This was certainly a great talk, and I'm all on board with it. I really encourage anyone interested in navy matters to take the time. That said, there are also some great graphics so you won't get 100% out of just listening in your car, but you can come back to those later. The fact that I loved it never prevents me from speaking out on the bits that I was slightly skew on :). I expect many will disagree with me, but the dialog is all part of the fun... I think it has been a bit surprising that some assume that the Chinese are interested only in local or regional hegemony. China may signal local defense as its objective, however, the following indicate that is far from the limits of its endeavors... [] Nuclear submarines: While a wonderful status symbol, if their goal was truly local, they could have much more cost effectively have invested in diesel electric submarines. [] Carriers: Excellent power projection platforms, but if all you are protecting is in range of land based air, how essential are they (again, considering the considerable investment)? [] Overseas basing: The Chinese are certainly investing in local bases (like Cambodia), but now spreading to Djibuti as well. I suspect other bases, especially in Africa (and possibly South America), are also in the works due to the next effort... [] Overseas Influence of all types, ranging from economic adventurism in developing countries (with clear ties to gaining long term influence and potentially basing--look at the number of ports around the world now run by Chinese companies) to strategic efforts like balloon overflights. Also, the focus on the tonnage of shipping vs. the count of shipping really drags the whole debate into a numbers game that misses the point. Looking at Battleforce ship counts or total tonnage is like trying, in 1962, to measure the capability of the North Vietnamese with counts of combat aircraft and tanks (and I am sure that's been done!). The impact of the Maritime Militia, especially, cannot be overstated, especially the impact this is likely to have on rules of engagement: "Western Navy helo fills fishing boat full of 2.75 inch rockets" blasts from the worldwide press... Lastly, I was disappointed by the misunderstanding of shipyard capacity. There are a lot of challenges with US Shipbuilding, but we would be remiss to assume that those problems are entirely solved by finding a different shipyard. Yes, the US produces 3 Large Surface Combatants (DDGs) a year today. But shifting production to overseas only alleviates that problem of pace to the extent that the US is willing to give up strict adherence to current design standards and requirements for domestic sourcing of components. Given those two relaxations--essential for foreign sourcing--domestic shipyard production rates would rise considerably as well. Otherwise, building DDG-51/III in the Far East is likely to go as well as building a FREMM frigate in the US.
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Accomplished public speaker.
A must-watch. If you weren’t already sobered by the pace, comprehensive nature, and sophistication of China’s naval and maritime build up, you sure will be after this….