The shock-effects of South Asian tumult

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From the start of this decade, India has received one shock after another in its neighbourhood. If in 2021, it was the coup in Myanmar and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, in 2022 there was the ouster of Prime Minister Imran Khan from office in Pakistan and riots that pushed Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of the country in Sri Lanka. Since then there have been some other events — the dramatic electoral change in the Maldives, that pushed the more India-friendly Solih government out, while a similar effect in Nepal wrought by coalitions collapsing, has brought the less India-friendly Oli government in. With Bangladesh, the shock of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s dramatic departure and her arrival in India is all the more palpable, because of how heavily New Delhi invested in the Hasina government. It has now been left scrambling to reach out to her successors. If the last few years are a trend, then what are the lessons for India that can help insulate it from the spill-over effects of radical shifts in South Asia, and escape similar consequences for itself?

India stayed on one side of the fence

Perhaps the first big lesson is that the government cannot be caught napping by events in its own neighbourhood. India’s presence in Bangladesh, with four consulates in Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna and Sylhet, apart from the High Commission in Dhaka and a slew of agencies working on various projects there, should have ensured that the groundswell of anger against the Hasina government was well documented and relayed to Delhi — not just in the past few months, but over the past few years. Despite obvious signs that the Awami League government was transforming into an authoritarian, single-party-rule regime that jailed, raided or sent most of its political opposition into exile, and that various sections of civil society felt alienated and harassed, New Delhi did little to acknowledge the situation or reach out to the government with its concerns in any perceptible way.

What’s next for Bangladesh?

In addition, the failure of India’s diplomats to keep a close contact with the opposition, refusing permission to Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leaders to visit, and on one occasion even deporting a British lawyer for the BNP at the request of the Hasina government, underlined South Block’s decision to be only on one side of the political fence. Many a time, such one-sided engagement is demanded by history. While the BNP’s term in office under Khaleda Zia was a period of where India-Bangladesh tensions were grave, especially over the issue of terrorism and border killings, India cannot choose to ignore the main opposition party in the neighbourhood (the BNP) for a sustained period of time.

India’s decision to strengthen ties with the Taliban, despite its leaders’ involvement in deadly attacks on Indian missions in Afghanistan, or the warm welcome to leaders of Sri Lanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a party that has often espoused an anti-Indian stance, and having to deal with Communist Party of Nepal led by K.P. Sharma Oli, despite his constitutional move on maps that India had raised strong objections to, point to one thing, It indicates that, eventually, pragmatism dictates engagement with all stakeholders in neighbouring countries.

The making of the Bangladesh revolt

In the Maldives, India’s full support to then-President Ibrahim Mohamed (Ibu) Solih and the casting of Mohamed Muizzu as an anti-India leader came a cropper when electoral tides turned. Even though India had to swallow a bitter pill and withdraw its troops from the islands, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar sought close engagement with the Muizzu government during his visit this week. Such hard lessons can be avoided if New Delhi abjures its “muscular” outlook, and broadbases its neighbourhood engagements. Rather than the stability of the one-party rule, New Delhi must favour a plurality of political views — within and outside its borders.

Loss of reputation, communal lens

Conversely, another lesson, well learnt in the case of Bangladesh and Sheikh Hasina, is that India must never forget its friends. After the fall of Kabul, New Delhi lost its reputation as a dependable partner when it refused visas to hundreds of Afghans fleeing the Taliban — many were senior defence and security officials in the previous Afghan establishment who had personally risked their lives to secure Indian diplomats. India’s decision to slam the door on them has left a lingering bitter taste. Apart from the principle, it is necessary to take the pragmatic view.

In South Asia, leaders often lose power, only to return after some time. New Delhi has done well by allowing Sheikh Hasina to stay in India until she finds another safe destination, as to have turned its back on her would have been a betrayal. The future too must be calibrated carefully. Ms. Hasina’s continued stay will complicate ties with the new government, especially if they ask for her extradition on charges, or the Awami League is perceived to be using India to regroup itself.

The third lesson the government must learn, sooner rather than later, is that it is a mistake to reduce ties in the neighbourhood to communal binaries. South Asia is a region of religious majorities, with Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists forming overwhelming parts of the population in different countries. The assumption that good ties are somehow linked to religion in any way, is faulty. Hindu-majority Nepal has been one of India’s most difficult relationships, while Buddhist-majority Bhutan and Muslim-majority Maldives have often been its best allies. The government’s move on the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, to fast-track citizenship only for non-Muslims from Muslim-majority countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh) has backfired badly across the neighbourhood — not just in the countries it mentions, but others who see it as India’s overreach. The Modi government’s concern for minorities in Bangladesh in the wake of Ms. Hasina’s removal is well placed, but must be expressed more discreetly, and not through blunt instruments such as India’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ five-man committee. India’s concerns may be taken more seriously if the government also shows, by its actions not words, that it is committed to securing minorities within its borders as well.

Erosion of pan-South Asian mechanisms

Lesson number four is that India must regain its place as the pre-eminent power in the subcontinent — not one that can be buffeted by one global power or another. While China’s inroads in the region are necessary to counter, the region must not become a playground for United States-China rivalries, where neither shows a sensitivity to India’s interests. China’s moves to marginalise India in trade, connectivity, investment and strategic ties in South Asia is well recorded. In Bangladesh, the U.S. campaign against Sheikh Hasina crushed India’s concerns underfoot. Washington’s increasingly harsh statements on the Hasina government, its decision to impose a special “visa policy” to secure democracy in Bangladesh was hypocritical when judged against its lack of comment on Pakistan’s elections.

India must instead revive pan-South Asian mechanisms such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and find ways to engage with the neighbourhood without external interference. Bilateral issues with Pakistan have led to a boycott of SAARC for a decade now. New Delhi must also consider whether it would abandon the other mechanism, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, or BIMSTEC, if ties with Bangladesh worsen, in the manner it has abandoned SAARC, and where that would leave it.

Finally, not just New Delhi but all South Asian capitals must focus on certain common lessons from the last few years of turmoil and election results. Joblessness and unequal growth are fuelling anger on the streets and must be addressed. However, no amount of economic progress can cover up for democratic backsliding. In modern democracies, the stifling of dissent is unsustainable in the long run. The old dictum that if you want to ‘raise crop for one year, plant corn…If you want to plant a crop for eternities, raise democracies’ holds true for India and its ties in the neighbourhood.

suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in