Matt Jones responds to a recent article in the The Washington Post, "Egregious Pentagon delays reflect problem the military is just starting to solve" with his thoughts on how the DoD can make changes to the acquisition process now.
"Medium-sized companies play a critical role in bridging the gap between innovation and scale, providing the necessary flexibility and capacity to integrate new technologies into broader applications. This dynamic ecosystem raises an intriguing question: why are the large primes increasingly focusing on innovation, an area traditionally dominated by smaller firms?"
Read the entire article below.
Jay TurnerScott GarrenKenneth PomiettoMichael MacFaddenEd AndersonScott RitchieThor JamesJames BeereJeff MorganMark Reese, D.Sc., MPMJonathan HarndenEddie RoseScott Aukema
If the defense department doesn't start releasing a whole bunch of cost plus contract for drones,, and ant drone research,, the military can really be in a sad state.
Federal Sales Guide/Senior Executive who Builds Industry Intel & Customized Winning Federal Sales Action Plans for Contractors through her ‘Three-Step Program.’ Over 10,000 people and 350 companies trained since 2002.
I was thrilled to co-author this piece with Doug Robb in Defense News on ways to help the Navy contracting workforce meet the demands of our current threat environment.
Because here’s a hard dose of truth no one is talking about: The Navy has a contracting problem. Spoiler alert: it has nothing to do with the hard-working contracting personnel themselves.
We’re pushing a culture of change and innovation across the DoD but a disconnect persists between DoD strategic messaging and how we are equipping (or not) our contracting officers. The entire acquisition workforce is getting new guides and frameworks and tools to "move at the speed of relevance" but Navy contracting officers still have...........the FAR/DFARS/NMCARS. That simply doesn't work. It's like the whole team is trying to build a LEGO set but the contracting officers have the wrong build manual.
I lived this in 2017 while working a rapid acquisition for directed energy. As I sat across from my program manager one afternoon, she nearly threw the FAR at me in frustration as I internally struggled to bridge the gap between everything I had been taught and how I was now being asked to move, stretch, and think – with no new tools, save my own wits – in ways that were completely foreign to me so that we could get capability to the fleet. I like to think I was a pretty creative and forward-leaning contracting officer but make no mistake, that was a hard moment even for me.
And if you’re not lucky enough to have a contracting officer with the ability, resources, and leadership support to think creatively, what comes out the other end these days will be a mystery and who knows how long it will take to get there.
Let’s do better for our contracting officers and, in turn, for the fleet.
US NavyOffice of the Secretary of the NavyNaval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)Marine Corps Systems CommandNaval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC)Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)Office of Naval Research
I was thrilled to co-author this piece with Doug Robb in Defense News on ways to help the Navy contracting workforce meet the demands of our current threat environment.
Because here’s a hard dose of truth no one is talking about: The Navy has a contracting problem. Spoiler alert: it has nothing to do with the hard-working contracting personnel themselves.
We’re pushing a culture of change and innovation across the DoD but a disconnect persists between DoD strategic messaging and how we are equipping (or not) our contracting officers. The entire acquisition workforce is getting new guides and frameworks and tools to "move at the speed of relevance" but Navy contracting officers still have...........the FAR/DFARS/NMCARS. That simply doesn't work. It's like the whole team is trying to build a LEGO set but the contracting officers have the wrong build manual.
I lived this in 2017 while working a rapid acquisition for directed energy. As I sat across from my program manager one afternoon, she nearly threw the FAR at me in frustration as I internally struggled to bridge the gap between everything I had been taught and how I was now being asked to move, stretch, and think – with no new tools, save my own wits – in ways that were completely foreign to me so that we could get capability to the fleet. I like to think I was a pretty creative and forward-leaning contracting officer but make no mistake, that was a hard moment even for me.
And if you’re not lucky enough to have a contracting officer with the ability, resources, and leadership support to think creatively, what comes out the other end these days will be a mystery and who knows how long it will take to get there.
Let’s do better for our contracting officers and, in turn, for the fleet.
US NavyOffice of the Secretary of the NavyNaval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)Marine Corps Systems CommandNaval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC)Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)Office of Naval Research
Would you like to play a game?
As a huge fan of complex strategic simulations such as HOI4, this article really caught my eye. In HOI4 playing R&D and acquisitions catch-up for smart and lethal integrated naval platforms later in the historical or alternative timelines is not a recipe for success. In most cases, a land/air power will often find their late game lacking in surgical firepower and maneuverability to achieve desired end-states.
In the 'game’ falling behind is usually caused due to resource limitations, poor allocations, political position/preference, and technology availability. The US probably has a fair to good historical balance/handle of those factors. However, as in the game and as the article suggests poor (or legacy) polices and plain old bad choices leads to poor acquisition outcomes in-real-life (IRL).
It’s called the military industrial complex for a reason. Good acquisitions practices, policies, governance, and relationships are key to the complex’s success. The FAR/DFAR are part of ‘policies and governance’ and were written with good intent, but do they still help programs achieve good outcomes?
I am not a back seat driver; I have experienced poor rules or more accurately poor rule interpretations and lethargy to adapt with catastrophic effect. Precious time and resources are often just lost if not for a timely intervention by a key stakeholder. Cmdr. Doug Robb and Kate Robb explain in their article good alignment and policy crafted upfront will negate some of these issues.
I have however also been lucky enough (in a previous position) to get stakeholders to think differently about key desired IT acquisitions outcomes and adjust policies accordingly. The collective will updated polices, created relationships, and helped form DON PEO Digital which was vital to enabling IT efficiencies and achieving IT results. In my current organization, we have taken some of those lessons and have strived to align IT strategies and acquisitions to meet goals with less churn.
Building advanced naval warfighting capabilities transcends the complexity (and to some degree the risk) of deploying IT and thus has more boxes to check. However, what is really telling about current acquisitions policy and choices is our inability despite great economic and industrial advantages to pivot from let’s say shooting down cheap drones with million-dollar missiles. Applying the article’s reasoning is a step in the right direction to solve some clear issues preventing desired outcomes.
In the end, the inability to smartly acquire or rapidly shift to more efficient technologies because of legacy acquisitions policies or the lack of interest to change will have long term consequences for the US. What we don’t want IRL is a future scenario where the US has 50,000 tanks and 500,000 troops sitting in a port with no ride to the party. In my opinion IRL then becomes game-over.
I was thrilled to co-author this piece with Doug Robb in Defense News on ways to help the Navy contracting workforce meet the demands of our current threat environment.
Because here’s a hard dose of truth no one is talking about: The Navy has a contracting problem. Spoiler alert: it has nothing to do with the hard-working contracting personnel themselves.
We’re pushing a culture of change and innovation across the DoD but a disconnect persists between DoD strategic messaging and how we are equipping (or not) our contracting officers. The entire acquisition workforce is getting new guides and frameworks and tools to "move at the speed of relevance" but Navy contracting officers still have...........the FAR/DFARS/NMCARS. That simply doesn't work. It's like the whole team is trying to build a LEGO set but the contracting officers have the wrong build manual.
I lived this in 2017 while working a rapid acquisition for directed energy. As I sat across from my program manager one afternoon, she nearly threw the FAR at me in frustration as I internally struggled to bridge the gap between everything I had been taught and how I was now being asked to move, stretch, and think – with no new tools, save my own wits – in ways that were completely foreign to me so that we could get capability to the fleet. I like to think I was a pretty creative and forward-leaning contracting officer but make no mistake, that was a hard moment even for me.
And if you’re not lucky enough to have a contracting officer with the ability, resources, and leadership support to think creatively, what comes out the other end these days will be a mystery and who knows how long it will take to get there.
Let’s do better for our contracting officers and, in turn, for the fleet.
US NavyOffice of the Secretary of the NavyNaval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)Marine Corps Systems CommandNaval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC)Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)Office of Naval Research
ALL,
Here is a link to HR 7401 Contract our Veterans bill:
https://lnkd.in/eqtdbHFh
Have you heard of it? If passed it will:
• Create 30,000-50,000 new SDVOSBs. (Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Businesses)
• Generate 150,000 - 250,000 new veteran jobs.
• Strengthen the DOD's supply chain with thousands of new, committed veteran vendors.
• Drive down prices at the DOD through increased competition.
• Enhance recruiting and retention efforts by offering business opportunities to prospective recruits with the largest buyer in America – the DOD.
• Significantly reduce veteran suicide rates by providing meaningful employment opportunities.
What can you do help? Get the word out, email/call members of the House Armed Services & Small Business Committees:
https://lnkd.in/eszkixGXhttps://lnkd.in/eubYQppN (Republicans)
https://lnkd.in/eqG2iZHu
and tell them to support/the bill. Pass the word to all your friends and fellow veterans.
Unfortunately, recommendations such as these continue to be offered by those with little actual experience in DoD acquisition... Each rule in the 3000+ pages cited exists because some corrupt government official(s) collaborated with a corrupt businessman to defraud the American taxpayer - the answer is NOT to simply abolish the rules or trust industry to do the right thing... the PPBE commission reforms accepted by DoD are a slow, but sure start.
Not to mention, show me the ONE person in the world who wants the US Navy to be efficient with spending... no one's personal interest is aligned with efficient spending!
https://lnkd.in/gyYnN8Rh
A new United States Department of Defense finalized rule addresses domestic preferences in DOD procurement. In our latest Government Contracts Navigator post, my colleagues Samarth Barot and Shane Hannon review the rule and note that defense contractors should ensure their sourcing and supply chain systems incorporate the updated requirements.
#dod#procurement#domesticpreferences#govcon#governmentcontracting
Love Tucson. Go Cats!
1moIf the defense department doesn't start releasing a whole bunch of cost plus contract for drones,, and ant drone research,, the military can really be in a sad state.