Yasiru Ranaraja’s Post

Competition or Confrontation? The video is a good summary on the strategic choices ahead and how to balance them. This was my overview of naval statecraft and the book: US Naval Power in the 21st Century See the book here: https://lnkd.in/eRZ4caeK

Primacy of Maritime Strategy in Naval Shipbuilding? The Case of Imperial Germany | Tyler Self 'The conventional wisdom of naval analysts maintains that a country’s maritime strategy occupies a place of prime importance in determining the course of its naval shipbuilding. According to Sir Julian Corbett, “Classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time.”[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan also writes, “Conditions and weapons change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to…those wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy.”[2] More recently, Andrew S. Erickson has written that “ships are the ultimate embodiment of maritime strategy,” while other analysts state that “ships are the essential element of the ‘means’ by which the ‘ends’ of maritime strategy are achieved.” #Navy #Corbett #Mahan #Germany https://lnkd.in/gRw-qbxH

Reviews of my book are rolling in, courtesy of Tom Duffy 😁 "European Naval Power is an invaluable guide and source of insight for those analyzing European defense approaches as well as those considering larger questions of maritime strategy and seapower." @ National Maritime Historical Society seahistory.org read review here👇 https://lnkd.in/d9cuyZfT

An interesting perspective from our strategic account executive, Vice Adm. (USN, Ret.) Frank Pandolfe who delivers a robust four-point strategy to boost US Naval deterrence effectively. Are we ready to navigate through the evolving currents of Asian geopolitics? Dive into our latest article and chart the course of future Naval strategies. https://bit.ly/3Uug3Hz

This new SIPRI paper by Tytti Erästö, SU FEI and Wilfred Wan examines the drivers and implications of naval build-ups in the Indo-Pacific, considering key actors’ security objectives and threat perceptions. Find out more ➡️ doi.org/10.55163/DKWB3559

Naval Might: The Evolution and Innovation of Warships Throughout History Introduction to Naval Might Throughout history, naval warfare has been an esse... Read More - https://lnkd.in/dK_BEdaC

🛳 #NewArticle in JMSE! ⚓️ 'Assessment of Selected Alternative Fuels for Spanish Navy Ships According to Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis.' Explore the latest findings on alternative fuels for naval ships. 👉 Read the full article here: https://lnkd.in/dAnZ8Yks #NavalEngineering #AlternativeFuels

This was certainly a great talk, and I'm all on board with it.  I really encourage anyone interested in navy matters to take the time. That said, there are also some great graphics so you won't get 100% out of just listening in your car, but you can come back to those later. The fact that I loved it never prevents me from speaking out on the bits that I was slightly skew on :). I expect many will disagree with me, but the dialog is all part of the fun... I think it has been a bit surprising that some assume that the Chinese are interested only in local or regional hegemony. China may signal local defense as its objective, however, the following indicate that is far from the limits of its endeavors... [] Nuclear submarines: While a wonderful status symbol, if their goal was truly local, they could have much more cost effectively have invested in diesel electric submarines. [] Carriers: Excellent power projection platforms, but if all you are protecting is in range of land based air, how essential are they (again, considering the considerable investment)? [] Overseas basing: The Chinese are certainly investing in local bases (like Cambodia), but now spreading to Djibuti as well. I suspect other bases, especially in Africa (and possibly South America), are also in the works due to the next effort... [] Overseas Influence of all types, ranging from economic adventurism in developing countries (with clear ties to gaining long term influence and potentially basing--look at the number of ports around the world now run by Chinese companies) to strategic efforts like balloon overflights. Also, the focus on the tonnage of shipping vs. the count of shipping really drags the whole debate into a numbers game that misses the point. Looking at Battleforce ship counts or total tonnage is like trying, in 1962, to measure the capability of the North Vietnamese with counts of combat aircraft and tanks (and I am sure that's been done!). The impact of the Maritime Militia, especially, cannot be overstated, especially the impact this is likely to have on rules of engagement: "Western Navy helo fills fishing boat full of 2.75 inch rockets" blasts from the worldwide press... Lastly, I was disappointed by the misunderstanding of shipyard capacity. There are a lot of challenges with US Shipbuilding, but we would be remiss to assume that those problems are entirely solved by finding a different shipyard. Yes, the US produces 3 Large Surface Combatants (DDGs) a year today. But shifting production to overseas only alleviates that problem of pace to the extent that the US is willing to give up strict adherence to current design standards and requirements for domestic sourcing of components. Given those two relaxations--essential for foreign sourcing--domestic shipyard production rates would rise considerably as well. Otherwise, building DDG-51/III in the Far East is likely to go as well as building a FREMM frigate in the US.

The Marine Corps is investing aggressively into developing its value proposition to the Joint Force and the Nation. As a Cyber Warfare Officer in our beloved Corps, I encounter two pretty distinct groups of individuals working two separate but related problem sets. Problem Set 1. How does cyber support the Joint Force? Problem Set 2. How does cyber support the Marine Corps supporting the Joint Force? Both problem sets are incredibly challenging and rewarding to work on behalf of the nation. In my opinion, as our service develops, Problem Set 2 should be priority for a few reasons: 1. Answering this question justifies our existence. 2. The Marine Corps wants us to support them and will support and advocate for us to do so. 3. Marines of all specialties are hungry to get after it, and fight better together. 4. The Marines deserve solutions that make them more lethal and survivable. 5. The problem set is unique to the Marine Corps, and we are the only branch resposible for solving it. The complexity of the problem requires the combined effort of our best and brightest, integrated with the larger Marine Corps team.