The Bellona Environmental Transparency Center

In our latest report The Bellona Environmental Transparency Center has analyzed the current state of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and assessed the technical feasibility of its restart, as well as the diplomatic situation surrounding the ZNPP. The analysis shows that technically, Rosatom could attempt to restart at least one unit of the plant by the end of 2024. The ZNPP, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe with six nuclear reactors, was seized in March 2022 at the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russian troops are stationed on its territory, and the plant’s staff is essentially held hostage. Since then, the ZNPP has been repeatedly shelled. For more than a year and a half, all the plant’s reactors have been shut down and are currently in a “cold shutdown” state, one of the safest modes given the current circumstances of war. Recently, however, Russian officials and even the head of the IAEA have increasingly discussed the possibility of restarting the plant. Switching even one reactor to electricity generation mode at the plant, which is near the front line, would significantly increase the risk of nuclear and radiation incidents and exacerbate their potential consequences. Download PDF: https://lnkd.in/dR-M_2Zd

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly warned of the dangers of fighting around nuclear plants following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By stationing heavy military equipment within the confines of the Zaporizhzhia facility — which is the largest nuclear plant in Europe — Moscow’s troops have all but guaranteed that its six VVER type reactors would be drawn into the conflict. While the strategic aims of Ukraine’s recent Kursk incursion remain uncertain, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attack is part of an effort to bring the war to an end on terms amenable to Ukraine. The Russian nuclear power plant - Kursk NPP has Unit 1 reactor, which dates from 1976, which was shut down in 2021 to operate in non-generation mode. Unit 2, which dates from 1979, was shut down in 2024. Reactor Number 3, from 1983, and Reactor Number 4, from 1985. In August the Number 4 was taken out of service for planned repairs, leaving Number 3 as the single active unit. if the roof of the Kursk NPP’s third reactor unit is pierced by outside shelling and one of the operating reactors subsequently gets hit, radiation would spread dozens of kilometers. We've added the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant to our watchlist. Stay informed by subscribing to our nuclear digest: https://lnkd.in/d2PWDRPc The image is AI-generated.

A must-read by Darya Dolzikova on the risks at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. The article features insights from our nuclear advisor, Dmitry Gorchakov, on current events surrounding Kursk NPP and potential risks.

This issue of the Environment & Rights magazine published by Bellona is dedicated to the Arctic and available in PDF. What specific content is in this magazine? We've tried to answer the following questions: - What does international cooperation in the Arctic look like after the start of the war in Ukraine? - Is it possible to study the Arctic without Russia's involvement? - What has Russia been doing in the region since February 2022, and how has it interacted with other countries before the war? - What environmental threats does the Northern Sea Route pose? - Why can't Russia solve the problem of accumulated environmental damage on its own? - And most importantly, what's all the fuss about? You'll be able to take a look at a map of valuable minerals that Arctic countries are eyeing with great interest. - And the last, but not least! You'll learn how the war has affected the environmental rights of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic. 💬 Why so much focus on Russia? Don't other countries also pollute the Arctic? Russia owns 53% of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, and the Russian Arctic zone makes up a quarter of the total Arctic area. We've been working in the country for over 30 years and continue to monitor its impact on the environment from abroad. We agree that we don't have many tools to force Russia to change today, but we have knowledge which is an important weapon. And it's available at this link: https://lnkd.in/daPtzpMb

"I hope that we do not see any attack or attempt to seize the Kursk nuclear plant. There is simply no safe way to do it. Any attempt to do so carries risks of a nuclear or radiation accident", - says our nuclear advisor Dmitry Gorchakov. But what might happen if Ukraine actually seizes it? https://lnkd.in/ddUZYrWC

About a year ago one of the founders of the now closed Bellona-office in St. Petersburg, nuclear advisor and environmentalist Alexander Nikitin appeared on the cover of a new book prepared for the 20th anniversary of the Whistleblower Award! Every two years this award is given to people who have revealed information that their governments have tried to hide from public, damaging democracy or the environment. Behind the award are two respected German non-profit organizations: IALANA (The International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms) and Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler e.V. (The Federation of German Scientists). 18 whistleblowers have so far received the award, including Alexander Nikitin. In 1996 together with his colleagues he revealed the issue of radioactive contamination from the Russian Northern Fleet. Those were the times! He is accompanied by Daniel Ellsberg, who published the Pentagon documents on the Vietnam War, Can Dundar, who revealed the supply of weapons by Recep Erdogan to the Islamic State, Edward J. Snowden, who spoke about the PRISM project, the US government massive surveillance program and other prominent public figures. The book "20 Years of the Whistleblower Award. What became of the laureates and their revelations?" contains materials about the laureates, interviews with them and stories about the consequences of their revelations. If you have any questions, write them in the comments, and we thank you for all the support for Bellona during all these years.

Today we are witnessing the largest war in Europe since World War II, between two major countries with a significant number of nuclear facilities. As the front line shifts in one direction or another, these facilities may end up on captured territory. We have already observed the seizure of at least three nuclear facilities during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine - a research reactor in Sevastopol during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the capture and subsequent liberation of the Chernobyl NPP in 2022, and the ongoing two-plus year occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are currently conducting a military operation in the Kursk region. Small groups of military personnel have been spotted just 23 km away from the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. What risks do military actions near the nuclear plant pose, and how can the plant be secured for the rest of the world in the event of a potential capture? Read more in the article by our nuclear advisor Dmitry Gorchakov. https://lnkd.in/dXQa9C_r

In this article we address the current state of the four most problematic industrial clusters in the Russian Arctic from an environmental point of view: the Norilsk Nickel sites in Norilsk and the Murmansk region, as well as mining operations in Vorkuta and the Usinsk region of the Komi Republic, which in 1994 experienced the world’s worst land-based oil spill. This is not a complete list of long-standing environmental hot spots in the Russian Arctic, we just took the worst Big Four suffering from old industrial sites and it's a total nightmare for every living and breathing environmentalist. And the EU continues to buy products from some of Russia’s dirtiest companies! Several large industries have been operating in the Russian Arctic for decades — many of them dating back to Soviet times — and are having an unprecedentedly destructive impact on the region’s environment. And more are coming. Industrial projects are being implemented, primarily in the field of natural resource extraction, some of which, due to their scale and enormous capacity, are proudly called megaprojects in Russian government documents. Take a look at the big picture on our website: https://lnkd.in/dP8vE7Fq

The Kursk NPP is the closest Russian nuclear power plant to the border with Ukraine, about 60 km away. This is Russia’s largest nuclear construction site, where two VVER-TOI reactors have been completed recently. The possible military actions close to a nuclear plant - serious nuclear threat. If we got it right, yesterday evening, the armed forces of Ukraine were already spotted 23 km from the Kursk NPP. Our nuclear advisor Dmitry Gorchakov made a diagram based on @TheStudyofWar cards.

Rosatom once again does not recognize the Zaporizhzhia NPP as Russian—a remarkably stable stance, well done. As in last year's annual public report, Rosatom's published key results for 2023 (https://lnkd.in/dBqQ6DME) state that only 11 NPPs with 37 units are operating in the Russian Federation as of the end of 2023. These indicators remain stable and align with pre-war figures. Since the end of 2020, after the launch of the Leningrad NPP-6 unit with VVER-1200, 35 units at 10 land-based NPPs and 2 units at the floating NPP have been operational in the Russian Federation. However, since January 2024, there are fewer units in operation following the shutdown of the old RBMK at the first unit of the Kursk NPP after 45 years of service. Assuming that the 6 units of the Zaporizhzhia NPP are excluded due to being in cold shutdown, this is not a valid argument. A shutdown mode is also an operational mode. For instance, if you visit the Rosenergoatom website, you'll see that only 31 of the 37 operating units are currently in power mode, with the rest in shutdown mode undergoing repairs. This is a normal situation. The argument that the ZNPP has not been transferred to Rosatom's ownership but operates through a subsidiary is also flawed. The report specifically mentions the number of nuclear power units operating "in Russia." Does Rosatom not recognize the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, including the city of Energodar, as Russian? Well done again. It is clear that Rosatom provides some explanation to its curators in the Kremlin (or not?). Nevertheless, Rosatom's consistent reluctance during the war, despite Putin's decrees and even the current Russian constitution, to include ZNPP among Russian NPPs in its public reports is very revealing and somewhat amusing. Perhaps they understand that this is not permanent. Let's see what appears in the extended annual report, which has not yet been released. And of course, let's hope that the Zaporizhzhia NPP will soon return to Ukraine, not only on Rosatom's papers but also in reality.