-SaskPower	29.1%	12.8%	-1.9%
NPCC-Maritimes	49.7%	39.3%	20.2%
NPCC-New England	17.7%	7.0%	-3.9%
NPCC-New York	30.3%	17.0%	9.9%
NPCC-Ontario	14.0%	14.0%	8.6%
NPCC-Québec	37.1%	37.1%	37.1%
PJM	31.9%	23.4%	8.4%
SERC-Central	18.0%	9.6%	6.4%
SERC-East	19.1%	16.0%	9.0%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	26.6%	19.9%	12.8%
SERC-Southeast	39.6%	36.4%	33.8%
SPP	24.6%	14.3%	-4.0%
Texas RE-ERCOT	23.0%	16.5%	-1.6%
WECC-AB	24.8%	21.9%	8.1%
WECC-BC	28.9%	28.8%	-5.4%
WECC-CA/MX	35.0%	29.0%	-11.9%
WECC-NW	28.5%	22.5%	-12.9%
WECC-SW	19.5%	15.8%	-6.8%

Extreme generation outages, low resource output, and peak loads similar to those experienced in wide area heat events and the heat domes experienced in western parts of North America during the last three summers are ongoing reliability risks in certain areas for the summer of 2023. When forecasted resources in an area fall below expected demand, BAs would need to employ operating mitigations or EEA to obtain the capacity and energy necessary to meet extreme peak demands. Table 2 describes the various EEA levels and the circumstances for each.

Table 2: Energy Emergency Alert Levels			
EEA Level	Description	Circumstances	
EEA 1 All available generation resources in use	The BA is experiencing conditions where all available generation resources are committed to meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments and is concerned about sustaining its required contingency reserves.		
	Non-firm wholesale energy sales (other than those that are recallable to meet reserve requirements) have been curtailed.		
EEA 2 Load management procedures in effect	The BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is an energy deficient BA.		
	An energy deficient BA has implemented its operating plan(s) to mitigate emergencies.		
	An energy deficient BA is still able to maintain minimum contingency reserve requirements.		
EEA 3	Firm Load interruption is imminent or in progress	The energy deficient BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements.	

Regional Assessments Dashboards

The following assessment area dashboards and summaries were developed based on data and narrative information collected by NERC from the six Regional Entities on an assessment area basis. Guidelines and definitions are in the Data Concepts and Assumptions table. On-Peak Reserve Margin bar charts show the Anticipated Reserve Margin compared to a Reference Margin Level that is established for the areas to meet resource adequacy criteria. Prospective Reserve Margins can give an indication of additional on-peak capacity but are not used for assessing adequacy. The operational risk analysis shown in the following regional assessments dashboard pages provides a deterministic scenario for understanding how various factors that affect resources and demand can combine to impact overall resource adequacy. For each assessment area, there is a risk-period scenario graphic; the left blue column shows anticipated resources (from the Demand and Resource Tables), and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand (from the Demand and Resource Tables) and the extreme summer peak demand determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources. Adjustments may include reductions for typical generation outages (maintenance and forced not already accounted for in anticipated resources) and additions that represent the quantified capacity from operational tools (if any) that are available during scarcity conditions but have not been accounted for in the SRA reserve margins. Resources throughout the scenario are compared against expected operating reserve requirements that are based on peak load and normal weather. The cumulative effects from extreme events are also factored in through additional resource derates or low-output scenarios. In addition, results from a probability-based resource adequacy assessment area and provided further insights into the risk conditions forecasted for the summer





MISO

MISO is a not-for profit, member-based organization that administers wholesale electricity markets that provide customers with valued service; reliable, cost-effective systems and operations; dependable and transparent prices; open access to markets; and planning for long-term efficiency. MISO manages energy, reliability, and operating reserve markets that consist of 36 local BA and 394 market participants, serving approximately 42 million customers. Although parts of MISO fall in three Regional Entities, MRO is responsible for coordinating data and information submitted for NERC's reliability assessments.

Highlights

Coal

Solar

■ Nuclear


■ Natural Gas

■ Conventional Hydro

- Demand forecasts and preliminary resource data indicate that MISO is at risk of operating reserve shortfalls during periods of high demand or low resource output. MISO's resources are projected to be lower than in the summer of 2022 while net internal demand has also decreased. Firm transmission imports for this summer have significantly increased; this has resulted in a higher Anticipated Reserve Margin (ARM) of 23% (on an installed capacity basis) compared to 21% last summer. MISO's capacity auction has not concluded at the time of this assessment, which could lead to some change to MISO's firm resources for the summer.
- MISO conducted its annual probabilistic LOLE analysis and determined a 2023 Reference Margin Level (RML) of 15.9% results in an LOLE of 1 day in 10 years. MISO's RML declined from 17.9% in 2022 to 15.9% in 2023 based on the newly implemented seasonal capacity construct and associated modeling improvements that include seasonal outage rates and other enhancements. Comparing the increased ARM to the lower RML indicates improved reliability from the LOLE base case at 1 day in 10 years.
- Performance of wind generators during periods of high electricity demand is a key factor in determining whether system operators need to employ operating mitigations, such as maximum-generation declarations and energy emergencies. MISO has over 30,300 MW of installed wind capacity; however, the historically-based on-peak capacity contribution is 5,488 MW.




Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., load modifying resources and energy transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs. Emergency declarations that can only be called upon when available generation is at maximum capability are necessary to access load modifying resources (demand response) when operating reserve shortfalls are projected.





On-Peak Reserve Margin



- Anticipated Reserve Margin
- Prospective Reserve Margin
- Reference Margin Level

Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast using 30 years of historical data

Maintenance Outages: Rolling five-year summer average of maintenance and planned outages

Forced Outages: Five-year average of all outages that were not planned

Extreme Derates: Maximum historical generation outages

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.4 GW capacity resources available during extreme operating conditions




MRO-Manitoba Hydro

Manitoba Hydro is a provincial Crown Corporation and one of the largest integrated electricity and natural gas distribution utilities in Canada. Manitoba Hydro is a leader in providing renewable energy and clean-burning natural gas Manitoba Hydro provides electricity to approximately 608,500 electric customers in Manitoba and provides approximately 293,000 customers with natural gas in Southern Manitoba. The service area is the province of Manitoba which is 251,000 square miles Manitoba Hydro is winter peaking. Manitoba Hydro is its own Planning Coordinator (PC) and BA. Manitoba Hydro is a coordinating member of MISO. MISO is the RC for Manitoba Hydro.


Highlights


- Manitoba Hydro is not anticipating any operational challenges and/or emerging reliability issues in its assessment area for the summer of 2023.
- The Anticipated Reserve Margin for the summer of 2023 exceeds the 12% Reference Margin Level.
- Six of the seven units at Keeyask Generating Station (hydroelectric) have reached commercial operation status. The remaining unit (Keeyask Unit 6) is listed as a Tier 1 capacity resource as it is operating but awaiting official commercial operation status.
- The 2022 probabilistic work indicated the annual probabilistic indices for the Manitoba Hydro system for 2024 of 29 MWh per year of EUE. Given comparable supply and demand balance, the 2024 EUE is a reasonable estimate for all of 2023.



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: (50/50) Demand with allowance for Extreme Demand based on extreme summer weather scenario of 37 C (99 F)

Forced Outages: Typical forced outages

Extreme Derates: Summer wind capacity accreditation of 18.1% of nameplate rating based on MISO seasonal analysis

Normal hydro generation expected for this summer.

Operational Mitigations: Utilize Curtailable Rate Program to manage peak demand; utilize operating reserve if additional measures required



MRO-SaskPower


MRO-SaskPower is an assessment area in the Saskatchewan province of Canada. The province has a geographic area of 651,900 square kilometers (251,700 square miles) and a population of approximately 1.1 million. Peak demand is experienced in the winter. The Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) is the PC and RC for the province of Saskatchewan and is the principal supplier of electricity in the province. SaskPower is a provincial crown corporation and, under provincial legislation, is responsible for the reliability oversight of the Saskatchewan BES and its Interconnections.


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
- Summer reserve margins in Saskatchewan are higher than in 2022 due to the addition of new wind resources, fewer scheduled generator outages, and lower forecasted peak demand.
- Saskatchewan is a winter-peaking region but also experiences high load in summer during extreme hot weather.
- SaskPower conducts an annual summer joint operating study with Manitoba Hydro and prepares operating guidelines for any identified issues. Inputs from the Western Area Power Administration are included in the study.
- Results from SaskPower's probabilistic analysis indicate that the expected number of hours with operating reserve deficiency for the 2023 summer season (June to September) is 0.21 hours. The month with the highest probability of EEA is September (0.07 hours). The risk of operating reserve shortage during peak load times or EEAs could increase if large generation forced outage combined with planned maintenance outages occurs during peak load times in June, July, August, and September months.
- In case of extreme electricity demand from high temperatures combined with large generation forced outages, SaskPower would use available demand response programs, short-term power transfers from neighboring utilities, and short-term load interruptions if necessary.
- The Reference Reserve Margin was updated to adequately assess energy risks, such as due to changing resource mix, and to align with NERC recommended RRM.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.







- Reference Margin Level

Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and above-normal scenario based on peak demand with lighting and all consumer loads

Maintenance Outages: Average of planned maintenance outages for the last three summers less future planned outages (already considered in Anticipated Resources)

Forced Outages: Estimated by using SaskPower forced outage model

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Low Wind Scenario: 33% reduction in nameplate capacity for temperatures between 35° C and 40° C

Operational Mitigations: Estimated non-firm imports and stand-by generators on 2–7 day notice



NPCC-Maritimes

The Maritimes assessment area is a winter-peaking NPCC area that contains two BAs. It is comprised of the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, and the northern portion of Maine, which is radially connected to the New Brunswick power system. The area covers 58,000 square miles with a total population of 1.9 million.


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
- The Maritimes area has not identified any operational issues that are expected to impact system reliability. If an event were to occur, there are emergency operations and planning procedures in place. All of the area's declared firm capacity is expected to be operational for the summer. As part of the planning process, dual-fuel units will have sufficient supplies of heavy fuel oil on-site to enable sustained operation in the event of natural gas supply interruptions.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, minimal amounts of cumulative LOLE (<0.03 days/period), LOLH (<0.11 hours/period), or EUE (<5 MWh/period) were estimated over the May–September summer period for all modeled scenarios. The Maritimes area is winter peaking. The analysis included simulation of a base case (normal 50/50 demand and expected resources) and a highest peak load scenario as well as a low-likelihood, reduced resource case. This reduced resource case considered the impacts of wind capacity being derated by half during July and August due to calm weather, natural-gas-fired units being derated by half in July and August due to supply disruptions (dual-fuel units assumed to revert to oil) as well as reduced transfer capabilities. The highest load level results were based on the two highest load levels of the seven modeled, having approximately a combined 7% chance of occurring.



Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (above 90/10) extreme demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical operating experience

Extreme Derates: A low-likelihood scenario resulting in an additional 50% derate in the remaining capacity of both natural gas and wind resources under extreme conditions



NPCC-New England

NPCC-New England is an assessment area consisting of the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont that is served by ISO New England (ISO-NE) Inc. ISO-NE is a regional transmission organization that is responsible for the reliable day-to-day operation of New England's bulk power generation and transmission system, administration of the area's wholesale electricity markets, and management of the comprehensive planning of the regional BPS.

The New England BPS serves approximately 14.5 million customers over 68,000 square miles.


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
- Reserve margins in New England are projected to be lower this summer due to less existing-certain capacity and firm imports. The New England area expects to have sufficient capacity to meet the 2023 summer peak demand forecast. As of April 4, 2023, The New England area expects to have sufficient resources to meet the 2023 summer peak demand forecast of 24,664 MW, for the weeks beginning June 4 through week beginning September 10, 2023, with the lowest projected net margin of 231 MW (0.9%) during the week of June 25, 2023. The 2023 summer demand forecast takes into account the demand reductions associated with energy efficiency, load management, behind-the-meter photovoltaic (BTM-PV) systems, and distributed generation.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, ISO-NE may rely on limited use of its operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood case. This reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.12 days/period) with associated LOLHs (0.4 hours/period) and EUE (175 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in June. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM.



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios with local operating procedures. Extreme summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response, transfers, appeals) and EEAs. As noted above, the risk of load shedding is low.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Peak net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance & Forced Outages: Based on historical weekly averages

Extreme Derates: Represent a case that is beyond the (90/10) conditions based on historical observation of force outages, additional reductions for generation at risk due to operating issues at extreme hot temperatures, and other outage causes reported by generators

Operational Mitigations: Based on load and capacity relief assumed available from invocation of ISO-NE operating procedures




NPCC-New York

NPCC-New York is an assessment area consisting of the New York ISO (NYISO) service territory. NYISO is responsible for operating New York's BPS, administering wholesale electricity markets, and conducting system planning. The NYISO is the only BA within the state of New York. The BPS encompasses over 11,000 miles of transmission lines, 760 power generation units, and serves 20.2 million customers. For this SRA, the established Reference Margin Level is 15%. Wind, grid-connected solar PV, and run-of-river totals were derated for this calculation. However, New York requires load-serving entities to procure capacity for their loads equal to their peak demand plus an Installed Reserve Margin (IRM). The IRM requirement represents a percentage of capacity above peak load forecast and is approved annually by the New York State Reliability Council. New York State Reliability Council approved the 2022–2023 IRM at 20.0%.


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
- NYISO is not anticipating any operational issues in the New York control area for the upcoming summer. Adequate capacity margins are anticipated, and existing operating procedures are sufficient to handle any issues that may occur.
- A number of combustion turbine generators will be retiring before or during this summer as a result of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Peaker Rule. Retirements in 2023 include 16 MW of natural-gas-fired, 53 MW of oil-fired, and 558 MW of dual-fueled generation. New generation includes 556 MW of land-based wind, 90 MW of new solar PV (coming in the third quarter), and 136 MW of new offshore wind generation (coming in the third quarter). Overall, the rule is expected to lead to the retirement of approximately 1,600 MW of capacity by 2025.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, NYISO may rely on limited use of its operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood case. This reduced resource case with highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.5 days/period) with associated LOLH (1.1 hours/period) and EUE (525 MWh/period) with the highest risk in June and August. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM.



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) extreme demand forecast

Maintenance Outages:

Forced Outages: Based on historical 5-year averages

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.3 GW based on operational/emergency procedures in area emergency operations manual



NPCC-Ontario

NPCC-Ontario is an assessment area in the Ontario province of Canada. The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is the BA for the province of Ontario. The province of Ontario covers more than 1 million square kilometers (415,000 square miles) and has a population of more than 14 million. Ontario is interconnected electrically with Québec, MRO-Manitoba, states in MISO (Minnesota and Michigan), and NPCC-New York.


Highlights

- Ontario has entered a period during which generation and transmission outages will be increasingly difficult to accommodate. The IESO expects these conditions to persist for the foreseeable future. IESO is strongly encouraging market participants to plan ahead and coordinate with IESO to ensure planned outages can be appropriately scheduled.
- Under both normal and extreme weather conditions, Ontario may rely on imports and outage management for a significant number of weeks during the 2023 summer assessment period primarily as a result of coincident generator outages. Should market participants be unable to reschedule certain outages during this period, Ontario may have to rely on more than 2,000 MW of non-firm supply from other areas and/or additional operating actions to ensure reliability.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, Ontario is expected to need only limited use of its operating procedures that are designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios except the severe low-likelihood cases, which resulted in small LOLH (0.3 hours). These results model import availability and indicate that Ontario will be able to obtain the necessary supplies from neighbors over a range of most conditions, but there is a risk during extreme demand and low resource periods.
- The ongoing transmission outage at the New York–St. Lawrence interconnection continues to impact import and export capacity between Ontario and New York. This issue is expected to be resolved by the end of the fourth quarter of 2023.

On-Peak Reserve Margin 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Anticipated Reserve Margin Prospective Reserve Margin Reference Margin Level

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load or extreme outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and non-firm transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50 Forecast) and highest weather-adjusted daily demand based on 31 years of demand history

Extreme Derates: Derived from weather-adjusted temperature rating of thermal units and adjustments to expected hydro production for low water conditions

Operational Mitigations: Imports anticipated from neighbors during emergencies



NPCC-Québec

The Québec assessment area (Province of Québec) is a winter-peaking NPCC area that covers 595,391 square miles with a population of 8 million. Québec is one of the four Interconnections in North America; it has ties to Ontario, New York, New England, and the Maritimes; consisting of either high voltage direct current ties, radial generation, or load to and from neighboring systems.


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
- The Québec area forecasted summer peak demand (excluding April, May, and September) is 22,859 MW during the week of August 13, 2023, with a forecasted net margin of 7,202 MW (31.5%). No particular resource adequacy problems are forecasted, and the Québec area expects to be able to provide assistance to other areas up to the transfer capability available.
- In the Québec RC area, most transmission line, transformer, and generating unit maintenance is done during the summer period. Internal transmission outage plans are assessed to meet internal demand, firm sales, expected additional sales, and additional uncertainty margins. They should not impact inter-area transfer capabilities with neighboring systems. During the 2023 summer operating period, some maintenance outages are scheduled on the interconnections. Maintenance is coordinated with neighboring RC areas so as to leave maximum capability to summer-peaking areas.
- Based on an NPCC Probabilistic Assessment, Québec is expected to need only limited use of its operating procedures designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases.



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenario: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Net Firm Transfers: Anticipated exports to neighbors during the risk hour



PJM


PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. PJM serves 65 million customers and covers 369,089 square miles. PJM is a BA, PC, Transmission Planner, Resource Planner, Interchange Authority, TOP, Transmission Service Provider, and RC.


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
- PJM expects no resource problems over the entire 2023 summer peak season. Installed capacity is over twice the PJM reserve requirement necessary to meet the 1-day-in-10-years LOLE criterion.
- The 2022 PJM reserve requirement study used to establish the target installed reserve margin of 14.9% analyzed a wide range of load scenarios (low, regular and extreme) as well as multiple scenarios for system-wide unavailable capacity due to forced outages, maintenance outages, and ambient derations. Due to the rather low penetration of limited and variable resources in PJM relative to PJM's peak load, the hour with most loss of load risk remains the hour with highest forecasted net peak demand.
- No other reliability issues are expected.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Based on historical data and trending

Extreme Derates: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 2.5 GW based on operational/emergency procedures




SERC-Central

SERC-Central is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Central includes all of Tennessee and portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Kentucky. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-Central is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC-Central is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 Planning Authorities (PA), and 6 RCs.


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
- Entities in SERC-Central have not identified any potential reliability issues for the upcoming summer season. Entities anticipate having adequate system capacity for the upcoming summer season and are equipped to address unexpected short-term issues by leveraging diverse generation portfolios and spot purchases from the power markets when necessary.
- Non-economic dispatch (out of merit) of available coal-fired generators ahead of the upcoming summer season is anticipated in order to build inventory and limit consumption of fuel and consumables for plant operations and mitigate supply and transportation challenges during the summer.
- Each entity continues to work collaboratively to ensure reliability for its area within SERC and to promote reliability and adequacy across the entire SERC Regional Entity.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups among others. These working groups help the entities identify and address emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis indicates negligible risk for resource shortfall. The 2022 study found negligible LOLH and EUE during summer months for a similar resource mix and demand levels.



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.9 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-East


SERC-East is an assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-East includes North Carolina and South Carolina. Historically a summer-peaking area, SERC-East is beginning to have higher peak demand forecasts in winter. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 PAs, and 6 RCs.


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
- SERC-East is transitioning to a hybrid-peaking (both summer and winter peaking) area as solar PV reduces summer peak demand and electrification of heating drives up winter peak demand.
- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.
- Entities continue to perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and to maintain reliability to the system.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis shows a low risk for resource shortfall during the months of July and August. The 2022 study found LOLH of 0.005 hours and EUE of 2.381 MWh during summer months for a similar resource mix and demand levels.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 1.5 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-Florida Peninsula

SERC-Florida Peninsula is a summer-peaking assessment area within SERC. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the Southeastern and Central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 PAs, and 6 RCs.


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
- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues or operational concerns for the upcoming summer season.
- Entities continue to perform resource studies to ensure resource adequacy to meet the summer peak demand and to maintain system reliability.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC Near-Term and Long-Term Working Groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- SERC probabilistic analysis indicates negligible risk for resource shortfall. The 2022 study found negligible LOLH and EUE during summer months for a similar resource mix and demand levels



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.8 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SERC-Southeast

SERC-Southeast is a summer-peaking assessment area within the SERC Regional Entity. SERC-Southeast includes all or portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. SERC is one of the six companies across North America that are responsible for the work under FERC approved delegation agreements with NERC. SERC is specifically responsible for the reliability and security of the electric grid across the southeastern and central areas of the United States. This area covers approximately 630,000 square miles and serves a population of more than 91 million. The SERC Regional Entity includes 36 BAs, 28 Planning Authorities, and 6 RCs.

Highlights


- Entities have not identified any emerging reliability issues for the upcoming summer season that will impact resource adequacy.
- The available system capacity for the upcoming summer season meets or exceeds the reserve margin target. Reliability is supported by a diverse fuel mix, firm natural gas contracts, and power purchases.
- Entities continue to participate actively in the SERC near-term and long-term working groups. These groups identify emerging and potential reliability impacts on transmission and resource adequacy along with transfer capability.
- Probabilistic analysis indicates almost no risk for resource shortfall.




Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios.



On-Peak Reserve Margin





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand forecast based on extreme summer weather (equals or exceeds the (90/10) demand forecast)

Maintenance Outages: Adjusted for higher outages resulting from extreme summer temperatures and aggregated on a SERC subregional level

Forced Outages: Accounts for reduced thermal capacity contributions due to performance in extreme conditions

Extreme Derates: Estimated resources unavailable in extreme conditions

Operational Mitigations: A total of 3.0 GW based on operational/emergency procedures



SPP


SPP PC footprint covers 546,000 square miles and encompasses all or parts of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. The SPP long-term assessment is reported based on the Planning Coordinator footprint, which touches parts of the Midwest Reliability Organization Regional Entity and the WECC Regional Entity. The SPP assessment area footprint has approximately 61,000 miles of transmission lines, 756 generating plants, and 4,811 transmission-class substations, and it serves a population of more than 18 million.


Highlights


- At this time, SPP projects a low likelihood of any emerging reliability issues impacting the area for the 2023 summer season.
- BA generation capacity deficiency risks remain depending on wind generation output levels and unanticipated generation outages in combination with high load periods.
- SPP performed a statistical analysis of risk of energy emergencies for the upcoming summer based on historical data. They found it likely that operators would use part of the 2 GW operating reserves and issue EEA1 and EEA2 level approximately one day each summer; it is likely that operators would deplete all operating reserves approximately once every five summers, resulting in an EEA3.
- Using the current operational processes and procedures, SPP will continue to assess the needs for the 2023 summer season and will adjust as needed to ensure that real-time reliability is maintained throughout the summer time frame.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources are sufficient to meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand and outage scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e. demand response and transfers from neighboring systems) and EEAs.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand is a 5% increase from net internal demand

Maintenance & Forced Outages: Represent 5-year historical averages; calculated from SPP's generation assessment process

Extreme Derates: Additional unavailable capacity from operational data at high demand periods

Low Wind Scenario: Derates reflecting a low-wind day in the summer



Texas RE-ERCOT


The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is the ISO for the ERCOT Interconnection and is located entirely in the state of Texas; it operates as a single BA. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers retail switching for nearly 8 million premises in competitive choice areas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. ERCOT is summer-peaking. It covers approximately 200,000 square miles, connects over 52,700 miles of transmission lines, has over 1,100 generation units, and serves more than 26 million customers. Texas RE is responsible for the RE functions described in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 for ERCOT. On November 3, 2022, the Public Utility Commission of Texas issued an order directing ERCOT to assume the duties and responsibilities of the Reliability Monitor for the Texas power grid.


Highlights


- Given an Anticipated Reserve Margin of 23% and Reference Reserve Margin of 13.75%, ERCOT expects to have sufficient operating reserves in expected normal summer system conditions.
- Solar PV nameplate capacity expected for the 2023 summer season is 4.4 GW higher than the forecast amount reported for the 2022 SRA.
- Several generator owners in the ERCOT area indicated they could run out of NOx emission allowances by July 2023 under U.S. EPA's Good Neighbor Plan. Texas filed a motion to stay the EPA's regulatory action. A delay in implementation has alleviated these concerns. ERCOT's probabilistic risk assessment indicates a low probability of energy emergency conditions during the summer peak load period, but the risk increases into the early evening hours due reductions of solar PV generation. There is a 4% probability that ERCOT will declare an EEA1 during the expected daily peak load hour increasing up to 19% probability at the highest risk hour ending at 8:00 p.m.
- System stability and strength stemming from the growth of IBRs remains a concern. ERCOT is also experiencing large increases in renewable production curtailments due to transmission constraints, and these curtailments are increasingly occurring at solar PV sites.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal and extreme peak-demand scenarios. Extreme generator outages combined with low-wind output during extreme peak demand could result in the need to employ operating mitigations such as demand response, EEAs, and localized load shedding.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and extreme demand represents weather conditions 2% worse than summer peak in 2011

Forced Outages: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last three (2019–2021) summer seasons

Low Wind Scenario: Based on the 10th percentile of historical averages of hourly wind for June through September, hours ending 1:00–9:00 p.m. local time

Extreme Derates: Based on the 95th percentile of historical averages of forced outages for June through September weekdays, hours ending 3:00–8:00 p.m. local time for the last five (2019–2021) summer seasons

Operational Mitigations: Additional capacity from switchable generation and additional imports



WECC-AB

WECC-AB (Alberta) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of Alberta, Canada. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


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
- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- There is 35% less coal-fired generator capacity in Alberta compared to last summer (446 MW). Resource additions include 554 MW of natural-gas-fired generation, 336 MW of new solar PV resources, and 1,350 MW of new wind generation.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-AB assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.



Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under the assessed scenarios





Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Typical Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) point of resource performance distribution



WECC-BC


WECC-British Columbia (BC) is a winter-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that consists of the province of British Columbia, Canada. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- BC shows adequate reserve margins to meet demand under extreme conditions.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-BC assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- BC is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m., under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under the extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at peak demand hour

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) and (90/10) demand forecast

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) resource performance distribution at peak hour



WECC-CA/MX


WECC-CA/MX is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity that includes parts of California, Nevada, and Baja California, Mexico. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights

- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- CA/MX shows adequate reserve margins under expected conditions on the peak hour. However, increased risk occurs during the hours after peak demand and into the evening due to the variability of energy availability. CA/MX is typically reliant on imports during these periods.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, WECC-CA/MX is projected to have negligible-to-low amounts of LOLH (<0.5 hours) this summer. Variation in LOLH is attributable to the amount of Tier 1 resources that connect before the later months.
- CA/MX is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.
- For the peak riskiest hour ending 8:00 pm (four hours later than the peak) under an extreme summer peak load, CA/MX would need to rely on increased imports to maintain adequate reserves. Under expected net internal demand for the same riskiest hour (not an extreme summer peak for that hour), any of the typical outages or extreme derates would also cause a need for increased reliance on imports.



Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios studied.





On-Peak Reserve Margin

Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy at 8:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Estimated using market forced outage model

Extreme Derates: On natural gas units based on historic data and manufacturer data for temperature performance and outages



WECC-NW


WECC-NW is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. The area includes Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and parts of California, Nebraska, Nevada, and South Dakota. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada, the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico as well as all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


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
- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- NW shows adequate reserve margins under expected conditions on the peak hour. However, NW shows increased risk a few hours later during the peak riskiest hour, due to the variability of energy availability later in the evenings. NW would be reliant on increased imports.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-NW assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- WECC-NW would need to rely on imports to maintain adequate reserves on the peak riskiest hour (five hours later at 9:00 p.m.) under an extreme summer peak load and either
 extreme thermal or extreme hydro derates or any combination of two other extreme derate scenarios.

Risk Scenario Summary

Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

- **Risk Period:** Highest risk for unserved energy at 9:00 p.m. local time as solar PV output is diminished and demand remains high
- Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour
- Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages
- Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario
- Low Hydro Scenario: Reduced hydro availability resulting from drought conditions



WECC-SW


WECC-SW is a summer-peaking assessment area in the WECC Regional Entity. It includes Arizona, New Mexico, and part of California and Texas. WECC is responsible for coordinating and promoting BES reliability in the Western Interconnection. WECC's 329 members include 39 BAs, representing a wide spectrum of organizations with an interest in the BES. Serving an area of nearly 1.8 million square miles and more than 82 million customers, it is geographically the largest and most diverse Regional Entity. WECC's service territory extends from Canada to Mexico. It includes the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia in Canada as well as the northern portion of Baja California in Mexico and all or portions of the 14 Western United States in between.


Highlights


- The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into the summer of 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events.
- WECC-SW shows adequate reserve margins to meet demand under extreme conditions.
- Based on a WECC Probabilistic Assessment, the WECC-SW assessment area had negligible LOLH and EUE.
- WECC-SW is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 5:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined as a one-in-ten probability at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.



Expected resources meet operating reserve requirements under normal peak-demand scenarios. Above-normal summer peak load and outage conditions could result in the need to employ operating mitigations (i.e., demand response and transfers) and EEAs. Load shedding may be needed under extreme peak demand and outage scenarios.







Scenario Description (See Data Concepts and Assumptions)

Risk Period: Highest risk for unserved energy occurs at the hour of peak demand (5:00 p.m. local)

Demand Scenarios: Net internal demand (50/50) at risk hour and (90/10) demand forecast at risk hour

Forced Outages: Average seasonal outages

Extreme Derates: Using (90/10) scenario

Data Concepts and Assumptions

The table below explains data concepts and important assumptions used throughout this assessment.

General Assumptions

- Reliability of the interconnected BPS is comprised of both adequacy and operating reliability:
 - Adequacy is the ability of the electricity system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity consumers at all times while taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.
 - Operating reliability is the ability of the electricity system to withstand sudden disturbances, such as electric short-circuits or unanticipated loss of system components.
- The reserve margin calculation is an important industry planning metric used to examine future resource adequacy.
- All data in this assessment is based on existing federal, state, and provincial laws and regulations.
- Differences in data collection periods for each assessment area should be considered when comparing demand and capacity data between year-to-year seasonal assessments.
- 2022 Long-Term Reliability Assessment data has been used for most of this 2023 summer assessment period augmented by updated load and capacity data.
- A positive net transfer capability would indicate a net importing assessment area; a negative value would indicate a net exporter.

Demand Assumptions

- Electricity demand projections, or load forecasts, are provided by each assessment area.
- Load forecasts include peak hourly load¹⁰ or total internal demand for the summer and winter of each year.¹¹
- Total internal demand projections are based on normal weather (50/50 distribution¹²) and are provided on a coincident¹³ basis for most assessment areas.
- Net internal demand is used in all reserve margin calculations, and it is equal to total internal demand then reduced by the amount of controllable and dispatchable demand response projected to be available during the peak hour.

Resource Assumptions

Resource planning methods vary throughout the North American BPS. NERC uses the categories below to provide a consistent approach for collecting and presenting resource adequacy. Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, their contribution to reserve margins and other on-peak resource adequacy analysis is less than their nameplate capacity.

Anticipated Resources:

- Existing-Certain Capacity: Included in this category are commercially operable generating unit or portions of generating units that meet at least one of the following requirements when examining the period of peak demand for the summer season: unit must have a firm capability and have a power purchase agreement with firm transmission that must be in effect for the unit; unit must be classified as a designated network resource; and/or where energy-only markets exist, unit must be a designated market resource eligible to bid into the market.
- Tier 1 Capacity Additions: This category includes capacity that either is under construction or has received approved planning requirements.
- Net Firm Capacity Transfers (Imports minus Exports): This category includes transfers with firm contracts.

¹⁰ Glossary of Terms used in NERC Reliability Standards

¹¹ The summer season represents June–September and the winter season represents December–February.

¹² Essentially, this means that there is a 50% probability that actual demand will be higher and a 50% probability that actual demand will be lower than the value provided for a given season/year.

¹³ Coincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads that occur in the same hour. Noncoincident: This is the sum of two or more peak loads on individual systems that do not occur in the same time interval; this is meaningful only when considering loads within a limited period of time, such as a day, a week, a month, a heating or cooling season, and usually for not more than one year. SERC and FRCC calculate total internal demand on a noncoincidental basis.

Prospective Resources: Includes all anticipated resources plus the following:

Existing-Other Capacity: Included in this category are commercially operable generating units or portions of generating units that could be available to serve load for the period of peak demand for the season but do not meet the requirements of existing-certain.

Reserve Margin Descriptions

Planning Reserve Margin: This is the primary metric used to measure resource adequacy; it is defined as the difference in resources (anticipated or prospective) and net internal demand then divided by net internal demand and shown as a percentage.

Reference Margin Level: The assumptions and naming convention of this metric vary by assessment area. The Reference Margin Level can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic (based on a 0.1/year loss of load study) approaches. In both cases, this metric is used by system planners to quantify the amount of reserve capacity in the system above the forecasted peak demand that is needed to ensure sufficient supply to meet peak loads. Establishing a Reference Margin Level is necessary to account for long-term factors of uncertainty involved in system planning, such as unexpected generator outages and extreme weather impacts that could lead to increase demand beyond what was projected in the 50/50 load forecasted. In many assessment areas, a Reference Margin Level is established by a state, provincial authority, ISO/RTO, or other regulatory body. In some cases, the Reference Margin Level is a requirement. Reference Margin Levels may be different for the summer and winter seasons. If a Reference Margin Level is not provided by an assessment area, NERC applies 15% for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro systems.

Seasonal Risk Scenario Chart Description

Each assessment area performed an operational risk analysis that was used to produce the seasonal risk scenario charts in the Regional Assessments Dashboards. The chart presents deterministic scenarios for further analysis of different resource and demand levels: The left blue column shows anticipated resources, and the two orange columns at the right show the two demand scenarios of the normal peak net internal demand and the extreme summer peak demand—both determined by the assessment area. The middle red or green bars show adjustments that are applied cumulatively to the anticipated resources, such as the following:

- Reductions for typical generation outages (i.e., maintenance and forced outages that are not already accounted for in anticipated resources)
- Reductions that represent additional outage or performance derating by resource type for extreme, low-probability conditions (e.g., drought condition impacts on hydroelectric generation, low-wind scenario affecting wind generation, fuel supply limitations, or extreme temperature conditions that result in reduced thermal generation output)
- Additional capacity resources that represent quantified capacity from operational procedures, if any, that are made available during scarcity conditions

Not all assessment areas have the same categories of adjustments to anticipated resources. Furthermore, each assessment area determined the adjustments to capacity based on methods or assumptions that are summarized below the chart. Methods and assumptions differ by assessment area and may not be comparable.

The chart enables evaluation of resource levels against levels of expected operating reserve requirement and the forecasted demand. Furthermore, the effects from extreme events can also be examined by comparing resource levels after applying extreme-scenario derates and/or extreme summer peak demand.

Resource Adequacy

The Anticipated Reserve Margin, which is based on available resource capacity, is a metric used to evaluate resource adequacy by comparing the projected capability of anticipated resources to serve forecast peak demand. Large year-to-year changes in anticipated resources or forecast peak demand (net internal demand) can greatly impact Planning Reserve Margin calculations. All assessment areas have sufficient Anticipated Reserve Margins to meet or exceed their Reference Margin Level for the 2023 summer as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Summer 2023 Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins Compared to Reference Margin Level

¹⁴ Generally, anticipated resources include generators and firm capacity transfers that are expected to be available to serve load during electrical peak loads for the season. Prospective resources are those that could be available but do not meet criteria to be counted as anticipated resources. Refer to the Data Concepts and Assumptions section for additional information on Anticipated/Prospective Reserve Margins, anticipated/prospective resources, and Reference Margin Levels.

Changes from Year-to-Year

Figure 5 provides the relative change in the forecast Anticipated Reserve Margins from the 2022 summer to the 2023 summer. A significant decline can indicate potential operational issues that emerge between reporting years. NPCC-Ontario, SPP and WECC-BC have noticeable reductions in anticipated resources with NPCC-Ontario close to falling below its Reference Margin Level for the 2023 summer. NPCC-Ontario is experiencing ongoing nuclear refurbishments and recent retirements will make it difficult to accommodate unplanned generator or transmission outages. NPCC-Ontario will rely on demand response and transfers from neighbors during a higher load scenario to avoid load interruption. The lower Anticipated Reserve Margins for NPCC-Maritimes, NPCC-Québec, SERC-C, and WECC-AB do not present reliability concerns on peak for this upcoming summer. Additional details for each assessment area are provided in the Data Concepts and Assumptions and Regional Assessments Dashboards sections.




Figure 5: Summer 2022 and Summer 2023 Anticipated Reserve Margins Year-to-Year Change

Net Internal Demand

The changes in forecasted Net Internal Demand for each assessment area are shown in Figure 6.15 Assessment areas develop these forecasts based on historic load and weather information as well as other long-term projections.




Figure 6: Change in Net Internal Demand—Summer 2022 Forecast Compared to Summer 2023 Forecast

¹⁵ Changes in modeling and methods may also contribute to year-to-year changes in forecasted net internal demand projections.

Demand and Resource Tables

Peak demand and supply capacity data—resource adequacy data—for each assessment area are as follows in each table (in alphabetical order).

MISO MISO				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	124,506	123,728	-0.6%	
Demand Response: Available	6,287	6,903	9.8%	
Net Internal Demand	118,220	116,825	-1.2%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	141,844	140,650	-0.8%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	1	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,353	3,018	123.1%	
Anticipated Resources	143,197	143,668	0.3%	
Existing-Other Capacity	669	668	-0.1%	
Prospective Resources	149,756	151,579	1.2%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	21.1%	23.0%	1.8	
Prospective Reserve Margin	26.7%	29.7%	3.1	
Reference Margin Level	17.9%	15.9%	-2.0	

MRO-SaskPower					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins 2022 SRA 2023 SRA 2022 vs. 2023 SRA					
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,656	3,539	-3.2%		
Demand Response: Available	60	50	-16.7%		
Net Internal Demand	3,596	3,489	-3.0%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	3,743	4,213	12.6%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	290	290	0.0%		
Anticipated Resources	4,033	4,503	11.7%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	4,033	4,503	11.7%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	12.2%	29.1%	16.9		
Prospective Reserve Margin	12.2%	29.1%	16.9		
Reference Margin Level	11.0%	15.0%	4.0		

MRO-Manitoba Hydro						
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins 2022 SRA 2023 SRA 2022 vs. 2023 SRA						
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)			
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,059	3,060	0.0%			
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-			
Net Internal Demand	3,059	3,060	0.0%			
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)			
Existing-Certain Capacity	5,523	5,731	3.8%			
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	186	91	-50.9%			
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-1,816	-1,872	3.1%			
Anticipated Resources	3,893	3,950	1.5%			
Existing-Other Capacity	44	34	-23.4%			
Prospective Resources	3,937	3,984	1.2%			
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference			
Anticipated Reserve Margin	27.3%	29.1%	1.8			
Prospective Reserve Margin	28.7%	30.2%	1.5			
Reference Margin Level	12.0%	12.0%	0.0			

NPCC-Maritimes				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	3,475	3,612	3.9%	
Demand Response: Available	255	328	28.6%	
Net Internal Demand	3,220	3,284	2.0%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	4,419	4,834	9.4%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	64	81	26.6%	
Anticipated Resources	4,483	4,915	9.6%	
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-	
Prospective Resources	4,483	4,915	9.6%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	39.2%	49.7%	10.4	
Prospective Reserve Margin	39.2%	49.7%	10.4	
Reference Margin Level	20.0%	20.0%	0.0	

NPCC-New England					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins 2022 SRA 2023 SRA 2022 vs. 2023 SRA					
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	25,300	25,111	-0.7%		
Demand Response: Available	483	447	-7.5%		
Net Internal Demand	24,817	24,664	-0.6%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	28,626	27,997	-2.2%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,292	1,030	-20.3%		
Anticipated Resources	29,918	29,027	-3.0%		
Existing-Other Capacity	911	872	-4.3%		
Prospective Resources	30,829	29,899	-3.0%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.6%	17.7%	-2.9		
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.2%	21.2%	-3.0		
Reference Margin Level	14.3%	12.0%	-2.3		

NPCC-New York				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	31,765	32,049	0.9%	
Demand Response: Available	1,170	1,226	4.8%	
Net Internal Demand	30,595	30,823	0.7%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	37,431	37,216	-0.6%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,465	2,932	18.9%	
Anticipated Resources	39,896	40,148	0.6%	
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-	
Prospective Resources	39,896	40,148	0.6%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.4%	30.3%	-0.1	
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.4%	30.3%	-0.1	
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0	

NPCC-Ontario				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,546	22,439	-0.5%	
Demand Response: Available	666	687	3.1%	
Net Internal Demand	21,880	21,752	-0.6%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	25,648	24,575	-4.2%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	24	9	-61.5%	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	150	223	48.5%	
Anticipated Resources	25,822	24,807	-3.9%	
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-	
Prospective Resources	25,822	24,807	-3.9%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.0%	14.0%	-4.0	
Prospective Reserve Margin	18.0%	14.0%	-4.0	
Reference Margin Level	13.3%	13.2%	0.0	

NPCC-Québec					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	22,271	22,859	2.6%		
Demand Response: Available	0	0	=		
Net Internal Demand	22,271	22,859	2.6%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	33,542	33,690	0.4%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-2,304	-2,353	2.1%		
Anticipated Resources	31,238	31,337	0.3%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	31,238	31,337	0.3%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	40.3%	37.1%	-3.2		
Prospective Reserve Margin	40.3%	37.1%	-3.2		
Reference Margin Level	10.3%	11.0%	0.7		

РЈМ					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	148,938	149,059	0.1%		
Demand Response: Available	8,527	7,288	-14.5%		
Net Internal Demand	140,411	141,771	1.0%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	184,837	186,540	0.9%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	10	0	-100.0%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	124	463	273.4%		
Anticipated Resources	184,971	187,003	1.1%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	185,095	187,466	1.3%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.7%	31.9%	0.2		
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.8%	32.2%	0.4		
Reference Margin Level	14.9%	14.9%	0.0		

SERC-Central				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	41,267	42,223	2.3%	
Demand Response: Available	1,841	1,910	3.7%	
Net Internal Demand	39,426	40,313	2.2%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	47,424	46,964	-1.0%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	93	-	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-795	1,068	-	
Anticipated Resources	46,629	47,556	2.0%	
Existing-Other Capacity	4,808	2,313	-51.9%	
Prospective Resources	51,437	49,868	-3.0%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.3%	18.0%	-0.3	
Prospective Reserve Margin	30.5%	23.7%	-6.8	
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0	

SERC-East				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	42,883	43,889	2.3%	
Demand Response: Available	1,298	1,008	-22.3%	
Net Internal Demand	41,585	42,881	3.1%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	49,380	50,452	2.2%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	486	0	-100.0%	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	612	624	2.0%	
Anticipated Resources	50,478	51,076	1.2%	
Existing-Other Capacity	1,097	1,182	7.8%	
Prospective Resources	51,575	52,258	1.3%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	21.4%	19.1%	-2.3	
Prospective Reserve Margin	24.0%	21.9%	-2.2	
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0	

SERC-Florida Peninsula					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA 2023 SRA 2022 vs. 2023 SI				
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,172	52,195	0.0%		
Demand Response: Available	2,932	2,898	-1.2%		
Net Internal Demand	49,240	49,297	0.1%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	56,571	60,074	6.2%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	2,540	1,742	-31.4%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	300	589	96.3%		
Anticipated Resources	59,411	62,405	5.0%		
Existing-Other Capacity	847	776	-8.4%		
Prospective Resources	60,258	63,181	4.9%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	20.7%	26.6%	5.9		
Prospective Reserve Margin	22.4%	28.2%	5.8		
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0		

SERC-Southeast					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 vs. 2023 SRA				
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	47,258	46,127	-2.4%		
Demand Response: Available	1,946	2,010	3.3%		
Net Internal Demand	45,312	44,117	-2.6%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	59,828	59,559	-0.4%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,514	2,865	89.3%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-2,524	-815	-67.7%		
Anticipated Resources	58,818	61,609	4.7%		
Existing-Other Capacity	859	908	5.7%		
Prospective Resources	59,677	62,517	4.8%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	29.8%	39.6%	9.8		
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.7%	41.7%	10.0		
Reference Margin Level	15.0%	15.0%	0.0		

Texas RE-ERCOT					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	77,317	82,307	6.5%		
Demand Response: Available	2,856	3,380	18.3%		
Net Internal Demand	74,461	78,927	6.0%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	89,603	94,580	5.6%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,199	2,445	103.9%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	20	20	0.0%		
Anticipated Resources	90,822	97,045	6.9%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	=		
Prospective Resources	90,850	97,073	6.9%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	22.0%	23.0%	1.0		
Prospective Reserve Margin	22.0%	23.0%	1.0		
Reference Margin Level	13.75%	13.75%	0.0		

SPP					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	52,040	53,468	2.7%		
Demand Response: Available	658	842	27.9%		
Net Internal Demand	51,382	52,626	2.4%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	67,245	65,821	-2.1%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	0	0	-		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	-144	-238	65.0%		
Anticipated Resources	67,101	65,583	-2.3%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	66,554	65,036	-2.3%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	30.6%	24.6%	-6.0		
Prospective Reserve Margin	29.5%	23.6%	-5.9		
Reference Margin Level	16.0%	19.0%	3.0		

WECC-AB					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	11,228	11,206	-0.2%		
Demand Response: Available	0	0	=		
Net Internal Demand	11,228	11,206	-0.2%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,926	13,759	15.4%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,082	227	-79.0%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	437	0	-100.0%		
Anticipated Resources	13,445	13,986	4.0%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	13,445	13,986	4.0%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	19.7%	24.8%	5.1		
Prospective Reserve Margin	19.7%	24.8%	5.1		
Reference Margin Level	10.1%	9.9%	-0.2		

WECC-BC					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	8,088	8,636	6.8%		
Demand Response: Available	0	0	-		
Net Internal Demand	8,088	8,636	6.8%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	11,266	11,135	-1.2%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	3	0	-100.0%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	ı		
Anticipated Resources	11,269	11,135	-1.2%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	11,269	11,135	-1.2%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	39.3%	28.9%	-10.4		
Prospective Reserve Margin	39.3%	28.9%	-10.4		
Reference Margin Level	16.3%	14.4%	-1.9		

WECC-SW				
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA	
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	26,720	25,992	-2.7%	
Demand Response: Available	399	380	-4.7%	
Net Internal Demand	26,321	25,612	-2.7%	
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)	
Existing-Certain Capacity	28,249	26,206	-7.2%	
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	1,369	1,655	20.9%	
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	1,002	2,747	174.2%	
Anticipated Resources	30,620	30,608	0.0%	
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	=	
Prospective Resources	30,620	30,608	0.0%	
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference	
Anticipated Reserve Margin	16.3%	19.5%	3.2	
Prospective Reserve Margin	16.3%	19.5%	3.2	
Reference Margin Level	10.2%	10.8%	0.6	

WECC-CA/MX					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	57,269	56,356	-1.6%		
Demand Response: Available	844	862	2.2%		
Net Internal Demand	56,425	55,494	-1.7%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	70,791	69,408	-2.0%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	3,381	5,522	63.3%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	0	0	-		
Anticipated Resources	74,172	74,930	1.0%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	=		
Prospective Resources	74,172	74,930	1.0%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	31.5%	35.0%	3.6		
Prospective Reserve Margin	31.5%	35.0%	3.6		
Reference Margin Level	16.9%	16.8%	-0.1		

WECC-NW					
Demand, Resource, and Reserve Margins	2022 SRA	2023 SRA	2022 vs. 2023 SRA		
Demand Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Total Internal Demand (50/50)	63,214	66,366	5.0%		
Demand Response: Available	1,104	1,038	-6.0%		
Net Internal Demand	62,110	65,328	5.2%		
Resource Projections	MW	MW	Net Change (%)		
Existing-Certain Capacity	70,154	76,587	9.2%		
Tier 1 Planned Capacity	798	2,350	194.5%		
Net Firm Capacity Transfers	2,517	5,004	98.8%		
Anticipated Resources	73,469	83,941	14.3%		
Existing-Other Capacity	0	0	-		
Prospective Resources	73,469	83,941	14.3%		
Reserve Margins	Percent (%)	Percent (%)	Annual Difference		
Anticipated Reserve Margin	18.3%	28.5%	10.2		
Prospective Reserve Margin	18.3%	28.5%	10.2		
Reference Margin Level	16.1%	16.3%	0.2		

Variable Energy Resource Contributions

Because the electrical output of variable energy resources (e.g., wind, solar PV) depends on weather conditions, on-peak capacity contributions are less than nameplate capacity. The following table shows the capacity contribution of existing wind and solar PV resources at the peak demand hour for each assessment area. Resource contributions are also aggregated by Interconnection and across the entire BPS. For NERC's analysis of risk periods after peak demand (i.e., U.S. assessment areas in WECC), lower contributions of solar PV resources are used because output is diminished during evening periods.

BPS Variable Energy Resources by Assessment Area									
	Wind			Solar			Hydro		
Assessment Area / Interconnection	Nameplate	Expected	Expected Share of	Nameplate	Expected	Expected Share of	Nameplate	Expected	Expected Share of
Assessment Area / interconnection	Wind	Wind	Nameplate (%)	Solar PV	Solar PV	Nameplate (%)	Hydro	Hydro	Nameplate (%)
MISO	30,373	5,488	18%	7,499	3,750	50%	4,884	4,688	96%
MRO-Manitoba Hydro	259	47	18%	-	-	0%	6,220	5,548	89%
MRO-SaskPower	615	203	33%	30	-	0%	851	797	94%
NPCC-Maritimes	1,212	255	21%	4	-	0%	1,315	1,183	90%
NPCC-New England	1,448	186	13%	2,914	1,163	40%	3,565	2,472	69%
NPCC-New York	2,879	331	12%	179	84	47%	6,731	5,067	75%
NPCC-Ontario	4,943	771	16%	478	126	26%	8,985	5,185	58%
NPCC-Québec	3,880	-	0%	10	-	0%	40,307	32,974	82%
PJM	10,923	1,688	15%	5,169	2,984	58%	3,027	3,027	100%
SERC-Central	1,206	564	47%	885	511	58%	4,967	3,315	67%
SERC-East	-	-	0%	1,475	1,473	99%	3,064	3,013	98%
SERC-Florida Peninsula	-	-	0%	7,724	4,534	59%	1	1	0%
SERC-Southeast	-	-	0%	5,305	4,647	88%	3,242	3,288	101%
SPP	32,028	4,500	14%	440	378	86%	5,465	4,996	91%
Texas RE-ERCOT	30,938	10,293	33%	15,958	12,509	78%	563	477	85%
WECC-AB	3,619	309	9%	1,165	763	65%	894	416	47%
WECC-BC	747	137	18%	2	1	50%	16,519	10,124	61%
WECC-CA/MX	9,362	1,111	12%	21,975	14,489	66%	13,957	4,606	33%
WECC-SW	2,994	593	20%	3,493	1,411	40%	1,202	844	70%
WECC-NW	20,296	3,968	20%	9,270	5,062	55%	41,860	22,752	54%
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION	85,886	14,032	16%	32,102	19,649	61%	52,316	42,578	81%
QUÉBEC INTERCONNECTION	3,880	-	0%	10	_	0%	40,307	32,974	82%
TEXAS INTERCONNECTION	30,938	10,293	33%	15,958	12,509	78%	563	477	85%
WECC INTERCONNECTION	37,018	6,118	17%	35,905	21,726	61%	74,432	38,742	52%
INTERCONNECTION TOTAL:	157,722	30,443	19%	83,975	53,885	64%	167,618	114,771	68%

Probabilistic Assessment

Regional Entities and assessment areas provided a resource adequacy risk assessment that was probability-based for the summer season. Results are included in the Highlights section of each assessment area's dashboard and summarized in the table below. The risk assessments account for the hour(s) of greatest risk of resource shortfall. For most areas, the hour(s) of risk coincide with the time of forecasted peak demand; however, some areas incur the greatest risk at other times based on the varying demand and resource profiles. Various risk metrics are provided and include LOLE, LOLH, EUE, and the probabilities of EEA occurrence.

		Probability-Based Risk Assessment
Assessment Area	Type of Assessment	Results and Insight From Assessment
MISO	Annual probabilistic LOLE study	MISO's RML decreased from 17.9% in 2022 to 15.9% for Summer 2023. The change results from implementing seasonal forced outages and probabilistic distributions of non-firm imports. Operating mitigations are needed in extreme peak summer conditions.
MRO-Manitoba	Verification of NERC 2022 Probabilistic Assessment (2022 ProbA)	The 2022 ProbA results indicate 29 MWh per year of EUE for 2024. Given comparable supply and demand balance, the 2024 EUE is a reasonable estimate for all of 2023. EUE for summer is less than the annual EUE.
MRO-SaskPower	Probability-based capacity adequacy assessment	Results indicate that the expected number of hours with operating reserve deficiency for the 2023 summer season (June to September) is 0.21 hours. September is the month with highest risk.
NPCC	NPCC conducted an all-hour Probabilistic Assessment that consisted of a base case and several more severe scenarios examining low resources, reduced imports, and higher loads. The highest peak load scenario has a 7% probability of occurring.	The assessment forecasts that the NPCC Regional Entity will have an adequate supply of electricity this summer. Necessary strategies and procedures are in place to deal with operational challenges and emergencies as they may develop. Results of the probabilistic analysis by assessment area are below.
NPCC-Maritimes		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Maritimes is likely to use a combination of imports and operating procedures to mitigate resource shortages this summer. Cumulative LOLE (<0.03 days/summer), LOLH (<0.11 hours/summer), or EUE (<5 MWh/summer) were estimated over the May–September summer for all modeled scenarios.
NPCC-New England		NPCC's assessment results indicate that ISO-NE may rely on limited use of its operating procedures to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. The reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.12 days/period) with associated LOLHs (0.4 hours/period) and EUE (175 MWh/period) with the highest risk occurring in June. This scenario is based exclusively on the two highest load levels with a 7% chance of occurring and a low resource case consisting of extended summer maintenance across NPCC and reduced imports from PJM.
NPCC-New York		NPCC's assessment results indicate that NYISO may rely on limited use of its operating procedures to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. The reduced resource case with the highest peak load scenario resulted in a small estimated cumulative LOLE risk (0.5 days/summer) with associated LOLH (1.1 hours/summer) and EUE (525 MWh/summer). The highest risk is in June and August.
NPCC-Ontario		NPCC's assessment results indicate that Ontario is likely to use a combination of imports and operating procedures to mitigate resource shortages this summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases. These results indicate that Ontario will be able to obtain necessary supplies from neighbors over a range of conditions.

	Probability-Based Risk Assessment				
Assessment Area	Type of Assessment	Results and Insight From Assessment			
NPCC-Québec		Québec is expected to need only limited use of its operating procedures designed to mitigate resource and energy shortages during the summer. Negligible cumulative LOLE, LOLH, and EUE risks were estimated over the summer period for all modeled scenarios, including the severe low-likelihood cases.			
РЈМ	Based on 2022 PJM Reserve Requirement Study (RRS)	PJM is expecting a low risk of resources falling below required operating reserves. PJM forecasts a 29% installed reserve margin, well above the target of 14.9%. Due to the low penetration of variable energy resources in PJM relative to PJM's peak load, the hour with most loss of load risk remains the hour with highest forecasted demand.			
SERC	Verification of NERC 2022 ProbA Results	The 2022 Base Case results indicated adequate resources for the SERC Region as a whole with an observed LOLE of 0.03 days/year for the year 2024. Trends from 2022 to 2023 indicate little change in study results, so SERC does not anticipate resource adequacy risk for the upcoming summer season.			
SERC-Central		Probabilistic analysis indicates no risk for resource shortfall.			
SERC-East		Probabilistic analysis shows low risk for July and August with EUE of 2.38 MWh and LOLH 0.005 hours.			
SERC-Florida Peninsula		SERC Probabilistic analysis indicates no risk of resource shortfall.			
SERC-Southeast		Probabilistic analysis indicates almost no risk of resource shortfall.			
SPP	Statistical analysis of the Summer 2022 real time data; Operational process and procedures	Potential risk of using operating reserves and EEA1 or EEA2 is 1 day per summer. Risk of EEA3 is 0.2 days per summer. Risks is associated with low wind generation output levels or unanticipated generation outages in combination with high load periods.			
Texas RE-ERCOT	ERCOT's Summer 2023 Probabilistic Assessment	There is a 4% probability that ERCOT will declare an EEA1 during the expected daily peak load hour; Increasing up to 19% probability at the highest risk hour and ending at 8:00 p.m.			
WECC	The 2022 Western Assessment of Resource Adequacy provides the most recent probability-based resource adequacy risk assessment for Summer 2023 across WECC's areas.	The Western Interconnection is experiencing heightened reliability risks heading into Summer 2023 due to increased supply-side shortages and fuel constraints along with the ongoing drought impacts in some areas, continued wildfire threats, and expanding heat wave events. The installation of new resources for the summer and the availability of the imports, especially during wide-area heat events, affects resource adequacy for the U.S. assessment areas. The reliability and resource adequacy of the Western Interconnection depends on the ability to move power throughout the footprint.			
WECC-AB		Alberta is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.			
WECC-BC		BC is expected to have sufficient resource availability to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 4:00 p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates.			
WECC-CA/MX		WECC-CA/MX is projected to have negligible-to-low amounts of LOLH (<0.5 hours) this summer with variation attributable to the amount of Tier 1 resources that connect before the later months. Resources are sufficient to meet demand and cover reserves on the peak hour at 3:00			

Probabilistic Assessment

		Probability-Based Risk Assessment
Assessment Area	Type of Assessment	Results and Insight From Assessment
		p.m. under a summer peak defined at the 90th percentile with any combination or accumulation of derates. However, there is increased risk of insufficient reserves at later hours (up to 8:00 p.m.) due to the variability of energy resource output. Imports to the area are required to cover these risk periods; however, regional resource availability and transmission constraints can affect external assistance during wide area heat events.
WECC-NW		WECC-NW assessment area is projected to have negligible LOLH and EUE this summer with planned resource additions and normal transfer availability. However, some LOLH (<0.1) and EUE (<400 MWh) is anticipated during above-normal demand periods if new resource are delayed or external transfers are disrupted. WECC-NW would rely on imports to maintain adequate reserves on the during the risk hours from 4:00–9:00 p.m. under extreme summer peak load and low-resource conditions (e.g., extreme thermal or extreme hydro derates or combinations of other low energy output scenarios.)
WECC-SW		WECC-SW assessment area is projected to have negligible LOLH and EUE this summer with planned resource additions and normal transfer availability. However, some LOLH (<0.1) and EUE (<150 MWh) is anticipated during above-normal demand periods if new resource are delayed or external transfers are disrupted.

Errata

May 2023

• The Risk Scenario Summaries for SERC-Central and SERC-East were corrected (page 23 and page 24)