International Institute for Strategic Studies

China has increasingly employed legal means to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and legitimise its territorial claims over the island. In the last year, China’s efforts to distort the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and conflate the one-China policy and one-China principle have attracted much attention. However, an examination of legal initiatives being implemented within China reveals that a significant number of CCP actors are engaged in less-discussed initiatives that attempt to further cross-Strait integration and could provide legal justification for future actions against Taiwan. Xi Jinping’s attempt to create a ‘common market’ across the Taiwan Strait has empowered local party committees working within the constraints of top-down directives to both devise and implement specific policies. Their implementation is often coordinated by local Taiwan Affairs Offices in conjunction with several national and local state administrative bodies. ➡ Download the latest Charting China infographic: https://lnkd.in/eF-7t6eq ➡ Learn more with in-depth analysis: https://lnkd.in/eFGu3kza ➡ Explore more Charting China infographics on China’s lawfare against Taiwan: https://lnkd.in/ejRJVCcD

On paper, NATO members still have a 2:1 advantage over Russia in 152mm and 155mm self-propelled artillery pieces. However, without the inventories of Greece, Turkiye and the US, NATO members are left with a 3:2 advantage in Russia’s favor. Find the full analysis here: https://lnkd.in/eY_T_MmX

Hosted by IISS Japan Chair, Robert Ward, our distinguished panel of experts, Professor Sahashi Ryo, Dr Alexandra Sakaki and Francesca Ghiretti shared their thoughts on Japan’s economic security and sensitive technology policies during yesterday's discussion at Japan House London. If you missed the proceedings, you can catch up on the recording here. https://lnkd.in/esaxCAfP

'The problems in Vietnam were not really the result of combat preferences. The real issue was the lack of an intelligible grand strategy during the period of its major combat operations, in the years between the Cuban Missile Crisis and detente. The fact that grand strategy was in flux made it impossible to settle on a definition of victory. While the main objective was the preservation of an independent non-communist South Vietnam, there was no consensus about how to know when Saigon could stand on its own. Or, more precisely, there was no agreement about the consequences of Saigon’s possible collapse. There was also no consensus on how to apply enough US force to compel North Vietnam to negotiate, while simultaneously weaning South Vietnam off the US security guarantee. Without a clear idea of US grand strategy, policymakers could not settle on the value of the object in the war.' Read the latest Adelphi’s Introduction by Joshua Rovner and find out more: https://lnkd.in/efhbdWFs

China’s rapid naval advance saw it pass the milestone in 2024 of achieving more than 50% of the US Navy’s firepower in vertical launch system missile cells on its surface ships, with the gap still closing. Read the latest analysis: https://lnkd.in/eke8tP8k

The human impact and intensity of conflicts continue to rise in most regions of the world. Our timely analysis offers a clear breakdown by region. 📖 Interested in learning more? Uncover the stories behind the statistics in The Armed Conflict Survey 2024. Explore the various in-depth Regional Analysis and Regional Spotlight chapters, as well as detailed Country Profiles. 👉 Dive into the Editor’s Introduction for the latest findings here: https://lnkd.in/eyMqMZDR  

Lawfare is part of the PLA’s ‘Three Warfares’ strategy and is understood as shaping the legal context, building justification for future actions against Taiwan and using domestic laws to signal future intentions. China has recently employed several types of legal initiatives against Taiwan. This map details the use of these initiatives, which could be employed to legitimate a variety of future Taiwan scenarios, ranging from cross-Strait integration to military action.     These different measures seek to achieve the following objectives:     ◻ Intimidate and coerce Taiwanese society  ◻ Erode Taiwan’s territorial claims and sovereignty  ◻ Isolate Taiwan diplomatically  ◻ Build legal justifications to legitimate future action against Taiwan  ◻ Promote further cross-Strait integration to keep open the option for reunification without military action, whilst also establishing common standards and laws that bolster the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a domestic issue     Click here to download the full map: https://lnkd.in/ejRJVCcD Click here to view more infographics on China’s legal warfare against Taiwan: https://lnkd.in/e_h8_aUb

While European and Asian defence spending were at similar levels in 2010, the European share of global spending remained relatively constant around 18%, while the Asian share increased from 17% to 25%. Find the full analysis here: https://lnkd.in/eY_T_MmX

🌐 Online event  📅 Tuesday 28 January ⏰ 13:30-14:45 EST | 18:30-19:45 GMT | 19:30-20:45 CET | 14:30-15:45 AST ▶️ Join the discussion here. https://lnkd.in/eKU_z4Tk  

Turkiye’s defence industry has enjoyed a growth in exports to European countries over the last five years. So far, most of these sales have been to customers in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, where broader diplomatic relations with Ankara are viewed more through a lens of regional security, and Turkiye is also seen as a potential defence-industrial partner. This contrasts with other parts of the continent where countries might have their own defence-industrial capability in specific areas, pre-existing close partnerships with other countries, or prioritise other factors in their relationship with Turkiye, such as objections to elements of Turkish foreign policy. As with Turkish exports globally, this greater success with European customers began to materialise from 2019 onwards and the sale of armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) make up a substantial element of this. The previous year, Turkiye secured its first armed UAV export order with Qatar’s selection of Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2, which was followed in 2019 with a contract with Ukraine for the same system. To date, Baykar has signed contracts with five other European countries (Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Poland and Romania) and is negotiating with others. Read the latest analysis by Tom Waldwyn and find out more: https://lnkd.in/eKFuqGnx