The Sacramento County Recommended Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024-25 has been released. The Board of Supervisors will begin hearings on the Recommended Budget at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 5, in Board Chambers at the Sacramento County Administration building, located at 700 H Street in Sacramento. The public is invited to attend the hearings and be heard on any items in the budget, either publicly or through written comments. Budget hearings will also be telecast live on Metro Cable 14 and the County’s website. The hearings will continue beginning at 9:30 a.m. through June 6 and 7, if necessary. This year’s $8.8 billion spending plan is an increase of 6.9% compared to the FY 2023-24 Adopted Budget. Of the total $8.8 billion budgeted: $3.5 billion is in Enterprise and Special Revenue Fund appropriations (utility rates, fees and other dedicated revenue) $3.8 billion is in General Fund appropriations (funded with $990 million in discretionary resources, $1.5 billion in reimbursements from restricted funds, and the remaining $1.3 billion in Federal, State and fee revenue dedicated to specific purposes) $1.5 billion in Restricted Funds Learn more: https://lnkd.in/gpUjXUqF
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We need more transparency when it comes to the New York State budget, not less. That’s why the Citizens Budget Commission joined with Reinvent Albany, Citizens Union, and Common Cause to urge Governor Kathy Hochul to omit provisions that would expand Executive powers and undermine Comptroller oversight. Some of these provisions were first enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic, but the situation now is vastly different, and these extraordinary powers are no longer justified. We recommended the Fiscal Year 2026 Executive Budget not propose to: • Remove competitive bidding requirements and the Comptroller’s oversight via provisions added to individual appropriations; • Limit the scope of Comptroller review of certain bond transactions, as proposed for the first time in last year’s Executive Budget; • Allow universal appropriation transfer and interchange authority within the State Operations bill; • Authorize up to $4 billion in short-term revenue anticipation notes; • Authorize transfer of $1 billion from the General Fund to the “Health Care Transformation Account," absent more clearly defined uses in appropriations; and • Increase the “Special Emergency Appropriation” from $1 billion to $2 billion. Proposals to constrain the oversight authority of the State Comptroller open the door to wasteful spending and impropriety. The State Legislature has largely rejected them during past budget negotiations. Full letter: https://lnkd.in/d4RgrMnV
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State agency budget requests offer insights into the results of the first phase in the State Budget process, as well as into the needs State agencies identified to fulfill their missions. Agency requests for State Fiscal Years (SFYs) 2026 and 2027, submitted in early October, show both the proposed responses State agencies have to challenges and the constraints associated with estimated spending targets for the next State Budget cycle. Read more about the State agency requests in our latest blog: https://lnkd.in/e7SEhriC
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We are planning on putting a longer think piece on the Budget out early next week - but one immediate reflection comes from Darren Jones, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury's, media round this morning. The Budget assumed only a 1.3% per year real funding increase for the next (post 26) spending review period. Jones lent on the 2% annual public sector productivity target as a reason why the Government would not need to raise taxes to fund increases above this level. Getting there will necessitate good public-private partnerships, on which delivery of public services is heavily reliant. One area that is really clear is in the state of the public estate, where the (by historical standards) relatively generous 25/26 settlements for areas such as Justice, the NHS and Local Government are unlikely to touch the sides in terms of the need to upgrade the buildings and other capital. In all these areas, a poorly functioning estate is now a significant drag on the performance of public services. The reason the public estate has ended up in this state is because departments have raided maintenance budgets to fund day-to-day spend. The fact that the the new fiscal rules do not remove the in-year incentive for cash-strapped departments to raid their CapEx budgets to fill current spending holes is therefore arguably a key shortcoming - and a marked contrast to the 2000s rules, which did exercise some constraint on this. Arguably, unless a solution is found swiftly which involves private capital or some kind of wider partnership which effectively locks in spending, then the situation will get worse.
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Progress on this - as picked up in yesterday's Health Service Journal, HMT has revealed that it will in fact update the Consolidated Budget Guidance to prevent departments from switching from capital to revenue allocations. Or rather - to make this tougher, by requiring HMT permission. This is good news. The fiscal rules fall some way short - contra HMT evidence to the pay review bodies - of removing the perverse incentive on government to prioritise revenue over capital. That's because, unlike the pre-2008 'Golden Rule', the new commitment to 'only borrow to invest' only bites in the future, not in the present; for the moment, the future means not until 2029. That's why additional restraints are so important. What will be interesting to see now is whether this form of restraint, absent stronger fiscal rules, is sufficient. HMT ministers will soon come under pressure from departments to allow exceptional cases, which they'll have plenty of discretion to do. Let's wait and see whether capital budgets are honoured - this will be a real test of the government's rhetoric about rebuilding for the long term.
We are planning on putting a longer think piece on the Budget out early next week - but one immediate reflection comes from Darren Jones, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury's, media round this morning. The Budget assumed only a 1.3% per year real funding increase for the next (post 26) spending review period. Jones lent on the 2% annual public sector productivity target as a reason why the Government would not need to raise taxes to fund increases above this level. Getting there will necessitate good public-private partnerships, on which delivery of public services is heavily reliant. One area that is really clear is in the state of the public estate, where the (by historical standards) relatively generous 25/26 settlements for areas such as Justice, the NHS and Local Government are unlikely to touch the sides in terms of the need to upgrade the buildings and other capital. In all these areas, a poorly functioning estate is now a significant drag on the performance of public services. The reason the public estate has ended up in this state is because departments have raided maintenance budgets to fund day-to-day spend. The fact that the the new fiscal rules do not remove the in-year incentive for cash-strapped departments to raid their CapEx budgets to fill current spending holes is therefore arguably a key shortcoming - and a marked contrast to the 2000s rules, which did exercise some constraint on this. Arguably, unless a solution is found swiftly which involves private capital or some kind of wider partnership which effectively locks in spending, then the situation will get worse.
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#CaLeg is working through a budget 💰 and the May Revise is only a couple of weeks away. But what exactly does that mean? (For those who don't work in the political industry) How exactly does the process work? Basic High-level Timeline: 📅 Jan. 10 - California Governor submits a budget proposal for the upcoming fiscal year. 📅 Jan. - Budget Bills are designated in each house. Legislative Analyst Office reviews the proposal. 📅 Feb. to May - Budget subcommittees meet and discuss budget proposals. 📅 By EOD May 14 - Governor releases a May Revise. 📅 May - Full Budget committees finalize their proposals. 📅 June - Budget Conference Committee reviews the proposals from the two houses and combines them into one proposal. Both houses vote on the budget proposal. 📅 June 15 - Deadline for the main budget bill(s) to be passed. Things to keep in mind: 💵 California's fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30. 💵 If the legislature does not pass a budget by June 15, they work unpaid until it is passed. 💵 While the main budget bills must be passed by June 15, trailer bills designating specific funding can continue past the deadline, but must be listed in the main budget bill. Some basic definitions: 💲 Budget Bills - Each house at the beginning of the session designates a span of bills that will specifically address the budget. 💲 Budget Subcommittee - Each house has a budget committee. That committee is broken into subcommittees that focus on specific subject matters. 💲 Legislative Analyst - A nonpartisan office that reviews budgets (and some other legislation) and reports on estimated fiscal impacts. 💲 May Revise - A revision of the budget proposal the governor submitted in January. 💲 Budget Conference Committee - Members of the budget committees for each house come together to combine both houses' proposals into one budget. #cabudget #publicaffairs
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You're thinking of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, a landmark piece of legislation in the United States aimed at eliminating the federal budget deficit by 1991. It was named after its sponsors: Senators Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and Ernest Hollings. Here's a breakdown of its key provisions and impact: Goals: Eliminate the federal budget deficit: The primary objective was to achieve a balanced budget by gradually reducing the deficit each year, culminating in zero deficit by fiscal year 1991. Mechanisms: Declining Deficit Targets: The act established annual deficit targets, decreasing each year until reaching zero in 1991. Automatic Spending Cuts (Sequestration): If the actual deficit exceeded the target for a given year, automatic across-the-board spending cuts (sequestration) were triggered to bring the budget back in line. These cuts were to be implemented by the Comptroller General, a non-partisan official in the legislative branch. Challenges and Controversies: Constitutional Concerns: The Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that the automatic trigger mechanism, which granted the Comptroller General the power to implement spending cuts, was unconstitutional as it violated the separation of powers. This led to a revised version of the act in 1987. (*duster) Economic and Political Difficulties: Meeting the deficit targets proved challenging due to economic downturns and political resistance to spending cuts. The targets were repeatedly revised and ultimately not met. Focus on Short-Term Goals: Critics argued that the act's emphasis on short-term deficit reduction hindered long-term economic growth and investment in essential programs. Impact and Legacy: Raised awareness of the deficit: Despite its shortcomings, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings helped bring the issue of the federal deficit to the forefront of public debate. Paved the way for future budget control efforts: The act's focus on deficit reduction and its use of mechanisms like sequestration influenced subsequent budget control legislation, such as the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Key Takeaways: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings represented a significant attempt to address the growing federal deficit in the 1980s. Although it ultimately failed to achieve its goal of a balanced budget, it played a crucial role in shaping the debate on fiscal responsibility and influenced future efforts to control government spending.
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Check out the recent analysis by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the FY25 President's budget request. The CBO estimated that the President's budget overstated revenue by $1 trillion over the next decade. This raises interesting questions about the differences between how CBO and the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approach economic forecasts and budget proposal impacts. The White House generally tends to be more optimistic in its economic forecast assumptions. A rosier picture of the economy leads to additional revenue generated in the proposals in the President's budget. This discrepancy highlights the importance of CBO's objective analysis in providing a realistic view of the federal budget. CBO is the basis of Congressional action, and Congress has the final say on spending and taxing. For detailed insights into federal programs and comprehensive explanations of the budget, it's essential to refer to resources like the President’s Budget Appendix and federal agency congressional justifications. Stay informed and bookmark these valuable sources of CBO and OMB for a deeper understanding of federal programs, spending, revenues, and deficits. The views expressed are my own. #CBO #BudgetAnalysis #FederalSpending #OMB #BudgetForecasting
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Counties to Lose Sh20 Billion in President Ruto’s Budget Reorganization President William Ruto has announced a reorganization of the national budget that will see counties lose Sh20 billion in the current financial year. This decision comes after the withdrawal of… #Budget #Counties #Ruto >>> Read more
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SERP-P NEW PUBLICATION: Policy Costing and Its Importance in Policymaking, Budgeting, and Oversight Published by the Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department, this paper shows the importance of policy costing, which involves estimating the cost of legislative proposals, in supporting the Congress in its core functions of legislation, oversight, and representation. Policy costing enables legislators to prioritize expenditure or revenue measures, taking into account the government’s limited budgetary resources and the fiscal sustainability of proposed policies. Furthermore, it elevates the quality of policy debates and enhances the transparency of government budget data. As of June 2023, the Department of Budget and Management reported 205 laws with funding deficiencies, 159 of which do not have a specified budgetary requirement. The accumulation of unfunded measures places pressure on the government to increase its deficits and hampers the intended provision of better services to beneficiaries. House bills on budget modernization seek to address this issue by requiring a Financial and Budgetary Information Sheet for each bill that adds to government expenditure. Hence, for the Philippines to successfully adopt policy costing, it is important to clearly define the purpose, scope, and institutional arrangements when preparing policy cost estimates. Access the full publication here: https://lnkd.in/gS9mECuZ
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The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) was a significant piece of legislation in the United States aimed at controlling the federal deficit. It was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on November 5, 1990. Here's a breakdown of its key components: Main Goals: Reduce the federal deficit: The primary aim was to curb the growing national debt by setting limits on government spending and encouraging fiscal responsibility. Shift focus from deficit targets to spending controls: Unlike previous legislation (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), the BEA moved away from fixed deficit targets and instead implemented mechanisms to enforce spending caps. Key Mechanisms: Discretionary Spending Caps: The BEA established limits on discretionary spending, which is the portion of the budget that Congress appropriates annually (e.g., defense, education, transportation). These caps were set for different categories of spending and aimed to keep spending growth in check. Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rules: This provision required that any new legislation that increased direct spending (e.g., entitlements like Social Security and Medicare) or reduced revenues (through tax cuts) had to be offset by corresponding spending cuts or revenue increases elsewhere. This ensured that new policies didn't add to the deficit. Impact and Legacy: Contributed to deficit reduction in the 1990s: The BEA, along with other factors like economic growth, played a role in reducing the deficit during the Clinton administration. Influenced subsequent budget control efforts: The concepts of spending caps and PAYGO have been incorporated into later budget control legislation, demonstrating the lasting impact of the BEA on fiscal policymaking. Expired in 2002: Although the BEA was extended a few times, it ultimately expired in 2002. However, its core principles continue to inform budget debates today. Criticisms: Emphasis on discretionary spending: Some argued that the focus on discretionary spending limited the government's ability to invest in important programs and respond to unforeseen needs. Complexity: The BEA's rules and procedures were complex, making it challenging to fully understand and implement. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 represents a significant attempt to address the issue of the federal deficit in the United States. While it had its limitations and ultimately expired, its key principles continue to shape budget discussions and legislation today.
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