The Speaker has the final authority to decide the conduct of business in the House and prior permission is required for members to ask a question, or to discuss even any matter. As a result, he or she retains the power to expunge, in full or in part, remarks that might be considered unparliamentary or even critical of the ruling dispensation. Photo: Special Arrangement
With the first session of the 18th Lok Sabha likely to commence in the third week of June, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) led by Chandrababu Naidu and the Janata Dal (United) led by Nitish Kumar — the two key allies of the BJP in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) — are said to be vying for the post of Speaker. This move is to “insulate” the alliance partners from any possible split in the future especially since the Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority wields considerable power in deciding disqualification petitions under the anti-defection law.
Defections can alter the numbers in the House and can potentially lead to a government’s collapse. As a result, the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (anti-defection law) was introduced as a safety valve for India’s multiparty democracy. However, in recent times, critics have flagged that the Speaker remains a biased functionary of the ruling dispensation despite occupying a constitutional position. This alleged bias was particularly noticeable during the Maharashtra political crisis when current Chief Minister Eknath S. Shinde and numerous other Shiv Sena MLAs rebelled against then Chief Minister Uddhav B. Thackeray in the Maharashtra Vidhan Sabha. Their actions ultimately led to the collapse of the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) government, which included the Shiv Sena, the Nationalist Congress Party, and the Indian National Congress.
Alluding to the internal split within the party, Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Aaditya Thackeray claimed in a social media post on X that the BJP has a pattern of undermining its allies once in power. He accordingly advised the TDP and JD(U) to secure the Speaker’s position to safeguard their interests.
However, this is not the first time that the TDP is pursuing the Speaker’s chair. In 1998, Ganti Mohana Chandra Balayogi was handpicked by Mr. Naidu to become the youngest and first Dalit Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
Constitutional authority
The post of Speaker, the constitutional and ceremonial head of the Lok Sabha, usually goes to the ruling alliance while a member of the Opposition party conventionally holds the Deputy Speaker’s post. Article 93 of the Constitution stipulates that the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker must be elected “as soon as may be” after the commencement of the House. However, the Constitution does not specify a time limit or process for conducting elections for the post of Speaker. The Speaker is elected by a simple majority vote and his or her term concludes with the dissolution of the House unless they resign or are removed from office earlier.
A Speaker can be removed through disqualification proceedings or a no-confidence motion in the House. However, as per Article 94 of the Constitution, such a resolution can only be moved after a 14-day notice. Following their removal, a Speaker is allowed to attend the proceedings but is not permitted to preside over them.
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‘Impartial’ arbiter
While there are no specific qualifications required for becoming the Speaker, the duties discharged by the authority are unique compared to other members of the House. The book ‘Practice and Procedure of Parliament’ published by the Lok Sabha Secretariat, describes the Speaker as “the principal spokesperson of the House”, representing its collective voice and serving as its sole representative to the outside world.
The Speaker has the final authority to decide the conduct of business in the House and prior permission is required for members to ask a question, or to discuss even any matter. As a result, he or she retains the power to expunge, in full or in part, remarks that might be considered unparliamentary or even critical of the ruling dispensation. For instance, last year, former Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla was accused of rank partisanship for ordering the expunction of Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s remarks on the purported links between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and industrialist Gautam Adani.
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It is also the Speaker’s decision that determines whether a Bill should be certified as a Money Bill — over which the Rajya Sabha exercises limited powers. In the recent past, the BJP government has been accused of introducing crucial laws such as the Aadhaar Bill, amendments to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), and the Foreign Contributions Regulations Act, 2010, as Money Bills, purportedly to circumvent the Rajya Sabha where it does not enjoy a majority.
Another crucial instance when a Speaker’s impartiality impacts the Opposition is when a motion of no-confidence is moved against the government. In 2018, when the YSRCP and TDP gave notices for a motion of no-confidence against the BJP government, then Speaker Sumitra Mahajan adjourned the House several times before admitting the motion and putting it to vote.
Additionally, data collated by The Hindu reveals that Lok Sabha rules that empower the Speaker to suspend members for misconduct in the House are disproportionately used against the Opposition members. Last year, Congress leader Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury was swiftly suspended for his remarks against the Prime Minister (which was later revoked) but BJP MP Ramesh Bidhuri who hurled communal slurs and abuse at Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) member Kunwar Danish Ali was let off only with a warning by Speaker Om Birla. Later, the complaints against Mr. Bidhuri were referred to the Lok Sabha’s Privileges Committee, which comprises a majority of BJP members.
The Table shows the political affliations of MPs suspended from the 17th Lok Sabha
Cognisant of the need to insulate the constitutional authority from political influence, the Supreme Court in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Hon’ble Speaker Karnataka (2019) sharply observed, “The constitutional responsibility endowed upon him [the Speaker] has to be scrupulously followed. His political affiliations cannot come in the way of adjudication. If the speaker is not able to disassociate from his political party and behaves contrary to the spirit of neutrality and independence, such person does not deserve to be reposed with public trust and confidence.”
Anti- defection law
For the Opposition, the Speaker’s authority under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is arguably more crucial than any other function. The anti-defection law was introduced in 1985 to curb instances of House members switching from one party to another, often after an inducement. However, when two-thirds of elected members of a party agree to “merge” with another party, they become exempt from disqualification.
In the landmark case Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the powers vested in the Speaker to decide such disqualification petitions and further ruled that judicial review is permissible only after the Speaker renders a final order. However, in recent times, partisan actions by the Speaker have led elected governments to fall. A delay by the Speaker in deciding disqualification petitions can reduce the Tenth Schedule to nullity and make governments that do not have clear majorities increasingly vulnerable.
Last year, the top Court came down heavily on Maharashtra Assembly Speaker Rahul Narwekar for the delay in deciding disqualification petitions against the rival MLAs of the Uddhav Thackeray and Eknath Shinde factions of the Shiv Sena. While noting that the petitions were pending for over a year and a half, the Bench led by Chief Justice of India (CJI) D.Y. Chandrachud rebuked Mr. Narwekar for reducing the disqualification proceedings to a “charade”.
Earlier, in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Honble Speaker Manipur (2020), the apex Court directed the Speakers of Assemblies and Lok Sabha to decide such disqualification pleas within three months except in extraordinary circumstances. Notably, it also recommended revoking the Speakers’ disqualification powers and instead vesting the authority in an independent tribunal headed by former judges.
