Morningstar Sustainalytics’ Post

At Meta’s 2024 AGM, a shareholder proposal requested annual reporting on child safety efforts on its platform. While reported shareholder support was 19%, our research estimates non-affiliated shareholder support to be closer to 60%. With CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s Class B shares controlling 61% of voting power, the board's recommendation to reject all shareholder-sponsored proposals — including this one — prevailed. Our latest stewardship report, “Shareholder Democracy and the Challenge of Dual Class Share Structures: How Unequal Voting Rights Influence Proxy Voting Outcomes and Corporate Governance” investigates this critical issue regarding dual class share structures. They give some of a company’s shareholders superior voting rights, while contradicting shareholder democracy: the principle of one share, one vote. Using 2024 proxy season data, authors Ignacio García Giner, Senior Analyst, Stewardship; Matteo Felleca, Analyst, Stewardship; and Jackie Cook, Director, Stewardship, Product Strategy & Development; examine how such structures can distort shareholder democracy and obscure proxy voting signals. Discover insights on: 🚫 Some of the conflicting views on dual class share structures. 🗳️ How dual class share structures obscure proxy voting signals. 🔎 How clearer voting disclosures would strengthen accountability and limit systemic risks. Download the report to learn more: http://spr.ly/6040a7oee

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