The US claims UN "snapback" has happened, and threatens measures to require compliance

On 19th September, Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo announced that, according the US, the UN had re-imposed sanctions on Iran under the JCPOA.

As noted in an earlier piece, the US had sought to invoke the snapback provisions of the JCPOA which, ultimately, would have lead to a UN Security Council vote to continue the UN suspension of its sanctions, which the US would then have vetoed. This would result in the automatic reimposition, or “snapback” of UN sanctions. The other signatories of the JCPOA argued that as the US had withdrawn from the JCPOA, it had given up its right to invoke the dispute settlement processes.

 As has been expected, the other members of the UN, including those on the Security Council declined to accept the US declaration that snapback had occurred, with, for example, the EU stating:

“the US unilaterally ceased participation in the JCPOA by presidential Memorandum on 8 May 2018 and has subsequently not participated in any JCPOA-related activities. It cannot, therefore, be considered to be a JCPOA participant State and cannot initiate the process of reinstating UN sanctions under the UN Security Council resolution 2231.”

Pompeo’s statement however contained the following key paragraph

“The United States expects all UN Member States to fully comply with their obligations to implement these measures. In addition to the arms embargo, this includes restrictions such as the ban on Iran engaging in enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, the prohibition on ballistic missile testing and development by Iran, and sanctions on the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to Iran, among others. If UN Member States fail to fulfill their obligations to implement these sanctions, the United States is prepared to use our domestic authorities to impose consequences for those failures and ensure that Iran does not reap the benefits of UN-prohibited activity.”

The US appears therefore to be planning to use its domestic legislation to enforce the UN snapback. As the other Member of the UN have not accepted the US right to invoke the “snapback” provisions of the JCPOA, this appears to put the US on a collision with most of the rest of the UN.

Part of the thinking in the UN, and by its Members, probably relates to the US Presidential election in November, and the possibility that a new Biden Administration would reverse the position of the Trump Administration and rejoin the JCPOA. As of the date of writing, the Biden position on the JCPOA is not fully articulated, with the few comments made pointing to a requirement that Iran fulfils all its obligations under the JCPOA before a Biden Administration rejoins. While rejoining may not be a simple process, a Biden Administration would want to mend fences with allies and so any US measures imposed to force third countries to comply with US policy on snapback would be repealed quickly.

Obviously, a Trump victory would be unlikely to change the situation and a second term Trump Administration might feel emboldened to act more aggressively.

The EU is set resolutely against the Trump Administration position, and has means, albeit imperfect, to counter any use of US extraterritorial sanctions in the EU, namely Regulation 2271/96, the so-called Blocking Regulation. However, use of the Blocking Regulation would be largely symbolic as most EU businesses have withdrawn from Iran, partly as a result of the US position, but largely as a result of the inability to get paid for any business they could do.

It is worthwhile reiterating that the EU is not intending to “snapback” any UN multilateral or EU unilateral sanctions on Iran, and so whatever business EU companies are doing in Iran will remain unaffected.

As the US position on enforcement of "snapback" occurs, we will return to this issue.