Secure Illinois Retirements’ Post

In the last couple of days, I have examined two of the three key findings of the 1965 Report of the President’s Cabinet Committee on Private Pension Plan Regulation, i.e., vesting and funding. Today, I take up the regulation of pension investments. Before and during the Committee’s deliberations, trustees of pension trusts had few constraints relating to their choice of investments. It was anticipated that the Committee would recommend some restrictions, however, based on a then nascent trend of pension trustees to seek out more speculative investments in an effort to increase yield. When the Committee was doing its work, pension funds were generally invested to ensure the safety of principle and the liquidity of funds. Government bonds were the principal investment in most plans, and unions tended to invest even more conservatively than corporations. (There was at least one, glaring exception. The Teamsters pension invested in some large Las Vegas gambling hotels and golf courses. What could possibly go wrong?) The Committee was presented with no evidence to support the claim that greater losses would result from higher risk investments, however. It did not therefore suggest any substantive changes to existing law. Notably, the Committee’s finding that higher risk investments would not cause greater losses would not survive scrutiny under modern portfolio theory. While modern portfolio theory first emerged in the 1930s, it was not until the 1990s that Dr. Harry Markowitz shared the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on the subject. Today, modern portfolio theory is near universally accepted. The Committee did propose some modest legislative changes to require as a condition of tax qualification that a plan may not invest more than ten percent of its funds in the stock of the employing company. It also proposed amending the Welfare Plans Disclosure Act to require additional information related to a plan's investment activities.

One of Illinois's biggest challenge for long term economic growth and prosperity are the state's large pension obligations. Anything that increases this challenge instead of structurally addressing it is a serious threat to the future to all of us living here. That is why it's so important to solve the legal challenges around Tier 2 of our pension system in a way that satisfies the legal requirements to be compliant but minimizes any increased financial obligations for the state, and therefore for all of us tax payers. Today's Chicago Tribune OpEd by Derek R. B. Douglas from the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago, Joe Ferguson from the Civic Federation, and David Greising from the Better Government Association makes a persuasive argument to fix the Tier 2 safe-harbor problem while ensuring the state’s pension plans remain compliant with federal regulations. The state already faces $142 billion in unfunded pension liabilities which makes the recommended approach by these three organization and supported by Governor JB Pritzker even more important. Changing the Tier 2 pay cap to match the Social Security wage base for the three largest state pension plans would add about $12 billion to the state’s 2045 pension liability and require about $7 billion in additional state pension contributions through 2045. But this measure to be legally compliant will be considerably less than alternative proposals under consideration by the legislature -including bringing Tier 2 benefits entirely up to the level of Tier 1 — at a cost to taxpayers that the OpEd estimates at $82 billion through 2045. Let's be financially smart and responsible instead of creating unacceptable burdens for future generations and their opportunity for economic well-being.

Finance Act 2022 removed constraints whereby Employer contributions to Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs) were previously subject to a Benefit in Kind charge and contributions limited to an employee's salary or years of service. Therefore, company directors, business owners, and key employees can now receive unlimited contributions to their PRSAs subject to a ceiling of €2m, significantly enhancing their ability to plan for retirement. Jim Stapleton CFP®, Head of SME Financial Planning commented that at "a recent Oireachtas Finance Committee meeting recently, Revenue Commissioner chairman Niall Cody told the meeting that he “was concerned” with the amendment and that this “concern has been shared” with the Department of Finance. The Department of Finance is monitoring the relaxation of the funding changes closely." So for now, employer contributions to Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs) continue to remain exempt from the BIK and company directors, business owners, and key employees can still receive unlimited contributions to their PRSAs. For the company, it can pay up to €2m into a PRSA and claim full Corporation Tax relief immediately. If you have any pension funding queries, contact Eolas Money and we will be delighted to help.  #retirementplanning #wealthcreation #eolasmoney Jim Stapleton CFP®

https://lnkd.in/eViTxCG3  Very interesting article for us pension dweebs. Uncommonly detailed with good inside baseball. Ultimately skewed, and of limited use. Many thoughts here. Following are a few: 1. The article confuses correlation for causation as a lot of the growth in the pension assets is attributable to growth in the markets generally, and not the effect of the legislation itself. For example, using 1995 as the baseline for determining the growth in pension assets, right before the late 90s internet boom as well as the QE environment of the 2010s with the related favorable investment climate, skews to the benefit of the author’s intended conclusion.  If the 7T grew at the actual annual 10.3% S&P rate over those 28 years, the retirement system would have 60T by now, not 38T as stated in the article (with no further net contributions). Even if the assets grew at 6.3% annual, there would be 38T. So how, other than compounding, have the changes to the pension system resulted in wealth disparity that would not have occurred anyway? 2. The article comes up short in tying the pension legislation to a windfall for the wealthy, the article’s thesis.  3. The article did not address ‘anti-wealth” provisions in the legislation, such as eliminating stretch. It also did not address how incentives are necessary for small business owners to set up plans.  Addressing these points would have provided balance. 4. It would have been helped if the addressed how removing incentives to form plans would affect retirement plan assets. 5. Rarely does extreme wealth disparity result from retirement assets, despite the occasion large balance situation. 6. None of this suggests that continued review for improvements and reconsideration of how pension system should operation is not warranted – it is. For example, why are there still vesting rules? Can the rules be simplified? What more can be done to reduce fees?

SURPRISE: On average, public pensions in #Democrat-led states (9.1% annual returns) outperform financially those in #Republican-led states (8.8% annual returns), from the latest available data of 2011-2022 -- resulting in up to a $159 billion gap over 12 years for those state #pensions that are #antiESG (vs #proESG) that could be funding police, firefighter, teacher, and govt employee retirements. Our HIP Investor Inc. analysis of these financial returns of 204 public pensions (state/city/county/schools) across 50 US States is the lead cover story on ImpactAlpha today authored by financial industry veteran editor Lynnley Browning. Thanks to HIPster Onindo Khan for leading the analytics. From ImpactAlpha: "Pension funds in pro-ESG ‘blue’ states outperform those in anti-ESG ‘red’ ones — to the tune of $159 billion. Financially material environmental, social and governance factors play a major role in investment decisions at many public pension funds — except for those in states that have joined the conservative-led backlash against consideration of #ESG risks. A study of more than 200 US #pension funds found that those in pro-ESG “blue” states tend to outperform their peers in #Republican-controlled “red” states that disparage so-called “woke investing.” Funds in #Democrat-led states, which allow and sometimes require the use of ESG criteria when selecting investments, returned an average 9.1% a year over more than a decade through 2022, according to a new report, shared exclusively with ImpactAlpha, by HIP Investor, an impact investment advisory firm in Laguna Beach, Calif. By contrast, the average yearly return by public pension funds in Republican-led states over the same period was a lower 8.8%. “The self proclaimed ‘party of business’ — Republicans — can't seem to systematically achieve higher pension returns for state pensions,” HIP’s R. Paul Herman, FSA told ImpactAlpha. “The GOP sounds off regularly as a defender of free markets, yet pursues anti-ESG laws and proclamations that appear to correlate with lagging pension returns.” https://lnkd.in/gFmFbmPw (registration may be required to read the full feature)

A principal goal of Congress in enacting ERISA was to ensure the security of pension promises. ERISA’s vesting and funding standards, along with its pension-guaranty program under Title IV, were among its the law’s means whereby. As yesterday’s post made clear, neither big business nor big labor were on board with Congresses’ agenda, although for different reasons. This post examines business’ objections. I will turn to labors’ objections tomorrow. While the pension-guaranty program made pension plans less risky for employees, they also interposed the federal government deeply into private-sector employment relationships. Title IV of ERISA forced defined-benefit plans and their sponsors into a government program that purported to cover a risk but that many experts believed was not even insurable. The final version of the President’s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds saw the light of day January 1965. (This is the report first commissioned by President Kenedy in 1961. It was final issued during the Johnson administration.) Big business was not pleased. In March 1965, a representative of the National Association of Manufacturers warned the Senate Special Committee on Aging that “[n]othing…will blight the promising future of private plans so quickly as detailed Federal standards or regulations as to benefit amounts, vesting, and funding.” [Wooten 2005]. Businesses’ reaction to vesting and funding standards were equally averse. 

Are the Pension Funds under-funded? Exploring an aspect of group influence that has been little studied: the role interest groups play on the inside of government as official participants in bureaucratic decision-making. The challenges for research are formidable, but a fuller understanding of group influence in politics requires that they be taken on. Here we carry out an exploratory analysis that focuses on the bureaucratic boards that govern public pensions. These are governance structures of enormous financial consequence for state governments, public workers, and taxpayers. They also make decisions that are quantitative (and comparable) in nature, and they usually grant official policymaking authority to a key interest group: public employees and their unions. Analysis suggests that these “interest groups on the inside” do have influence—in ways that weaken effective government. Going forward, scholars should devote greater attention to how insider roles vary across agencies and groups, how groups exercise influence in these ways, how different governance structures shape their policy effects, and what it all means for our understanding of interest groups in politics. Another basic feature of pension politics is that public workers and their unions have incentives to support the chronic underfunding of their own pensions. Due to state statutes, constitutions, and judicial decisions, pensions promised by state politicians are backed by strong legal protections almost everywhere; and public workers thus know they will eventually get what they are promised even if their pension plans are currently underfunded. Indeed, because full funding on a regular schedule would be tremendously costly for state (and local) budgets— crowding out other services, forcing higher taxes, making the true costs of pensions painfully transparent to citizens —public workers and their unions have incentives to prefer that their pension plans be underfunded. Underfunding enables the fiscal illusion that pension benefits are much less expensive than they really are. If public workers and their unions want increasingly generous benefits in future years, they need to convince the public that these benefits are not costly to provide. At the same time, underfunding keeps employee contributions to their own pension funds at low levels; and by keeping contributions by their employers down, they are freeing up public money for other government services, keeping public workers employed—and providing funds for their own salaries and raises. Quoted from open sources.

9.1% annual returns sounds significantly but not massively bigger than 8.8% annual returns. A $159 billion gap between #proESG and #antiESG states _does_ sound massive. #ESG #investment #pensions #value

Public service personnel and elected officials must be eligible for only a single pension benefit, not for each and every position they have held. This is a pure waste of taxpayers' money. Because the wise use of taxpayers' money is critical to ensuring that citizens come forward to pay taxes. Elaboration: The argument is centered around the principle of fiscal responsibility and the efficient use of public funds. It suggests that allowing public service personnel and elected officials to receive multiple pension benefits for different positions held is not only wasteful but also potentially discourages citizens from paying taxes due to perceived misuse of their money. Here are some points to consider in this context: 1. **Principle of Fiscal Responsibility**: Governments have a duty to manage public funds responsibly. Allowing multiple pension benefits for the same individual can be seen as contrary to this principle, especially if it significantly increases the financial burden on taxpayers without a corresponding increase in public service value. 2. **Perception of Waste**: The perception that public funds are being wasted can erode trust in government and reduce compliance with tax laws. If citizens believe that their tax money is not being used efficiently, they might be less inclined to pay their taxes, leading to a decrease in government revenue and an increase in enforcement costs. 3. **Equity and Fairness**: The current system might be seen as unfair to taxpayers and possibly to other public servants who do not have the opportunity to accumulate multiple pension benefits. Ensuring that pension benefits are structured in a way that is fair and equitable can help maintain public trust. 4. **Sustainability of Pension Systems**: Pension systems are designed to provide financial security to retirees. However, if these systems become too costly to maintain, they risk becoming unsustainable. Limiting pension benefits to a single payment per individual could help ensure the long-term viability of these systems. 5. **Encouraging Transparency and Accountability**: Implementing a rule that limits public service personnel and elected officials to a single pension benefit could be part of broader efforts to increase transparency and accountability in government spending. This could involve clearer reporting on pension costs and benefits, as well as mechanisms for public oversight. 6. **Potential Impact on Recruitment and Retention**: It's also worth considering the potential impact on the recruitment and retention of public service personnel and elected officials. While limiting pension benefits might save money, it could also make these positions less attractive, potentially affecting the quality of candidates and the overall effectiveness of public services.

Today rounds out my discussion of the 1965 Report of the President’s Cabinet Committee on Private Pension Plan Regulation. Over the last few days, I covered the report’s big three concerns: vesting, funding, and the regulation of pension investments. There were eleven recommendations in total. In addition to the items listed above, they included actuarial assumptions, portability, limits on waiting periods, non-discrimination rules, and enhanced disclosure standards. Some 9 years later, ERISA included most of the Committee’s recommendations in some form or other. The only items not included were a proposal to create a public institution to accept pension credits and strict limits on the extent to which a pension plan could be integrated with Social Security. While the Committee’s work provided the template for broad-based pension reform, it did not make the prospect of passage any more palatable to the two constituencies whose support was most essential—big labor and big business. Following the release of the report, however, the need for pension reform attracted the attention of Senator Jacob K. Javits. In 1967, Senator Javits, who is sometimes referred to as “the grandfather of ERISA." proposed legislation to address the funding, vesting, reporting, and disclosure issues identified by the Committee. While his legislative proposals attracted a good deal of attention, they did little to advance the cause of pension reform. That task fell to an award-winning 1972 NBC News documentary that investigated abuses in the private pension system. In future posts I will take a closer look at the roles that both Senator Javits and the NBC documentary played in getting ERISA signed into law.