Christopher C. Misner’s Post

The age old problem we are seeing unfold is the Army fights tomorrows war with the war of today. I’m sure the Ukrainian conflict has something to do with cancellation of the FARA program but we shouldn’t be focused on tomorrows fight based on Ukraine. It should be anticipation of emerging threats and doctrine. And those should be based on what is happening behind closed doors in research facilities. Heck we are seeing tactics being employed from over a century ago that are meshing with the 21st century battlefield. Taking away a capability because of a concern we see now will only kick the can down the road.

No doubt there will be plenty of naysayers out there who will point to taxpayers money being wasted here. But the reality is that the requirements for the warfighters are evolving at a pace most #defence organisations are not used to reacting to - including Defence Australia. Ukraine has taught us that and we should heed the lessons. The US Army is ending its latest effort to build a new armed scout helicopter, known as the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA), an abrupt change of direction that marks one of the department’s most significant program cancellations of the last decade. The service will delay procurement of its next-generation helicopter engine, which was set to be used in all UH-60s, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters as well as to power FARA. Army had already spent at least $2 billion on the program and had requested another $5 billion for the next five years, according to budget documents. Unclear whether this will impact the Australian Government decision to acquire Boeing Apache helicopter. As several defence old hands have pointed out that this is a signal from the United States Department of Defense that the nature of airlift and rotary wing support in the battlefield has fundamentally changed. #defence #defense US Navy U.S. Indo-Pacific Command United States Marine Corps United States Air Force US Navy Royal Australian Navy Royal Australian Air Force Australian Army Defense News Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Defence Connect #technology #innovation

Article Extract : “Gen. James Rainey, an acquisition leader overseeing the program, said he doesn’t view the cancellation [of the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft, or FARA] ‘as a failure’ for Army Futures Command, the Austin, Texas-based office heading the service’s modernization efforts.” “We are making great progress, we have momentum, the overwhelming majority of our signature modernization efforts are either on time or ahead of schedule and are starting to translate into capabilities,” he told reporters Thursday. “The Army has already twice canceled potential replacement efforts for the armed scout. In 2004, it terminated the Comanche program after spending $9 billion to produce two prototypes.” “Four years later, it canceled the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.” “In the last attempt before FARA, the service asked industry to bring commercial off-the-shelf aircraft to a “fly-off” to fill the armed scout mission, but the Army walked away from the effort in 2013, finding nothing that met all of its requirements.” #unitedstates #army #aviation #helicopter #program #cancellation #replacement #reconnaissance #scout #industry #manufacturing #termination #military #defense #bell #textron #financial #accountability #management #futures #command

Credit to Jen Judson Aug 3, 2024 Army’s long-range tiltrotor aircraft moves to next development phase https://lnkd.in/gndJEMAa The U.S. Army’s future long-range aircraft is moving out of technology development and into the critical engineering and manufacturing development phase, the service announced Friday. The Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program, or FLRAA, is estimated to be worth approximately $70 billion across its lifespan, including foreign military sales, and is set to replace roughly 2,000 Black Hawk utility helicopters. It is expected around 2030 to take over the roles of the Black Hawk, long the workhorse of the Army for getting troops to and around the battlefield. The Army’s current fleet of helicopters will be incapable of meeting future distance requirements in places like the Indo-Pacific theater. The service wants the FLRAA to be capable of traveling roughly 2,440 nautical miles — or 2,810 miles — without refueling, but also be agile enough to maneuver troops into dangerous hot spots. “Future battlefields require expanded [maneuvers], the ability to sustain and provide command and control across vast distances, and of course, evacuate our wounded,” Maj. Gen. Mac McCurry, the Army Aviation Center of Excellence commander, said in the statement. “All of these apply to both conventional and Special Operations Forces. With roughly twice the range and twice the speed, FLRAA brings unmatched combat capability to the Joint Force.” The Army’s current fleet of helicopters will be incapable of meeting future distance requirements in places like the Indo-Pacific theater. The service wants the FLRAA to be capable of traveling roughly 2,440 nautical miles — or 2,810 miles — without refueling, but also be agile enough to maneuver troops into dangerous hot spots. The Army’s current fleet of helicopters will be incapable of meeting future distance requirements in places like the Indo-Pacific theater. The service wants the FLRAA to be capable of traveling roughly 2,440 nautical miles — or 2,810 miles — without refueling, but also be agile enough to maneuver troops into dangerous hot spots. “Future battlefields require expanded [maneuvers], the ability to sustain and provide command and control across vast distances, and of course, evacuate our wounded,” Maj. Gen. Mac McCurry, the Army Aviation Center of Excellence commander, said in the statement. “All of these apply to both conventional and Special Operations Forces. With roughly twice the range and twice the speed, FLRAA brings unmatched combat capability to the Joint Force.”

September marks an important month for historic milestones in vertical-lift aviation. After WWII, the United States Marine Corps understood that emerging weapons technology threatened the viability of amphibious assaults that depended on massed fleets of surface connectors operating close to an enemy shoreline. To stay relevant, the Marine Corps bet big on technological innovation by forming its first operational helicopter squadron, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron (HMR) 161. Established on January 15th, 1951, HMR-161 only received its first Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopters in April and rapidly trained aircrew and maintainers for a deployment to Korea in August. After arriving at Pusan on September 2nd, 1951, HMR-161 wasted no time demonstrating the utility of vertical-lift aviation. In quick succession, the squadron conducted the first combat resupply utilizing helicopters (Operation Windmill I) and the first heliborne air assault (Operation Summit). On September 27th, without the benefit of night vision goggles, GPS, or navigational FLIRs, HMR-161 conducted the first helicopter combat mission at night, using six aircraft to traverse narrow mountain valleys to insert 200 troops in less than two and a half hours. In the early years of the Cold War, the Marine Corps demonstrated the significant impact a new technology could have on the battlefield by clearly identifying emerging threats that challenged the status quo. They rapidly fielded new combat platforms, developed required procedures, and avoided risk-averse implementation. Today, emerging threats challenge the joint force's ability to operate in permissive environments. Helicopters and other vertical-lift platforms remain relevant, but their impact can be bolstered by new systems that leverage emerging technology being developed specifically to address these threats. Will today’s military continue to be hindered by a cumbersome procurement process and reliance on small numbers of aged, exquisite platforms, or will it follow the example of HMR-161 by rapidly integrating the innovative systems required for success in a potential peer conflict?

We shouldn't let sunk-cost analysis push a program forward when conditions and requirements change. We should also remember that the technical know-how acquired during the development process isn't lost when the project is cancelled.

“"The US Marine Corps has embraced this guidance and is moving to increase the number of battalions and squadrons that field unmanned systems and acquire the SHIELD AI V-Bat to enable further operating concepts. The V-Bat takes off and lands vertically, eliminating the need for catapults or skyhooks. Consequently, it has a much smaller operational footprint than the ScanEagle or RQ-21 and even could operate from small naval vessels that lack flight decks, such as patrol craft and optionally manned or unmanned surface vehicles.” https://lnkd.in/gVDeEQJy

OTD in 2018: Take off performance was not seen as a concern in the powerful F-22A, so calculations were skipped and under-speed rotation had become a norm across the F-22 community. https://lnkd.in/eNVN7ty #aviation #aviationsafety #flightsafety #military #organizationalculture