Oxford China Policy Lab

DeepSeek's emergence as a frontier AI player has put China’s AI ecosystem on the map around the world – just ask the U.S. stock market. But amidst growing concern about the risks increasingly powerful Chinese models pose, many have overlooked a fascinating development unfolding since Christmas: DeepSeek and a bunch of other Chinese companies have rolled out promises to safeguard their AI. And their commitments look remarkably similar to the ones mostly Western companies had signed onto at the International AI Summit in Seoul in May. The similarities in wording and focus are striking. Both sets of commitments emphasize: - Risk assessment across the AI lifecycle - Safety-focused organizational structures - Clear risk mitigation processes - Transparency about model capabilities and limitations Of course, differences remain. The Chinese commitments have explicit provisions for open source models, for example, while the Seoul commitments emphasize specific risk thresholds. And Chinese industry has more explicit government backing through affiliations with the Ministry of Innovation and Information Technology. But this convergence could be significant. China’s release of its AI Safety Commitments follows a pattern in China's AI governance: launching domestic initiatives that foreshadow international consensus. Similar dynamics played out when China released its Global AI Initiative domestically before signing the Bletchley Declaration as part of a global effort. As frontier models become more powerful - and potentially riskier - finding space for coordination on safety becomes increasingly critical. The upcoming Paris AI Summit in February will be a key test: will more Chinese companies sign onto the Seoul Commitments? My latest analysis for Carnegie explores what these commitments are, how they came about, and what it all means for international AI governance: https://lnkd.in/esgg_qyt

In May 2024, 16 frontier AI companies signed “Frontier AI Safety Commitments.” At the time, only one Chinese firm was among them. Fast forward nine months, and 17 Chinese companies have signed onto their own AI Safety Commitments, with strikingly similar language to the Seoul Commitments. Writing for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford China Policy Lab Director Scott S. explores the latest on frontier companies converging on safety and security measures. https://lnkd.in/ej29C8xF

Oxford China Policy Lab Director Kayla Blomquist spoke to Australia's national broadcaster, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), about DeepSeek. • Who founded it? • What's the conversation around chips? • What are the strategic implications going forward? Listen below! https://lnkd.in/edqa9Jwr

DeepSeek's latest release "absolutely challenges the idea of monetisation strategies that a lot of leading US AI firms have had." Oxford China Policy Lab's Director Kayla Blomquist spoke to the BBC's Technology Editor Zoe Kleinman. https://lnkd.in/eMWCpxVi

DeepSeek: what's going on? There's been significant media and political speculation around the latest DeepSeek update; some of it good, much of it nonsense. Cutting through the noise, Oxford China Policy Lab Non-Resident Expert Sihao Huang and RAND's Lennart Heim deliver a tight assessment detailing all you need to know. https://lnkd.in/gVUm-HQd

Because we don't have enough takes on DeepSeek already, Sihao and I added our personal two cents: What the Headlines Miss. TLDR: timing is political but tech is real, compute constraints bite differently than you think, and the story is more complex than "export controls failed." Link in the comments.

Delighted to be joining the great team at OCPL as a non-resident expert!

Kicking off 2025 with a bang! We are extremely pleased to announce three new hires at Oxford China Policy Lab, and a new non-resident expert. Karuna Nandkumar is our new Head of Policy Programmes. Karuna most recently worked on Indo-Pacific policy at the US Department of Defense in D.C, and her work focuses on Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. She also speaks Mandarin and several other languages fluently. Sam Hogg is coming on as our Head of Policy Engagement. Sam previously ran Beijing to Britain, which produced analyses on the UK-China bilateral read a million times across 140 countries. Prior to that, he worked in Parliament. His work focuses on strategy. Nadine Staes-Polet is our Programme Associate. Her research focuses on how Southeast Asian states navigate the US-China geopolitical rivalry, and she speaks Mandarin fluently. And we're delighted to announce a new Non-Resident Expert: Ruby Osman. Ruby is a Policy Advisor and China expert at The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, where her research focuses on Chinese foreign policy and elite politics, and helping political leaders create coherent China strategies.

New year, new country: I’m happy to officially announce that I’ve moved to the UK to join the Oxford China Policy Lab (OCPL) as Head of Policy Programmes. In 2023, as China’s post-COVID reopening was underway, a six-year-old girl on vacation in Chongqing with her family asked me, “中国和美国之间的战争会不会爆发？”, “Will China and the U.S. go to war?” After working on U.S.-China relations and broader Asia policy in international organizations and U.S. government for the past four years, the reply I gave her remains my view today: I believe war is far from inevitable, but it depends on both of us. That’s why I spent two years in Beijing deepening my Mandarin language skills and trying to understand a more complex picture of China than we often see in our news feeds, and communicate a more complex picture of the U.S. than many of my Chinese counterparts see on their 小红书 (at least before last week…). But in a more multipolar world - with chaotic information environments, spiraling defense industrial buildups, leaps in emerging technology capabilities, and total breakdowns of international cooperation - we desperately need to bridge the gap between policymaking communities and academic, technical, and global perspectives. We need to stress test evidence-based ideas and train talent working on the hardest problems. I’ve joined OCPL to do just that. As Head of Policy Programmes, I’m thrilled to help build a global community of China and emerging tech researchers dedicated to rigorous, policy-relevant analysis of the U.S.-China relationship and its international impacts. Now that I’ve touched down in London, I’d love to meet you all! So please reach out if you want to grab a coffee.

My article, 'Covert Interference and the UK Foreign Influence Registration Scheme' has been published in the RUSI Journal (Taylor & Francis Group). The article examines the UK's Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), introduced under the 2023 UK National Security Act, to expose covert foreign interference by requiring political lobbyists working for foreign governments to register their activities. The register's launch has been repeatedly delayed under the new Labour government, pending the release of the UK's 'China audit' later this year. I argue these delays leave UK politics vulnerable to hostile state interference from countries such as Russia and China. High profile incidents such as the recent revelations about Prince Andrew's friendship with Chinese spy Yang Tengbo underscore the risks posed by unchecked foreign interference in undermining UK national security and eroding trust in its democratic institutions. I also explore how lessons drawn from equivalent US and Australian registration schemes can strengthen the effectiveness of FIRS. Thanks to the Oxford China Policy Lab for providing funding through their fellowship program and to the two anonymous peer reviewers for their comments. https://lnkd.in/euPu5HZ5