Analysis of South African policymaking of the past 27 years

The African National Congress (ANC) is the political party in government for the past 27 years and has had the moral leadership of exemplary leaders such as Albert Luthuli, Sefako Makgatho, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo among others. Since the 1994 elections, the political dispensation changed dramatically where the ANC took over as a governing party with a significant support from the voting public.

Historically, the ANC was and it is still a vibrant public policy organisation which had rich ideas on development, economic development and social development. The mandate of the ANC, which informs its deployed officials in the machinery of government, State-owned Companies and regulatory agencies to implement its policy mandate.

Generally, the ANC battled to implement its policy mandates in Government and all related agencies. The inertia of some of its deployed cadres and officials in government ended up being implicated in corrupt activities which dented the brand ANC both locally and internationally. The first period of organisational change accompanied South Africa’s transition to a non-racial democracy and witnessed extensive organisational reshaping between 1994 and 1996. This entailed the alteration, disbandment and creation of new functional government departments. The net result was this produced an expanded size of national departments. Initially the public sector was conceptualised to be rationalised at least at the national level, therefore blunted by pressure to maintain continuity of public service delivery and preserve a stable organisational platform. With a hope to beef up delivery to disenfranchised groups under apartheid. 

The period 1994–1998/99 was the policy period, defined by various policy reviews and formulation, adaptation to a changed context and making public service training primary. The motive for change appeared particularly sensitive to high expectations of a public service that must meet aspirations of the people/citizens. The Department of Health and Welfare was split to form two new departments to focus on each sector reflected the huge upscaling of services demanded. This was evident in the significant budgetary allocation these two sectors continue to be large budget items even to date. The creation of the departments responsible for Communications, Public Service and Administration and Safety and Security signalled the introduction of new policy space and related oversight.

At the core of the morality challenges faced by the ANC is shaping fundamentally the relations it had shaped with capital as driven by two principal factors; firstly, as a political party the ANC needing funding, secondly, the ANC championing the National Democratic Revolution, most notably through Black Economic Empowerment and other transformation policies it wanted to implement. In more recent times the Radical Economic Transformation, which is not an official ANC policy agenda topic or theme.

TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was the seminal campaign programme of the election of the ANC in the 1994 elections, it was used and applied as the primary socio-economic programme. Broader objective of this socio-economic policy was to establish a more equal society through reconstruction and development and at the same time strengthen democracy that will benefit every citizen.

The RDP identified five major policy programmes expanded in The White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1995) as follows:

a) create a strong, dynamic and balanced economy; 

b) develop human resource capacity of all South Africans; 

c) ensure that no one suffers racial or gender discrimination in hiring, promotion or training situations; 

d) develop a prosperous, balanced regional economy in Southern Africa; and 

e) democratise the state and society. 

Policy was aimed to redress the inherited inequalities of apartheid, socially, economically and spatially. The ANC government intended to mobilise people and resources towards the eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future. RDP was successful in social security in which the government established a very extensive social development system. The system catered for the aged, disabled, children in need, foster parents and many others too poor to meet their basic social requirements. Social development programme provided for free health care programmes aimed at pregnant women and small children and free meals were provided for between school children, this still continues.

The new government encountered difficulties in the full implementation of the RDP namely fiscal constraint because of:

1) poor fiscal and economic legacy it inherited after 50 years of apartheid and 20 years of total isolation from world trade and international relations; 

2) an organisational constraint because of the lack of an efficient public service and a troubling inability of the new government to build the necessary state capacity, 

3) the inability of the new government to prioritise the RDP and to integrate it as the guiding principle of its socio-economic policies. 

The RDP ignored the gathering of new taxes (revenue for a function state), rather focused narrowly on fiscal prudence and the reallocation of existing revenues. The government had lack of sufficiently skilled managers, while policy co-ordination and implementation methods used were not successful. The same challenges are prevalent today, the National Development Plan 2030 has a dedicated section that deals with building a capable state that is able to deliver and implement public policy effectively.

TACKINGL ECONOMIC GROWTH THAT ADDRESSES SOCIAL NEEDS

South African government, which was largely led by the ANC, introduced a macroeconomic policy framework called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996. The aim of GEAR was to stimulate faster economic growth, which was required to provide resources to meet social investment needs. The policy embraced most of the social objectives of the RDP, however, was also aimed at reducing fiscal deficits, lowering inflation, maintaining exchange rate stability, decreasing barriers to trade and liberalising capital flows.

Under GEAR policy, which is a neo-liberal policy agenda; fiscal deficit, inflation and government consumption targets were all somewhat met. South Africa had achieved greater macroeconomic stability, better reporting and increased accountability. Management of public finances improved radically under GEAR in regard to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the negative growth rate of the early 1990s was reversed. Tightening of the monetary policy, restructuring of government structures led to a drop in government expenditure (trade unions such as Congress of South African Trade Unions were unhappy). This was testament to a policy that was implemented within government led by the Head of State and President of the Republic of South Africa, in the from the late Nelson Mandela.

Private investment, job creation and GDP growth indicators were unsatisfactory. Therefore, low levels of economic growth and private investment were insufficient to contribute to the reduction in unemployment. The GEAR policy achieved very little success with the distribution of wealth, which was fundamentally at the core of the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution ambitions. The GEAR policy was singularly relevant in achieving macroeconomic objectives, however, it failed with regard to the social challenges, most notably poverty reduction and employment. This is still the major challenge of the South African economy, notably exacerbated by inequality.

SOUTH AFRICA’S SHARED GROWTH PATH

GEAR was replaced in 2005 by the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) as and additional development and build up on the first two developmental strategies followed after 1994. South African Government and the leadership of the ANC recongised the challenges of protracted poverty driven by unemployment, and low earnings and the jobless nature of economic growth. Therefore, ASGISA envisioned the following aims: 

a) reduce poverty by 2010, and halving unemployment by 2014 from the 28% in 2004 to 14% by 2012.

ASGISA builds on the foundations of the RDP’s goals of building a united, democratic, non-sexist and non-racial society and a single integrated economy. The level of implementation and future of the programme was uncertain as there was no clear leader of the programme in government and state machinery. The political factional battles within the ANC were emerging as key influences to scupper ownership of policy implementation. Irony was that Thabo Mbeki was President of the ANC and Republic of South Africa.

When President Thabo Mbeki was defeated at the ANC Polokwane Elective Conference in regards re-election as ANC President, it then led to ASGISA being replaced with New Growth Path (NGP) which was led by Jacob Zuma (ANC President after Polokwane Elective Conference) in his administration. New Growth Path became a formal government policy as articulated Zuma’s State of the Nation address in 2010. The nomenclature of the New Growth Path is similar to all previous policies of the ANC and government meaning it recognised that:

1) structural unemployment remains extremely high; 

2) poverty continues to afflict millions; 

3) oppression of workers continues; and 

4) inequalities are now deeper than ever before. 

The New Growth Path was intended to accelerate growth in the South African economy and to rapidly reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality. The wording and phraseology were similar and the leadership of the policy was different. Unfortunately, New Growth Path simply failed to live up to its intended objectives.

NEW VISION TOWARDS 2030

In 2013 the government had presented the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 as South Africa's long-term socio-economic development roadmap, which was mobilised into various sectors of the economy including civil society. The leadership in government and other key social partners viewed the NDP as the cornerstone and blueprint for a future economic and socio-economic development strategy for the country. 

The 2012/20123 Elective Conference of the ANC in Mangaung blessed the NDP as a policy blueprint for eliminating poverty and reducing inequality in South Africa by 2030. The NDP identified the key constraints to faster growth among other things and presents a roadmap to a more inclusive economy. The NDP was a neo-liberal policy framework and generally the ANC followed a neo-liberal economic model in reforming policy and legislation economically, socially and strategically. This caused tensions in the tri-partite formation comprising ANC, Cosatu and South African Communist Party, called the alliance.

The ANC became very much the leading voice of policy formulation and shaping, that created frustrating battles with its partners in the alliance.

The South African National Civic Organisation was no longer a major player in the formulation of policy formulation at a local level. Tragically, the local government sphere was excluded in the macro policy formulation and little consideration was given towards effective local government and governance.

EXPROPRIATION WITHOUT COMPENSATION

The Cyril Ramaphosa administration is implementing an ANC policy effort to amend the Constitution to include the expropriation of land without compensation for redistribution to victims of apartheid-era discrimination and land seizures. The land policy was for a long time an ANC policy and never prioritised as a policy action in government. After adopting the expropriation of land policy in early 2018, parliament appointed a constitutional review committee that held nationwide hearings and in late 2018 recommended that the change proceed. The National Assembly then appointed a committee to draft and introduce a reform amendment. Ironically, the EFF nudged the ANC and government to reach this stage in regards to this policy. Ramaphosa had worked hard to be the voice and spokesman of the policy.

The tenets of land reform as framed in the expropriation of land without compensation is misunderstood. DA is exploiting the policy confusion to cause further damage to the ANC brand that the governing party is irresponsible by following this policy.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN FOCUS

Transformative local government was an ANC policy since 2001, however local government was marked by declining financial viability and sustainability, ageing infrastructure and poor maintenance of assets, poor performance information on service delivery, unprecedented skills drainage with adverse impact on the institutional capacity of municipalities, political instability leading to lack of governance, poor oversight and lack of consequence management; and escalating disclosures of unauthorised, irregular and fruitless expenditure annually. 

South Africa’s local government is technically on the brink of complete collapse.

The policy dialogue is further clear that 247 municipalities in South Africa may be consolidated in order to manage resources effectively and reduce the risk of governance failures.

A decline in oversight, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of policies and legislation by the national government leads to the poor performance of both at provincial and local government. Unfortunately, the ANC has not changed the state of inconsistent management or leadership culture that emanates from the national leadership both in government and within the governing party that has had a negative impact on the whole of government. It is at local government that cadres of the ANC are deployed to take on senior and executive positions both administratively and politically in the form of Speaker of Council, Executive Mayor and Council. 

INDUSTRIALISATION, LOCALISATION AND SMME DEVELOPMENT

South African trade and industry policy formulations have no robust value-driven programme to ensure that entrepreneurs or Small Micro and Medium-sized Enterprises participate in the tertiary economy. Unfortunately, this was left in the hands of the unregulated market (state failed to be effective as a regulator) and it is the nature of the economy that affects every sector of society and other functional areas of government. 

The ANC’s leadership failure in policy implementation is clearly demonstrated here. On structural economic transformation and regulation, the government was able to make its presence felt on competition and not consumer protection, consumers or ordinary South Africans are under the chaos of concentrated monopolies and oligopolies (evidence of market failure), who set prices and raise costs as they see fit and this happens because there is no industry competition for established monopolies and oligopolies.

The inability to deregulate powerful monopolies and oligopolies is one of the fundamental reasons why social protection is weak and the reason why South Africa remains the most unequal country in the world. Retail supermarket companies such as Pick n Pay, Checkers, Woolworths, Shoprite, Boxer and all these concentrated retailers determine food prices and the food value chain in South Africa, with no social responsibility to the social conditions, where the majority of South Africans live below the breadline and in poverty. Lack of regulatory oversight continues to fail consumers and the underprivileged.

Government had failed to be a custodian of consumer interest, have no control of food prices, private hospital prices, medical care prices, education prices, energy prices, and many essential services. The ANC and its leadership failed to break up existing monopolies, which is central to South Africa’s structural economic transformation mandate.

The ANC and government had failed on its regulatory mandate to protect consumers, its own findings on the health sector found that the entire health value chain is controlled by the same companies which own banks, medical aid, private hospitals and even insurance. These companies go to the extent of gatekeeping new entrants into the health sector, which enables them to manipulate prices as they see fit. What is even more discouraging is that these private hospitals are also subsidised by taxpayers. 

Highly concentrated nature of South Africa’s economy, especially monopolies and oligopolies are an obstacle to the success or growth of SMMEs and job creation, as they intentionally exclude new and small entrants through price-fixing and various forms of collusion which are not even punished. The poorest of the poor, who are recipients of government social grants are victims of ruthless monopolies that control the retail sector, as their welfare money is primarily spent on high food prices. In fact, government has defaulted on its constitutional mandate.

The South African economy is largely and deliberately excluding the black majority from participating in the mainstream economy. Designation of products and localisation linked to women and youth-owned enterprises within value chains of auto, clothing and textiles as part of the industrialisation mandate of government seem not to be a consideration as the entire economic productive value chain is still in the hands of whites. The development to the special economic zones and industrial parks, which have no links to social infrastructure and township development in terms of digitalisation, further worsens the exclusion of SMEs and black people.

South Africa’s economic and social disparities are as a result of concentrated deregulated monopolies and oligopolies that are not sustainable and need urgent attention by ANC and its deployed leaders in government.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Constitution of South Africa sets a solid foundation for human rights for all South Africans, a framework for a just and equitable society. In fact, this is a credible basis and yardstick to examine whether the state and its related agencies live up to the constitutional principles and socioeconomic and cultural rights secured for citizens.

Section 26 of the Constitution sets out the right to adequate housing in South Africa, however, since 1994, the government has provided over 3,7 million opportunities (not housing) to people to live where they choose, however, the number of completed housing units had shown a decline since 2012. In regards planning and township establishment, government had shifted focus on mega or catalytic projects, which inadvertently continued the legacy of apartheid spatial planning, placing people further away from centres of economic activity, without providing adequate or affordable public transport. Many poor South Africans spend about 60% of their income on transport and time travelling to and from work.

The Upgrading Informal Settlements Programme supports municipalities to work with communities to provide tenure security and basic services. In regards housing policy of the ANC and government informal settlements needed to be upgraded, wherever geotechnically and environmentally feasible. The provision of affordable housing, well-located housing was set as vital for urban land reform and redistribution. However, the state and government machinery had caused the following:

a) poor implementation, 

b) under-spent budgets and 

c) lack of political will.

The net effect was frustrating the efforts to secure socioeconomic rights, particularly in housing. The resolution of socio-economic rights facilitates participation by civil society organisations, individuals and communities in the formulation and implementation of social programmes bearing on socio-economic rights protected in the Constitution. However, there are various factors, institutional and political, which regulate whether courts can play a transformative role in the realisation of socio-economic rights.

Civil society organisations and other actors in socio-economic rights litigation should be aware of the institutional and capacity limits of courts in delivering socio-economic goods and consider that particular claims may be properly considered through advocacy and other associated strategies. The key is to avoid the risk of unsuitably resorting to litigation resulting in judgments that may not necessarily aid the realisation of socio-economic rights.

The Constitution provides for broad remedial powers for the courts to enforce socio-economic rights, however, despite this broad responsibility, this is another area of its socio-economic rights jurisprudence where the Constitutional Court was more deferential and cautious. Civil society organisations and other key stakeholders should ensure that the remedies that they seek from the courts in respect of socio-economic rights are fitting to the circumstances of the cases in question.

NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

The most significant result of South Africa’s May 8 election was that the political centre was intact, even as its margins decreased. The ANC registered its lowest electoral victory since the end of apartheid, however, the party still won 57.5% of the vote and retained control of eight of the nine provinces. Julius Malema’s populist Economic Freedom Front (EFF) increased its share of the vote from 6.4% in 2014 to 10.8%, from 26 members of parliament to 44. The youthful base and Malema’s rhetorical skills, will surely stand the party to attract attention and support. The Freedom Front Plus (FF+), whose base is largely of white voters on the far right, scored its largest percentage of the vote since 1994, taking the share of the Democratic Alliance’s votes.

The other notable trend from the 2018 election was that voter turnout was the lowest ever in an election, at 65%. More than 6 million youth, about half of those in the 18-30 age bracket, did not register to vote. This voter disenchantment was chiefly a reaction to corruption and the government’s failure to stimulate economic growth that reduces unemployment. Policy inertia and inability to implement adopted policies is negatively impacting the confidence among citizens.

South Africa’s political system may soon change dramatically as a result of a June 2020 Constitutional Court ruling that invalidated a national electoral law banning independent candidates from running in national and provincial legislative elections. The court ordered the National Assembly to amend the law within two years to allow for such candidacies. This will result in a system of concurrent direct constituency and electorate-wide party list-based elections. This change will have radical potential effects, both positive and negative, fostering a more competitive electoral landscape.

CONCLUSION

Social security system in South Africa falls short of its constitutional requirements. Key weaknesses of the existing social security arrangements are:

a) The absence of a statutory pension and insurance arrangement. The National Social Security Fund must pay benefits on retirement, disability, death prior to retirement or unemployment. It must be available to all workers and funded by mandatory contributions.

b) Limits to the reach of social assistance. The elimination of the means tests for social grants, together with a standardised disability assessment, will ensure that all those who are in need of social assistance receive it.

c) Fragmentation of social security arrangements. The establishment of a single department responsible for social security must unify policy making. Shared administration and services will improve efficiency and service delivery across the agencies and significantly reduce costs.

d) Variable quality of coverage in private sector arrangements. The approved funds framework must ensure that only well-run and transparent voluntary retirement and insurance arrangements must be eligible for tax-incentivised contributions.

Unfortunately, social security has not been closely aligned with labour-market policies as well as broader government priorities. A sharing of facilities between social security agencies and labour centres could enhance workers’ access to both and will expand the footprint of public employment services (including private sector opportunities).

END.