The Danger's of Hamas' Rocket Fire from Southern Lebanon

Hamas has no right to retaliate against Israeli debauchery at Al-Aqsa Mosque by using the Lebanese South to launch rockets at Israel. First, such operations violate Lebanon’s sovereignty. Secondly, they show contempt for the Lebanese people’s right to make their own decisions, and the Palestinian people’s right to solidarity and support, by risking backlash against them as a result of Hamas’ desperate adventures. Ismail Haniyeh, the chief of Hamas’ political bureau, has no right to risk Israeli retaliation against Lebanon and its people, who are going through the ordeal of economic collapse. And certainly, Hezbollah’s chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was sitting with Haniyeh on the same day the ‘Palestinian’ rockets were fired, has no right to drag Lebanon to battles dictated by the IRGC in Tehran, and repeat the scenario of the war of 2006 that he once expressed regret for, saying “If only I had known” what would happen. Such acts are not resistance. They are part of intra-Palestinian rivalries and Iranian interference meant to say only the Islamic Republic has a response to Israel’s outrageous actions at Al-Aqsa. However, it is the Israeli strikes on Iranian sites in Syria that are the main motive behind the actions of the regime’s men in Tehran, who likely had advance knowledge of the ‘Palestinian’ rockets fired from the Lebanese front, whose purpose was to offset their failure in the Syrian front. But if they did not have advance knowledge, then that is a disaster for them. 

 Let’s start with Israel. The actions of the Netanyahu government, the Israeli security forces, and racially charged Israeli settlers at Al-Aqsa Mosque violate international law and basic humanitarian norms, and merit condemnation and resistance. But the Palestinian resistance against these violations is falling prey to inter-Palestinian one-upmanship, as a result of the Palestinian divisions that have exacerbated the suffering of Palestinian people living under Israeli occupation. Hamas is the main party to blame for these divisions, but Fatah and the Palestinian leadership have also failed the Palestinian people by refusing renewal at the top and stubbornly persisting on the same path at all levels. 

 Hamas has made no effort to deny its loyalty to the IRGC in Iran, and its susceptibility to Turkish dictates whenever that suits its aspirations. Hamas is in fact the perfect example of a the combination of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and the pragmatism of allying with the Islamic Republic of Iran, from which it receives its rockets and its guidance. 

 Turkish-Iranian relations are tense these days, especially in Syria. Russia is attempting to bring the two sides closer by persuading Turkish President Erdogan to reconcile with his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad; and convince Iran to agree to the terms demanded by Turkey for such a reconciliation. So far, Iran has refused this proposal. 

 During the four-way meeting in Moscow last week of the foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria, the parties failed to reach a roadmap to resolve their differences. Iran continues to insist on Syria’s territorial integrity including the Turkish-Syrian border region, bearing in mind that Tehran believes it has been invited by the legitimate Syrian government to deploy its influence, forces, and bases wherever it pleases on Syria’s territory. Iran does not want to give in a single inch on these privileges, and wants Russia to be a partner and guarantor of its position in Syria. However, Tehran’s problem with Moscow is a big one. 

 Iran resents Russia’s refusal to take military measures to respond to repeated Israeli raids on Iranian sites in Syria, bearing in mind that Russia has the ability to activate response mechanisms to protect Iranian positions, including by downing Israeli warplanes. Russia is therefore in a bind. 

 Russia knows well that Israel’s raids cause it a difficult dilemma. Indeed, the Russian President Vladimir Putin needs to leverage his friendship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Ukraine war. The Kremlin cannot gamble with this top priority issue, and therefore cannot comply with Tehran’s needs. 

 Tehran for its part is also incapable of expanding the scope of the skirmishes with Israel despite its threats of direct confrontation, including in Syria. Indeed, following the Chinese-brokered agreement with Saudi Arabia, Iran is not the same and it has to curb its military appetite. Iran has been thus forced to activate its favorite plan, namely to retaliate against Israel through its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and Gaza respectively. Unifying the fronts of ‘resistance’, or leveraging them as required, is a more urgent Iranian need today as it finds its hands otherwise tied. 

 The Hezbollah front is tougher today than other fronts, for two reasons. First, the explicit and implicit terms of the Saudi-Iranian-Chinese agreement require non-interference in the internal affairs of states and for Iran to prove its behavior has changed. In this context, Iran’s behavior in Lebanon and de-escalation through Hezbollah is a crucial part of these agreements. Therefore, dragging Lebanon into a war with Israel triggered by Hezbollah attacks is inconsistent with Iran’s promise to soften its behavior. Secondly, the agreement demarcating maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel was blessed by Iran and Hezbollah for a number of reasons, including the potential financial windfall of oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean.  

 Hezbollah rushed to leak remarks saying the rockets fired from the south were not Hezbollah’s. Unfortunately for Hassan Nasrallah, he decided to host Ismail Haniyeh while Haniyeh’s rockets were being fired from south Lebanon – Hezbollah’s stronghold where supposedly even insects need permission from him to fly. So either Nasrallah gave his permission in advance, or he was caught off guard. In both scenarios, a promise was broken, or a blunder was made. 

 It is possible that internal conflicts in the Islamic Republic of Iran are part of the explanation. Perhaps the IRGC and moderates in Iran are playing a game of good cop, bad cop – the moderates represented by Iranian FM Hossein Amir-Abdollahian who met with his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal Bin Farhan in Beijing, hosted by the Chinese FM, to kickstart the implementation of the two countries’ diplomatic agreement. 

 Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the guarantor of the agreement. It was he who wanted a new page in relations with Saudi Arabia, to save Iran from strangulation. He did so walking in the footsteps of his predecessor Khomeini, who “drank the poisoned chalice” as he said and agreed to a ceasefire with Iraq, accepting UN Resolution 598 in July 1988. 

 The Iranian domestic scene is not very clear today. There are conflicting indications when it comes to the power struggle and the competition for succession after Khamenei. At present, the men of the regime seem to have decided to accommodate China’s desire and enter into the agreement sponsored and guaranteed by Beijing. 

 The ministerial summit in Beijing this week was fruitful. It adopted important practical steps, from opening embassies and consulates and resumption of flights to economic partnership and crucially, the reactivation of a 2001 security cooperation agreement. This is the litmus test of whether the men of the 1979 Iranian Revolution have decided to modify their regime’s doctrine and raison d’etre, or whether they are still considering their options between permanent radical change and the temporary softening of its behavior. 

 The outcomes of the meetings between Abdollahian and Bin Farhan appear promising. Yemen will be the first place where intensions and actions will be tested. The issue of Lebanon has imposed itself more forcefully than the players had intended, on account of the developments in the south and the questions and contradictions they have raised. 

 Saudi Arabia and Iran both agree on condemning Israel and its illegal and outrageous actions against worshippers at Al-Aqsa Mosque and the racist and extremist policies of the Netanyahu government. Clearly, however, Saudi Arabia would not see any justification for using Lebanon as a launch pad for rockets fired by Palestinian factions to implicate it in a cycle of Israeli retaliation, in violation of its sovereignty. For its part, Iran’s positions are unclear vis-à-vis the Palestinian factions’ actions out of Lebanese territory, and theoretically it supports this courser in line with its project to unify ‘resistance’ forces against Israel. 

 It is not clear either whether the ‘Palestinian’ rockets launched from Lebanese fields near Rashidieh Refugee Camp were fired at the independent decision of Hamas – an unlikelihood –whether it was a ‘freelance’ attempt to please the IRGC, or whether it was a calculated decision made by Tehran and coordinated with Hezbollah. 

 Ultimately, it was an ill-conceived decision because it harmed both the Palestinians and the Lebanese, and exposed Iran’s incoherence and embarrassed Hezbollah on its turf. The obvious question here is: How do the Palestinian factions, especially Hamas, maintain such rocket capabilities in Lebanon when they supposedly need them in Palestine to carry out serious resistance against Israel, instead of carrying out shows of force that ultimately serve Israel?  

 The ill-fated Cairo Agreement of 1969, legitimizing Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, is the root cause of this problem. How can an independent state allow arms outside its control on its territory, if it truly was a state? 

 Hezbollah’s weapons justify Hamas’ weapons outside state control in Lebanon, in a flagrant violation of its sovereignty. While Hezbollah is a Lebanese faction with the right to national partnership, it has no right to monopolize decision-making. If Tehran truly intends to reform the logic of its regime to build up coexistence and security cooperation in the region, it must start thinking about dismantling its armed proxies in Arab countries, from the Houthis in Yemen to Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

 Resisting Israel out of Palestinian territories is a Palestinian right that requires ending the divisions and rivalry between Palestinian leaders. It requires an Arab and international strategy to pressure Israel to rein in its racist doctrine and actions, not just against worshippers at Al-Aqsa Mosque, but also its project to establish a pure Jewish state by seeking justifications to forcibly transfer Palestinians out to resolve the so-called demographic bomb. Hamas is giving Israel pretexts, either deliberately or out of stupidity. But all must beware falling into the trap of systemic Israeli extremism.