Concepts are tough. Predicated on what the future might look like, they are almost always doomed to fail, at least in the sense that they are exposed to so many edge cases that hindsight tends to show how "off" they can be.
Concepts are necessary though. They drive capability analysis, requirements, and acquisition decision trade-offs. In most cases, the concept just needs to be directionally correct to deliver relevant warfighting capability to the field; from there, it is up to the operators to deploy capability effectively within the ever-shifting operational and tactical paradigms of the battlefield.
One underlying issue the authors touch on is when concepts try to answer every operational and tactical question, they pose inherent risks to the warfighter on the ground. As the authors state, "Most concepts fall prey to this technological overconfidence, particularly in the field of communications. Assured connectivity in combat is central to nearly all multi-domain operations work. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and NATO all place some style of next-generation command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the core of their concept, assuming an assured availability of strong networks in the relatively near future. In reality, and despite a significant amount of attention in recent years, the level of assured connectivity upon which much multi-domain operations thought is predicated is far from realistic." Then they recommend, "stop trying to make war “not war” by being overly clever. New concepts cannot erase attrition from the battlefield or lift the fog of war. Attempts to do so are quixotic at best. Focus on concrete operational problems and build solutions from there."
To the point above, I wholeheartedly agree and often fear over-reliance on concepts and "technological overconfidence" cede focus from the power of mission command, commander's intent, solid, realistic training, and trust in our warfighters' adaptability and ingenuity.
For me personally, I always try to frame my work in the ADG market from the first principle question of "What is the warfighter (or intel analyst or government software developer or SETA employee, etc.) actually 'doing'?" In most cases, that question lifts the veil and cuts through the conceptual jargon of what might they do or what could they do if everything was perfect. This, in effect, helps me focus on the concrete operational problems a business is trying to help solve for the warfighter and hopefully help them at least do what they are actually doing, just better.
https://lnkd.in/e482MANv