Showing posts with label Video Codecs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Video Codecs. Show all posts

Thursday, April 20, 2023

MPEG LA settles patent enforcement actions against former pool contributor Samsung Electronics--but contract dispute apparently continues in NY state court

Patent pool administrator MPEG LA just announced (PDF) that "the HEVC enforcement actions brought in [the Dusseldorf Regional Court] against Samsung Electronics GmbH ('Samsung') announced on 28 March 2022 [...] have been settled with the taking of licenses. As a result, all legal disputes related to those patent enforcement actions have been resolved."

I commented on that March 28, 2022 announcement on the same day. What made it so noteworthy is that it was potentially the first dispute ever in which a pool's former licensor was sued for becoming an allegedly unwilling licensee.

So the parties have put the infringement actions behind them (which is another success story for MPEG LA's common counsel of record in Dusseldorf infringement actions, Axel Verhauwen of Krieger Mes and Gottfried Schuell ("Schüll" in German) of Cohausz & Florack).

But the announcement does not mention the contract lawsuit (PDF) brought by Samsung in a New York state court last May. I've checked the docket, and just at the beginning of this week, Samsung filed its opposition to a motion to dismiss by MPEG LA. There is no notice of voluntary dismissal on the docket, which together with the careful wording of today's announcement leads me to believe that they have not (yet) been able to agree on that part. That case is a royalty dispute. Samsung argues that MPEG LA is not paying the full amount of royalties the Korean electronics giant deems itself entitled to.

Two other companies who left MPEG LA and contributed their patents to Access Advance's HEVC Advance pool (ETRI and SK Telecom) are also suing MPEG LA over that question in New York state court. That case is essentially about whether MPEG LA licensees who signed up before a given licensor left the pool are licensed not only to HEVC-essential patents obtained before, but also to those obtained after the period during which the patentee in question was an MPEG LA licensor.

Wednesday, January 11, 2023

Xiaomi announces new patent license agreements with IP Bridge, Orange, Siemens: another sign of Access Advance pool being sidestepped

An interesting announcement hit the news wires yesterday:

"Patent owners IP Bridge, Orange, Siemens and Xiaomi, a world-leading consumer electronics and smart manufacturing company, today announced an end to long lasting disputes through an innovative patent licensing transaction to enable efficient licensing of patent rights across multiple technologies from the companies to Xiaomi. Novus IP, a company owned by Mr. Paul Lin, the former "Head of IP Strategy" at Xiaomi, worked as a deal facilitator and helped Xiaomi and the three licensors successfully close this licensing transaction in a highly efficient manner."

This looks like a virtual and temporary pool: three licensors (IP Bridge, Orange, Siemens) concluded an agreement with one licensee (Xiaomi). It's an interesting new approach, and adds to Mr. Lin's reputation as a patent licensing dealmaker who gets things done. By the way, last month I reported on a webinar moderated by Mr. Lin.

In early November, information I obtained from German court sources indicated to me that Xiaomi might have decided to enter into bilateral license agreements with the Access Advance's licensors instead of taking an HEVC pool license. Also, Xiaomi remains licensed to some patents--especially Samsung's HEVC patents--by virtue of having taken an MPEG LA license before Samsung left. As the saying goes, the early bird catches the worm--and the worm in question (a given company's HEVC standard-essential patent portfolio) keeps growing after it's been caught, like the gift that keeps on giving. Some Access Advance licensors don't want to face that fact, which is why some (in my opinion meritless) litigation is pending in state court.

Of the three companies who yesterday announced their new license agreements with Xiaomi, one is a key HEVC Advance licensor: IP Bridge was suing Xiaomi in Germany over its implementation of HEVC. Not so anymore. Another HEVC Advance licensor has settled with Xiaomi on a bilateral basis.

What's happening here doesn't generally call into question the ability of patent pools to provide transactional efficiencies. I'm sure we'll continue to hear about Xiaomi taking patent pool licenses. The situation between Xiaomi and Access Advance is an outlier, but Xiaomi must have reasons for what it's doing.

Let's see what 2023 will bring in terms of next-generation codec (VVC etc.) patent pool announcements.

Thursday, December 1, 2022

MPEG LA seeks dismissal of ETRI, SK Telecom complaint threatening 'the utility, benefit, and public trust underlying [patent] pool licenses': Supreme Court of the State of New York

If litigants try a long shot, it may every once in a while contribute to the evolution of the caselaw. At times, the term "long shot" is a euphemism, especially when a complaint goes against a crystal clear contract. Deutsche Telekom's "antitrust" action against patent licensing firm IPCom was thrown out by the Mannheim Regional Court six months ago as I had predicted. At least Deutsche Telekom didn't deny that the contract said what it said (they waived their right to bring antitrust claims over how other implementers would be treated later): Deutsche Telekom "only" argued that an unambiguous written commitment, made when no injunction was in force or imminent, should be held unenforceable anyway.

Worse than that, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and SK Telecom brought a suit in September that comes down to claiming that the relevant contract--an agreement among patent pool contributors--doesn't say what it says. The two are suing MPEG LA--a patent pool administrator in good standing that has been around for more than a quarter century (Wikipedia article)--in the Supreme Court of the State of New York (County of New York, case no. 653232/2022, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and SK Telecom Co., Ltd. v. MPEG LA, LLC (PDF)). ETRI and SK Telecom accuse MPEG LA of "falsely claiming to license to others hundreds of valuable patents owned by ETRI and [SK Telecom] when MPEG LA has no right or authority to do so"--but as I'll show further below, that's preposterous. If they won against all odds and common sense, a large number of MPEG LA licensees--from numerous small companies to the likes of Xiaomi--would subsequently face duplicative royalty demands and potentially infringement litigation over patents they are lawfully using (and paying for) under an existing pool license.

It's an attack on a bedrock principle of the patent pool system: that licensees can rely on being licensed to all patents that are essential to the relevant standard and belong to any of the licensors of a pool from which they take a license. I don't understand why two companies who contribute to various pools (with SK Telecom presumably also having taken many pool licenses) decided to bring that complaint, apart from being virtually certain to waste money on legal fees. They are making themselves ridiculous because of the absurdity of their theory and at the same time untrusthworthy:

  • How can other pool managers trust ETRI and SK Telecom that they won't challenge unambiguous clauses in other patent pool agreements?

  • How can licensees trust that if they license ETRI and SK Telecom patents from a pool, they won't later be sued over those patents (unless they pay again, and possibly a lot more than they paid the first time)?

Case overview

Patent licensing is a complex business, so there could be a legitimate question of contract interpretation here, right? Actually...no. One does have to read the Agreement Among Licensors Regarding the HEVC Standard that ETRI and SK Telecom attached to their complaint as Exhibit 3 (PDF). Then it's pretty clear that the issue the complaint attempts to make up simply doesn't exist.

ETRI and SK Telecom left the MPEG LA HEVC pool about three years ago (and instead joined Access Advance's HEVC Advance Pool, as did some other Korean companies, most notably Samsung). The complaint says: "For ETRI, termination became effective on January 2, 2020. For [SK Telecom], termination became effective on January 27, 2020."

What does such termination mean for licensees? One distinction is really key:

  • timely licensees (those who signed up before termination taking effect)

    vs.

  • tardy licensees (those who signed up after termination became effective)

"Timely licensees" and "tardy licensees" is just how I call them here.

The problem is that ETRI and SK Telecom emphasize another distinction, which one can make for academic purposes but which ultimately changes nothing about the contractual situation:

  • pre-termination patents (HEVC-essential patents of which ETRI and SK Telecom became owners before termination taking effect)

    vs.

  • post-termination patents (HEVC-essential patents of which ETRI and SK Telecom became owners after termination became effective)

A two-by-two matrix shows what the dispute is about, i.e., whether a given MPEG LA licensee is licensed to certain ETRI and SK Telecom patents:

Timely LicenseesTardy Licensees
Pre-Termination Patentslicensed
(undisputed)
not licensed
(undisputed)
Post-Termination PatentsMPEG LA says: licensed
ETRI/SK say: not licensed
not licensed
(undisputed)

In other words, tardy licensees get no benefit with respect to any of ETRI's and SK Telecom's patents; timely licensees remain licensed under pre-termination patents; and the question is now whether a timely licensee remains licensed to ETRI's and SK Telecom's HEVC portfolios including post-termination patents.

On November 7, MPEG LA brought a motion to dismiss (PDF). Contract interpretation is a matter of law, and if the contract is clear, the case must go away, based on documentary evidence alone.

The first contract clause to look at here is § 2.3 of the Agreement Among Licensors:

"Non-Exclusive Licenses or Sublicenses. Each [Licensor] shall hereby grant to [MPEG LA and any successor] a worldwide, nonexclusive, non-transferable license or sbulicense under all HEVC Essential Patents, which the [Licensor] and its Affiliates presently or in the future [emphasis added] has the right to license or sublicense (without payment to any third party which is not an Affiliate), with a right of [MPEG LA] to grant sublicenses which are identical in form to the sublicense in Attachment 1 hereto [i.e., the pool license agreement]. ..."

What does the termination clause (§ 7.2) say?

"Voluntary Termination. At any time after January 1, 2020 each [Licensor] shall have the right, effective upon thirty (30 days' written notice [...], to terminate with respect to itself all but not less than all of the following: (1) this Agreement [Among Licensors]; (2) the right of [MPEG LA] to grant additional sublicenses [i.e., pool licenses] (excluding renewals of sublicenses existing at such time) under its license or sublicense granted by such terminating [Licensor] pursuant to Section 2.3 herein; and (3) the Licensing Administrator Agreement entered into pursuant to Section 2.2 herein. [...] For the avoidance of doubt, such termination shall not affect the grant of the license, including renewals, or sublicenses contemplated pursuant to Section 2.3."

MPEG LA's motion to dismiss notes that ETRI and SK Telecom's complaint doesn't even quote the key passages, such as the "For the avoidance of doubt" part ("shall not affect the grant of the license, including renewals. Instead, the complaint makes it sound like "additional sublicenses"--which just means that MPEG LA can't give subsequent licensees any license to patents owned by licensors who have left--also included cases in which a timely licensee becomes licensed to post-termination patents.

Xiaomi is a great example here. Their license agreement with MPEG LA was announced (PDF) on January 9, 2020. Let's assume that the announcement wasn't delayed too much after the signing of the agreement, then they presumably became an MPEG LA HEVC licensee after ETRI's effective termination date, but undoubtedly prior to SK Telecom's. If Xiaomi or MPEG LA claimed that Xiaomi was licensed by MPEG LA to SK Telecom's HEVC patents, that would presumably be wrong, and I could see a case for declaratory judgment. But Xiaomi clearly got a license to all of SK Telecom's HEVC patents, including the ones SK Telecom obtained after termination ("in the future" as Section 2.3 as said). If SK Telecom was granted an HEVC-essential patent in, say, February 2020, Xiaomi is licensed, and the "For the avoidance of doubt" part applies--including that Xiaomi can perpetually renew its MPEG LA license agreement without losing those benefits.

Policy considerations

Implementers understandably expect legal certainty--peace of mind--with respect to the standard-essential patent (SEP) portfolios of the licensors they see on the list when they take a license. Why take a pool license at all if you may still face royalty demands and infringement litigation over patents from a party with which you thought you already had a deal in place?

Pools provide transactional efficiencies, but they can only do so with reasonable legal certainty.

ETRI and SK Telecom have a problem: anyone who negotiates an HEVC Advance license (a pool they joined because they thought they'd get a better deal than from MPEG LA) but already has a (timely) MPEG LA license will argue that certain parts of the Advance pool must not be paid for again. Access Advance--through its licensors that were asserting patents against Vestel--lost a case in Dusseldorf about a year ago because of the duplicative-royalties issues.

They're now trying a Hail Mary in a New York state court.

Another South Korean company, Samsung, also filed a lawsuit against MPEG LA there: a complaint (PDF) over royalty redistribution. Various cases by MPEG LA licensors against Samsung are pending in Dusseldorf. I don't want to disgree into the Samsung situation here. The cases aren't identical, but the root cause is the same and the issues are at least adjacent--and the complaints similarly meritless, though ETRI and SK Telecom's complaint has set a new absurdity record.

What Samsung has in common with ETRI and SK Telecom is the root cause of their grievances: they thought it was a smart move to join the Access Advance pool and leave the MPEG M;LA pool, and it's not going well. There are potential signs of piecemeal resolution by licensees such as Xiaomi, taking bilateral licenses rather than a pool license.

Those companies wish they could have left MPEG LA without existing licensees retaining any kind of license. But that's not what the contract says, nor would it be good policy. MPEG LA notes that what is at stake here is "'the utility, benefit, and public trust underlying [patent] pool licenses'."

The issues even go slightly beyond patent pools. Capture clauses in bilateral license agreements frequently include patents to be granted or acquired after certain key dates. Many bilateral license agreements resulting from individual negotiations as opposed to a standard agreement being signed by many parties. That is an important difference, but it is always unacceptable when licensors try to get out of their commitments in hopes of being able to charge more.

Federal courts deal with patent license agreements all the time because of license-based defenses to patent infringement complaints. State courts do have jurisdiction over contract law, including patent-related agreements, but don't see the practical implications in infringement cases. I suspect that ETRI and SK Telecom just hope that a state court can be fooled by them, but the contract language appears too clear--and the Supreme Court of the State of New York (County of New York) does adjudicate interesting commercial disputes on a daily basis. So my prediction is that the complaint will be dismissed.

Sunday, November 6, 2022

Xiaomi is settling video codec patent lawsuits with Access Advance licensors--but not necessarily taking a pool license

The Dusseldorf Regional Court used to be the world's leading video codec patent litigation venue--and it may still be, though Munich has gained popularity. Four licensors of Access Advance's HEVC (H.265) pool sued Chinese consumer electronics giant Xiaomi over H.265 standard-essential patents (SEPs): Philips, Mitsubishi, General Electric, and IP Bridge. The latest information that I've obtained from the Dusseldorf Regional Court's press office suggests that those lawsuits are coming to an end, but interestingly, Xiaomi and the various litigants may be opting for bilateral licenses instead of a pool license.

Let's take a step back. The most important Access Advance licensor is Samsung, but Xiaomi is licensed to those patents by virtue of an MPEG LA license it took in early 2020, shortly before Samsung left MPEG LA.

In March, Xiaomi settled a patent dispute with Philips that involved not only video codecs but also wireless standards. As a result of that settlement, Philips withdrew all lawsuits against Xiaomi, including any case(s) over video codec patents.

That left three plaintiffs from Access Advance's circle of licensors: Mitsubishi, General Electric (GE), and Japanese licensing firm IP Bridge. Here's what the Dusseldorf Regional Court has told me about those cases:

  • Case no. 4c O 50/20 (Mitsubishi v. Xiaomi) has been stayed by stipulation of the parties. Note that this is not a stay for the duration of a parallel nullity or opposition proceeding that is deemed likely to dispose of the case ("Aussetzung") but the kind of stay that parties seek when they believe they can work out a near-term settlement. That kind of stay is called "Ruhen" in German and rarely happens in patent infringement actions.

  • Cases no. 4c O 49/20 and 57/20 (General Electric v. Xiaomi) have also been stayed by stipulation ("Ruhen").

  • Case no. 4c O 51/20 (IP Bridge v. Xiaomi) was stayed by the court as Xiaomi's nullity complaint pending before the Federal Patent Court appeared likely to succeed.

It's unlikely that any of those cases will go anywhere. But what's the endgame? A set of bilateral licenses (to the extent that Xiaomi isn't already licensed to some of those patents thanks to MPEG LA)--or a pool license?

A pool license is an efficient one-stop solution; but when a pool has high administrative fees and when there are disagreements on how to avoid (partly) duplicative royalties, bilateral licenses may be easier for the parties to agree on.

If all complaints had been near-simultaneously withdrawn, the most plausible assumption would be that Xiaomi has taken a pool license. That would be the Tesla-Avanci pattern, where several cases brought by Avanci licensors against the automaker were voluntarily dismissed at around the same time, and no Avanci licensor has since filed suit against Tesla. It seemed odd that Tesla subsequently submitted an amicus brief against Avanci, supporting Continental's case that went nowhere and is now officially dead. That oddity, however, was outweighed by the extremely strong indications of a pool license that I mentioned before. But the Access Advance/Xiaomi situation is nowhere near that clear-cut. The procedural status of the IP Bridge case differs from that of the GE and Mitsubishi cases; Samsung's patents are the most important ones and Xiaomi is licensed to them; and what's telling is that Xiaomi agreed on a bilateral license with Philips instead of simultaneously taking an Advance license and settling only the non-codec parts of the dispute with Philips.

There's also a possibility of Xiaomi taking several bilateral licenses first, and a pool license later, just like Daimler settled with Sharp and Nokia before ultimately signing up to Avanci.

I'll try to find out more.

Monday, March 28, 2022

MPEG LA contributors file HEVC patent suits against Samsung, making it potentially the first ex-licensor ever to be sued by a patent pool for becoming an unwilling licensee

The MPEG LA patent pool firm just announced the filing of patent infringement actions against Samsung.

The patents-in-suit have been declared essential to the HEVC (High Efficiency Video Coding) standard, also known as H.265. The complaints were filed with the Dusseldorf Regional Court, a prime venue for video codec patents that dealt MPEG LA rival Access Advance a major setback in late 2021, but MPEG LA has consistently succeeded there. The same patent litigator-patent attorney duo is representing MPEG LA's enforcing licensors again: Axel Verhauwen of Krieger Mes and Gottfried Schuell ("Schüll" in German) of Cohausz & Florack.

Today's announcement is so very interesting not only because of Samsung's significance as a consumer electronics giant but also because of Samsung's history with MPEG LA. As the announcement mentions, "Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. was both Licensor and Licensee to MPEG LA’s HEVC Patent Portfolio License from Fall 2014 until terminating in March 2020, but Samsung has continued to offer products including smartphones, tablets and televisions in Germany that use patent protected HEVC methods without license since termination." The German lawsuits target that entity's German subsidiary Samsung Electronics GmbH.

In April 2017, Samsung joined Access Advance's HEVC pool named HEVC Advance (in fact, the entire company was named Access Advance at the time). A few years later, or about two years ago as we speak, it then terminated its MPEG LA contract.

It seems that even Xiaomi, which took an MPEG LA license in January 2020, is licensed to Samsung's HEVC patents as a result of its own MPEG LA license. This is important with a view to Access Advance's duplicative-royalty policy.

In order for Xiaomi not to be licensed, Samsung's contribution of patents to the MEPG LA pool would have had to end even sooner than its license agreement as an implementer. Today's announcement says Samsung terminated in March 2020. MPEG LA's HEVC licensor page is also pretty clear:

"*Terminated. For as long as they continue to be a Licensee, those Licensees who entered the HEVC Patent Portfolio License before a Licensor’s termination are covered under all HEVC Essential Patents that the terminated Licensor and its Affiliates presently or in the future has the right to license or sublicense, but coverage is not available to Licensees who enter the HEVC Patent Portfolio License after the Licensor’s termination date. Please see the addendum to the Attachment 1 (Click here) for specific termination dates."

The PDF accessible via the "Click here" link states:

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

(terminated March 27, 2020)

Given that Xiaomi is the closest competitor to Samsung among Android device makers in various respects, the question of whether Xiaomi has access to Samsung's patents on FRAND terms is key.

Today's MPEG LA press release is the first announcement of a major SEP enforcement action against Samsung since the dispute with Ericsson that settled about a year ago.

Actually, MPEG LA's terms favor large-scale implementers like Samsung, especially by virtue of royalty caps. It is hard to tell why Samsung didn't simply renew its license with MPEG LA. Maybe we'll learn more about it as a result of the infringement actions that have been brought.

I'm not aware of any other case in which a former contributor to a pool later got sued by that pool for a refusal to take a license. It may indeed be the first one of its kind. It is another example of the hot mess that is HEVC patent licensing (and that VVC patent licensing threatens to become unless the industry at large finds a better way forward).

Industry rumor has it that Samsung and Nokia have yet to agree on the terms of a renewal. There have been some Nokia-Samsung announcements in recent years, but there's no reason to assume they involved Nokia's cellular SEP portfolio. Should Nokia have to sue Samsung (as it is presently suing OPPO and Vivo), that would be a dispute orders of magnitude larger than MPEG LA's cases. Nokia does not believe in royalty caps, let's put it that way.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Friday, March 11, 2022

Access Advance's duplicitous royalty policy pretends to be FRAND but fails to withstand scrutiny: patent pools must not borrow from Ponzi schemes

There's been some talk this week about Access Advance's March 8 announcement of an update to its duplicate royalty policy. And once more, it's a non-solution. It would be a running gag if there weren't actually companies suffering due to pending and threatened infringement actions.

For a recap, the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Dusseldorf Regional Court) entered a landmark set of rulings that resulted in the first finding of un-FRAND-liness of a patent pool's terms. The issue was not the rate (which the Dusseldorf court had blessed before) but double-dipping: defendants like Vestel previously took an MPEG LA license and are therefore already licensed to many patents in the Advance pool (potentially also Samsung's HEVC (H.265) patents), but are now being pressured to take an HEVC Advance license without a reasonable credit or refund mechanism to avoid double-dipping. There have been various cases in which courts relied on pool licenses as comparable agreements, but there had not been a previous case in which a pool's terms raised issues. To add insult to injury, the normally rather patentee-friendly court not only found Vestel's FRAND defense meritorious but also declared that the defendant and counterclaimant was entitled to antitrust damages (of an amount to be determined subsequently). Access Advance now claims to have gone beyond the Dusseldorf court's requirements, but as I'll show further below, they still refuse to do what really needs to be done.

Earlier this year Access Advance, the GE-Philips-Dolby-Mitsubishi entity that is all about generating supra-FRAND income (in the combination of patent royalties and pool management fees) for its four owners, already claimed to have learned its lesson. However, a first attempt to address the Dusseldorf court's concerns had some glaring deficiencies. In February, the Dusseldorf appeals court overturned an anti-antisuit injunction against Xiaomi and mentioned the patentee's FRAND defeat in the lower court. Meanwhile I've found out about a number of Access Advance v. TCL cases pending in Munich.

There we are, and now Access Advance is giving it a third try. While there is a web form to request a copy of the new terms ("Duplicate Royalty Adjustment Amendment"), the policy statement summarizing the terms of that amendment is publicly accessible (though it's not straightforward to navigate there). So let's talk about that one, but first I'm going to edit the headline (click on the image to enlarge):

What makes that policy duplicitous is that unsophisticated observers, or sophisticated ones with a two-second attention span, may look at it and actually be led to believe that Access Advance is heeding the Dusseldorf court's criticsm. In reality, it looks like the economics of the HEVC Advance patent pool simply don't make it a profitable option to treat implementers fairly if they are already licensed to some of the patents in question. That shouldn't be an issue: patent pools have to avoid double-dipping all the time, and if, say, 30% of the patents in a pool (assuming for the sake of the argument that they're all equally valuable) have already been licensed, it's common sense that someone taking a license from that pool shouldn't pay a lot more than 70% of the standard pool rate. But Access Advance apparently can't do that without losing money, in which case the approach in question is broken beyond repair.

Were this a motion-to-dismiss process in the U.S., and had the latest policy been presented as a Second Amended Complaint, a renewed motion to dismiss would tell the court that almost all of the issues previously raised still exist. Blog posts aren't formal proceedings, so I can show you very quickly and easily why they haven't really addressed all of the issues.

Only refers to other pools, not bilateral licenses or exhaustion

This link (a so-called anchor link) takes you directly to the part of my January post on the previous version of that policy. In that one, I wrote:

"The first glaring deficiency is that it talks only about patents that are "also included in the patent list of another patent licensing pool, or joint licensing program," without addressing the scenario in which someone took a direct (bilateral) license, which is not at all uncommon in this industry. Bilateral licenses can result from license agreements or even from patent exhaustion. The Access Advance folks know that, and it must be attributed to bad faith that their Duplicate Royalty Policy fails to address that problem."

Nothing changed in that regard: in order to be eligible for the (questionable) benefits of that policy, a company must be "a licensee of another HEVC patent pool or joint licensing program (e.g., the HEVC patent pool administered by MPEG LA)."

As far as I know, Vestel's FRAND defense and counterclaim were based entirely on a prior MPEG LA license, not on a bilateral license or patent exhaustion. But that doesn't make that the other scenarios wouldn't apply to other companies. In January I wrote "the root cause of the Dusseldorf disaster is deep and structural." If Access Advance was sincere about becoming FRAND-compliant, they wouldn't wait until some future defendant raises a related issue: they'd simply recognize that double-dipping, for whatever reason it would occur, isn't FRAND, period.

On a related note, it's debatable whether it's reasonable for Access Advance to limit the applicability of its policy to scenarios in which an implementer took the other pool license first. This is, again, a non-issue in the Vestel and Xiaomi cases: they signed with MPEG LA first. MPEG LA's HEVC pool is the older one, which means a company can have signed up to MPEG LA before the HEVC Advance pool even existed, but not the other way round. But let's look at it this way: Access Advance has told implementers to go seek a refund from MPEG LA, but that wouldn't even be an option if MPEG LA, too, had formulated a duplicate-royalty policy according to which no adjustments will be made if someone subsequently licenses some of those patents elsewhere. So even if one agreed that it's fair to say that the older pool license takes priority, just like an older patent application beats a younger one in an interference proceeding, Access Advance is now taking a position that is self-serving and self-contradictory at the same time.

Commitment, not merely referral

The previous version of the policy had one weakness that has meanwhile been addressed, but on the bottom line licensees still won't really get a FRAND deal. In January I wrote:

"In a duplicate-license sceario, Access Advance does nothing for licensees other than to 'refer the request to the applicable Licensor(s)' (footnote 3), which falls far short of what the Dusseldorf court wanted, which was legal certainty for licensees."

And I noted that no one needs a policy for a scenario in which a licensor and a licensee agree. If they're on the same page, there is no problem left to be addressed by the pool. All that Access Advance has done is to eliminate that "referral" part. Instead, "Advance commits to deduct the amount of duplicate royalties," but as you'll see, the way they calculate "the amount of duplicate royalties" raises the very same issues as before.

In a nutshell, they do commit to a deduction right away, which would be an improvement over the previous state of affairs if the deduction was FRAND, which it is not.

A commitment to unfairness is the same from the point of view of an implementer seeking a credit or refund as a non-commitment to fairness.

In the next two sections I'll raise the two reasons for which the deduction they commit to falls far short of meeting FRAND criteria.

Access Advance acknowledges that some licensors--presumably including Samsung--receive no royalty payments

In January I already wrote that "Samsung may contribute lots of patents but not actually get much (if any) money out of the pool." That wasn't only about Samsung: there may be others. But Samsung is by far the largest HEVC Advance licensor, and previously was an MPEG LA licensor. It makes sense to focus on that example for practical reasons.

More than one industry source has told me on background that Samsung may not get much--if any--money out of the pool because it may have contributed its patents just to get a cheap license (or the next best thing to a zero-zero cross-license) for its own mobile devices and TV sets. One my intuitively feel that it's simply Samsung's choice to use its patents as a bargaining chip. If they're interested only in their margins as a device maker, that's a legitimate parameter--but companies like Vestel are still entitled to a license to Samsung's patents on FRAND terms.

Samsung has an interesting history with respect to FRAND. The European Commission deemed it a FRAND abuser in its dispute with Apple, though there were extenuating circumstances as it was just retaliation for non-SEP assertions and Apple's royalty demands, whether over rounded-corner design patents or software patents covering only particular implementations of minor features, weren't perfectly reasonable either. In 2014, Samsung withdrew its SEP assertions against Apple, and since then has consistently been advocating the devaluation of SEPs, just like Apple. However, the net effect of Samsung's sweetheart deal with Access Advance raises FRAND question. Even if one gives Samsung the benefit of the doubt (it might not have anticipated what would happen in the Vestel cases), it needs to be concerned in its patent dealings with preserving its consistency because there's a lot more money at stake for Samsung with respect to cellular SEPs than video codec patents.

Why are Samsung's competitors--and even companies that may implement HEVC in market segments in which Samsung has no presence, though Samsung is that big elephant in the room that it's almost impossible not to compete with--potentially harmed?

Assuming that my industry sources are right, Access Advance's new policy still wouldn't entitle those who took an MPEG LA license early on to a deduction with respect to Samsung's patents. There's a conspicuous conditional clause there:

"If a Licensor of Advance's HEVC patent pool would receive a share of royalties from Company under the HEVC Advance Patent Portfolio License Agreement (the 'HEVC Advance PPL') on account of products of Company licensed under such Licensor's patents that are included in both Advance's HEVC Patent Portfolio and the HEVC patent portfolio of another HEVC patent pool or joint licensing program (a 'Dual-Pool Licensor'), Advance commits to deduct [...]" (emphases added)

As Yogi Berra famously said, when you come to a fork in the road, take it. Here, there is a fork in the road because an IF is a condition that can be met, but need not be met. So we have to ask ourselves the question of what scenarios exist in which the IF condition isn't fulfilled. The fact that Access Advance made the actual receipt of royalty payments a condition can only be interpreted as an admission that one or more licensors don't receive a share of the pool's royalty income. Otherwise the wording would have been much simpler and shorter.

Normally it's a given that someone who contributes patents to a pool receives a share of the royalties. Seriously, I've never heard anyone doubt whether, for instance, a company like LG or OPPO gets money from Avanci. The general public doesn't know exactly how much (though the DOJ's Business Review Letter discussed the Avanci model with a view to 5G), but no one would assume that it's zero.

If Samsung got value out of its participation in the pool other than royalty payments, that doesn't mean implementers who previously licensed its patents aren't entitled to a FRAND deduction. Samsung can't just say "sorry, we get no money out of the HEVC pool" (unlike from MPEG LA, a pretty transparent pool). The problem is that GE-Dolby-Philips-Mitsubishi use Samsung's patents to justify the pool rate. They still point everyone to the fact that the Dusseldorf court didn't take issue with the rate--but a rate that appears reasonable for the entire pool may be clearly supra-FRAND when you take out a huge chunk of patents (because of a prior license).

Patent pools must not become Ponzi schemes in the sense that the benefits promised to the first ones to join depend on revenue generated through subsequent transactions with others who will lose money. Here, Access Advance--which, again, is just about maximizing revenues from IPR for GE-Dolby-Philips-Mitsubishi, all of which but Dolby are a shadow of their former selves with respect to video codec innovation--attracted Samsung to the pool with what may be the closest thing to a zero-zero cross-license. But the deal only benefits Access Advance and Samsung if subsequently some other licensees have to pay the very high Advance rate, which they seek to justify, to a large degree, with the strength of Samsung's portfolio. Subsequent licensees must get a FRAND deduction if they've already licensed Samsung's patents through MPEG LA (or a bilateral deal).

A FRAND deduction must be reflective of the overall value derived by a licensor. With a conventional pool, that value is simply a royalty check. But value creation doesn't depend on money changing hands. If a patent pool gave Samsung raw materials in exchange for its contribution, it would still be good and valuable consideration, and a deduction to combat double-dipping would have to be reflective of that type of benefit or it would not be FRAND. Here, the value is that Samsung's own devices got licensed.

Access Advance should tell the world who the licensors that get no money out of the pool are, and what that is so.

Exorbitant pool fees are not reduced

With respect to pool management fees I wrote in January that "[i]n the aggregate of multiple types of fees and charges, Access Advance keeps roughly 40% of the royalty income, which is several times more than MPEG LA's cut according to what people in the industry say about it." Access Advance still declines to reduce those fees in a duplicative-license scenario. Let's resume where we left off further above. After the IF clause I discussed in the previous paragraph, this is what the policy says:

"Advance commits to deduct the amount of duplicate royalties for such Dual-Pool Licensor's patents under the HEVC Advance PPL from invoices sent to Company (i.e., pre-net),(3) thus preventing the Dual-Pool Licensor from receiving duplicate royalties for the Dual-Pool Licensor's patents."

The term "pre-net" is defined in footnote 3:

"Duplicate royalties are that portion of actual net royalty collections apportioned and distributed to Dual-Pool Licensors under Advance’s HEVC patent pool based on products of Company covered by one or more of the Dual-Pool Licensor patents licensed through both Advance’s HEVC patent pool and another HEVC patent pool or joint licensing program, and expressly exclude all fees and other allocations or deductions made by Advance prior to apportionment and distribution of net royalty collections to all Dual-Pool Licensors based on their respective licensed patents." (emphasis added)

So even in scenarios in which implementers already have a license to a substantial part of the portfolio, implementers would still have to pay the same sky-high pool management fees as if they hadn't previously obtained a license to many of the patents in question.

Courts should not be fooled. Competition enforcers might want to take a look should the problem persist, which it probably will because neither Samsung nor GE-Philips-Dolby-Mitsubishi appear prepared to ensure that all implementers are treated fairly.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Tuesday, February 15, 2022

TCL facing onslaught from HEVC Advance licensors in Munich: video codec patent enforcement

When it comes to video codecs, Dusseldorf has been the world's leading patent enforcement forum for about a decade. However, Access Advance has lately suffered a major setback there, and it appears that the HEVC Advance pool's answer to the duplicate-royalty problem is still lacking and wanting.

Meanwhile I've done some research on patent infringement actions brought by HEVC Advance licensors against Chinese electronics maker TCL, a frequent defendant to standard-essential patent (SEP) assertions. Those cases were filed with the Munich I Regional Court, where TCL has also been sued by LG Elecronics over a couple of wireless patents, but those cases are stayed until at least the end of next month. The patents-in-suit in those wireless cases (case nos. 7 O 12979/20 and 7 O 12656/20) EP2239905 and EP2086155, both on an "apparatus for transmitting and receiving a signal and method of transmitting and receiving a signal."

A spokeswoman for the Munich court has confirmed the pendency of the following HEVC Advance v. TCL cases:

  • 21st Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Georg Werner); hearing dates in September and November

    • Dolby v. TCL, case no. 21 O 4139/21, EP2777270 on a "procedure for coding and decoding of images, apparatus for coding and decoding and corresponding computer programs"

    • Mitsubishi v. TCL, case no. 21 O 4136/21, EP2720468 on a "moving image decoding method"

    • GE v. TCL, case no. 21 O 4140/21, EP2559245 on "video coding using multi-tree sub-divisions of images"

    • ETRI v. TCL, case no. 21 O 4141/21, EP2723078 on an "image decoding apparatus"

    • IP Bridge v. TCL, case no. 21 O 8819/21, EP3288261 on a "moving picture decoding method"

  • 44th Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Anne-Kristin Fricke)

    • Philips v. TCL, case no. 44 O 6966/21, EP2950544 on "adaptive coding of the prediction error in hybrid video coding" (hearing date TBD)

In a somewhat related context, Juve Patent reported last year that TCL is typically represented in German patent infringement cases by Dr. Andreas Kramer of Vossius & Partner.

It's a safe assumption that TCL won't be the last company to be sued by HEVC Advance licensors in Munich...

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Tuesday, February 8, 2022

Next defeat for Access Advance patent pool in Dusseldorf: appeals court overturns anti-antisuit injunctions against Xiaomi though it concurs in part with Munich antisuit case law

2022 has resumed where 2021 left off with respect to Access Advance's patent enforcement attempts in Germany. Between Christmas and New Year's, Turkish TV maker Vestel prevailed on a FRAND counterclaim--and an affirmative FRAND defense to injunctive relief--over the Access Advance pool and some of its licensors. The patent pool firm--which was founded by Philips, General Electric, Dolby, and Mitsubishi--has so far failed to address the serious issue of duplicative royalties.

The first court ruling in 2022 to involve Access Advance's enforcement efforts has also favored a defendant: in this case, Xiaomi, one of the world's largest smartphone makers. Yesterday, the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court) lifted a set of anti-antisuit injunctions granted by the lower Dusseldorf court to Philips, GE, and Mitsubishi last summer (Juve Patent reported).

The Dusseldorf appeals court's 2nd Civil Senate under Presiding Judge Dr. Thomas Kuehnen ("Kühnen" in German) reversed the Dusseldorf Regional Court's 4c Civil Chamber on the question of whether the moving parties had a Rechtsschutzbedürfnis--"need for protection under the law" (against an imminent violation)--in this particular case. The three-judge appellate panel concurred with the Munich Higher Regional Court's 2019 decision affirming a Nokia v. Continental anti-antisuit injunction, but begged to differ slightly from the Munich I Regional Court's more expansive framework as laid out in InterDigital v. Xiaomi last year by the Munich court's 7th Civil Chamber under Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann.

Just like the courts in Munich, the Dusseldorf courts believe that the pursuit of a foreign antisuit injunction against the enforcement of German patents is an illegal attack on property rights protected by Germany's de facto constitution. Even more importantly, just like the Munich I Regional Court, the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court is of the opinion that an implementer seeking an antisuit injunction may be deemed an unwilling licensee, resulting in a sales ban once a SEP infringement has been identified.

What decided the case for Xiaomi against those HEVC Advance licensors is that there was no specific threat of Xiaomi seeking a Chinese antisuit injunction that would have prevented the patentees from enforcing their German patent rights. The mere fact that Xiaomi had obtained a Chinese antisuit injunction against InterDigital under fundamentally different circumstances was not deemed sufficient by the Dusseldorf appeals court to suspect that the same might happen in the HEVC Advance cases. (By the way, InterDigital and Xiaomi settled last summer.)

The Dusseldorf appeals court did not even see a basis for those HEVC Advance licensors to obligate Xiaomi to inform them beforehand of a motion for an antisuit injunction.

Whether the Munich I Regional Court and/or the Munich Higher Regional Court would have granted an anti-antisuit injunction when faced with the same fact pattern is hard to tell because each case is different and the lower Munich court's criteria for pre-emptive anti-antisuit injunctions are applied to the entire set of facts, with no single criterion necessarily being decisive in its own right. But there is a discernible difference between the Dusseldorf appeals court and the Munich lower court as the latter does attach some importance (in the multifactorial analysis of whether an anti-antisuit injunction should issue) to an implementer's conduct vis-à-vis other SEP holders--which the Dusseldorf appeals court is rather disinclined to take into consideration--as well as to an implementer's refusal to promise in writing not to move for a foreign antisuit injunction.

Munich's anti-antisuit case law is influential in Europe (and potentially beyond). A few months ago, a Dutch court denied Ericsson an anti-antisuit injunction against Apple (which denial was later affirmed by an appeals court) on similar grounds as the Dusseldorf appeals court's reversal of the anti-antisuit injunctions against Xiaomi, but applied some of the Munich logic.

It appears likely that the Mannheim Regional Court and its regional appeals court, the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court, will reach similar conclusions. Mannheim is a key SEP venue and reasonably protective of IPR owners.

The legal innovator who successfully obtained the first German anti-antisuit injunction (at a minimum, the first SEP-related one) is Dr. Arno Risse ("Riße" in German) of the Arnold & Ruess firm. On an ex parte basis, it was granted by the Munich I Regional Court's 21st Civil Chamber, then under Presiding Judge Tobias Pichlmaier (who has recently been reassigned, at his request, to an antitrust-specialized division). Judge Dr. Hubertus Schacht filled in for Judge Pichlmaier (during the main vacation season) to preside over a hearing on Continental's motion for reconsideration--and affirmed the prior decision, which was ultimately affirmed by the Munich appeals court (6th Civil Senate, under meanwhile-retired Presiding Judge Konrad Retzer). Later, Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann of the Munich I Regional Court's 7th Civil Chamber further developed the criteria to be applied to motions for anti-antisuit injunctions. And now the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court agrees with the Munich stance on anti-antisuit injunctions (including the potential stigmatization of an implementer as an unwilling licensee) to a larger extent than it differs from it on the hurdles for a pre-emptive anti-antisuit injunction.

Arguably, the Munich court's decisive action against foreign antisuit injunctions has been the primary reason why no SEP implementer appears to have employed that tactic in about two years.

Finally, I wish to thank the Loeffel Abrar firm for drawing my attention to this decision via Twitter.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Thursday, January 27, 2022

MPEG LA announcement of VVC patent pool: major patent holders still undecided, fragmentation of licensing landscape potential impediment to adoption

I've recently written about Access Advance's High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC, H.265) pool (one post discussing the logic of the recent Dusseldorf ruling against Access Advance, and another on how the problem appears to persist).

Today there's an announcement (PDF) by a more reputable pool administrator, MPEG LA, of a Versatile Video Coding (VVC, H.266) pool. So let's look at VVC, but start with Access Advance, which was first to announce its initial group of licensors.

On its homepage, Access Advance says about its VVC Advance Licensing Program that its terms are FRAND, "providing rates that balance both Licensor and Licensee interests and complying with worldwide laws applicable to patent pools." (emphasis added) The highlighted part of that quote is "rich." I mean, either they haven't read their own website in a while or they still haven't read the writing on the Dusseldorf court's wall.

The only patent pool administrator (to the best of my knowledge) to license patents (HEVC in that case) on terms that a court even thought entitled unlicensed implementers to damages is not in a great position to assist the rest of the world with FRAND compliance. It happened to them in a court in which MPEG LA had dozens of successes, and still has a clean white shirt when it comes to FRAND.

At this early stage, Access Advance's VVC pool (named VVC Advance) has support from 28 licensors (listed in a January 11, 2022 press release) vs. MPEG LA's initial 11 (b<>com; British Broadcasting Corporation; Digital Insights Inc.; FG Innovation Company Limited; Hanwha Techwin Co., Ltd.; Koninklijke KPN N.V.; Nippon Hoso Kyokai; Orange; Siemens Corp.; Tagivan II LLC; Vidyo, Inc.).

While IPlytics explained how hard it is to estimate the strength of VVC-essential portfolios at this stage, they nevertheless presented a slide last summer that listed 21 major VVC patent holders. Some of them are on Access Advance's list of licensors (Dolby, SK Telecom, Toshiba). But the other 18 out of the 21 listed by IPlytics are either companies who rarely join pools (like InterDigital) or, which is quite telling, they are in the HEVC Advance pool but not--or not yet--VVC Advance licensors, such as Samsung, Google, Microsoft, Huawei, Canon, and LG.

It would take only a few major VVC SEP holders who join MPEG LA's pool, and they'd take the lead. That's why it's too early to call the game. Access Advance is in a difficult position now, and can't explain away the Dusseldorf disaster. Maybe even some of its initial 28 licensors would have made a different decision if the Dusseldorf rulings in the Vestel cases had come down a month or two earlier (before the internal decisions on which pool to join were made).

Implementers will be concerned about the fragmented licensing landscape. There are now two pools, lots of undecided major portfolio owners, and I've heard from industry players that a third pool is being formed.

MPEG LA's AVC/H.264 pool was a huge success, and it made the AVC standard successful. With HEVC, things didn't work out, mostly due to patent licensing issues. What will happen to VVC? Will it ultimately be less popular than some alternatives? Will there be a lot of litigation (by Access Advance licensors more so than anybody else)? It's too early to tell.

One year ago, MPEG LA announced the development of a VVC pool license. Today, they reached the next milestone and listed the first 11 licensors, one of which (Digital Insights) is--quite interestingly--an HEVC Advance licensor.

While VVC Advance--by virtue of being early and not having to poach MPEG LA licensors--may be able to avoid some of Access Advance's HEVC-related FRAND problems, my concerns are still structural. The unfair refund terms are not the root cause of their problems. The fundamental issue is that Access Advance optimizes all of its terms for the purposes of its four owners, only one of which (Dolby) appears on IPlytics's list of 21 major VVC patent holders. If they operated their pools more independently and transparently, they could also have acted more constructively with respect to refunds. But the cut taken by Access Advance and those special deals with companies who are both licensors and major implementers (like Samsung) complicated everything. In some other way, shape or form, that root cause may lead to problems--if not for Access Advance, then at least for the standard in question.

It's a rhetorical question which of these two patent pool administrators has always understood (and which one still doesn't seem to realize) that if licensing terms are reasonable, a standard is more likely to be adopted by many implementers, which in turn makes the licensing revenue cake bigger for patentees than a scenario of high fees and low adoption.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Monday, January 24, 2022

Access Advance pool doesn't really intend to solve duplicate-royalty problem: video codec implementers remain victims of unfair licensing scheme

This is a follow-up to 'Access Advance' patent pool can rename itself 'Suffer Setback' after Dusseldorf court ruling: flagrant FRAND abuse concerning video codec patents. In the previous post I discussed the logic of the Dusseldorf Regional Court's holding that certain Access Advance licensors owe Vestel damages for FRAND abuse, and cannot obtain injunctive relief against the Turkish TV manufacturer.

Weeks before I commented on this, Access Advance already sent an email to its existing and prospective partners, claiming that the outcome of the Dusseldorf cases was largely a win (as all of the asserted patents were deemed essential to the HEVC standard), and the denial of injunctive relief was disappointing but based on a narrow holding, which according to Access Advance wouldn't even have come down if a recent change to its Duplicate Royalty Policy had been made before--not after--trial. I disagree in at least three respects:

  1. Access Advance can't explain away the significance of a denial of injunctive relief by a German court on unprecedented grounds. Dusseldorf is a video codec patent enforcement hotspot, and MPEG LA's licensors never faced any such issue.

  2. While the court considered it dispositive that implementers who already had an MPEG LA license (such as Vestel) didn't enjoy legal certainty with respect to the avoidance or recovery of duplicate royalties when taking an HEVC Advance license, the court did express some skepticism concerning other aspects of the Access Advance business model--it just didn't have to analyze them to the full extent.

  3. The duplicate royalty policy of the HEVC Advance pool is publicly available, and it doesn't withstand scrutiny. The problem is structural. The inadequacy of that duplicate royalty policy is crystal clear if one takes into consideration the way the Access Advance pool optimized its dealings with third parties (licensors as well as licensees) for just the needs of its four owners (General Electric, Philips, Dolby, and Mitsubishi). That conflict of interest is only going to exacerbate, as those four companies own a much smaller piece of the VVC patent cake than the one for HEVC.

It's high time that someone told the story of what's wrong with the Access Advance scheme. The more I've looked into this, the more I consider Access Advance a liability not only for HEVC but even more so with a view to the industry's transition to VVC (H.266).

"Unprecedented" would be an understatement for Access Advance's Dusseldorf disaster

In Germany, patent enforcement is all about injunctive relief. Damages don't matter unless you're asserting an expired patent. Access Advance's defeat is all the more shocking when compared to other video codec judgments in the same jurisdiction. I've been able to research 32 video codec enforcement campaigns (27 over MPEG-2, 5 over AVC) that started in Dusseldorf and were in each case brought by multiple MPEG LA licensors against partly large and sophisticated defendants (even including Huawei). 32 is a rounding error compared to more than 7,000 license agreements concluded by MPEG LA without litigation, but in absolute terms it's a large enough sample to serve as a point of reference here.

In at least six of those disputes, injunctions came down. Time and time again, MPEG LA's terms were considered FRAND, from the Dusseldorf Regional Court (where all those cases were filed) all the way up to the Federal Court of Justice. Is it just because MPEG LA's lawyers are better? Well, Krieger Mes's Axel Verhauwen and patent attorney Gottfried Schuell ("Schüll" in German) of Cohausz & Florack are extremely well-respected in the German patent litigation community. But I believe even they could not have defended Access Advance's duplicate royalty policy--a type of issue that never once came up in an MPEG LA case.

Access Advance's scheme to attract patent holders who are large-scale implementers

The duplicate-royalty issue facing those who previously took an MPEG LA (or direct) license cannot be fully understood without looking into how Access Advance entices a certain category of patent holders to join its pool as licensors. Not the only but by far the most important patent holder of this kind is Samsung, which holds far more HEVC patents than any other Access Advance member (arguably, Samsung alone accounts for about 40% of the pool)--but which is also an ultra-large-scale implementer with its phones, tablets, and TVs.

For a long time, during which the focus was almost exclusively on AVC/H.264, companies like that were actually happy to work with MPEG LA. They had an interest in encouraging widespread adoption of those standards, but due to their high-volume implementations of video codec standards they wanted to limit their spend on license fees.

So what was Access Advance able to offer an organization like Samsung--other than impeding the adoption of a standard and driving up licensing costs, none of which would normally be too appealing?

The story was that the likes of Samsung could still license all of MPEG LA's patents at the usual rate, but by joining HEVC Advance they also got the other patents in that (normally very expensive) pool at an extremely low cost in exchange for getting only a small payout from Access Advance relative to the actual size of their portfolios. If Samsung got its fair share of HEVC Advance's royalty distribution, it would get--like I said--about 40%. But it would drive up its royalty costs as an implementer, as Access Advance is like four times as expensive as MPEG LA. The oversimplified version is that Access Advance invited them to join the pool and the primary incentive was to save costs as an implementer, not to generate much of a license fee income as a patent holder--though the latter is what Access Advance's owners (GE, Dolby, Philips, Mitsubishi) very much care about.

Intuitively, one may ask: "What's wrong with that? Shouldn't patent holders who are also implementers be free to optimize their bottom line?"

Of course they can do that. The problem with the Advance scheme is just that its key success factor is not a more reasonable royalty rate--it's that others must be treated unfairly in order for Access Advance's owners to maximize their revenues and for certain patent holders who are large-scale implementers (first and foremost, Samsung) to optimize their bottom line.

And that takes us full circle back to the problem with duplicate royalties.

Access Advance's duplicate-royalty economics

Access Advance is not merely about double-dipping, such as if a patent holder licensed a supplier and had actually exhausted its patent rights, but tried to get paid again somewhere downstream. The problem is more fundamental than that:

  • By the time HEVC Advance started, and especially by the time some other major patent holders defected from MPEG LA as a result of the type of deal I outlined in the previous section, wide swaths of the implementer landscape had already taken an MPEG LA license, and therefore remain licensed to some companies' patents even after those patent holders left MPEG LA. But Advance is all about "let's charge several times more." Its business model critically depends on extracting higher royalties from some who already have a license to many of those patents.

  • It would seem logical that if a licensee can get a cheap license to a set of patents or an expensive one, the licensee will prefer the less expensive option. Alternatively, some might argue that the principled approach is that the first license you take is a done deal and must be respected, so any pool licenses you take subsequently must factor out the patents to which you are already licensed. Whether one agrees with the first approach (let the customer choose) or the second (earlier-concluded license shall remain in force), there is just no principled--FRAND--basis on which the second pool can tell licensees they should pay for another (and more expensive) license to patents they've already licensed, and should then seek a refund from the first pool when the second pool is way more expensive than the first. But that's what Advance has been trying for a while, and what it's still trying, though the Dusseldorf court has just complicated--if not thwarted--that scheme.

  • Advance's economics just wouldn't work if they had to do the right thing, which is to reduce the royalty rate if a licensee is already licensed to many of the patents in the pool. That's because large parts of the portfolio come from patent holders like Samsung, who don't actually get much money out of the pool (because they joined with their interests as net implementers in mind). If, say, a licensee had to pay $100 million, 40% of which would be distributed to Samsung (minus management fees, which I'll talk about in a moment), and the licensee already had a license to Samsung's patents, then the royalty payment could be reduced to, say, $60 million. But here, while Samsung's patents would be used by the Advance pool in order to inflate the portfolio value when a court has to evaluate or determine a royalty rate, Samsung wouldn't get $40 million anyway, so there isn't really anything that Access Advance can deduct without its owners losing money on the deal.

  • What makes all of this even more complicated is that Access Advance is known to charge very high management fees. In the aggregate of multiple types of fees and charges, Access Advance keeps roughly 40% of the royalty income, which is several times more than MPEG LA's cut according to what people in the industry say about it. The higher the management fee, the more of an incentive the pool administrator has to avoid any reductions (no matter how reasonable in light of prior licenses), and the harder it is to make an adjustment work economically for all parties involved.

For the reasons I've just explained, it is essential to the Advance scheme that implementers are forced to take a license at a far higher rate than the MPEG LA rate.

Access Advance's duplicate-royalty policy is fundamentally flawed and deficient

Having laid the foundation in the previous passages, let's now look at HEVC Advance's Duplicate Royalty Policy. That one is a joke.

The first glaring deficiency is that it talks only about patents that are "also included in the patent list of another patent licensing pool, or joint licensing program," without addressing the scenario in which someone took a direct (bilateral) license, which is not at all uncommon in this industry. Bilateral licenses can result from license agreements or even from patent exhaustion. The Access Advance folks know that, and it must be attributed to bad faith that their Duplicate Royalty Policy fails to address that problem.

Even with respect to pools and joint licensing programs, that policy is merely reflective of the problem and does not provide a workable solution. In a duplicate-license sceario, Access Advance does nothing for licensees other than to "refer the request to the applicable Licensor(s)" (footnote 3), which falls far short of what the Dusseldorf court wanted, which was legal certainty for licensees. Unless a licensor and a licensee reach an agreement (in which case one doesn't need a policy anyway because they're on the same page), each licensor then gets to choose the lesser of two refund amounts:

  • the net distribution the Licensor received from Access Advance, or

  • the net distribution the Licensor received from another pool or joint licensing program.

Footnote 5 clarifies that net distribution "expressly exclude[s] all fees and other allocations/deductions made by Access Advance prior to apportionment and distribution of net royalty collections to all Licensors based on their respective patent portfolios." One of the problems is that Access Advance takes a huge cut, which the policy declares immune from a refund. With a much more reasonable pool management fee, even licensees might accept not getting that part refunded, but in the case of Access Advance, it's a major economic issue.

Furthermore, Access Advance is so intransparent and asymmetrical that you can't just look at the percentage of the patents you've licensed and you know what refund you'll get: a Samsung may contribute lots of patents but not actually get much (if any) money out of the pool.

Another problem with "net distribution" is that if Samsung makes products and obtains a cheaper license for them by contributing its patents to the pool, why should--to use the current Dusseldorf examples as examples--Vestel and Xiaomi (who compete with Samsung) indirectly pay for that by Samsung's true benefits from is membership in the Access Advance pool not being taken into consideration in the refund context? It's so unfair and unreasonable.

There will be some licensors who get a lot of money out of Access Advance (especially its founders). They're obviously going to elect the more profitable option for them: they'll refer implementers to MPEG LA for a refund. Someone like Samsung, however, could argue--based on Access Advance's policy--that they don't really get much money out of that pool, so there's pretty much nothing they can offer as a refund.

Access Advance should not become the fox in charge of the VVC hen house

The root cause of all of the problems outlined in here (and I don't even claim that this is an exhaustive list of issues) is that Access Advance serves the interests of its four founders, then does asymmetrical deals with patent holders who are major implementers, and in the end tries to let the Vestels and Xiaomis of the world pay the bill, which in turn impedes the widespread adoption of the standard.

The exorbitant pool management fees I mentioned in the previous section are just an example of a construct that is just meant to make GE, Philips, Dolby, and Mitsubishi more money. The implications of asymmetrical terms (with some getting a lot of money out of Access Advance, while others are just interested in reducing their own licensing costs) for refunds are another example. And now that the industry is transitioning to VVC, there's another problem to bear in mind: the collective share in HEVC patents belonging to Access Advance's founders is far greater than their positions in VVC. IPlytics held an "Unpacking VVC SEPs and standards contribution data" webinar last summer. IPlytics explained how difficult it is to analyze who owns how much of VVC, but they gave it a try, and one can see that some companies who held no AVC or HEVC patents are now pretty big significant contributors to VVC (TikTok operator Bytedance, for instance), while GE, Philips and Mitsubishi don't seem to play a major role in VVC. Dolby is still somewhat significant, but not a leading VVC contributor either.

For Access Advance's founders, HEVC is therefore more lucrative than VVC. That's why it makes economic sense for Access Advance to offer a combined VVC-HEVC license with a certain discount: its founders own a larger share of a combined VVC-HEVC pool than a VVC-only pool.

With respect to VVC, Access Advance is an early entrant and may be able to avoid the problem that licensees got a less expensive license through another pool before Access Advance came to them and wanted them to pay even more for a license they already had. But the root cause of the Dusseldorf disaster is deep and structural. It's that Access Advance games the SEP licensing system to the benefit of a small group of companies. It's not a transparent pool administrator who treats everyone at arm's length regardless of whether a patent holder is a shareholder in the pool firm or not. Instead, Access Advance is a scheme that makes its founders money, makes NPEs money, saves patent holders who are major implementers money by giving them terms that are fundamentally different from the terms offered to founders and other net licensors, and then has to prey on other implementers in order to make money.

This is not the right way forward for the industry.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

Wednesday, January 19, 2022

'Access Advance' patent pool can rename itself 'Suffer Setback' after Dusseldorf court ruling: flagrant FRAND abuse concerning video codec patents

The most recent IAM Sunday Digest mentioned the Access Advance pool firm's VVC Advance announcement as well as the Dusseldorf Regional Court's conclusion that the HEVC Advance pool's terms are non-FRAND. I had mentioned the latter in a recent post on a wireless SEP dispute. While I haven't been able (yet) to obtain a copy of the Dusseldorf decision, I have meanwhile seen reports by IAM (as I mentioned) and Juve Patent, and would like to add some observations.

This is not going to be my last post on that set of cases and the underlying conduct, which I find egregious. A few organizations' greed threatens to bring the very concept of patent pools into disrepute unless we all make the proper distinction between the vast majority of pools that serve their purpose--and an abusive outlier like Access Advance. It is equally important to understand that just because a company joined that pool as a licensor doesn't necessarily mean that it has unclean hands. They aren't all wrongdoers, but the Dusseldorf disaster should give the more reasonable ones among those Access Advance licensors pause, above all with a view to the latest and greatest in video codec standards: VVC.

There's a certain complexity and some specialized terminology, so let's get an overview first.

From AVC (H.264) to HEVC (H.265) to VVC (H.266)

Wikipedia describes Advanced Video Coding (AVC), also known as H.264, as "by far the most commonly used format for the recording, compression, and distribution of video content, used by 91% of video industry developers as of September 2019." Since 2010 this blog has repeatedly mentioned patent pool administrator MPEG LA's AVC/H.264 Patent Portfolio License, which many regard as a key enabler of H.264's widespread adoption.

It's a huge problem that almost two decades after H.264's adoption as a standard, its successor--H.265 or High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC)--is nowhere near as popular, despite its technical merits. I attribute that disappointing fact largely to patent licensing issues, as do others (for example, the Eagle Eye Networks blog says "adoption is slow" and "[t]he primary reason for this[] is that unlike [H].264 which has 1 patent pool, [H].265 has 3 patent pools with different pricing structures and terms & conditions." As a result, "many content providers have stuck with [H].264 because at least they know it will always play."

The next big thing could and should be Versatile Video Coding (VVC, H.266). It's roughly twice as efficient as HEVC.

Theoretically, you can encode videos with an 8K resolution even in H.264. But as a rule of thumb it makes sense to use at least HEVC (H.265) for 4K videos, and for 8K what you really want is VVC (H.266)--unless you don't give a damn about efficiency, of course. But with video accounting for the largest part of global data traffic (a large part of which is consumed on mobile devices), we should care.

"HEVC Advance"

I've never heard anyone complain about the terms of MPEG LA's HEVC pool license, but have repeatedly (!) been told by industry players and their counsel that they took issue with the "HEVC Advance" license. The pool administrator originally had the same name, and later renamed itself "Access Advance" so as not to be identified with a single standard. I put both names in quotes because to me "advance" means "progress"--a misnomer as that organization has actually impeded the adoption of HEVC, but I'll omit the quotes from here on out./p>

On its website, Access Advance doesn't say anything about ownership. For what I know, that entity is not the "independent licensing administrator company" it claims to be. It appears to be owned by four patent holders: General Electric (GE), Philips, Dolby, and Mitsubishi. They set up this entity in 2015 because they thought they could extract far higher royalties by not participating in MPEG LA's HEVC pool. They went on to persuade some of MPEG LA's HEVC licensors to join the HEVC Advance pool, on a basis that created all sorts of problems culminating in last month's Dusseldorf holding that the pool's terms are not FRAND.

Current Dusseldorf plaintiffs: GE, Philips, Dolby, IP Bridge

As a pool administrator, Access Advance does not hold patents, so its licensors have to enforce their IP if someone declines to take a license. In the current round of Dusseldorf cases (see this Juve Patent article), the plaintiffs are GE, Dolby, Philips, and Japan's IP Bridge (a non-practicing entity that is a public-private partnership involving the Japanese government).

Current Dusseldorf defendants: Vestel and Xiaomi

After getting a medium-sized (if not small) German company named MAS Elektronik to take an HEVC Advance license, those patent holders decided to take on Xiaomi and Vestel. The former needs no introduction, and the latter is a reasonably successful Turkish company that makes (inter alia) TV sets, though it is small compared to Xiaomi.

Overview of cases adjudicated in December

The Xiaomi cases will go to trial this spring. Six Vestel cases were adjudicated last month by the Dusseldorf Regiona Court's 4c Civil Chamber under Presiding Judge Sabine Klepsch (who in 2020 famously referred Nokia v. Daimler to the European Court of Justice, which never got to hear the case due to a settlement).

Two patents asserted by GE and two asserted by Dolby were deemed essential (and not considered very likely to be invalid). One IP Bridge and one Philips case were stayed as the patents-in-suit appeared fairly likely to be invalid.

Vestel had not only defended itself against the infringement allegations but had also counterclaimed, alleging that the electronics maker suffered damages as a result of the HEVC Advance pool terms being out of compliance with the FRAND licensing obligations of its licensors. In the cases in which GE and Dolby prevailed on the purely technical merits, the court furthermore had to reach the FRAND defense to injunctive relief--which largely overlaps with the FRAND counterclaim.

Vestel deemed willing licensee

The court applied the German Sisvel v. Haier standard, starting with an amalgamated perspective on whether the defendant was a willing licensee. The three-judge panel concluded that Vestel was a willing licensee. (We will see what happens in the Xiaomi cases, but that company does enjoy a good reputation in the licensing community.)

The hurdle for being deemed a willing licensee may be higher in Munich and Mannheim than in Dusseldorf, which is why I recently raised the question of when those courts would finally consider an implementer of a standard to be a willing licensee.

GE's and Dolby's bilateral offers disregarded

Only if and when the implementer is a willing licensee do German courts--under Sisvel v. Haier--take a closer look at the patentee's licensing offer(s).

Here, each plaintiff made a bilateral offer (i.e., a direct license that bypasses the pool) and pointed to the HEVC Advance pool license as another licensing offer. As a matter of policy, I actually believe courts should encourage that SEP holders make--wherever it is warranted--alternative offers. The more offers are on the table, the more likely it is that the implementer regards one of them as palatable. However, in Dusseldorf they have a different attitude: at least some of the judges there consider it necessary for every single one of a plurality of licensing offers to be FRAND. I believe reasonable people can disagree on this question, but in the Vestel cases the court decided not to analyze GE's and Dolby's bilateral licensing offers in detail: the court contented itself with identifying a FRAND breach just based on the HEVC Advance pool rate.

Should an appeals court (theoretically this could go up to the Federal Court of Justice) or another German court (if any cases were brought there) agree with me, it still wouldn't solve the problem for Access Advance. Its members might then win some cases (unless their bilateral royalty demands are insanely prohibitive, as may very well be the case here), but HEVC Advance would remain stigmatized regardless.

Dispositive part of FRAND analysis: HEVC Advance terms

I've seen cases (such as Microsoft v. Motorola) where pool rates served as important points of reference aiding judges as they were making a FRAND determination, but to the best of my knowledge, it's unprecedented for a court to find a patent pool's terms non-FRAND. It's a result that will live in infamy--to quote FDR. (For Vestel and its counsel, Gruenecker's Dr. Ulrich Blumenroeder, it's a remarkable success though.)

So why did it happen in this set of cases?

There's a problem of (a) double-dipping and (b) reneging on a prior FRAND licensing commitment. Vestel already had an MPEG LA HEVC license, and was therefore licensed to the portfolios owned by those former MPEG LA licensors who succumbed to Access Advance's lure of easy money. So, just as a rough estimate, Vestel was already licensed to about half of the patents in the HEVC Advance pool--and at a far more reasonable rate than the HEVC Advance rate, that is.

The court easily figured out what the HEVC Advance scheme is about. The pool charges what in my estimate is about four times the MPEG LA rate (relative to the patents in the pool). Some thought it was a simple way to make more money. But implementers who already have an MPEG LA license obviously take the position that they shouldn't have to pay again for patents they had licensed before--and especially not a far higher rate.

The court touch on multiple issues in its ruling, but needed to reach a definitive conclusion on only one in order to decide the cases in Vestel's favor. Once I've obtained a copy of the ruling, I'll go into more detail on that--and later this week or early next week I'll talk some more about why HEVC Advance is doing what it is doing. For now, suffice it to explain the following problem:

HEVC Advance refuses to lower its rate for those who have already licensed many of those patents through MPEG LA. Instead, HEVC Advance tells them to go to MPEG LA and seek a refund. What HEVC Advance should do is apply a credit. Maybe it would also be acceptable if HEVC Advance's licensors offered a refund on FRAND terms--though I have serious doubts about whether that would be the appropriate vehicle under any circumstances.

The key lesson from the Dusseldorf Vestel decisions is that you can't just join a first pool, make your patents available on one set of terms, and later join a second pool, ask for several times more money, but refuse to take into consideration that some implementers already got a less expensive license. It's a scheme to renege on a prior FRAND licensing commitment.

There are reasons for which HEVC Advance and its licensors don't treat licensees fairly. Those reasons have a lot to do with its owners' conflict of interests (with a few licensors owning and controlling the pool administrator), and with the deal structures they apparently offered to companies like Samsung and possibly also Microsoft (which just became an HEVC Advance licensor recently, so its patents were not at issue in the Dusseldorf Vestel cases) in order to get them to join. I've done some research on that, I'm still working on it, and I'll talk about this topic again in a matter of days. Stay tuned. The story must be told. While Access Advance will avoid the double-dipping problem through the terms of its new VVC pool (which will not allow licensors to participate in other pools at the same time), the root causes of the Dusseldorf disaster still pose a serious risk to the adoption of VVC.

Share with other professionals via LinkedIn:

 
  翻译: