Institute for the Study of War

NEW: Major Publication: Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War Ukraine’s unfolding Kursk Campaign shows that the battlefield is not fully transparent despite pervasive surveillance by both sides and that concealing operational intent can still achieve operational surprise. The war in Ukraine has seen the most advanced use of offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) in history. Pervasive reconnaissance drones have made the battlefield nearly transparent — except when the adversary has been able to blanket it with effective defensive EW. Despite this formidable technological obstacle (and many others, discussed below), the Ukrainians, against great odds, were able to conceal their intent for long enough to launch a successful penetration attack and subsequent exploitation into Russian territory. In a new paper, “Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War, ISW President Kimberly Kagan and Director of the Critical Threats Project at American Enterprise Institute Frederick Kagan offer a new framework within which Ukrainian forces and their Western backers can break the current positional warfare and allow Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Learn more: https://lnkd.in/ezqYY7HX

NEW: Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully. Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders. Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Gaza Strip right now. The death of Yahya Sinwar and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however, given the degraded state of Hamas’ military organization Read More: https://lnkd.in/eFcp2Ssh Other Key Takeaways: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014. Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes using B2 Spirit stealth bombers in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16. The strikes targeted Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.” Israeli media reported on October 17 that Hezbollah fighters killed five 1st Infantry Brigade soldiers during clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 16.

NEW: Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City. Read More: https://lnkd.in/eewQk8Ek Other Key Takeaways: The European Union issued a statement on October 16 condemning Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

NEW | Iran Update, October 16, 2024: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Israeli forces are seizing and clearing terrain in border towns and areas to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. Israeli forces have previously seized or partially secured terrain in Maroun al Ras, Yaroun, and Blida in southeastern Lebanon. Full report: https://lnkd.in/gzfh2CD2 Additional Key Takeaways: Israeli Policy in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm. Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah’s extensive development of military infrastructure. Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran. Iranian Nuclear Policy: Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons. Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons." Post-War Plans in the Gaza Strip: US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. US officials are now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel.

NEW | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 16, 2024: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian and Western officials expressed support for Zelensky's plan on October 16, and Zelensky noted that he will present the plan to the European Council on October 17. Full report: https://lnkd.in/gY5yAsEw Additional Key Takeaways: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin's current theory of victory in Ukraine seeks to protract the war and posits that Russian forces can outlast Western support for Ukraine and collapse Ukrainian resistance by winning a war of attrition. Russia will likely face serious medium- and long-term constraints that will undermine this strategic effort, however. Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin notably questioned the Kremlin's articulated theory of victory and assessed that 2025 and possibly late 2024 will be “a serious test” for Russia because the Kremlin has yet to address medium- to long-term force-generation and defense-industrial-capacity constraints. Girkin also assessed that Russian Summer–Fall 2024 offensive campaign did not accomplish its goals in the entire theater and is unlikely to do so ahead of the muddy season, although Russian forces are continuing intense offensive operations in several operational directions in Ukraine. US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine worth $425 million following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on October 16. The South Korean Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 16 that it is "closely" monitoring indications that North Korean troops are directly supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine amid reports that the Russian military is training North Korean soldiers. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Kreminna, near Siversk, and near Toretsk.

Applications are open for our Spring 2025 Communications Internship. Our interns play a crucial role in promoting our research, tracking key internal metrics, and crafting compelling messaging across platforms. Applications are reviewed on a rolling basis, so apply now: https://lnkd.in/efGZvKiY

NEW: Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general framed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.” He also indicated that Hezbollah leadership remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem did not express faith in the plausibility of a negotiated settlement. Read the full report: https://lnkd.in/gT6fycWD Key Takeaways: Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general dismissed Israeli claims that Hezbollah fighters are failing to defend Lebanese territory, adding that the group intends to rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces when they enter Lebanese territory. This suggests that Hezbollah decided to avoid becoming decisively engaged in an area defense along the border. Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Elements of a brigade assigned to the 210th IDF Division entered Lebanon. There are now elements of five IDF divisions in Lebanon. Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: Senior Israeli officials guaranteed senior American officials that Israel will target Iranian military and defense sites instead of nuclear or oil facilities in its retaliatory strike on Iran. West Bank: A recent IDF investigation revealed the role that Hamas’ international and West Bank attack cells play in terrorist attacks targeting Israeli civilians.

NEW: The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible. Read the full report: https://lnkd.in/gZeMRDJc Key Takeaways: The Kremlin has elected to address the recent controversy regarding its reliance on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by offering financial incentives to any personnel involved in defending the state border. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law allowing Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stay in his position despite reaching retirement age (again) demonstrating Putin's continued preference for keeping curated loyalists from his inner circle in positions of power. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger heavily criticized Russian forces' reliance on the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord following Russia's recent ban of the platform.

Moldova stands to advance its path towards European integration in the upcoming October 2024 presidential election and referendum, but Moldova will likely remain a battleground state into the 2030s as Moldova's European Union (EU) membership negotiations continue. The possible reelection of pro-Western Moldovan President Maia Sandu and passing of the pro-EU referendum in October 2024 will not set Moldova's EU path in stone. Read the full report: https://lnkd.in/eRN97YvG The Kremlin has recently been trying to sabotage Moldova’s EU accession and destabilize Moldovan democracy and will continue these efforts in the coming decade. Support for EU membership is growing in Moldova, but the Kremlin is unlikely to cease its influence operations and may instead increase its efforts to reverse pro-EU trends in the coming decade. The Kremlin is likely prepared to pursue several lines of effort in the future to derail Moldova’s EU path, such as: 🔹 Attempting to influence and capture Moldovan state institutions 🔹 Exploiting the Kremlin's military, economic, and political ties to the pro-Russian Moldovan regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia 🔹 Conducting reflexive control campaigns to shape EU member states' decision-making regarding Moldova's EU accession The threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova through Ukraine is currently extremely low, but the current conditions may change in the future, allowing Russia to invade and occupy more of Moldova than what it currently does in Transnistria. Moldova's future as an independent and sovereign state is directly tied to the outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine and affects NATO's planning for the defense of its eastern flank. Western aid to both Ukraine and Moldova is vital to these states' abilities to resist Russian malign influence and aggression and keep Russian forces from threatening NATO.

NEW: Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon. Read More: https://lnkd.in/eNskXTqc Other Key Takeaways: Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023. Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11. An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim. Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran.