Showing posts with label Counterfactual history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Counterfactual history. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 6, 2016

Interview with Bill Fawcett, author of 101 Stumbles in the March of History (Plus an Excerpt)

I had the opportunity to interview historian Bill Fawcett who, along with other contributors, wrote the 101 Stumbles in the March of History. Check out our conversation below and keep scrolling to read an excerpt from the book.

Welcome to Alternate History Weekly Update, Bill. How would you describe yourself to someone you just met?

I suppose that I would say that I am someone who enjoys history and sharing the amazing things I discover about it. If forced to choose a title, I suppose “Pop Historian” might fit. Maybe that I am more than a little cynical because those in power never seem to learn from history and optimistic that history shows nations often overcome the worst of leaders and their mistakes… but not always.

What got you interested in alternate history?

I discovered science fiction and history spending my early summers reading in the shade of a tree in our front lawn. Whether it was Tom Swift Jr, Rick Brandt, boy scientist, and Tom Corbett, Space Cadet or accounts of battles and life in ancient times the road noise and neighborhood just disappeared. As I grew older I realized that much of the Science Fiction I loved was derived from events that actually occurred. Once I began writing and editing there was a real revelation. You can’t make it up story elements that are as amazing as what has really happened in the past. From Game of Thrones being loosely based on the equally cut throat events in the War of Roses or the campaigns of Belisarius being the inspiration for novels by David Drake, those writing SF and fantasy often use the past as a model. I suspect it was almost inevitable that the two should merge directly into what we now call Alternate History. I guess I’ve been imaging what would have happened if the Huns had conquered Rome or if Napoleon had left Moscow in time all my life. Back in the 1980s I helped put together with historian Dennis Showalter a “What If” book on WWII alternatives. From then on I was hooked.

What is 101 Stumbles in the March of History about?

So much of our history is the result not of great plans and brilliant strategies, but what happened when those went wrong.  Mistakes and their consequences are a great moving force through history, for the better or worse. Progress is never inevitable. I have done two other books for Penguin on great mistakes and how they affect history, these are the not too subtly named 100 Mistakes that Changed History and Trust Me, I Know What I'm Doing: 100 More Mistakes That Lost Elections, Ended Empires, and Made the World What It Is Today. This  new book is a look at yet more history changing events and something more, what if.

What inspired you to create the book?

My editor at Penguin was generous enough to say that in this volume we could pull out the stops and also speculate on how life would be today if 101 of the worst mistakes in history had not been made. It was impossible to resist. I’ve been doing it in my head and in discussions with the other writers in earlier volumes for another publisher for years.

How did you find the other contributors to 101 Stumbles?

I did write about half the mistakes. A few other contributors are historians whom I had worked with before. They share the view that history is fascinating and can be written like it is both interesting and relevant. Beyond them I reached out to those who write Alternate History fiction. I was fortunate enough that some of the best, Harry Turtledove, Eric Flint, Mike Resnick, and Charles Gannon agreed to join in.  Their insight and unique approaches really add to the book.

Your story "The Last Crusader" is one of my personal favorite stories of yours. What inspired you to make Napoleon a priest?

I have always been fascinated by the Napoleonic Wars. They were really the last of the wars where the man, not the weapon, still made all the difference. The great uniforms and pomp don’t hurt either. The survival of Revolutionary France was a near thing. What if Bonaparte was on the other side of the equation?

If you lived in Corsica, a poor island controlled by France, there were only few ways to escape the poverty and really achieve something.  Beyond smuggling there was only the church or the army.  The story speculates that the ambitious Napoleon choose instead to become a priest. He would have quickly risen in the ranks of the Church. This would have meant he was sympathetic to the monarchies and nobility who supported the Catholic Church extensively. In the story we see Bishop Napoleon, a fiery speaker and émigré’ leader, successfully inspiring the Austrian and Russian troops to defeat the godless Revolutionary French at Austerlitz. Just one different choice by him as a young boy and it just might have been.

Are there any other projects that you are working on?

I am actually researching an alternate history where the very secular Kurds managed to be united as a single nation and the Middle East in the near future is a far different place. They are an amazing people, and tough as ISIS is constantly finding out. If the British had just drawn a few boundaries differently or the UN had lived up to their charter on borders and ethnic groups, it might have been. This will likely be for a military oriented SF novel.

Any advice for aspiring writers?

(Beyond keep you day job?)  My first bit of advice is write, often and anything. The second is to write about what you are passionate.  Learn the technical skill of writing, whether its fiction or non-fiction, the skill is necessary. It is like tennis or programming, you need to practice and get better. Those reading you want to enjoy and learn from what you write. What it really comes down to is do what you love, share what excites you and it will show. It will show in your books.

And now an excerpt from "Bad Omen" by Bill Fawcett, found in 101 Stumbles in the March of History:

It took two mistakes, both classical in all senses of the word, to bring down the world’s first democracy. There have been times when superstition in the form of omens and prophecies affected a battle, but there was one omen that lost Athens the entire Peloponnesian War. Athens had been winning a protracted war with Sparta and that city’s allies. It appeared to almost everyone that Sparta was about to lose and just one more push was needed. But military actions are expensive, particularly for Athens, which traditionally paid the rowers and other sailors. This meant they had the best and most enthusiastic crews, but this was costly. Then one of the city’s most ambitious and controversial figures, Alcibiades, began to push for Athens and its allies to invade Sicily and conquer Syracuse. The fabled treasury of Syracuse could then be used to finance the rest of the war.

No one, except the most conservative Athenians, cared that they were starting a second war with one of the other democratic cities on a distant island. They were defeating Sparta, how difficult could Syracuse be? Everyone expected to win quickly, long before a battered Sparta could react. Athens, as head of the Delian League, literally voted to open a second front against a powerful and rich enemy in the middle of another war.

From the beginning things did not go well in Sicily. The reason for this was the choice of commanders. At first it looked like Athens was going to make the traditional mistake of splitting command. Both the impulsive Alcibiades and perhaps the most reverent and hesitant noble in the city, Nicias, were put in command of the invasion of Sicily. Likely the idea was for the two to balance out each other. What happened was that, due to a scandal involving the destruction of sacred statues of Hermes just before they left, Alcibiades was recalled shortly after arriving. Since it appeared that he was about to be railroaded on the charge, Alcibiades sailed not home, but to Sparta—and changed sides.

Making a military decision, or rather not making it, for twenty-seven days on the basis of one general’s reverence for, and fear of, an omen, was the second mistake. Between the two mistakes, the Delian League and Athens turned near-certain victory into defeat. It took ten more years to lose. Athens held on and raised fleets whenever it could. But the Delian League had lost tens of thousands of soldiers, citizens, and sailors, and nearly its entire fleet in an unnecessary war. The city of Athens and its League were literally and monetarily spent. Eventually, the Spartan side, helped by the defections of Athens’ former allies, won the war and doomed the city. The Delian League was dissolved. Because of two mistakes: fighting a war on two fronts and allowing superstition to override military necessity, Athens was never again the center of Greece or its culture.

Your life would today be different had the Delian League prevailed, which it almost certainly would have if its ill-fated invasion of Syracuse had not happened. Greece might have united as a nation. Macedonia would not have been able to overwhelm a united Greece. Persia might well have hesitated to make its many invasions, or perhaps Alexander would have partnered with Greece to invade Persia and change the world. Or Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander might have been obscure footnotes in books about the Delian League’s defeat of Persia. Or there might be chapters about Persia defeating Greece. If Athens had been dominant for more centuries, then would democracy in some form have become the conventional form of government, not the exception, for the next twenty-five hundred years? That surely would have changed everything.

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

Sideways in Time Schedule

The Sideways in Time schedule it out now! You can check out the international slate of alternate historians set to present on March 30-31 (including yours truly):

Sunday, March 29

5.00pm: Free Pre-Conference Social: Stephen Baxter and Adam Roberts discuss their fiction at Waterstones Liverpool One

Monday, March 30

8:30am–9:30am: Registration

9:30am–10:30am: Keynote: Karen Hellekson, “Agency and Contingency in Televisual Alternate History Texts”

10:30am–12:00pm: Panel 1 – Examining Female Perspectives of Alternate History
  • Amanda Dillon, University of East Anglia (UK), “Speaking Unspoken Timelines: Feminist Time Travel and Alternate Histories in Kage Baker’s The Company”
  • Rosie M. Lewis, Durham University (UK), “Re-envisioning Female Subjectivity, Aesthetics and Collective Resistance in Lizzie Borden’s Born in Flames”
  • Sarah Lohmann, Durham University (UK), “On the Edge of Time: Feminist Utopias, Complexity Theory and Parallel Future Histories”
12:00pm–1:00pm: Panel 2 – Responses to the Enlightenment
  • Alex Broadhead, University of Liverpool (UK), “The Romantics in Alternate History from Hawthorne to Card: Beyond Enlightenment Historiography”
  • Jim Clarke, Coventry University (UK), “Unwriting the Reformation: Anti-Catholic uchronias in Science Fiction”
1:00pm–1:45pm: Lunch

1:45pm–2:45pm: Keynote: Stephen Baxter, “Alternate Cosmologies”

2:45pm–4:15pm: Panel 3 – Moments and People of Power
  • Francis Gene-Rowe, Birkbeck College (UK), “Blasting Open the Historical Continuum: Antihistoricism in Benjamin, Dick & Le Guin”
  • Fred Smoler, Sarah Lawrence College (USA), “Refiguring the Heroic in Two Alternate Histories: Stephen Vincent Benét and Harry Turtledove”
  • Jonathan Rayner, University of Sheffield (UK), “‘Forever being Yamato’: Alternative Pacific War Histories in Japanese Film and Anime”
4:15pm–4:30pm: Break

4:30pm–6:00pm: Panel 4 – Alternate History in Europe
  • Mikhaylo Nazarenko, Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University (Ukraine), “Post-colonial alternate history: the case of Ukrainian literature”
  • Marzena Sokołowska-Paryż, University of Warsaw (Poland) “Ideological (Mis)Uses of Genre: Dystopian Visions of the ‘Past-Present’ in Daniel Quinn’s and Stephen Fry’s Alternate Histories”
  • Chris Pak, (UK), “‘It Is One Story’: Writing a Global Alternative History in Kim Stanley Robinson’s The Years of Rice and Salt”
Tuesday, March 31

8:30am–9:00am: Registration

9:00am–10:30am: Panel 5 – Examining the Place of Alternate History
  • Daniel Dohrn, Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany), “Counterfactuals in Historiography – A Philosophical Assessment”
  • Matt Mitrovich, (USA), “Warping History: An Overview of Fans and Creators of Alternate History in the Internet Age”
  • Ursula Troche, “Alternate History as re-imagining/re-writing: with particular reference to Lennon’s ‘Imagine’ and Evaristo’s ‘Blonde Routes’”
10:30am–12:00pm: Panel 6 – Blurring the Boundaries of Alternate History
  • Pascal Lemaire (Belgium), “Our world, really ? Techno Thrillers and Alternate History”
  • Andrew M. Butler, Canterbury Christ Church University (UK), “Quest for Love: A Cosy Uchronia?”
  • Leimar Garcia-Siino, University of Liverpool (UK), “Alternate [un]Realities: The Possibility and Impossibility of the Fantasy Alternate History”
12:00pm–1:00pm: Keynote: Adam Roberts, “Geoffroy, Tolstoy and the Fragile Solidity of History”

1:00pm–1:45pm: Lunch

1:45pm–2:45pm: Panel 7 – Different Landscapes
  • Alan Gregory and Dawn Stobart, Lancaster University (UK), “The Survival of a President: Rewritten American Histories and the Failed Assassination of John F. Kennedy in Stephen King’s 11/22/63”
  • Laura Ettenfield, Leeds Beckett University (UK), “‘The sea is everything… the embodiment of a supernatural and wonderful existence… it is the Living Infinite’: the alternate reality of subaquatic space in Nineteenth-century literature”
2:45pm–3:45pm: Panel 8 – Alternate History after 9/11
  • Anna McFarlane, (UK), “Lavie Tidhar’s Osama (2011) and Alternate History After 9/11”
  • Rachel Mizsei Ward (UK), “Impotent in the face of history – How superhero narratives (didn’t) engage with 9/11”
3:45pm–4:00pm: Break

4:00pm–5:30pm: Panel 9 – How Do We Know?
  • Chloe Alexandra Germaine Buckley, Lancaster University (UK), “Cthulhu versus Sherlock Holmes: Shadows over Baker Street, epistemological disruption and the ‘willing surrender of disbelief’ in postmillennial alternative-history Weird fiction”
  • Hellen Giblin-Jowett, (UK), “A ‘whiff of printer’s shrapnel’: HG Wells and the nostrils of divergence”
  • Molly Cobb, University of Liverpool (UK), “‘Time is a private matter’: The subjective nature of time and the lack of a universal continuum”
5:30pm–6:30pm: Wine Reception

I'm going to be missing some of the pre- and post-conference events because I want to sight-see a little on my first visit to Britain, but there seems to be a lot of interesting topics to enjoy. I can't wait!

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Matt Mitrovich is the founder and editor of Alternate History Weekly Update and a blogger on Amazing Stories. Check out his short fiction. When not writing he works as an attorney, enjoys life with his beautiful wife Alana and prepares for the inevitable zombie apocalypse. You can follow him on Facebook or Twitter.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Alternate Israels: Five Historical Proposals for a Jewish Homeland

This week on Amazing Stories, I discuss five historical proposals for a Jewish homeland. I give a brief history on each and then discuss what might happen had they actually become a homeland of the Jewish people. Some you probably already know about, but others might surprise you. I hope you like it.

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Matt Mitrovich is the founder and editor of Alternate History Weekly Update and a blogger on Amazing Stories. Check out his short fiction. When not writing he works as an attorney, enjoys life with his beautiful wife Alana and prepares for the inevitable zombie apocalypse. You can follow him on Facebook or Twitter.

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

Are Counterfactuals a Waste of Time?

This week at Amazing Stories, I write a response to Richard J. Evans article on The Guardian titled: 'What if' is a waste of time. Check out my article here. You may also be interested in reading Evans book, Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History. Just remember to buy it through The Update so I can make some money on my worthless counterfactual blog!

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Matt Mitrovich is the founder and editor of Alternate History Weekly Update and a blogger on Amazing Stories. Check out his short fiction. When not writing he works as an attorney, enjoys life with his beautiful wife Alana and prepares for the inevitable zombie apocalypse. You can follow him on Facebook or Twitter.

Wednesday, March 5, 2014

World War I Alternatives Part 1: Pax Germanica

It is my Royal and Imperial command that you exterminate the treacherous English and march over General French’s contemptible little army.’ (Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1914)

With this year being the 100th year anniversary of the start of World War I, I have decided to delve into the counterfactual side of this war. It is a war that is usually ignored by writers and fans due to its better known sequel, but it is nevertheless important to our history. The entire map of the world was changed drastically in just a few short years. Meanwhile, millions of people died, denying us their potential contributions to science and culture. It directly led to the rise of fascism and communism that brought the world into another devastating war, proving once again that humans don't learn from history.

It set the theme for the entire 20th century and its affects are still felt today. There are even some commentators like Nouriel Robini and Margaret MacMillan who have compared the events of the present to the world leading up to the Great War. While some might feel this is a stretch, considering the events happening right now in the Ukraine, perhaps conflict between the great powers is not so ridiculous even in our post-Hiroshima world.

Here at Alternate History Weekly Update, we are going to cover this war in the only way we know how: sideways. I am going to discuss the common alternate history points of divergence and scenarios resulting out of World War I over multiple posts. I will give a general overview and also discuss the plausibility of each scenario, while suggesting other options for amateurs and professionals to try in their alternate history. I can't think of a better way to start this breakdown of World War I alternate histories then with the most popular one of them all: what if Germany won World War I? Or as I like to call it: the Pax Germanica.

To be honest when people think of "German domination" they general think of Nazi Germany or (if they really want to be nasty) they are referring to modern Germany's economic prowess. Nevertheless, Germany had an earlier chance to secure control of Europe during World War I. It goes without saying that if they had been victorious, the history of Europe would have been completely different. Counterfactual historians have discussed it and the master himself, Harry Turtledove, wrote about it in his young adult novel Curious Notions.

How they win the war varies depending on who you ask. The Schlieffen Plan is by far the most popular point of divergence. For those who don't know, the Schlieffen Plan, was German strategic war plan that was developed in 1905 in case Germany ever found itself in a two front war between France and Russia (as they did in our timeline). The plan, however, was modified before World War I and some scholars suggest that if the plan had been carried out as originally proposed, it could have ended in a German victory in the West before the war had ever begun.

Granted there is the old military maxim that no plan survives contact with the enemy (fun fact: the nephew of  the guy who said that was the one who modified the Schlieffen Plan), but that hasn't stopped alternate history writers from putting their faith in the unmodified Schlieffen Plan. "The Redemption of August" by Tom Purdom and "Uncle Alf" by Harry Turtledove are two examples of stories set in a timeline where the Schlieffen Plan was followed to the letter.

I personally am not convinced by how successful the Schlieffen Plan could be and I am not alone. You can certainly argue it did not take into account modern weapons and may have likely still have resulted in trench warfare on the Western Front. So are there any other possible points of divergence? Fiction does suggest a few. Well known counterfactual historian Niall Ferguson suggested in Virtual History, that the war in the West could have ended in 1914 if Britain had either stayed out of the war or if the British Expeditionary Force had been late in coming to France's defense.

Certainly there were people who were trying to keep Britain out of the war, such as Sir Edward Grey, and if Germany had respected nuetrality, Britain may have sat this one out. Of course, that means Germany completely rejects the Schlieffen Plan (both versions) which would require a point of divergence much earlier than 1914. If you are going to do that you may as well suggest that Germany just stay on the defensive in the West, never invade the Low Countries and focus all of their strength Russia.

Other point of divergences include having unrestricted submarine warfare never being prevented at first by the German High Command. Robert L. O'Connell suggested this in his essay "The Great War Torpedoed", originally published in What If? 2. Although it would have certainly brought America into the war earlier, O'Connell believes the loss of trade would have led Britain to collapse in 1916.

There there are those divergences where the Entente is forced to fight on another front or the Central Powers are able to free up more troops elsewhere. Guido Morselli proposed in Past Conditional: A Retrospective Hypothesis that if Italy had been knocked out of the war earlier, the Central Powers could have ultimately won (although the same result could have happened if Italy stayed neutral or actually honored the Triple Alliance). Friend of The Update, Andrew Schneider, proposed in his essay "A Nation Once Again: An Alternate History of the Easter Rising" that a more successful Easter Rising in Ireland could have drawn enough troops away from the Western Front to make a difference.

Surprisingly, there are many point of divergences set in 1918 when the war was close to the end. Even at this late date some writers believed Germany still had a chance to pull out a win. Not completely far fetched really, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk did free up battle-hardened German forces from the East to fight a French army dealing with mutinies. The Spring Offensive of 1918 (also known as the Kaiserschlacht) could have ended the war in a German victory if it had not been stopped at the Second Battle of the Marne.

Alternate histories set in 1918 tend to focus around this period of time. "Issue and Men" by Oswald Garrison Villard, "Si les Allemands avaient gagne la guerre…" by Gaston Hornsy and The Summer Isles by Ian R. MacLeod all focus on a German victory around the Spring Offensive. Stephen Baxter took a slightly different track in "Mittelwelt" by suggesting if Philippe Petain had not been replaced as commander of the French forces, the Entente might have broken against the German onslaught.

So we have discussed how Germany could have won the war, but what happens once the war is over. What does a post-war world look like where Germany wins? Well you are going to see Germany enlarge itself certainly and many of the client states it and its allies created during the war might have a longer existence. They likely would have all been together in a German led economic union like the Zollverein. Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire may also be tied into this economic union, especially to prop up their already fragile empires (if they still survive the war).

It is possible for Germany to be technologically dominant in this world. Victory in World War I would forestall the Nazis and thus the Jewish German nuclear scientists would not be driven away (although don't fool yourself that Europe would be less anti-Semitic), thus Germany would be the first to develop nuclear weapons. Not everyone, however, agrees with this hypothesis, including Robert Silverberg who wrote "Translation Error" where technological progress is stalled after a German victory. He might not be far off if you consider that Germany would be spending money maintaining their empire rather than investing in new technologies.

Socially, Germany would still be a conservative, militant autocracy with limited democracy. This would be further entrenched after the German victory, but it wouldn't last forever. The Reichstag wouldn't just sit idly by and let the Army seize all the power they carefully earned over the years. In fact in the post-war euphoria where Germany rules all (or most) of Europe, the people may be more willing to consider reforms. Economic crises and the changing political landscape of the defeated Entente (more on that below) may even cause Germany to moderate itself to differentiate themselves from their more radicalized neighbors. Or the exact opposite could happen as fear of their neighbors drives Germany further under the military's control.

France and Russia would pay the price for Germany's territorial gains in this alternate World War I, with Britain managing to avoid any occupation due to its geography and navy (Kaiser's Germany was probably even less prepared to invade Britain then Hitler's Germany). Britain, however, might lose some of its empire as a defeated power (Ireland, as suggested before, and maybe even South Africa). It is also popular for Germany to gain the Belgian Congo in a post-war world, although that is no guarantee as the Germans lost everywhere when it came to their colonies in the our timeline's war. Britain might not want to give them up and Germany, even in their triumph probably couldn't do anything about it.

Politics among the defeated nations would likely be radicalized. It is sometimes suggested that Germany would occupy France in its entirety or else create a French puppet monarch. Perhaps there will even be governments in exile as there are in the game Enigma: Rising Tide. I think this is wishful thinking on the part of many creators as the cost in men and material to keep the French (and especially the British) under control would have been cost prohibitive. More likely the Germans would have wanted to prevent the French from ever having the ability to threaten Germany again, much like what the Entente tried to do with the Treaty of Versailles and we all know how that ended up.

Unless the Germans had the will to intervene in France whenever a threat presented itself, we would likely see a fascist France arise bent on revenge. The same could happen to Britain and Italy (if they don't side with Germany in these victory timelines) as well. Then again Britain may even cozy up to a German led Europe as Ferguson suggested above. This Britain/German alliance is not unheard of, although it mostly appears in amateur scenarios and not often in professional fiction.

Russia is a different story. A German victory in the West won't necessarily forestall the rise of Communism or the Soviet Union. Some authors have suggested Germany could have helped defeat the Bolsheviks and prop up the Czar, but this is even more implausible than the occupied France scenario above. The allied intervention in Russia failed to do that in our timeline. One could argue Germany's proximity to a Red Russia might be a great motivator to secure their eastern flank, but the German leaders might find it hard to convince their people to weather a few more Russian winters after declaring victory in Europe. With the Soviets to the East and the fascists to the West, is it that far fetched to see an alliance of convenience to crush the German autocracy, much like the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of our timeline?

A threat toward Germany, however, may come from another direction. For example, the United States would still have the potential to be a rival to the German Empire. Most authors write off the United States in these scenarios by saying they would have sunk into deep isolation or else become pro-German due to the large numbers of German-Americans. Some authors even believe Germany might pick a fight with America as Robert Conroy suggests in his new novel 1920: America's Great War. It is even foreseeable that Germany would court allies in Latin America with promises of protection from American exploitation. In our timeline, the Zimmermann Telegram promised Mexico the American Southwest and there is nothing stopping Germany from still using that promise to bring Mexico into their sphere. Mexican Missile Crisis anyone?

Then there is Japan. They tend to do very well in a timeline with a victorious Germany. Distracted elsewhere, the European colonial powers are unable to stop Japan from gobbling up their Pacific empires (Germany wouldn't be able to do much to stop them either come to think of it). A Japan with an enlarged colonial empire so early in its history would be a significant player in international affairs and could lead to a multi-polar world with different regional power blocs competing for influence and stockpiling weapons. The chances for the "Great War" to remain the only "Great War" are as slim in this universe as they were in ours.

Of course all the above might just be crap after all. When it comes right down to it the Germans probably had less chance of winning World War I than the South did of winning the American Civil War. I will, however, wait to comment on that until my next entry in my World War I series: Entente Victorious.

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Matt Mitrovich is the founder and editor of Alternate History Weekly Update and a blogger on Amazing Stories. Check out his list of short fiction. When not writing he works as an attorney, enjoys life with his beautiful wife Alana and prepares for the inevitable zombie apocalypse. You can follow him on Facebook or Twitter.

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

6 Common Mistakes Every American Revolution Alternate History Makes

Although American Civil War and World War II histories dominate the English-speaking world, stories about a stillborn United States are still quite common. Whether it happens because the Thirteen Colonies lose the American Revolutionary War or else the political upheaval that led to their independence is avoided through diplomacy, all the timelines lead to a world where North America from the Arctic to the Rio Grande remains under the Union Jack.

While these timelines have merit, both professional and fans authors often make the same mistakes, historical misconceptions and omissions again and again. To prevent this from happening in the future, here is a list of common mistakes found within American Revolution what ifs...

Florida
At some point, whatever government is created for British North America, they will want Florida. Sometimes they just take it or other times they buy it. Either way Florida will stop being Spanish not long after the POD. Except why would they need Spain need to hand it over in the first place? This is a mistake I find again and again with alternate American Revolution timelines and it needs to stop...now.

Here is what history tells us: at the end of the French and Indian War/Seven Years War, Florida was ceded to Britain and was split into West and East Florida. The two Floridas remained loyal to Britain during the Revolutionary War, but in the end were ceded back to Spain after they had sided with the rebellious colonists. Much later West Florida rebelled against Spanish rule and was annexed by the United States, while East Florida was ceded to the United States in 1821.

In a timeline where Britain retains control of the Thirteen Colonies, Florida would have remained British because Spain would either have no war to join or else would have been on the losing side. The two Floridas would be components of whatever government is created for British North America and might even have special status in those versions that had a war since they had remained loyal. So please stop making this mistake before I start tearing my hair out.

Louisiana and the Great Plains
As British North America grows in these timelines it expands westward and (usually around 1803) decides it wants the port of New Orleans and the rest of the Great Plains. This proves quite simple since they usually just take it from those dastardly French (curse them!). But why would the French be there in the first place?

This does not happen as often as the Florida problem, but still often enough I feel I should address it. As we know, France ceded New Orleans and the Great Plains to Spain, who added it to the Viceroyalty of New Spain (a.k.a. Mexico) at the end of the French and Indian War/Seven Years War. The territory remained under Spanish control until 1800 when France took back the territory under Napoleon who dreamed of building an empire in the Americas. A slave revolt in Haiti caused the Emperor to scrap those plans and instead sell the territory to the young American republic.

Having Louisiana become French again in a timeline where there is no United States assumes a lot events of OTL will still happen as scheduled, including the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon. Even if they did happen (which I will discuss later) it is hard to believe that Napoleon would want such a huge tract of land only lightly populated by Europeans that was surrounded on the north and east by the British. Most likely he would look elsewhere for his overseas empire and leave the land to the Spanish. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the British Americans wouldn't want the strategic port of New Orleans, but it is still possible the land we know today as the "Louisiana Purchase" might be part of Mexico in one of these alternate timelines.

French Revolution and Napoleon
Speaking of the French, who incidentally were big supporters of the rebels, they end up in these timelines never spending all that cash propping up the Americans and thus never have the ton of debt that brings the French Revolution upon the royal houses of Europe. Enlightened monarchies continue to govern the world with democracy being nothing more than a quaint Ancient Greek custom and a young Corsican artillery officer dies of old age without anyone ever knowing his name

Of course, when has history ever been that simple? France's support of the Americans was just one of many causes that brought on the French Revolution and the lack of a Revolutionary War won't hand wave them away either (and its not like the monarchy would take all the extra money they saved to help the lower classes). Even a failed rebellion could still be disastrous for Louis XVI's rule if he still decided to intervene. The events and names might be different, but the French Revolutions could still happen and the chaos caused could allow a man like Napoleon to rise to power.

I admit one of the unwritten rules of alternate history is that nothing is inevitable, but we still need things to be plausible. A POD around the 1770s is not enough time to butterfly away an event that happened in 1789. In all likelihood, instead of defending New Orleans from the British, we could see Andrew Jackson take Orleans while leading an army of Red Coats. We have to remember that a good alternate history has to plausible and certain PODs will effect some historical events, but not others.

Canada
In these timelines, the great Dominion of British North America stretches from sea to shining sea. Members of Parliament gather in the capital, Georgetown (named after the great King George III), to celebrate another year as the most important member of the Empire. No one notices the politicians from the far northern provinces, but it is not like these men from the lightly populated, snowy wilderness have ever contributed anything significant to the Commonwealth. Right? RIGHT?!?!

One of the greatest flaws of American Revolution alternate histories is that they tend to be written by...well, Americans. These authors, however, remain surprisingly ignorant of the OTL British North America, or to put it another way, Canada. These timelines gloss over the northern half of British North America as almost if it doesn't matter and instead read more like an American history where everyone speaks with a British accent. This is especially important with timelines where recognizable historical figures still make cameos, but you rarely see Canadian VIPs in positions of importance.

While I will admit that the center of power might shift to the south in an enlarged British North America, how can one of the world's largest economies and most cultural diverse OTL countries not have an impact at all in a world where America remained under British rule? The city of Toronto alone is the fourth largest city in North America, which would make it the third largest city in a British North America (beating out my hometown of Chicago) and making it a significant region in politics. I guess what I am trying to say is that ignorance of Canadian history is not an excuse for your implausible alternate history.

Native Americans
Another group who is ignored in these alternate histories (and history in general for that matter) are Native Americans. In timelines where the Thirteen Colonies stay British, their history tends to parallel OTL history, that is if the author decides to mention them at all. Essentially they remain non-entities in these universes.

Now the Native Americans were treated rough by most Europeans, but the British did try to normalize relations with the tribes with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which established the Indian Reserve that stretched from the Great Lakes to West Florida. The proclamation was controversial to the colonials and was one of the causes of the American Revolution. Most Native Americans east of the Mississippi sided with the British during the Revolutionary War and after the war were eventually driven west and forced to settle in reservations far from their ancestral homes.

In these alternate histories, however, it is unlikely the British would radically change their policy to Native Americans if they maintained control of the lands east of the Mississippi. In fact we might see the British grant autonomy to the most powerful and loyal tribes, much like the princely states of India of OTL. This policy might even be carried west if British North America expands that far leading to an ethnically diverse North America where Native Americans exercise more political power than they did in OTL. That sounds like a much more interesting alternate history to me.

The British Empire
Above is a political map of the world of The Two Georges, with the British Empire in red. Despite some loses in Africa, the British Empire is excessively larger than it was in OTL. In fact, most American Revolution alternate histories lead to an enlarged British Empire. But how plausible is it for the British Empire to be this large?

In a world where the Thirteen Colonies stay British, the Crown would need (if I can quote the late Warren Zevon) lawyers, guns and money to maintain their rule. If they are spending these resources on British North America, they would not be able to spend it elsewhere. Consider how different the history of Australia would be. Before the American Revolution, thousands of criminals had been sent to the Americas by the British. After the loss of the Thirteen Colonies, the British found replacement colonies in Australia. In a world, however, where they never lost their original penal colonies, there would be less interest about settling Australia and thus all or some of it could have been gobbled up by another Europe power.

The same can go for other important British colonies as well. A world without the French Revolution and/or Napoleon (if they for some reason do not happen) would not give the British the excuse to take South Africa from the Dutch. Plus considering the economic potential of the lands that make up the OTL USA and Canada, it might not be India that will gain the title of "jewel in the crown" of the British Empire. In fact this same economic potential might even give some alternate leaders the motivation to try and break from the empire and could potentially cause an earlier collapse of the British Empire.

Conclusion

All of the above are either outright mistakes, historical misconceptions or overlooked people/ideas that are common to American Revolution alternate histories. The best way to avoid them, in my humble opinion, is to do your research when you set out to create your timeline. Remember, as Mark Twain once said: "It's not what you don't know that kills you, it's what you know for sure that ain't true."

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Matt Mitrovich is the founder and editor of Alternate History Weekly Update and a blogger on Amazing Stories. His new short story "Road Trip" can be found in Forbidden Future: A Time Travel Anthology. When not writing he works as an attorney, enjoys life with his beautiful wife Alana and prepares for the inevitable zombie apocalypse. You can follow him on Facebook or Twitter.

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Atomic Machines: An Atompunk Sampler

Guest post by Mark J. Appleton.

The dawn of the atomic age in 1945 inspired myriad proposals for ways to apply this terrifying new force.   Some of these – power plants, ships, and submarines – were actually built.   Many more were not.

As a connoisseur of atompunk – retrofuturism based on the 50s and 60s, standing to Robert Heinlein and rocketships as steampunk is to Jules Verne and zeppelins – I have collected some of the more entertaining possibilities thrown up in those heady early years.   I've decided to limit my selection to American proposals for the moment, but similar projects were launched in other countries as well.   These were not merely the musings of fanciful journalists, but serious proposals put forth by scientists and engineers that, with a change in circumstances, might perhaps have been built.

The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program
What: ANP aimed to build a plane with jet engines powered by heat from a nuclear reactor instead of burning oil.   The massive radiation shielding needed meant the A-plane would be expensive, slow, and huge – more than twice the size of the B-52 – but it could potentially stay aloft for weeks.   A nuclear-powered airplane could orbit over the oceans continuously, beyond the reach of Soviet attacks, and then approach and strike its targets from any direction.

When: 1945 to 1961, with some research continuing into the early 70s.

How Far: Convair installed a low-power nuclear reactor in a B-36 and flew it 47 times – followed by a plane carrying paratroopers.   If the NB-36 crashed, their job was to jump down and secure the wreckage – the 2 MWth reactor was too small to contaminate a large area, but the intense radioactivity would make the crash site extremely dangerous for unprotected onlookers and would-be rescuers.
GE also built and static-tested three nuclear-powered turbojets in Idaho, known as the Heat Transfer Reactor Experiments.   HTRE-3 was essentially a prototype of a flyable atomic jet engine.
And Oak Ridge National Laboratory built and briefly operated a prototype molten-salt-fueled reactor for a more advanced indirect-cycle propulsion system, although it wasn't connected to a jet engine.

Why Not: The Air Force kept changing their mind through the 1950s about whether or not they actually wanted a nuclear airplane; the resulting oscillations in the budget seriously delayed development.   By the time Kennedy was elected the government had spent $2 billion on the project – more than $15 billion in modern money – and expected to spend a lot more before an A-plane could see combat.   Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decided that the money could be better spent on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

How It Could Happen: The simplest point of divergence would be more consistent support from the Pentagon; with stable funding, a low-power prototype could fly before 1960, although it would not be suitable for combat.   It's harder to find a way to keep A-planes flying, given the obvious safety and environmental problems, but they could perhaps find roles as ballistic missile carriers and airborne command/communications posts.

Further Reading: Giving Wings to the Atom

Project PLUTO
What: A nuclear-powered cruise missile.   Actually, it was more like a nuclear-powered unmanned bomber – powered by a direct-cycle nuclear ramjet, and without the need for any wussy “radiation shielding”, the Supersonic Low-Altitude Missile (SLAM) could reach Mach 3.   Boosted to its operating speed by strap-on solid rockets, the SLAM would penetrate Soviet airspace at treetop height, carrying 12 hydrogen bombs and spraying radioactive fission products behind it.

When: 1957 through 1964.

How Far: Two nuclear ramjets, Tory-IIA and -IIC, were static-tested in Nevada.   Tory-IIC reached 513 MWth power for five minutes, cooled by pressurized air supplied by 25 miles of oil well casing.
Why Not: PLUTO, like ANP, found itself outclassed by cheaper, simpler ballistic missiles.   An extra problem was that no one could figure out a way to test such a machine without running the risk of the guidance computer going haywire and, say, taking it on a tour of downtown Los Angeles, spraying fallout behind it.   One engineer proposed flying it over Nevada tied to a gigantic tether.

How It Could Happen: Stall the development of ballistic missiles long enough and PLUTO might have a chance.   PLUTO was as fast as the planned B-70 Valkyrie, could remain on airborne alert for weeks, and could penetrate Soviet airspace via circuitous routes at low altitude.   Perhaps if the Nazis had put the money for the V-2 into more V-1's instead, leading to less post-war support for ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles could be delayed long enough for PLUTO to fly.

Further Reading: The Flying Crowbar

Project Orion
What: A spacecraft propelled by nuclear explosions.   The ship would be mounted on top of a giant “pusher plate”; small hydrogen bombs would be ejected out the back, and the ship would ride the shockwave.   An ideal spaceship drive has both a high thrust, so that it can push out of the Earth's gravity, and a high fuel efficiency, so that it does not need a massive fuel tank.   Existing spaceship drives can only achieve one or the other; Orion is one of the few proposals that could offer both.   Project engineers envisioned 10,000-ton spaceships making three-year cruises of the Saturn system or putting thousands of tons of payload into Earth orbit.
When: Although first proposed in 1946, real development work began in 1958 and continued until 1964.

How Far: Several small model-scale demonstrators using conventional explosives were flown; one reached a height of 56 meters.

Why Not: Orion always faced a number of challenges, but the proximate cause of the project's demise was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which forbade nuclear explosions that were not contained deep underground.

How It Could Happen: It's not entirely clear even today if Orion would actually work – several serious technical problems remained, such as pusher plate ablation, misfire recovery, and coping with the EMP generated during launch.   Leaving those aside, the simplest way to get Orion flying is for the human race to need to launch a lot of payload into space as quickly as possible.   Say, if aliens showed up, or we discovered the Earth is going to explode.

Further Reading: Project Orion

The Pan-Atomic Canal
What: A new canal excavated through central America with hundreds of hydrogen bombs.   The new canal would be wider than the Panama Canal, allowing bigger ships to cross, and located at sea level, so it would not need the Panama Canal's complicated system of locks to carry ships over the mountains.
When: The late 50s through mid 60s.

How Far: Several nuclear cratering tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site, most famously the 100-kiloton SEDAN test.
Why Not: Like Orion, the project was scuppered by the Partial Test Ban Treaty.   Work continued for some time after the PTBT was signed, since the Atomic Energy Commission hoped the Soviets might agree to a revision of the treaty for “peaceful nuclear explosions”, but this was not to be.   Besides this, it was rather questionable if the US could find a partner in Central America willing to host several hundred thermonuclear detonations.   Panama was certainly not interested – in addition to the obvious issues, a new sea-level canal would mean the thousands of Panamanians employed operating the existing canal lock system would be laid off.

How It Could Happen: Not only do you need a very different public attitude towards radiation, but also a reason for why the Panama canal could not be used.   That means somehow detaching Panama from the American orbit and attaching it to someone else's, presumably Russia.   A communist-aligned Panama under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, though implausible, would definitely lead to a new canal of some kind.

Project PACER
What: Electrical power generated from nuclear fusion has been a holy grail for physics since the mid-1950s, but so far we've only been able to produce fusion energy in bombs.   So a group of Los Alamos scientists proposed a simple solution to the problem: detonate hydrogen bombs in enormous underground chambers filled with steam, and use the heat produced to drive a turbine.   Two 50-kiloton blasts per day would power a 2 GWe generating station, enough to power 1.6 million American homes.

But electricity would really be a side-benefit; PACER's main product would be neutrons from the blast, which would transmute thorium into fissile uranium-233 to power conventional nuclear reactors.   The U-233 would produce ten times as much energy as the PACER machine itself.

When: The concept was proposed in 1957 and studied off-and-on by the Plowshare project.   PACER itself lasted from 1972 to 1974.

How Far: One nuclear test in 1961, GNOME, had power generation as a secondary purpose, but PACER itself was largely limited to computer modeling and nuclear charge design.

Why Not: PACER would only be cost-competitive if it could produce U-233 fuel more cheaply than conventional uranium fuel could be mined – and an outside review in 1975 concluded the price of uranium would have to rise by a factor of eight before that happened.

How It Could Happen: It probably couldn't happen historically – but it's imaginable it might come into use some time in the far future, if all other resources are depleted and no better alternative is found.

The Manhattan Shelter Study
What: A system of underground bomb shelters deep enough to survive (hopefully) a direct hit with a high-yield thermonuclear weapon and the ensuing radioactive fallout.   Although the study used Manhattan as a case study, the plan was to build them in every major urban area in the country, with space for 200 million people in total – the system would make Fallout's Vaults look like broom closets.   The Manhattan shelters would have enough supplies for two months of underground living, and be powered by four submarine reactors.

When: 1956 through 1958.

How Far: A preliminary study with some concept art.

Why Not: It would be insanely expensive – the study estimated their proposed national shelter system would cost $1.6 trillion in 2012 dollars, and I have it on expert authority that that is likely an underestimate by a factor of six.   Also, one in every ten people in the country would be recruited as quasi-military “civil defense cadres”, and the Eisenhower administration was unwilling to endorse such a permanent militarization of American society.

How It Could Happen: Given the titanic resources demanded for such a project, it will only happen if the US government and populace believe nuclear war is not just possible, but actually imminent.   My suggestion would be that continued US neutrality in World War II allows the Nazis to defeat Russia; by 1960 the US has woken up to the threat and is furiously building up for an anticipated nuclear war with a genocidal Third Reich led by an increasingly unstable Hitler.

Further Reading: Rock to Hide Me

The Subterrene
What: A tunneling machine that would drill through the Earth by melting the rock in front of it with heat from a nuclear reactor.
When: 1970 through 1976.

How Far: Small-scale versions using electrical heating elements instead of an atomic reactor were built and successfully tested.   Patents were filed on the nuclear version, but no serious development work was done.
Why Not: I haven't found any record for the specific reason, but the 1970s were not a good time to be proposing new and exciting uses for the atom.   The Atomic Energy Commission was transforming into the Department of Energy and nuclear energy wasn't sexy anymore; there was no appetite in Washington for the effort needed to turn this into a working technology.

How It Could Happen: There's likely no way to rescue the subterrene in the '70s.   But a world that saw significantly more use of nuclear energy in general, and a public more tolerant of radiation hazards, could perhaps see the machines be built.   And even if it was never used on Earth, there have been several proposals to use it in space, such as on a probe to melt through the Europan ice cap to the ocean underneath.

Further Reading: The Atomic Subterrene

Thermal Radiation Attenuating Clouds (TRAC)
What: Massive smoke generators would cover cities with dense banks of smog.   The smoke would absorb the pulse of heat from an atomic bomb detonation, attenuating it and reducing the damage.   A bomb would still damage a TRAC-protected city, but to a lesser degree.

When: 1951 through the late 60s.

How Far: Prototype smoke generators were built and tested in two nuclear tests in the 1950s.
Why Not: I have not found a specific reason for TRAC's cancellation, but I suspect it was cancelled because while it did work, it only reduced (not eliminated) the damage, and only one type of damage – TRAC did nothing to shield against blast or radiation.

How It Could Happen: Like the Manhattan Shelter Study, TRAC is only likely to happen if the United States believes that a nuclear war is imminent, and is desperately trying to do anything it can to minimize the damage.

Chrysler TV-8
What: It's a nuclear-powered tank.   Yes, really.

When: 1955.

How Far: They made a really cool-looking scale model.   The TV-8 was a speculative tank design proposed more as a thought experiment than anything else.   The nuclear engine was just one possibility listed among a number of other propulsion options, and most of the work was on the unusual (and bizarre) hull design intended to resist near-misses by tactical nuclear weapons.

Why Not: It was determined the TV-8's unusual design did not actually offer any advantages.

How It Could Happen: It probably couldn't.   Even if the TV-8 was somehow built, it wouldn't have a nuclear engine – I'm skeptical a reactor could even be made small enough to move such a vehicle using 1950s technology.   It certainly could not be done at a price even the Pentagon would be willing to pay.

Further Reading: The Chrysler TV-8 Concept Tank

Nuclear Gas and Oil Stimulation
What: Using deeply-buried hydrogen bombs to break up rock to release natural gas or oil – think of it as nuclear fracking.

When: The late 50s through early 70s.

How Far: Three natural gas stimulation shots were conducted (GASBUGGY, RULISON, and RIO BLANCO), as well as several tests at the Nevada Test Site to develop nuclear explosives that would produce less radioactive contamination in the gas.

Why Not: Three reasons: because of worry about nuclear proliferation, because the biggest experimental test failed to actually produce much gas due to mistakes in site selection, and because by the early 70s people no longer thought that a little radiation in the morning put hair on your chest.

How It Could Happen: The Russians actually did it, setting off 25 oil and gas stimulation shots, so it apparently can be cost-effective (English-language reports disagree about whether the gas produced was radioactive).   However, widespread use of nuclear stimulation goes against the strong anti-proliferation inclinations of the US government since the 60s, and as long as simpler, less nukey options are available it's very unlikely the technology would be deployed even if radiation was not a concern.   Perhaps if the US became extremely desperate for oil it might be deployed.

Check out Part 2!

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Mark J. Appleton blogs on atompunk history at Atomic Skies.

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Review: Explaining the Iraq War by Frank P. Harvey

A popular what if of the recent decade is the President Gore counterfactual. In these timelines, Al Gore becomes President of the United States in 2000 either because of a different Supreme Court decision or some other point of divergence (POD). A unique circumstance of these timelines is the general assumption that the Gore administration would not have gone to war with Iraq. Frank P. Harvey, however, attacks the plausibility of this assumption in his book: Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence.

Through his book Harvey makes a compelling argument against the generally accepted view of history: that President Bush and his neoconservative allies managed the mislead the American public and the rest of the world about the danger of Iraq, thus leading to an unpopular war. This view of history is apparent in Greenfield's 43*, as Andrew Schneider pointed out in his review and even in Archduke Franz Ferdinand Lives. Harvey, on the other hand, suggests that the groundwork for the confrontation with Iraq was laid much earlier than 9/11 and that a foreign policy hawk like Gore would have followed a similar route as Bush in dealing with Iraq.

Fair warning, Explaining the Iraq War is not an alternate history book. It is a counterfactual history and yes there is a difference. This is not a traditional narrative most alternate historians are used to, even including the fictional history textbooks or memoirs like When Angels Wept. This book is over 300 pages of facts, figures and quotes from a large variety of sources that Harvey uses to make his argument about the foreign policy of his counterfactual Gore administration. It is a dense tome that counterfactual historians and foreign policy buffs will enjoy for its insightful look at the causes of the Iraq War, but more casual alternate historians will find this book difficult to read.

Although I found Explaining the Iraq War to be a fascinating look at recent history, the relative nearness of the counterfactual's POD means that how much weight you give to Harvey's argument will likely depend on your own personal politics. The Iraq War remains a controversial subject for most of the world and will remain so until sufficient amount of time is allowed to pass to remove it from the present and truly make it history. Nevertheless, Explaining the Iraq War is a good look at another perspective of history besides Great Man theory and an important lesson for why you study all of the factors leading up to important historical events instead of just the people who were in charge.

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Matt Mitrovich is the founder and editor of Alternate History Weekly Update and a blogger on Amazing Stories. His new short story "Road Trip" can be found in Forbidden Future: A Time Travel Anthology. When not writing he works as an attorney, enjoys life with his beautiful wife Alana and prepares for the inevitable zombie apocalypse. You can follow him on Facebook or Twitter.

Friday, October 25, 2013

Alternate Nixons Part 2

Guest post by Andrew Schneider. Read Part 1 here.

There are any number of minor changes that could have led to a Nixon victory in 1960. The popular vote was the closest in living memory, with just a fraction of a percent separating the winner from the loser. In Barry N. Malzberg’s “Heavy Metal” -- published in Mike Resnick’s short story collection Alternate Presidents -- a last minute fight between Kennedy and Chicago’s Mayor Daley prompts the latter to tilt his city’s returns, and thus Illinois as a whole, into Nixon’s column.

Undoubtedly, the first presidential debate between Nixon and Kennedy played a role in JFK’s eventual victory.  Polls conducted after the debate suggested that a majority of those who watched the debate on television believed Kennedy won. But the majority of those who listened to the debate on the radio believed Nixon was the victor. If Nixon had accepted advice from his handlers on how to prepare for the debate – let the makeup people do their work, or you’re going to look unhealthy under the lights – then appearance would have played less of a role in popular perceptions of who won. The fact was that Nixon wasn't in the best of health.  He was still recuperating from an infection he’d sustained by slamming his knee into a car door. Subtract the injury, and Nixon would not only have looked healthier but might have turned in a sharper performance.

A more intriguing turning point to me hinges on the way each of the candidates reacted to the arrest and imprisonment of Martin Luther King Jr. in Georgia on trumped up charges.  Kennedy called King’s wife Coretta to offer his sympathy. Nixon failed to do so, though he apparently did try, without success, to get the Eisenhower Justice Department to intervene to get King released.

Nixon’s 1968 victory came in significant part because of his domestic platform of “law and order,” framed as a coded appeal to whites who resented the civil rights policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The strategy laid the ground work for a massive shift in the states of the South, transforming it over the course of a few decades from a solidly Democratic bastion to an overwhelmingly Republican one. So it’s easy to overlook the fact that Vice President Nixon was a staunch supporter of the civil rights movement.
Jeffrey Frank explores this subject at some length in his recent study of Nixon’s relationship with Eisenhower, Ike and Dick: Portrait of a Strange Political Marriage. Frank characterizes Nixon as “the one major [Eisenhower] administration official who went out of his way to meet regularly with black leaders” (p. 214). Nixon had been on good terms with King since they met in 1957, and he had the active support of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr., a highly influential figure in his own right. As a private citizen, he supported passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act -- unlike Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Frank characterizes Nixon’s decision not to intervene more forcefully as “cautious, even cowardly,” motivated by fear that he would alienate Southern whites who’d voted for Eisenhower without making any significant inroads among black voters. But JFK took an even greater risk. Nixon could have won without the South. Kennedy could not.  In our timeline, the risk paid off. Kennedy picked up tens of thousands more black votes than he otherwise expected, including in the critical states of Illinois and Texas. Had Nixon shown the courage of his convictions, those votes could have been his.

It’s worth examining what this would have meant for an earlier Nixon presidency. There were any number of Republican presidents prior to 1960 who had campaigned for, and been elected with the help of, African-American votes, but who failed to do anything significant in the way of mitigating the horrors in which African-Americans lived. Nixon may well have been different, if for no other reason than because of the time at which he took office. Nixon saw civil rights as an issue intertwined with the Cold War. America claimed the mantle of leader of the free world, casting the Soviet Union as the enemy of freedom. However obvious that might be in retrospect, it was difficult to make that case to other when the United States visibly denied civil rights (and frequently life itself) to non-white citizens across much of its territory. It was even more difficult in the new nations of Africa, freshly emerging from decades or even centuries of colonial rule.

My guess is that a Nixon elected president in 1960 would have made this argument forcefully to Congress.  With Democrats still in charge of both houses, and segregationist Southerners in charge of many of the key committees, getting any civil or voting rights bills through would have been just as difficult for Nixon as for Kennedy.  It’s possible, though, that Nixon may have been able to pull enough support among Northern Democrats, together with the Republican caucus, to have pushed such measures through. He would likely have shown fewer compunctions than did Eisenhower about using federal authority to integrate southern schools.

From that standpoint, there might have been little difference in the pace of civil rights legislation under an earlier President Nixon than under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The long-term implications for U.S. politics, though, would have been significant. It would have made a G.O.P. embrace of the Southern Strategy highly implausible. The end result would likely have been a party that was less sectional and more moderate. That raises the question, though, of where conservative southern whites would have taken their votes. In 1968, both Nixon and George Wallace were competing for that bloc. If President Nixon emerged as a champion of civil rights, would that bloc have stuck with the Democrats? Or would have led to a durable third party, aiming both at southern conservatives and disaffected northern whites?

The Nixon of 1960 was a complex man, prone to self-doubt, temper tantrums, and bullying behavior. He had an extremely suspicious nature. He’d demonstrated a willingness to play dirty, both in his first congressional campaign (1946) and in his senatorial campaign (1950). He was not an easy man to like. But he was a long way from the bitter, obsessive, vengeful figure he’d become by 1968. Whether a Nixon elected in 1960 would have been any more effective as president, he would have been far less likely to have broken the law.

Could Nixon have had an even earlier start to his presidency? This is a question Frank comes back to repeatedly. Eisenhower was close to death at least three times during time in office. He suffered his first heart attack in September 1955, a severe gastrointestinal illness in June 1956, and a stroke in November 1957.

The stroke offered the greatest possibility for an early, and successful, Nixon presidency. It brought about widespread, public speculation that Eisenhower was no longer physically capable of carrying about the duties of his office. It was particularly worrisome to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.  Dulles’ uncle, Robert Lansing, had been secretary of state when President Woodrow Wilson suffered his own debilitating stroke, leaving the government largely under the influence of Wilson’s wife Edith for months. The stroke itself came just weeks before Eisenhower was scheduled to travel to a NATO meeting in Paris. According to Frank, had Eisenhower not recovered sufficiently to make the NATO meeting, he had planned to resign.

There were relatively few crises between 1957 and 1960 that give us much ground for speculation on how Nixon would have behaved differently from Eisenhower. It’s unlikely, for example, that Nixon at this stage in his career would have been inclined to risk war with Mainland China when, in August 1958, it resumed shelling of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, occupied by Chiang Kai-shek’s forces.  Nor is it likely that Nixon would have intervened to prevent the January 1959 overthrow of Cuba’s Fulgencio Batista. At this point, it was still unclear that Fidel Castro was a Communist. By contrast, the corrupt Batista was generally regarded as an embarrassment to the United States. The odds are that Nixon would have performed competently.

Would he have then won a term on his own merits in 1960? John F. Kennedy would have had a much tougher time beating Nixon as a sitting president than as a departing vice president. Lyndon Johnson – then the Senate majority leader and the most powerful Democrat in Washington – would have made a more formidable opponent had he been able to rouse himself to pursue the nomination more energetically than he did in our timeline. But Johnson would have faced a serious problem in terms of his geographical origins.  In 1960, no one from South of the Mason-Dixon Line had been elected president in more than 100 years. His support for the 1964 Voting Rights Act and the 1965 Civil Rights Act were far in the future. In fact, LBJ was one of the Southern Democratic leaders who participated in the epic filibuster of the weaker 1957 Civil Rights Act. That might have helped him in the South, but it would have killed him in the North. It’s difficult to envision either of the other major Democratic candidates of 1960 -- Adlai Stevenson and Hubert Humphrey -- doing much better against an incumbent Nixon.

What might have happened if Eisenhower had died in 1955 or 1956 is another matter. At this point, Nixon was younger and less seasoned a foreign policy hand. He would have faced the twin crises of the Suez War and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, presumably in the midst of a campaign for a full term as president.
Eisenhower ended the Suez Crisis by forcing Britain and France to withdraw their forces from Egypt, on pain of forfeiting badly needed financial assistance. Israel, then isolated, was pushed to withdraw from the Sinai in exchange for United Nations guarantees of its security and freedom of navigation (both of which ultimately proved worthless, leading directly to the Six Day War of 1967). This was one of the few moments since the start of the Cold War when the U.S. and the Soviet Union found themselves taking a common position against the European colonial powers. Nixon let it be known, years later, that he disagreed with Eisenhower’s handling of the Suez Crisis.

Nixon didn’t hold back from expressing his position on the Hungarian Revolution at the time, though. Shortly before Election Day 1956, Nixon gave a speech at Occidental College calling for open support of the rebels as part of a campaign to liberate Eastern Europe from Soviet rule.  Calling for the liberation of Eastern Europe was hardly new for Nixon. Nor was it unique to the vice president. It was a position he shared with his foreign policy mentor, Secretary of State Dulles.

As mentioned above, Eisenhower refused to intervene in the Hungarian Revolution. Would the young Nixon have shown similar restraint? The pairing of Suez and Hungary would have presented him with an international crisis to match what Kennedy faced in October 1962. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis, this could all too easily have escalated into a nuclear confrontation.

Frank presents earlier points of divergence for Nixon. There were concerted efforts to dump Nixon from the Republican ticket, both in 1952 and again in 1956. Eisenhower appeared to support these efforts at times, particularly during the financial scandal that Nixon sought to stem with his famous “Checkers” speech.  Eisenhower never liked to fire people. He much preferred to have other people deliver the bad news, or to encourage the offenders to resign. Various lieutenants in the 1952 Eisenhower campaign – including New York Governor Tom Dewey, twice the former GOP standard bearer – passed the word to Nixon that Eisenhower wanted him to resign from the ticket. Ike himself said nothing directly, and Nixon declined to fall on his own sword.

Eisenhower could have demanded Nixon’s resignation, though, which would have left the vice presidential nominee with little choice. Most likely, Nixon’s replacement on the ticket would have been William Knowland, the senior senator from California and Nixon’s bitter rival. Knowland was an experienced foreign policy hand, a staunch conservative, and an ally of Eisenhower’s main opponent for the Republican nomination, Ohio Senator Robert Taft. An Eisenhower-Knowland ticket would likely have triumphed in November 1952, although the upheaval might have made it a closer race than Eisenhower actually enjoyed against Stevenson. Whatever the outcome for Eisenhower, though, it’s unlikely Nixon would ever have had another shot at national office.

There is one still earlier divergence for Nixon that is particularly intriguing. In 1937, fresh out of Duke University School of Law, Nixon applied to become an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Nixon’s full application has since been declassified and is available for viewing on the FBI’s website. It appears that Nixon’s application was in fact approved. What happened next is unclear.  According to one telling, Nixon’s decision to postpone his accepting the post until after he’d taken the bar exam led to the offer being withdrawn.

Nixon himself later claimed Hoover told him the only thing that kept Nixon from being made an agent was that Congress hadn't appropriated the necessary funds in 1937 -- entirely possible, given that 1937 was a year of budget cutbacks, but this doesn't appear as part of the original FBI record. Either way, had Nixon joined the Bureau, it’s unlikely he would have served in the Navy in World War II, and less likely still that he would have entered politics. Instead, he may well have spent the balance of his career hunting Communists and other alleged subversives with a badge and gun. And the shape of post-war American politics would have been unimaginably different.

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Andrew Schneider is the business news reporter for KUHF Houston Public Radio. His work has appeared in print in The Kiplinger Letter and The Writer, as well as online at KUHF.org. He is currently writing a memoir of his time in Afghanistan as a war correspondent. You can follow him on Facebook or on Twitter.
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