EASA - European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s Post

Important Safety Information: GNSS Interference and Navigation Procedures A recent EASA safety bulletin highlights the potential impact of GNSS interference on navigation, however, perhaps of greater concern will be to instrument flight procedures (IFP), particularly those reliant on GNSS for approach, departure, and arrival, including RNP and satellite-based augmented approaches. While reversionary navigation methods are included in procedure design when possible (e.g. DME/DME for SIDs and STARs), the lack of established ground infrastructure in many countries or areas means many procedures, like SIDs and STARs, are designed solely for GNSS. Considering Interference During Design: From an ATM (Air Traffic Management) and IFP (Instrument Flight Procedures) perspective, considering and incorporating known areas of interference into the design operational requirements document (OR) at the concept stage, could be beneficial. EASA have published a dedicated website to GNSS outages and alterations, containing a link to known and affected Flight Infomation Regions (FIR): https://lnkd.in/e5pc4d67 We'd like to hear your thoughts, those especially welcomed from the procedure designer community: * Have you considered GNSS interference during concept and initial consultation stages? * What mitigation strategies do you propose for risk assessment and hazard identification studies or operational impact assessments? Let's discuss how we collectively can ensure safe and reliable navigation procedures in the face of potential GNSS interference. Fly-by NUNES Ltd. in partnership with GLOBAL AVIATION SPECIALISTS LTD are an Instrument Flight Procedures design service provider. We provide the following services: ▶ Procedure Design, Airport & Procedure Safeguarding, Periodic Reviews ▶ Air Traffic Management Studies ▶ Wind Farm Assessments ▶ Procedure Design and Airspace Concept Studies ▶ Aeronautical Studies ▶ Hazard Identification and Operational Impact studies Why not get in touch today to see how we can assist? Visit https://lnkd.in/ekcj3vK2 for more. Fly-by NUNES. SAFE FLIGHT PATHS BY DESIGN. #GNSS #aviation #airtrafficmanagement #procedures #safety #IFP #pilots #airtrafficcontrol #aviationsafety #EASA #ATM #CNS

An important update on the topic of GNSS. A new SIB and also a new dedicated webpage that will be updated with all the latest information.

GNSS jamming and spoofing have become more severe, more intense, and more sophisticated, according to EASA's analysis. In response, an updated SIB has been released, reflecting these changes and incorporating feedback from stakeholders, including European Pilots. Stay vigilant and informed!

The solution already exists, just have inertial systems as the first navigation system (the newer generations are no different in terms of precision compared to GPS) and this problem is solved (there are no electronic warfare measures that affect these systems)😊

Spoofing of GPS signals. This is new & alarming! We’re all used to seeing GPS jamming enroute, which has significantly increased since 2018, & experienced by many aircraft in Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Russia & Ukraine. This month however, a new threat is emerging. A new variety of GPS spoofing is being reported by crews, where the signal is sufficiently strong & of sufficient integrity to fool aircraft systems. The result is that within minutes, the IRS becomes unusable, in many cases, all navigation capability on board is lost. Majority of reports received by flight crews have had to ask ATC for radar vectors. Given the types of airspace that these events are occurring in, this presents a significant risk. The spoofing reports are seen by all as alarming for two reasons: the sophistication of the methodology, & the unexpected “infection” of the IRS. This is just a summary of various operator’s & crew perspectives shared as context. You have been warned!

#DYK that our #OctoPod redefines Maritime Surveillance?   The OctoPod, a versatile belly-mounted multi-sensor pod designed for maritime surveillance aircraft, seamlessly integrates a variety of cutting-edge sensors and mission system technology into a single, adaptable package. Equipped with a Search Radar, a Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), an Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) camera, a Search & Rescue Direction Finder, an IR/UV Line Scanner, a VIS Line Scanner, a Laser Fluorosensor and a multi-frequency Microwave Radiometer, the OctoPod offers a comprehensive suite of sensors that enable real-time monitoring of maritime activities.   Its versatility makes it an indispensable tool for a wide range of critical missions, including coast guard operations, maritime surveillance, oil spill monitoring and Search & Rescue. The OctoPod enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of these missions, thereby contributing to safer and more secure maritime environments.   The OctoPod was jointly developed with our subsidiary OPTIMARE Systems GmbH. Our extensive expertise in mission systems and special mission conversion, combined with Optimare Systems GmbH's advanced maritime surveillance sensors, ensures that the OctoPod remains a formidable force in maritime surveillance technology.   #Aerodata #Optimare #OptimareSystems #MaritimeSurveillance #AviationTechnology #Innovation #sensorpod #multisensor #remotesensing #searchandrescue #oilspill

The article below highlights the impacts of GPS Interference on aircraft crossing Atlantic Ocean but has a few errors in it. First, it has been happening for months, not new. I have been cautioning airlines and the GPS manufacturers of this possibility since last year and sure enough it is almost a daily occurrence these days. The second is the article headline states GPS Jamming, it is the GPS Spoofing that causes the problems mentioned. There is a huge difference between the two and many people don’t seem to understand that. Please refer to my previous posts if you want to learn.

Following EASA analysis of recent data from the Network of Analysts and open sources that has concluded that GNSS jamming and/or spoofing has shown further increase in the severity of its impact, as well as an overall growth of intensity and sophistication of these events, the Agency has updated the SIB on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Outage and Alterations Leading to Navigation / Surveillance Degradation. The SIB (2022-2) was first published on March 17, 2022 and then updated to Revision 1 (R1) on February 17, 2023. Now we have this Revision 2 that has been published today, on the EASA SIB Tool. The Air Ops Community Site article at the link below has the link to the SIB itself and also outlines all the changes to make things as easy as possible. https://lnkd.in/eYmQejKe

EASA issues SIB 2022-02 Revision 2 to provide recommendations for aviation actors to address the cases of spoofing. Thanks to all experts involved in producing this material.

EASA have released a new SIB regarding GPS interference. Jamming is not new, but the severity seems to be increasing, and more spoofing events have been reported, particularly in the Iraq region so this is really good info for all crew to read! Spoofing differs from jamming in that it doesn’t just “take out” GPS systems, but is a strong, false signal which GPS receivers “believe”. In Iraq it has mostly been limited to a false stationary position being received - not a spoofing of actual trajectory though! Crew might detect a spoofing event if they see a stationary position for a period of time, see erroneous terrain displays, detect a map shift or change in ANP or identify their systems as using inertial data or navaid data for position input rather than satellite input, receive erroneous ADS-B IN info etc but this isn’t guaranteed and won’t prevent it, so vigilance and good monitoring of all systems is really key! Basic systems such as TCAS, radio altimeter, basic GPWS modes (using rad alt or terrain closure rate, heading etc are not impacted. It seems a lot of folk are calling on aircraft manufacturers to produce the answers and solutions to something that is not their fault, but a result on conflict zones. It is as much on operators, crew, authorities and States to help solve this too and to work together on it. #aviationsafety #aviationnews #GPS #conflictzones