MS&T Magazine’s Post

Last week, the House Armed Services Committee marked up the FY25 NDAA. Congresswoman Stefanik led and secured many provisions in this year’s bill including: - Establishing a requirement for MDA to construct an East Coast Missile Defense Site. - Securing funding for the USAF to complete their recapitalization plans for the NYANG 109th AW’s LC-130H Skibirds. - Prohibiting the DoD from contracting with companies that retain lobbyists who also lobby for Chinese Military Companies. - Increasing AFWERX Prime funding to continue to support critical eVTOL capabilities. - Requiring the DoD to establish a plan to lower the cost of secure UAS and components. - Prohibiting the DoD from operating or procuring PRC LiDAR. - Supporting AFRL-RI’s Future Flag Exercise to continue to strengthen the LVC EW training environment formalized under the Northeast Multi-Domain Operations Alliance (NEMDOA). Read more below! https://lnkd.in/eHUcpvqy

Innovation capabilities are a structural advantage of democracy v facism, related to organizational data-information-knowledge processes and problem-solving culture

This article is sobering for all Americans, but it resonates with me deeply in the work I do with business owners and my own journey as an entrepreneur. Here are four key lessons in John Ferrari’s critique of current Pentagon strategy that may be useful for entrepreneurs: 1. Adaptability is Essential: Relying on past successes or current technologies without considering future changes can lead to obsolescence. 2. Innovation Beyond Technology: True innovation requires a deep understanding of market shifts, customer needs, and the agility to pivot when necessary. 3. Continuous Learning: Challenges today faced by the world’s most expensive military remind us that no organization is immune to the need for constant evolution. 4. The Need For Scale: If you can’t scale your business rapidly to meet demands today, you may not have a business tomorrow. Today we are at pivot point in many industries. We need to constantly question everything, and look at ways to - if not reinvent - at least adapt to the coming changes. #EntrepreneurialMindset #Adaptation #Innovation #military

”The lightning-fast victory of the U.S. military over the Iraqi Army in the early 1990s marked a generational turning point for warfare, with the predominant lesson being that exquisite and precise munitions were the key to winning future conflicts. This fit a narrative that many desperately wanted at that time: namely, that we could spend less money, have fewer forces, and turn warfare into a targeting exercise by overwhelming the enemy with precise, short-burst barrages driven by top-down decision-making, all enabled by the digital revolution. The lessons our senior officials learned from the conflict encapsulated this narrative: spend more to get less, wars can be short with limited casualties, and policymakers can use technology to control from afar. These lessons made their way into military parlance, neatly tied up into concepts like revolution in military affairs, shock and awe, and effects-based operations. ... From Somalia in 1993, to nearly twenty years in Iraq and Afghanistan, to today’s wars in Ukraine and Israel, it’s becoming apparent that the United States may have built the entirely wrong war machine needed for the 21st century.”

The “wrong lessons learned” is more easily judged in hindsight and out of historical context. Were those the wrong lessons in the early post-Cold War environment when, at the time, there was little concern about a strategic competitor that would involve a war of attrition? We are now 30+ years removed from that environment, which is a decade longer than the spread between the World Wars or WWII and Vietnam. The valid question is: are we continuing to learn and apply the wrong lessons or are we able to pivot to accommodate for the new geopolitical context? Historically, the U.S. has found it difficult to invest in a mass peacetime standing military, not only because it’s an expense difficult for Congress to justify, but also because you run the risk of having a significant amount of irrelevant mass if the envisioned conflict occurs well past the envisioned timeframe. Looking back to the 1920s, Congress mandated a reliance on maintaining the WWI-era Air Force for which it had just paid $1 billion+, though technology rapidly outpaced those capabilities, which in turn stunted both development and modernization. As a result, the U.S. played aviation catch-up in the late 1930s. On the other hand, if they had invested in a significant pre-WWII build up, we would’ve gone to war with thousands of P-36s and P-40s (for example) that were nearly irrelevant in 1941. As military planners or congressional leaders, how do you make that choice?

For AETC and the various PME programs: What lessons are we learning within the Air Force? This article makes some significant comments regarding mostly ground operations. But Ukraine has never seen anything resembling air superiority, because they lacked, early, the tools to deny airspace over the battlefield to the Russians, and are fighting with Soviet era aircraft. New anti-air assets have worked to their advantage. But how will we respond in our next conflict (and we may have to pivot back to Europe sooner than China and the Pacific) when ELINT and COMMSEC/COMMINT will reduce our ability to use the technology we've become so dependent on? Serious question. Makes me wish I was back in PME right now.

In this Memorandum, Basil Germond examines the future of strategic threats and the changing operational context for UK Defence 🌍 ‘Each service should reflect on their contribution to the collective objectives, priorities and functions of UK defence. That is why the defence of the global maritime order depends not only on the Royal Navy but on the contribution of all services across domains.’ You can read the full article here: https://lnkd.in/eE4ft7dj #BritainsWorld #Memorandum

June 20 Central Command Update TAMPA, Fla. – In the past 24 hours, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) forces successfully destroyed four Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea, and two uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) over the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported by U.S., coalition, or merchant vessels. It was determined these systems presented an imminent threat to U.S. forces, coalition forces, and merchant vessels in the region. These actions were taken to protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S., coalition, and merchant vessels. https://ow.ly/vAKm50SmT1n

“the Department is currently engaged in the development of a future capability called the Glide Phase Interceptor, or GPI, will be a sea-based capability designed to engage offensive threats in the ‘glide’ portion of a hypersonic flight trajectory--or between the midcourse and terminal phases. GPI will supplement the Sea-Based Terminal defense capability to provide a maritime layered defense against regional hypersonic threats.” - John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy General Radar is poised to offer a level of missile defense to the United States' homeland that surpasses current systems. By providing cost-effective radars, General Radar could be instrumental in deploying a comprehensive defense network around North America. This would equip NORAD with the necessary sensors to detect, identify, track, and engage various airborne threats efficiently. Learn more at: https://lnkd.in/eymxXmsa #militaryradar #missiledefense #airdefense #hypersonicmissiles #ballisticmissiles #cruisemissile NORAD & US Northern Command Missile Defense Agency Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Defense Security Cooperation Agency U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Army Futures Command U.S. Army Materiel Command Congressional Research Service US Government Accountability Office Congressional Budget Office Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance NDIA Tennessee Valley Chapter Huntsville Air Defense Artillery Association

Morning briefing of the Ministry of Defense of Russia (August 15, 2024) - TEXT ONLY ⚡️ Russian Defence Ministry report on the progress of the special military operation (15 August 2024) The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continue the special military operation <== (1) Operational-Tactical Aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, and Missile Troops and Artillery of the Russian Groups of Forces have eliminated one missile and artillery ammunition depot, a storage of uncrewed surface vehicles, a parking site of fuel supply vehicles as well as clusters of enemy manpower and military hardware in 152 areas ▫️Air defence facilities have shot down three U.S.-made JDAM and French-made Hammer aerial bombs, 12 U.S.-made HIMARS projectiles, and 35 unmanned aerial vehicles 📊In total, 638 airplanes and 279 helicopters, 30,005 unmanned aerial vehicles, 569 air defence missile systems, 17,064 tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, 1,400 combat vehicles equipped with MLRS, 13,247 field artillery guns and mortars, as well as 24,738 units of special military equipment have been destroyed during the special military operation ==>(1) ▫️In Volchansk and Liptsy directions, the units of the Sever Group of Forces have engaged manpower and hardware of the AFU .. close to Volchansk and Tikhoye (Kharkov region). The AFU losses were up to 60 Ukrainian troops, .. ▫️The units of the Zapad Group of Forces have captured more advantageous lines and positions, defeated .. Armed Forces of Ukraine, .. close to .. (Lugansk People's Republic). The AFU losses were up to 470 Ukrainian troops, .. ▫️The units of the Yug Group of Forces have improved the tactical situation and inflicted losses on .. of the AFU and the 241st Territorial Defence Brigade near Aleksandro-Shultino, Stupochki, Chasov Yar, and Pobeda (Donetsk People's Republic). The AFU were up to 650 Ukrainian troops, .. ▫️The units of the Tsentr Group of Forces have liberated Ivanovka (Donetsk People's Republic), defeated .. of the AFU, .. near Toretsk, Grodovka, Vozdvizhenka, Kalinovo, Novogorodskoye, Mirolyubovka, and Nelepovka (Donetsk People's Republic). Seven counter-attacks of the AFU 53rd .. have been repelled. The AFU losses were up to 470 Ukrainian troops, .. ▫️The units of the Vostok Group of Forces have improved the tactical situation along the front line and inflicted losses on .. of the AFU .. near Vodyanoye and Prechistovka (Donetsk People's Republic). Two counter-attacks launched by assault detachments of the AFU .. The AFU losses were up to 105 Ukrainian troops, three motor vehicles, and one U.S.-made 155-mm M198 howitzer ▫️The units of the Dnepr Group of Forces have engaged .. close to Pavlovka, Novodanilovka (Zaporozhye region), and Lvovo (Kherson region). The AFU losses were up to 90 Ukrainian troops, .. https://lnkd.in/g29QW_mX